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ABSTRACT
DECISION MAKING UNDER SUNK COST
Gregory Kenneth Laing

This dissertation investigates whether trained professionals can be adversely influenc
by sunk cost information when making financial decisions. The rational decisionmaking model posits that sunk costs are irrelevant to choices between alternative
courses of action. However, a review of the literature reveals that, contrary to the
assumptions of normative theory, people do not always act in a rational manner when
making financial decisions. Moreover, sunk costs are taken into consideration and
induce economically irrational behaviour, such as committing more funds to doomed
projects which can be described as "throwing good m o n e y after bad". Such theoretically
irrational behaviour is the subject of behavioural (positive) theories of decision making
developed in psychology. Research in cognitive psychology has recognised that people
often use heuristics to simplify a decision task.
To test the predicted decision outcomes of expected utility theory a model was
developed based on prospect theory and image theory. In the context of prospect theory,
sunk cost and framing of the decision task were manipulated. Image theory was tested
by inclusion of problem space items and image compatibility questions. The model
provided a suitable conceptual framework for empirically testing the "sunk cost effect".
Testing for the existence of the sunk cost effect was focused on the decision behaviour
of particular professional groups and evidence was gathered using survey instruments
adapted from previous research. The professions surveyed were managers, accountants
and financial planners. A hypothetical outsourcing task was the basis of the survey of
managers and accountants. A hypothetical investment task was used to survey the
financial planners and was also included in the survey of the accountants.
The results of the investment task are consistent with image theory, the level of
responsibility was found to be positively correlated with a higher level of funding. In
the investment task the perceived level of responsibility for making the initial decision
was found to be a contributing factor to escalation of commitment. A n unexpected
result was that both the low and high image compatibility were found to be significant
predictors of the level of additional funding in the investment task. However, the
statistical significance of the high image compatibility was smaller compared to that of
low image compatibility. The sunk cost effect was found to be significant in both the
outsourcing task and in the negative framed version of the investment task. The sunk
cost effect was not statistically significant in the positive framed version of the
investment task. A n unexpected result was that framing produced risk behaviour that
was contradictory to the prediction of prospect theory. Negative framing, which should
have produced risk-taking behaviour resulted in risk-avoidance behaviour and positive
framing which should have produced risk-avoidance behaviour resulted in risk-taking
behaviour. The sunk cost effect was found to be nearly ubiquitous in the three
professional groups. This effect was observed across a range of tasks. The strength of
the effect depended on the relative magnitude of the sunk cost and other contextual
factors allowed for in the survey instruments, but remained constant regardless of these
influences to an observable degree.
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Chapter 1 ... Introduction to the Research

CHAPTER 1
Introduction to the Research
Chapter Introduction
A major source of non-rational behaviour, of concern to management accountants, is the
treatment of sunk costs in decision making. This dissertation argues that a specific form
of non-rational behaviour - sunk cost effect - cannot be explained within the normative
theory of rational decision making. Cognitive theories from the behavioural sciences are
used to investigate such behaviour observed to occur with financial professionals in
Australia.

This chapter commences by examining the theory of rational decision behaviour and the
failure of the normative model to address non-rational behaviour. T o account for
observed violations of the normative model, two cognitive theories— prospect theory
and image theory— are introduced and discussed. The non-rational behaviour, referred
to as the "sunk cost effect", occurs when sunk cost information is regarded as relevant
when it should be disregarded. The sunk cost effect is outlined thus leading to the
statement of the objective of the study. Definitions of terminology of particular
importance in the dissertation are provided and the boundaries of the research problem
are discussed. The specifics of the research design and methods employed in the
dissertation are reviewed. Finally, the assumptions and limitations are discussed and the
organisation of the dissertation is presented.

Background to the Research
Research has revealed that sunk cost is a cause of error in decision making that can
result in excessive costs to business and society. For example, the decision to continue
with the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant project that c o m m e n c e d with an original cost
estimate of $75 million (US) was mistakenly escalated. The project took 23 years to
complete, only to be closed before becoming fully operational due to safety issues and
technological obsolescence. B y the time of closure the cost had blown out to $5 billion
(US) (Ross and Staw, 1993). Other examples of the sunk cost effect have been
documented as occurring in decisions regarding information technology projects (Keil,
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1995; D r u m m o n d , 1998) and real estate development projects (Cornell, Longstaff &
Schwartz, 1996). However, the sunk cost effect is not just a major problem in business
decision making the effect can and does arise in real life influencing every-day
decisions (Drummond, 1994). Seemingly simple decisions such as waiting for an
inordinately long time for a bus to take you someplace where you could just as easily
have walked (Brockner, 1992) or situations where you are waiting in a queue at a
supermarket.

The inclusion of sunk cost information in decision making is a major source of nonrational behaviour of concern to management accountants. The normative assumptions
of management accounting consider information regarding sunk cost as immaterial to
the decision-making process. This type of non-rational behaviour— referred to as the
"sunk cost effect"— arises w h e n sunk cost information is regarded when it should be
disregarded as irrelevant. Implicit in the normative view of rational decision making is
the concept that once an asset is irrevocably committed and cannot be changed, or a
contract is irrevocably committed and cannot be changed, then the cost of that asset or
contract is sunk (Mas-Colell, Whinston & Green, 1995, 131).

This dissertation is concerned with the effect that sunk cost information has on the
behaviour of those engaged in financial decision making. Once a cost is sunk, it
becomes irrelevant to any decisions pertaining to the present or future (Horngren, Foster
& Datar, 2000, 379). Therefore, financial decision makers are prohibited from regarding
or taking into consideration any sunk cost information in the decision-making process.
The aim of the research was to investigate the conditions under which sunk cost
information is likely to be included in the decision-making process.
The Theory of Rational Behaviour
The normative theory of rational decision making posits that individuals seek to
optimise or maximize utility and that rational behaviour can be characterised as a
decision process that can be modelled (Schwartz, 1998, 39). The rational decisionmaking model sets d o w n a sequence of steps to be followed in evaluating alternative
courses of action (Parayre, 1995). The assumptions implicit in rational behaviour follow
from value judgments allowing for human preferences (Whynes, 1983, 198):
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The entire framework of economics... of whatever paradigm or in whatever
application... rests on a fundamental premise, namely that people behave rationally'. By
"rationally", I mean simply that before selecting a course of action individuals will
consider the expected benefits and costs of each alternative and they will then select
that course of action which generates the highest expected net benefit.

The basic unit of all human preference is expressed in terms of "expected utility" wh
expresses the ultimate goal of the individual's behaviour as governed by profit
maximization (Zey, 1992, 18). However, a number of violations of the goal of profit
maximisation are documented in the literature (Allais, 1953; Myers, Suyddam &
Gambino, 1965; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Wiseman & Levin, 1996). The rational
decision model is also criticised for being insensitive to the cognitive limitations
possessed by individuals (Simon, 1979). The inclusion of sunk cost information leads to
decision outcomes that do not maximize profit. Therefore, this decision-making
behaviour is not rational in the sense that the decision outcome is contrary to normative
assumptions of utility maximization (Ellsberg, 1961).

Failure to Address Non-Rational Outcomes
A n early attempt by Edwards (1954) to incorporate the behavioural aspects of decision
making was modelled as if decisions always followed normative, rational, decision
rules. This approach to the behaviour of decision-making processes virtually ignore the
psychological side of the individual decision maker. If the phenomenon being observed
is related to the psychological or cognitive processes of the individual, w h y then are the
theoretical models most commonly based on economic or mathematical formulas? The
most explicit answer is provided by Northcraft and Wolf (1984). They argue that in
cases where it is economically advisable to allocate additional resources (in spite of
negative feedback), any psychological causal mechanism is superfluous because a
simple economic explanation is equally predictive and more parsimonious. B o w e n
(1987, 56) concluded that this explanation was satisfactory justification for continued
research based on economic models.

The evaluation process upon which judgements are made reflects the preferences of the
individual involved. Intuition, flair and judgement are part of the conceptual skills
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exercised by professionals when they make choices based on their substantive
knowledge concerning the subject matter of their expertise (Bonner, 1994). Individuals
give meaning to information and the ability to make decisions is therefore a function of
both the individual and the task (Awasthi & Pratt, 1990; Shapira, 1995). Research
suggests that this intuitive choice process is no longer adequate (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979; Loomes & Sugden, 1982; Staw & Ross, 1987; Pablo, 1997). Researchers have
repeatedly demonstrated empirically that human judgement and decision-making
behaviour does not always follow the assumptions of the normative theories (Allais,
1953; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and continue to empirically demonstrate nonrational decision making of including cost information that should have been ignored
(Thaler, 1980; Staw, 1981; Arkes & Blumer, 1985).

Prospect Theory and Decision Behaviour
Unlike economic theory, which is based on normative preference axioms, prospect
theory takes an inductive/deductive approach to examining risky choice; that is choice
where there is a great degree of uncertainty (Laibson & Zeckhauser, 1998). Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) introduced prospect theory in response to the shortcomings of
research into decision making based on expected utility theory. Further research
demonstrated that decisions are affected by h o w outcomes are framed (whether the
wording is positive or negative) (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Fagley & Miller, 1987;
Miller & Fagley, 1991; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, 1992). The study of framing
effects in the context of decision making was confirmation of the adage, "...it's not just
what you say, but how you say it" (Blount & Larrick, 2000).

Prospect theory assumes that choices are evaluated in a two-step process: an initia
phase of editing and a subsequent phase of evaluation. In the editing phase, the choice
outcomes are coded as gains or losses relative to some reference point— which is
usually the current asset position, but m a y be influenced by the presentation of a choice
or by expectations of the decision maker (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Tversky and
Kahneman (1981) and Kahneman and Tversky (1984) also introduced the concept of
mental accounting as a type of decision framing in which individuals form
psychological accounts of the advantages and disadvantages of an event or choice. Data
considered irrelevant to the decision is relegated to a separate mental account. The
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concept of mental accounting was used to describe the propensity to sell winners too
early and retain losers too long when dealing with investments in securities (Shefrin &
Statman, 1985) and as a starting point for a model of consumer behaviour (Thaler, 1980;
1985).

Based on the evidence this dissertation argues that non-rational behaviour that violate
the axioms of rational decision making can be observed in accounting and financial
professionals making financial decisions when sunk cost information is provided,
despite their training in the normative decision model.

Statement of the Research Problem
Prior research in financial decision making focuses primarily on the decision-making
processes that conform or break with expected utility theory and are presumed to
determine an optimal allocation of resources. The primary focus of past research was to
test the impact of variables such as framing, reference point selection, weighting of
alternatives, and mental accounting approaches with little or no attention to the potential
of cognitive or personality variables which might moderate the decision-making
process. Further, while reference was m a d e to accounting (as in the topic of mental
accounting), little attention was paid to the variety of accounting choices or models that
could be employed in analysing financial information and determining the decision
outcome.

The "Problem" of Sunk Cost
The term "sunk cost" has a long history dating back to early analysis of costing in the
economics literature (Taussig, 1891; Brown, 1916; Clark, 1923). The definition of sunk
cost varies slightly across the economic, finance and accounting disciplines. However,
the basic tenet of sunk cost information's irrelevance to the decision process remains
constant. The following definitions provide evidence of this consistency:
Microeconomics- A sunk cost is an expenditure that has already been made and cannot
be recovered (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2001, 205).
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Finance- A sunk cost refers to an outlay that has already occurred (or been committed),

so it is an outlay that is not affected by the accept/reject decision under considerati
(Brigham & Gapenski, 1993, 263).

Management Accounting- Past costs that are unavoidable and irrelevant because they
cannot be changed no matter what action is taken [are sunk costs] (Horngren, Foster &
Datar, 2000, 379).
The common theme is that past costs cannot be avoided and are irrelevant to decision
making because they cannot be changed. In other words, sunk costs are irrelevant
because they do not contain information about the future effects of the decision.
Another view is that sunk costs are irrevocably committed and thus irreversible (at least
in the short-term) and are not relevant to the economic consideration of alternative
courses of action (Terry & Ford, 1984; McEachern, 1997; Frank & Glass, 2000).

Financial decision making primarily evolved from microeconomic models that treat
sunk cost information as irrelevant to decision making. Stermole (1982, 294) provided
the most comprehensive explanation for excluding sunk costs from economic and
financial considerations:

In general sunk costs are past costs that nothing we do now or in the future can affect
Costs that are relative to evaluations in general are future costs that have not been

made. Evaluations should be made to determine ifproposed costs should be incurred or

not, and if they are incurred, to determine what economic gains will be realised that
would not be realised if we do nothing.

Sunk Cost and Rational Behaviour
T h e argument for the exclusion of sunk cost information is part of the normative view
of rational behaviour that prescribes a "rational" approach to economic and financial
decision making. T o illustrate a decision involving sunk cost information, a special
order task is presented as Example 1.1 (Horngren, Foster & Datar, 1994,415). T h e
technique used to determine the optimal outcome is in accordance with economic theory
and depends on the decision maker identifying the relevant information (future costs
that vary between alternatives) and disregarding irrelevant information (sunk costs).
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Example

1.1 Special Order

W o o d y Company, which manufactures slippers, has enough idle capacity available to
accept a one-time-only special order of 20,000 pairs of slippers at $6 a pair. The normal
selling price is $10 a pair. Variable manufacturing costs are $4.50 a pair and fixed
manufacturing costs are $1.50 a pair. W o o d y will not incur any marketing costs as a
result of the special order. W h a t is the effect on operating income if the special order
could be accepted without affecting normal sales?

Solution:

Sales
Variable Costs
Contribution margin
Fixed costs
Operating Income

A H costs
Per pair
* $6.00
$4.50
$1.50
$1.50
-

Relevant costs
Per pair
$6.00
$4.50
$1.50
$1.50

Total
$120,000
90,000
30,000
$ 30,000

Comments:

The relevant costs are the expected future costs that differ between the alternatives— in
this c a s e — the variable manufacturing costs of $4.50 per pair. The fixed manufacturing
costs (including the marketing costs) are irrelevant, as they will not change whether or not
the special order is accepted. Accepting the order will not increase fixed costs, for
example, the costs of set-up and production scheduling, because there is surplus capacity
of those resources. Therefore the only relevant items for consideration are sales revenue
and variable manufacturing costs.

Acceptance of the special order will contribute $1.50 per pair or a total of $30,000 to the
operating income of the company.

This example emphasises the appropriate treatment of sunk cost information in
determining the relevant information upon which to base a decision. This example from
a m a n a g e m e n t accounting text is consistent with the normative economic and financial
theories that sunk costs should be treated as irrelevant to the decision at hand.
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Justification of the Research

Boundaries of the Research Problem
A central assumption of training for financial decision makers is that all decision
outcomes must maximize utility to the individual. The argument for this belief is
derived from neo-classical microeconomic theory of the rational decision maker. In this
framework, all people are held to be rational; the optimal financial decision is to either
maximize profit or minimize cost. This normative framework is woven into the
approaches to financial decision making in management accounting as well as finance.
However, the extant behavioural psychology literature identified a phenomenon of
decision making, which violates the normative assumptions, namely the sunk cost
effect. Parayre (1991, 23) defined the sunk cost effect as "the tendency to persist with a
committed course of action beyond what economic rationality, based on marginal costs
and benefits, would dictate." This sunk cost effect manifests in cases involving
sequential decisions and results in a tendency to escalate commitment to a course of
action that will not maximize profits or minimize costs.

Prior research established that considerable variation exists in the degree to which
decision makers actively review, analyse and then use the information to which they
have been exposed (Langer, 1989b; Isen, 1984; Wofford & Goodwin, 1990; Wright &
Bower, 1992). Dunegan, Duchon and A s h m o s (1995) argued that establishing a better
understanding of variability in information use contributes to more accurate decision
modelling and improved theory development. This dissertation contributes to the body
of knowledge in the field of behavioural management accounting literature by
advancing the knowledge of the specific variables influencing the financial decision
maker to include sunk cost information and provides a pathway for further behavioural
research in the field of management accounting. In addition, the study represents an area
of research in decision making that has received little attention in the field of
management accounting.

Three surveys provided the empirical evidence to investigate the sunk cost effect. The
first survey was conducted on managers from public and private hospitals within
Australia. T h e health care sector plays an important role in the Australian economy. For
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the financial period 2000-2001, the Commonwealth Government funding provided
under the Australian Health Care Agreements was $6.3b ( A B S , 2002). Initiatives by the
State and Federal Governments to corporatise the public sector impact on the
administration and managerial decision processes of public hospitals throughout
Australia (Harris, 1999; Chua, 1995) with an emphasis on cost reduction.

Research findings indicate that outsourcing as a type of cost reduction is growing
rapidly in the health care sector with research primarily based on the United States of
America (Hensley, 1997; Chin, 1997);. Given the economic importance of the sector in
the Australian economy, the inclusion of hospitals in this research was considered to
contribute to the understanding of financial decision making within the sphere of the
managerial change that has occurred. The research also provided a basis to compare
financial decision making in public and private hospitals.

The second survey was conducted using financial planners in Queensland, Australia.
Financial planners were selected on the basis that they provide expert analysis of
financial information upon which investment decisions are based and are expected to be
less subject to cognitive biases due to their training. In addition, the investment
advising/financial-planning sector plays an important role in the Australian economy.
Research into the decision-making processes of financial planners has been minimal.
Researching the decision making of financial planners was considered to provide a basis
to compare their decision outcomes with the decision outcomes of accounting
professionals.

The third survey was conducted using accounting professionals in Queensland,
Australia. Accountants were selected as subjects for the study because they perform
management roles in various businesses and also provide expert analysis of financial
information. Most research into decision making by professional accountants is
concerned with auditing procedures and financial statement preparation. This research
places a greater emphasis on management accounting topics and the impact of prior
knowledge through training in the application of the relevant cost model in decision
making.
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Objectives of the Study
Prior literature confirmed the existence of the "sunk cost effect" or "sunk cost
phenomenon" where sunk cost information was demonstrated to influence the outcome
of the decision process. T h e extant research examined this phenomenon in various
settings, most c o m m o n l y in laboratory and experimental settings. A noticeable
limitation was the lack of testing on professional target populations w h o have "real
world" experience in the tasks. T o broaden the research focus, this dissertation
examined the effect of the sunk cost phenomenon on three professional target
populations: hospital managers, accountants and financial planners using the survey
method. At the centre of this investigation was the measurement of the degree to which
professional financial decision makers empirically exhibited similar levels of
susceptibility to the sunk cost effect. This is of importance because trained professionals
are expected to be less susceptible to the sunk cost phenomenon due to their explicit
education and experience.

All three surveys answered one central research question:
Are trained professionals adversely influenced by sunk cost when making
financial decisions ?

Definitions

The following is a list of definitions, which relate to terms used in this thesis. The l
presented in alphabetical order.

Cost - Cost is a central theme in economic reasoning; much accounting theory was develop
to "account" for costs (Pieters, 1989, 442). Buchanan (1969, 7) argued that the basic meaning of
the word "cost" was pain or sacrifice. Asking a person "how much did that cost? " is analogous
to asking "how much did you have to sacrifice or how much pain did you have to bear to gain
that item?" (Pieters, 1989, 442).

Expected Utility Theory - Expected utility theory is a normative model of risky decision
behavior based on the idea that people maximize expected utility in selecting among gambles
(Wright, 1985,4).
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F r a m i n g - The presentation of information in different, but objectively equivalent,
descriptions of the same problem (Levin, Schneider & Gaeth, 1998, 150).

Gambles - Economic decisions made under uncertainty are defined as gambles (Frank, 1998,
191).

Mental accounting - A type of decision framing in which individuals are hypothesised to
form psychological accounts of the advantages and disadvantages of an event or choice
(Henderson & Peterson, 1992).

Opportunity cost -The contribution to income that is foregone (rejected) by not using a
limited resource in its next-best alternative use (Horngren, Foster & Datar, 2000, 388).
Probability - The long-term relative frequency of particular outcomes— for example, the
outcome of a toss of a coin (Freedman et al., 1991, 208). A probability is a number between
zero and one that measures the chance of some possible event occurring (McTaggart, Findlay &
Parkin, 1996, 402).

Prospect - A prospect is a course of action that yields a particular outcome (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979, 263). Alternative courses of action are referred to as choices or prospects within
the economic literature (Elliott & Archibald, 1989, 321). Decision making under risk implies a
choice between prospects or gambles.

Prospect Theory - Prospect theory is a descriptive model that modifies expected utility
theory in order to accommodate human decision behaviour that violates expected utility theory
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
Rational Behaviour -Rational behaviour may be characterised as making choices consistent
with maximizing the expectation of some utility index (Hagen, 1985) where the utility function
obeys certain axioms of preference (Arlington and Puxty, 1991).

Reference Point - In prospect theory, the reference point is deemed to represent the status
or h o w things are presently (Kuhberger, Schulte-Meclenbeck & Perner, 1999, 206). The
reference point is used to determine whether a given outcome is evaluated as a gain or loss
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, 456).
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Risk - Risk is uncertainty with probabilities attached to each possible outcome (McTaggart,
Findlay & Parkin, 1996, 402). However, definitions of risk m a y range from an emphasis on
threat of personal harm in the medical and hazard disciplines to an emphasis on possible
opportunities with varying levels of potential success as found in the economic and business
disciplines (Yates & Stone, 1992). A situation involving risk m a y be described as being
analogous with the flipping of a fair coin (Shapira, 1995, 4).

Risky choice - A risky choice may be characterised as a situation in which the decision ma
is not sure which outcome will occur (Shapira, 1995, 4) and implies that "one can either gain or
lose by selecting a particular alternative" (Shapira, 1995, 43). Choice situations with genuinely
incomplete information m a y be characterised as "risky choices" (Elster, 1986, 5).

Subjective Expected Utility Theory - Subjective expected utility theory is a normative
model of risky decision behavior where a subjective probability function is used in conjunction
with a utility function to represent risky preferences (Payne, 1985, 3).

Sunk cost- Past costs that are unavoidable and irrelevant because they cannot be changed n
matter what action is taken (Horngren, Foster & Datar, 2000, 379).

Uncertainty - Uncertainty is a state in which more than one event may occur, but no one ca
predict which event will occur. T o describe uncertainty, the concepts of probability and risk are
commonly used (McTaggart, Findlay & Parkin, 1996, 402).

Research Design and Methods
The next three sub-sections discuss aspects of the research design and methods
employed in this dissertation.

Behavioural Model and Theories
T h e rational decision making model assumes that individuals thoroughly process all
relevant information in order to choose the optimal course of action (Lord & Maher,
1990). H o w e v e r , previous research showed that certain characteristics of information,
such as sunk cost and framing, might lead an individual to m a k e sub-optimal decisions.
This research study employed three separate surveys to examine aspects of the same
p h e n o m e n o n using subjects derived from different professional groups. T h e choice of a
multiple-survey approach w a s based on the literature— which suggested that the nature
Page
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of decision making involving sunk cost information might be better examined from a
triangulation of findings— and that the focus of research should be on tasks c o m m o n to
the subject groups.

The thesis was structured so that an information-processing model derived from Libby
and Lewis (1977; 1982) provided the basis for testing constructs from combined
theoretical models reported in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. The model assumes
that w h e n an individual is confronted with a choice— the input is the relevant
information set or data which is combined or processed by the individual to determine a
choice from a m o n g the alternative courses of action (Libby & Lewis, 1977). The model
focuses on the ability of decision makers to use the information presented. In this
regard, the model was consistent with the objective of this dissertation. This objective
was to test the ability of decision makers to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant
information (the sunk cost effect) as well as measure the influence of the manipulation
of information (the framing effect) on the decision outcomes.

The basic model is represented in Figure 1.1. The model applied to the survey results
was a means for testing the use of information— manipulated through the inclusion of
sunk cost information and framing— with the interplay of various intervening and
moderating variables on the decision outcome. Peters (1993, 385) suggested that a
strategy of combining models and theories would strengthen the understanding of
accounting decision making. This research was designed to test the combination of
decision theories (prospect theory and image theory) within a simple information
processing model as suggested by Peters (1993).
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Figure 1.1
Theoretical Research M o d e l
(Decision Theories)
Prospect

Theory
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Normative
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- Positive
- Negative
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- Image Computability

Decision Behaviour
- Rational Choice
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(Information Processing Model)

Input

Process

Information Set

Output
Decision Outcome

This information processing model when overlaid with prospect theory, image theory
and expected utility theory provided an integrated perspective of the role of the key
constructs from each of the theories. Figure 1.1 demonstrates the relationship between
the input or information set (which in prospect theory is the problem frame and
reference point) and the process (which in prospect theory is theriskpropensity and in
image theory is theriskperception) and the output or decision outcome (in expected
utility theory this is the optimal choice).
Multiple Survey Design
In the first survey, the instrument consisted of an outsourcing decision set within the
context of the hospital sector. The information concerning the task was manipulated to
produce six different versions of the instrument. The manipulations were of details
regarding sunk cost, opportunity cost and asset specificity. The details of the different
versions are presented in Table 1.1. The task was based on the research of Roodhooft
and Warlop (1999), modified to suit the Australian environment and accommodate
improvements suggested in the literature.

Page

14

Chapter 1 ... Introduction to the Research

Table 1.1
S u m m a r y of Survey Details Outsourcing
(Public hospitals N = 128; Private hospitals N = 89)
Version

Make option

Outsource (buy) option

A

Production cost: $3,000,000

B

Production cost: $3,000,000

C

Production cost: $3,000,000
Sunk investment: $1,400,000
Production cost: $3,000,000
Sunk investment: $1,400,000
Production cost: $3,000,000
Sunk investment: $500,000
Production cost: $3,000,000
Sunk investment: $500,000

Purchase price: $2,600,000
Investment (not asset specific): $300,000
Purchase price: $2,600,000
Asset specific investment: $300,000
Purchase price: $2,600,000
Investment (not asset specific): $300,000
Purchase price: $2,600,000
Asset specific investment: $300,000
Purchase price: $2,000,000
Investment (not asset specific): $300,000
Purchase price: $2,000,000
Asset specific investment: $300,000

D
E
F

The second survey used an instrument that consisted of an investment decision set in a
context consistent with an investment appraisal. The information concerning the task
was manipulated to produce three different versions of the survey instrument. The
different versions in this survey were directed to testing the sunk cost effect, the framing
effect, the perceptions of problem space and image compatibility.

The first two versions had the same amount of sunk cost. However, one version
consisted of a positive frame and the other a negative frame. These two versions were
designed to test the framing effect. The remaining version had the same negative frame;
however, the amount of the sunk cost was less. This version was designed to test the
sunk cost effect. In addition to the framing and sunk cost manipulations there were
standard questions which addressed cognitive perceptions of problem space and image
compatibility in all three versions. The three versions are summarised in Table 1.2. The
task was based on research reported by Dunegan (1993) and Dunegan, Duchon and
A s h m o s (1995) with modifications as suggested by the literature and to be consistent
with the Australian setting.
Table 1.2
S u m m a r y of Survey Details Pertaining to Investment
(Financial Planners N = 8 6 )
Version
1 (n=31)
2 (n=33)
3(n=22)

Wording
High Sunk Cost ($400,000)
High Sunk Cost ($400,000)
L o w Sunk Cost ($100,000)

Framing
Negative
Positive
Negative
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The third survey instrument consisted of two tasks— an outsourcing task and an
investment decision task, each of which was set in a context consistent with the
accounting profession and the Australian setting. The information concerning the
outsourcing task was manipulated to produce four different versions of the survey
instrument, which are summarised in Table 1.3.

Table 1.3
S u m m a r y of Task 1 Details pertaining to Outsourcing
(Accountants N = 237)
Version

Make option

Outsource (buy) option

A

Production cost: $ 133,000
Sunk investment: $ 30,000

B

Production cost: $ 133,000
Sunk investment: $ 30,000

C

Production cost: $ 133,000
Sunk investment: Nil

D

Production cost: $ 133,000
Sunk investment: Nil

Purchase price: $ 134,000
Opportunity Costs:
$ 1,900 Rent saving p.a.
$10,000 Revenue from sale of asset
(one off framed as $10,000 revenue on disposal)
Purchase price: $ 134,000
Opportunity Costs:
$ 1,900 Rent saving p.a.
$10,000 Revenue from sale of asset
(one off framed as $20,000 loss on disposal)
Purchase price: $ 134,000
Opportunity Costs:
$ 1,900 Rent saving p.a.
Purchase price: $ 134,000
Opportunity Costs:
$ 1,900 Rent saving p.a.
Asset Specificity:
$ 500 pay slip machine.

The first task was based on an outsourcing decision (Roodhooft & Warlop, 1999) with
framing effects (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and self-evaluation questions (Northcraft
& Neale, 1986; Duchon, Dunegan & Barton, 1989). Additional information introduced
asset specificity and an opportunity cost. The second task consisted of an investment
decision set in a context consistent with an investment appraisal. The information
concerning the task was manipulated to produce three different versions of the survey
instrument. The differences in this survey were directed to testing the sunk cost effect,
the framing effect, and perceptions of problem space as well as image compatibility.

To test the relevance of the sunk cost and the framing effect, all reference to the s
cost was deleted in the third and fourth versions of this task. In the fourth version, an
investment was required for equipment to process the pay slips. The amount of $500
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was not enough to change the overall financial benefit in favour of outsourcing. This
asset, however, could not be used by the firm nor by any other payroll provider and had
no resale value. Thus, the investment was asset specific to the outsourcing option. Four
versions of task one were presented to subjects. The versions were distinguished
according to (1) the existence of a positive frame, (2) the existence of a negative frame,
(3) the absence of a sunk cost and no frame, and (4) the absence of a sunk cost, no
frame and additional asset. The second task was based on research by Dunegan (1993).
The differences between versions are summarised in Table 1.4.
Table 1.4
S u m m a r y of Task 2 Details Pertaining to Investment
(Accountants N=237)
Version

Wording

Framing

XI (n=51)

Minimal

X 2 (n=32)

Expanded

Yl (n=41)

Minimal

Negative

Y 2 (n=45)

Expanded

Negative

Zl(n=35)

Expanded & Reduced sunk cost

Positive

Z2 (n=33)

Expanded & Reduced sunk cost

Negative

Positive
' Positive

Variables
D u e to the nature of the multiple survey approach, more specific details of the variables
are discussed in the relevant chapters. However, a general summary of the
characteristics of the types of variables follows.
Independent variables
A n independent variable is the phenomenon or characteristic hypothesised to affect the
dependent variable (Sproull, 1995, 30). The main independent variable in each of the
surveys is sunk cost information. Sunk cost information was manipulated in three
different ways: high sunk cost, low sunk cost and no sunk cost. The other independent
variable is the framing of the task. Framing was also manipulated in three different
ways: a positive frame, a negative frame, and a neutral frame.
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Moderator variables
Moderator variables are a type of independent variable which are hypothesised to
modify the relationship between the independent and dependent variables (Sproull,
1995, 31). Moderating variables identified in this research are the age of the subject and
perceived image compatibility.
Control variables
Control variables are variables that m a y affect the relationship between the independent
and dependent variables (Sproull, 1995, 32). T h e effect of the control variable m a y be
cancelled out by eliminating the variable, holding it constant or using statistical
methods. A n example of a control variable used in this research is gender.
Dependent variables
The dependent variable is the phenomenon or characteristic hypothesised to be the
outcome of some other variable, which is usually the independent variable (Sproull,
1995, 29). The dependent variable in this research is the decision outcome.

It should be noted that some of the variables measured in this research had different
operational definitions in the three different survey studies.
Statistical Methods Employed
The following is an outline of the statistical methods used to analyse data and the
statistical software employed to perform the analysis in this dissertation.
Chi-square
The chi-square test is a statistical test for categorical (nominal) data. It is used to test
independence as well as goodness-of-fit (Vogt, 1999, 39). The chi-square test was used
to test for significant differences between the observed distribution of data a m o n g
categories and the expected distribution based upon the null hypothesis (Emory &
Cooper, 1991, 536).
Multiple Regression Analysis
Multiple regression analysis is considered to be the appropriate method of analysis
w h e n the research problem involves two or more metric (ordinal or interval data)
independent variables which are presumed to be related to a single metric (ordinal or
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interval data) dependent variable (Hair et al., 1998, 14). The objective of the analysis is
to predict the amount or magnitude of the change found in the dependent variable in
response to variation of the independent variables

ANOVA
Analysis of variance ( A N O V A ) is the statistical method (parametric test) for testing the
null hypothesis that the means of several populations are equal (Emory & Cooper, 1991,
536). O n e w a y analysis of variance uses a single factor, fixed effects model to compare
the effects of one factor on a continuous dependent variable.
Principal Component Factor Analysis
Factor analysis, including principal component analysis, is a statistical approach used to
analyse interrelationships among a large number of variables and was used to explain
these variables in terms of their c o m m o n underlying dimensions or factors (Hair et al.,
1998, 14).
SPSS Computer Software
S P S S (originally Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) is a comprehensive system
widely used for analysing data (Brace, K e m p & Snelgar, 2000, 12). Version 10.0 for
W i n d o w s was used to conduct the statistical analysis in this dissertation.

Assumptions and Limitations of the Research
There are a number of assumptions implicit in this dissertation. First, the predictive
capabilities of normative theory to explain real world decision behaviour were
considered to be limited. Second, prior research that found violations of the model of
rational decision behaviour were assumed to be valid arguments that normative theory is
limited in its application. Third, there was an assumption that the training of decision
makers might be at fault through the continuing support of normative unreality. Fourth,
an assumption was m a d e that, due to the nature of the professions and the consistency of
regulations across Australia, samples restricted to one state should be representative of
the wider population.
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There are also a number of limitations that constrained the research reported in this
thesis. First, the context in which the research was conducted was constrained by
differences between economic conditions in Australia compared to other countries as
well as differences in accounting regulations, management and administration
differences. Second, generalisability is limited because of the samples which were
chosen from one State (Queensland). Third, cost constraints and time constraints limited
the capacity to broaden the sample size and to incorporate other methods of data
gathering, such as interviews. Fourth, the surveys collected data that reflect a decision
m a d e at one point in time rather than a longitudinal or time series approach. This m a y
bias the perception of the importance of the task to the decision maker. However, to
address this matter, subjects were asked to indicate the level of perceived importance of
the task. T h e precise details are reported in the relevant chapters.

Organisation of the Study
This thesis is presented in eight chapters. Chapter 2 presents the normative theory of
rational decision making and provides the basis for determining the rules that constitute
rational decision behaviour.

Chapter 3 provides the behavioural theories underpinning approaches to examining
decision behaviour that deviates from the normative model. Chapter 3 also introduces
the variables and approaches devised in prior studies.

Chapter 4 is a discussion of the research methods employed. Issues of validity and
applicability of the direct mail survey approach are considered and the process as used
in the design and application are discussed. Three surveys were conducted on three
different sets of subjects derived from different populations, specifically hospital
managers, accountants and financial planners.

The analysis, interpretations and discussions in accordance with the hypotheses tested
for each of the three surveys are presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. A summary of the
findings and conclusions are presented in Chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 2
Normative Theories of Sunk Cost
Chapter Introduction
Normative theories concerning decision making overlap throughout economic theory,
finance, and management accounting literature. D u e to the overlapping nature of the
normative theories and their underlying assumptions, the treatment of sunk cost is
examined from the perspective of specific models of decision making proposed by
economic theory, finance, and management accounting. This chapter investigates the
similarities and differences in the normative approaches to the treatment of sunk cost
information within decision making across the business disciplines.

Chapter 2 is organised into six parts. The first part provides a background to the
normative theory of decision making and the rational decision-making model. T h e
second part addresses decision-making issues in economic theory including decision
making specific to expected utility theory with examples of decision making under sunk
costs in economics. The third part considers issues related to decision making in finance
by discussing investment appraisal methods and the treatment of sunk cost information
in finance with an example of a capital budgeting problem. In the fourth part, issues in
decision making in management accounting are dealt with by examining rational choice
in management accounting and the relevant decision techniques with examples of the
treatment of opportunity and sunk costs. In the fifth part, the analysis focuses on
providing evidence that all the normative decision models either explicitly or implicitly
treat sunk cost as irrelevant. Finally, the sixth part provides a chapter summary.

Background to Normative Theories of Sunk Cost
Normative Theory of Decision M a k i n g
Normative theory provides prescriptions, or detailed outlines, for how things ought to be
done. In economics, normative theory provides assumed objectives in terms of
prescriptions for rational behaviour (Lee, 1987, 167). In terms of decision making,
normative theory prescribes an evaluative process of rational behaviour without regard
to the choices that individuals might actually m a k e (Lee, 1971, 16). In contrast,
descriptive theories (as outlined in Chapter 3) are concerned with the choices "real"
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people actually m a k e regardless of the choices they should make. T o acquire better
insight into rational decision making, it is necessary to explore the origin and nature of
these normative prescriptions for rational behaviour. This research investigated the
tensions between the prescriptions for rational decision making and the actual observed
behaviour of individuals in decision-making situations in a management accounting
context.

Rational Decision-Making Model
The rational decision-making model is normative in that it takes a prescriptive, rather
than a descriptive, approach to decision making. T h e model prescribes the conditions
under which individuals m a k e rational decisions (Harrison, 1993, 27). T h e rational
decision model essentially describes the behaviour of an idealised individual. The
individual's behaviour is idealised in the sense that individuals are assumed to be
capable of expressing both consistent preferences and consistent beliefs (Hogarth, 1980,
65). In the rational decision model, a rational decision maker is one who, when
confronted with a decision problem, makes the choice (decision) that is best or optimal
in some well defined sense - for example, expected utility maximization (Lee, 1971, 7).

A rational decision-making model describes a sequence of logical steps taken to chose a
particular course of action. Heracleous (1994, 17) suggested that the steps should
include the identification of a problem, the identification of objective criteria to evaluate
alternatives, a search for alternative solutions, objective evaluation of the alternatives
and implementation and monitoring of the chosen course of action. If these steps are
followed then it can be said that a rational-decision making model has been followed to
arrive at a decision.

Decision Making Issues in Economic Theory
A s economics is "the science that describes and predicts the behaviour of several kinds
of economic human"

(Simon, 1959), it is assumed that "economic humans" are rational

beings and interested in an increase in well-being. Economic analysis rests upon the
fundamental assumption that the behaviour of individuals is driven by the pursuit of
their o w n egotistical ends (Mueller, 1984) which is often referred to as "instrumental"
behaviour. Economics is also a science that focuses on the allocation of scarce
Page
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resources; it is in the allocation of these scarce resources that financial decision
problems occur. Decision making is essentially resource allocation.

Neo-Classical Economic Theory
The concept of an economic m a n making rational choices is at the center of neoclassical economic theory (Reiter, 1994). T o explain decision behaviour, economic
theory postulates that consumers should seek to maximize utility (to the individual).
Normative theory also holds that the process of making a decision should conform to a
set of axioms that ensure that the individual's m a x i m u m expected utility is derived from
the decision outcome (Brown & Solomon, 1987). The assumption is that it is only by
maximizing expected utility that an individual can make an optimum and rational
choice. This rational, utility-maximizing individual is often referred to as " H o m o
Economicus" in the economic literature (Marsden, 1984).

The rational decision-making model, therefore, proposes that all people, in whatever
situation, should evaluate potential events— or alternative choices— in terms of the
overall effect on total wealth or utility (Schwartz, 1998). The normative models for
decision making contained within neo-classical economics attempt to explain not only
the behaviour of individual decision makers and groups of decision makers, but also to
explain decisions m a d e on behalf of the firm. W h e n considering the welfare of the firm,
utility maximization equates to maximizing wealth, or present value (Van H o m e , 1992).

Decision Making in Economic Theory
The underpinning assumption of economics is that resources of decision makers, no
matter h o w ample they m a y be, are always limited— that is, virtually all resources are
considered to be scarce (Baumol & Blinder, 1982, 38). Therefore, choices are m a d e
among a limited set of possibilities and "a decision to have more of one thing means we
must give up some of another" (Baumol & Blinder, 1982, 39). There are two sets of
basic principles for choice under neo-classical economics: methodological
individualism and rational choice (Boland, 1998, 516).
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Methodological individualism holds that only individuals, not things, can m a k e choices.
This restricts the list of acceptable exogenous (explanatory) variables. Under neoclassical e c o n o m i c s — as opposed to classical e c o n o m i c s — rational choice is
represented by a mathematical notion of constrained maximization (Wakker, 1993). T h e
implication is that once the objective function to be maximized is specified, anyone
facing the same constraints and maximizing according to the objective function should
m a k e the same unique choice (Boland, 1998, 517). This assumes that each individual
will use the same cost information to c o m e to the same unique choice. T h e unknowns
that are faced in making these decisions are described as "risk" and "uncertainty". T h e
degree of risk also affects the decision outcome

Relevant Costs in Decisions
It is essential that the decision maker correctly identify the economically relevant costs
to arrive at the optimal solution (Besanko & Braeutigam, 2002, 260). F r o m an economic
perspective, the relevant cost involved in any decision is its opportunity cost (Baumol &
Blinder, 1982, 39; Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2001, 204; Colander, 2001, 6). Economists use
the terms "economic cost" and "opportunity cost" synonymously. A n example of an
opportunity cost problem illustrates this point.

Example 2.1 (Opportunity Cost Problem)
A n opportunity cost can be exemplified by the following (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2001,
204):
A firm owns a building and therefore does not pay rent for office space. Does this mean
that the cost of office space is zero? Financial accountants would consider this cost as
zero.

An economist would take into consideration that the firm could have earned rent on the
office space by leasing it to another company. This rent foregone is the opportunity cost
of utilizing the office space and should be included as part of the "economic cost" of
doing business.
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Decision M a k i n g in Expected Utility Theory
The foremost theory of decision making underriskis the expected utility model. This
model is based on a set of axioms which provide criteria for the rationality of choices.
The choices of an individual w h o conforms to the axioms can be described in terms of
the "utility" of various outcomes for that individual. The utility is not a measure of the
individual's satisfaction, but an index for consistent ranking of alternatives in
accordance with observations and the implications of the axioms (Frank, 1998, 193;
Schwartz, 1998, 40). W h e n faced with a choice, a rational decision maker will,
therefore, prefer the outcome that offers the highest utility (Elster, 1986, 125; Tisdell,
1996, 29). Individuals are assumed to act on the basis of their evaluation with respect to
"the effects onfinalwealth levels" (Schoemaker, 1982, 550) in order to maximize their
expected utility. Expected utility is concerned with comparisons between the present
situation and the possible future outcomes of alternative courses of action; in this regard
the past is deemed irrelevant for the purpose of decision making. All that is relevant is
current wealth and future possible wealth states. H o w current wealth levels arose is of
no concern to the model. B y implication all sunk costs are irrelevant.

This argument can be put another way. The concept of expected utility in financial
decision making starts with the assumption that an individual has at a particular m o m e n t
in time, a given amount of wealth (an asset); the value of which is the current market
value. The desired outcome is to invest the asset in a manner that will maximize future
income streams from that asset. Expected utility theory suggests that "alternatives are
evaluated with respect to their effects onfinalwealth levels" (Schoemaker, 1982, 550).
A person's wealth is therefore measured in terms of the present, regardless of h o w it
was derived— that is, wealth is measured as the market value at a particular point in
time.

Only future or expected consequences are relevant to economic decisions (Heyne, 1997,
121). In the decision-making process, a person accepts the present situation (specifically
wealth as measured according to the current market value) and focuses on the future in
considering the rational choice and the risks involved. In other words, an individual
makes the best of the current situation and its probabilities, no matter h o w uncertain the
future m a y seem. A sunk cost is an expenditure that has been m a d e and cannot be
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recovered, as a result it is deemed irrelevant to decisions about the future (Pindyck &
Rubinfeld, 2001, 207).

The term gamble or gambles is used in economics to describe "...economic decisions
made under uncertainty" (Frank, 1998, 191). A model based on the idea that
individuals maximize expected utility in selecting from among gambles is represented
by the formula below (Demski & Swieringa, 1981, 34; Payne, 1985, 4; Ansic & Keasey,
1994, 185).
The expected utility of a given action A is represented by the formula:

EU(A) = 2 PiU[Xi]
i
where U[x] represents the utility of monetary outcome or "prospect" x„ and pt is the subjective
probability of possible, outcome i.

Accordingly, this formula implies that the value of a lottery or gamble depends on
money value of the prizes and the associated probabilities of each potential outcome.
The logic underlying this approach provides no role for past events— especially sunk
cost— to be applied to the current decision. A risky prospect (action) is one in which
the decision maker is not sure which outcome will occur (Shapira, 1995,4).
Accordingly, the utility of ariskyprospect is equal to the expected utility of its
outcomes— obtained by weighting the utility of each possible outcome by its
probability (Ansic & Keasey, 1994). A s the focus of the utility calculation is concerned
with future possibilities, a sunk cost is "irrelevant in weighting the future consequences
of the current decision" (Bomstein & Chapman, 1995, 251). A prospect is a course of
action that yields a particular outcome (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 263).

Sunk Cost in Economic Decision Making
The principle of ignoring sunk cost (or sunk capital) is generally implicit in most
microeconomic literature and textbooks. The term "sunk capital" in microeconomics is

defined as "...that capital...not capable of being put to alternative uses" (Dewett, 196
132). Sunk costs, according to economic textbooks (Frank & Glass, 2000; McEachern,
1997; Terry & Forde, 1984) are related to resources that have been committed and
subsequently cannot be reversed— for example, investments in plant and equipment or
land and buildings.
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The Problem of Sunk

Cost

A review of early microeconomic textbooks undertaken by W a n g and Y a n g (2001)
pointed out the term "fixed costs" w a s mistakenly used to refer to "unavoidable costs"
or sunk capital. W a n g and Y a n g referred to this as mistaken because fixed costs in
accounting terms are deemed to be necessary costs for production and decisions
concerning continued production. A s such these include future elements. In contrast,
sunk costs are not relevant because they are already incurred and cannot be reversed
(Mas-Colell, Whinston & Green, 1995).

Example 2.2 Sunk Cost Decision 1
A typical every day event that typifies the concept of a sunk cost occurs at the
supermarket check-out. First h o w do you decide which queue to join? I venture to say
that you pick the queue that you think will take you the least time to get served.

Now suppose that after waiting in line for ten minutes you realise that another queue
has moved more quickly and is n o w much shorter than yours. D o you switch queues?
Or do you think, 'I've already spent 10 minutes in this queue so I'm going to stay in it'?
The 10 minutes spent in the queue represents a sunk cost, which is a cost that cannot be
recovered whatever you do. Accordingly, such costs should be ignored when evaluating
alternative courses of action and making economic decisions.
Source: (Adapted from Quayle, Robinson & McEachern, 1994,29)

A more complex example of a decision task with a sunk cost involves a decision of
whether to drive or take a bus for a long journey.

Example 2.3 Sunk Cost Decision 2
Suppose you are planning a 250 kilometer trip to Sydney. Except for the cost, you are
completely indifferent between driving and taking a bus. Bus fare is $100. Y o u don't
know h o w much it would cost to drive your car, so you call Hertz for an estimate. The
Hertz representative tells you that for your make of car, the costs of a typical 10,000
kilometer driving year are as follows:
Insurance
Interest
Fuel & Oil
Maintenance
Total

$1,000
2,000
1,000
1,000
$5,000
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Y o u calculate that these costs come to $0.50/kilometer and use this figure to compute
that the 250 kilometer trip will cost you $125 by car. Since this is more than the $100
bus fare, you decide to take the bus.

If you decide in this fashion, you commit the error of counting sunk costs. Your
insurance and interest payments do not vary with the number of kilometers you drive
each year. Both are sunk costs and will be the same whether or not you drive to Sydney.
Of the costs listed, fuel and oil and maintenance are the only ones that vary with
kilometers driven. These come to $2,000 for each 10,000 kilometers you drive, or
$0.20/ kilometer. Therefore at $0.20/ kilometer, it costs you only $50 to drive to
Sydney, and since this is much less than the bus fare, you should drive.
Source: (Adapted from Frank & Glass, 2000, 13)

The assumption in this example that you are indifferent between the two modes of
transport is an important issue in the decision process. This means that the only
comparison that matters is the actual cost of the two choices. If you had preferred one
choice to the other, a weighting would be necessary for that preference. For example, if
you were willing to pay $60 to avoid the hassle of driving, the real cost of driving would
be ($50 plus $60) or $110, not $50, and you should take the bus.

Sunk Cost Defined in Microeconomics
Table 2.1, depicting the historical development of sunk cost in the microeconomic
literature, reveals that discussion of sunk costs is only included in the most recent
editions of microeconomic textbooks. T h e discussion is generally limited to the
axiomatic statement that "past costs are irrelevant for future investment decisions ". It is
therefore simply assumed that individuals, if behaving rationally, ignore sunk costs. A
consistent theme in the definitions is the notion that sunk costs are "irrevocable" (that is,
they cannot be recovered).
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Table 2.1
S u n k Cost Defined in Microeconomic Textbooks 1977-2001
Textbook Details
Calvo & Waugh (1977)

Sunk Cost ~ definition

Koutsoyiannis (1979)

No

Calvo & Waugh (1980)

No

Quirk (1983)

No

Freeman (1983)

No

Zamagni (1987)

No

Kreps (1990)

No

Gravelle & R e e s (1992)

No

Pindyck & Rubinfeld (1992)

Ch7p.l99
" A sunk cost is an expenditure that has already
been made and cannot be recovered."

Prager (1993)

No

Jackson, Mclver & McConnell (1994)

No

Mas-Colell, Whinston & Green (1995)

Ch5p.l31
" if some production decisions have been made, or
if irrevocable contracts for the delivery of some
inputs have been signed, inaction is not possible."
Ch 9 p. 203
"A sunk cost is the dollar cost of buying plant and
equipment that have no current resale value."

McTaggart, Findlay & Parkin (1996)

Frank (1998)

Pindyck & Rubinfeld (2001)

No

C h i p. 12
"costs that are beyond recovery at the moment a
decision is made."
Ch 7 p.205
" A sunk cost is an expenditure that has already
been made and cannot be recovered."

The analysis of the microeconomic textbooks indicates that changes in the issues
examined, such as the inclusion of sunk costs and discussion of decision making, were
m a d e after the mid 1990s. These concepts were implicit and n o w are often explicit
within microeconomic theory and provide the foundation for defining costs in
management accounting.

Decision Making Issues in Finance
Investment decisions involve committing a resource, usually cash, at one point in time
with the expectation of deriving economic benefits at some future point in time (Levy &
Sarnat, 1986, 16). A primary example is the acquisition of capital assets. Rational
decisions involving investment of a capital nature are generally based upon the notion
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that managers are expected to maximize the firm's economic profit (Peirson, Bird &
Brown, 1986, 8).

Economic profit, unlike accounting profit, is measured by changes in the value of the
firm and takes into consideration the opportunity cost of capital (Frank, 1998, 337).
Accordingly, maximizing economic profit is consistent with the objective of
maximizing the shareholders' wealth (Van H o m e , 1992, 6; Begg, Fischer & Dornbusch,
1987, 119). Therefore, the most appropriate methods of investment appraisal should
ensure that shareholders' wealth is maximized. Within the finance discipline (Kolb,
1988, 430), the market value is held to be the amount that could be realised (opportunity
cost) for the particular good or resource if it was not being used in the present
investment.

Investment Appraisal Methods
Finance textbooks and management accounting textbooks predominantly refer to
investment appraisal methods within the scope of specific categories. These categories
generally range from simple rules of thumb (such as payback and accounting rate of
return) to more mathematically sophisticated methods such as internal rate of return and
net present value. The categories and their relevant associated methods are detailed in
Table 2.2.
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Finance theory implicitly treats sunk costs as irrelevant to the evaluation of financial
decision choices. This is most evident in the treatment of decisions concerning
investment or project evaluation. Financial textbooks recommend the use of net present
values or other measures of future cash flow (or income) streams for decision-making
purposes (Robichek & V a n H o m e , 1967; Dyl & Long, 1969; Boinini, 1977; Gaumnitz
& Emery, 1980; H o w e & M c C a b e , 1983). Concepts integral to finance used to define
decision making are the time frame and the relationship between time and money.

Empirical research demonstrates that there are four predominant methods used in
practice to evaluate investment opportunities. In a recent survey in the United States of
America involving 392 corporate finance officers, Graham and Harvey (2001), found
that large firms relied heavily on present value techniques and the capital asset pricing
model while small firms tended to use the payback approach. These findings are
consistent with prior research that focused on large firms. Details of the prior research
findings are summarized in Table 2.3.

Table 2.3
Prior Research Findings on Investment Appraisal Methods by Large Firms
Klammer
1972
*(1969)

Gitman &
Kim&
Forrester Farragher
1977
1979

Klammer,
Koch&
Wilner
1988

Farragher,
Kleiman &
Sahu
1999

Evaluation Technique
Discounted cash flow

57%

74%

68%

86%

78%

Accounting ROI

26%

28%

8%

4%

34%

Payback

12%

10%

12%

5%

52%

* Survey conducted 1969 results published 1972.

The capital budgeting decision process is further complicated in industries where
uncertainty exists with regard to future organisational direction. A prime example of
this is the Health Sector. B y comparison with large corporate organisations, surveys of
investment appraisal methods used in the Hospital Sector demonstrate that the payback
method is the preferred method. Hospitals face the situation that both government and
health care funds dramatically influence future revenue flows (Campbell, 1994). Table
2.4 presents a summary of the findings of prior research undertaken in the Hospital
Sector.
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Table 2.4
Prior Research Findings on Investment Appraisal Methods by Hospitals
Cleverley &
Felkner
1982
n=87
Evaluation Technique
NPV

IRR
Accounting R O I

Kamath &
Elmer
1989
n=118

21%

Kamath &
Oberst
1992
n=94

22%

22.6%

*

16%

17%

3%

4.4%

7.5%

Payback

34%

26.5%

29%

Some other method

25%

31.1%

16.4%

No method

17%

-

7.5%

* data expressed as "discounted cash flow method" is included in N P V

Discussion of Investment Appraisal Methods
Capital Budgeting
Maximizing the net present value of the firm is the objective of capital budgeting
(Peirson & Bird, 1976, 33). Capital budgeting is the process of evaluating long-term
investment proposals (Raiborn, Barfield & Kinney, 1999, 342). Burke (1970) provides
examples of capital budgeting applications and practice. A more rigorous discussion of
issues and problems associated with capital budgeting constructs and techniques is
found in Anthony (1960) or King (1975). The models for decision making in use by the
finance discipline are consistent with the notion that sunk cost information is irrelevant
in making a rational decision and focus only on net present value and current market
value.

Capital budgeting decisions are among the most important of all management decisions
because they impact on an organisation's future (Smith, 1994). These decision
techniques are based on the microeconomic theory of the firm (Dyl & Long, 1969)
which posits that companies are profit motivated (Peirson & Bird, 1976, 29). Pierson
and Bird (1976, 28) suggested that the most suitable objective for financial decision
making is "... the maximization of the market value of a company to its shareholders."
Subsequently, for investment decisions, the criterion becomes one of selecting the
project that has the most favourable effect on the company's share price.
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A distinguishing feature of capital investment decisions is the consideration of the time
value of money. A s a typical capital investment decision invariably involves the
comparison of present cash outlays to future benefits, problems relating to the timing of
receipts and outlays are central to capital budgeting analysis. Capital budgeting
evaluation is concerned with comparing the expected future cash flows from the
prospective investment projects. T h e quantitative methods most favoured by the finance
discipline are the discounted net cash flow techniques: net present value and the internal
rate of return (Peirson & Bird, 1976,77; Levy & Sarnat, 1986, 202). Note that as in
expected utility maximization, past cash flows (sunk costs) are not considered.

Portfolio Theory
While net present value is the preferred method to determine the feasibility of capital
expenditures, investment in financial securities requires an approach that acknowledges
the diverse nature of the share market. T h e method prescribed in finance textbooks to
resolve this difference in scale and duration of alternative investment in securities is the
portfolio approach (Levy & Sarnat, 1986). Portfolio theory assumes that all investors
arerisk-averseand therefore prefer to avoid risk whenever possible (Markovitz, 1952;
Kolb, 1988). This implies that an investor requires compensation in the form of greater
return on investment for bearing risk (Kolb, 1988).

Portfolio theory also assumes that all assets are included in the formula at market valu
Essentially, the original cost of the asset is irrelevant in the decision process and by
inference sunk costs are also irrelevant. A n assessment of the portfolio theory model is
presented in Figure 2.1. T h e composition of a portfolio suggested by the model is based
entirely on the relationship between the forecast m e a n return (I and the forecast
volatility a. Past prices, in particular actual costs, are irrelevant.
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Figure 2.1
Portfolio Theory Model

Asset

I
(|X,0) represents the asset

^

Q

a represents the standard deviation (volatility) or risk
[i represents the m e a n of R t where

O n e period away

Rt=

Pt -

PM

Pt-i

Price n o w at start of period

R, is the expected rate of return (or cost of capital) in period t.
P's are current asset prices.

The main point is that only the forecast R t is taken into account in decision making
using portfolio theory. Past returns per se are not relevant (apart from their use in
forecasting future returns).

Return on Investment
In finance textbooks, return on investment (ROI) is consistently based on the current
market value of the asset (Brealey & Myers, 1988; Bishop, Crapp & Twite, 1985, 70;
Kolb, 1986, 7). This is so whether or not the asset is an item of plant, equipment, land,
building or shares in a company. This approach treats past costs as irrelevant. Historical
costs are the primary basis for measuring the value of assets under financial accounting
methods. However, in finance, historical costs are by definition irrelevant for financial
decision making. The rejection of historical cost for evaluation of an investment or
project in finance textbooks suggests that analysis based solely on accounting data m a y
well lead to a choice that is not optimal for the firm in terms of maximizing wealth.
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S u n k Cost in Finance
The discussion of sunk cost in finance textbooks is generally focused on the notion of
"outlays or outflows" as distinct from management accounting textbooks which focus
on the notion of "past costs". Table 2.5 reviews the historical development of the
treatment of sunk cost in finance textbooks from 1976 to 2000.

Table 2.5
S u n k Cost Defined in Finance Textbooks 1976-2000
Textbook Details
Peirson & Bird (1976)

Sunk Cost ~ definitions

Bishop, Crapp & Twite (1985)

No

Peirson, Bird & B r o w n (1986)

No

Kolb (1988)

C h 14 p. 430
"A cost that has been incurred previously and cannot be recovered is known as
a sunk cost."

Brigham & Gapenski L.C.
(1988)

Ch9p. 291

Brealey & Myers (1991)

No

"A sunk cost refers to an outlay that has already occurred (or been
committed), so it is an outlay that is not affected by the accept/reject decision
under consideration."

Ch 6 p. 95
"[Sunk costs] are past and irreversible outflows. ... they cannot be affected by
the decision to accept or reject the project, and so they should be ignored."

Campsey & Brigham (1991)

Bishop, Crapp, Faff & Twite
(1993)

Brigham & Gapenski (1993)

Brealey, Myers, Partington &
Robinson (2000)

Ch 14 p. 511
"A sunk cost is an outlay that has already been committed or that has already
occurred and hence is not affected by the accept/reject decision under
consideration."
C h 9 p.228
"Since the N P V of a project is concerned with estimating the change in the
value of thefirmas a result of accepting the project, past cash flows are
irrelevant for this purpose; sunk costs are irrelevant."
C h 8 p. 263
"A sunk cost refers to an outlay that has already occurred (or been
committed), so it is an outlay that is not affected by the accept/reject decision
under consideration."

Ch6p. 133
"[Sunk costs] are past and irreversible outflows. Because sunk costs are
bygones, they cannot be affected by the decision to accept or reject the
project, and so they should be ignored."

The historical review of finance textbooks indicates that changes in the portrayal of
investment appraisal methods occurred after the late 1980s when sunk costs were
included in decision-making discussions. A consistent theme in the definitions of sunk
cost presented in Table 2.5 is that sunk costs are "already committed and cannot be
affected by the decision" (that is, they cannot be changed whatever the decision). In
other words, sunk costs have no effect on the decision choices that lie in the future.
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Implications Regarding S u n k Cost in Finance M o d e l s
F r o m the perspective of the finance models, there is an implicit suggestion that to ignore
sunk costs is normal rational behaviour. S u n k costs are basically ignored in the
discussion and formulation of the decision-making models in finance textbooks. T o
illustrate the fact that net present value calculations treat sunk costs as irrelevant,
E x a m p l e 2.4 is presented and examined (Bishop et al., 1993, 241).

Example 2.4 (Capital Budgeting Problem)
Replace E q u i p m e n t
Example:
A firm is considering the installation of a new machine to replace an existing machine.
Corporate tax is 4 0 % and the n e w and old machines each have an expected salvage
value of zero at the end of ten years. The required rate of return appropriate for each
alternative is 1 0 % per annum. The estimated cash flows are:

N e w machine

Existing Machine
Cost
Annual net cash outflows
Annual depreciation
Current salvage value
Tax saving on disposal

0
-30,000
3,000
10,000
8,000

-70,000
-10,000
7,000

Life

10 years

10 years

Incremental
Cash Flows
-70,000
20,000
4,000
10,000
8,000

Solution:
Incremental cash flow

= (20,000 x 0.60) + (4,000 x 0.4)
= $13,600 per period

The N P V of the change will be:

incremental NPV

^ 13,600
= -70,000 + 10,000 + 8,000 +2J n l0y
= -52,000+13,600(6.145)
= $32,572

Comment:
Since this net present value is positive, the n e w machine should be preferred to the old.
A s the existing machine is already in place, it is necessary to compute the incremental
cash flows associated with accepting the n e w machine to determine the change in net
operating cash flows after corporate tax.
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The point worth noting in this example is that the historic cost of the existing machine,
that is the sunk cost, is ignored in evaluating its continued use. However, the market
value of the existing machine is a valid cash flow in the consideration of changing to a
new machine. Cash flow analysis is a major theme in finance models and is linked to
the concept of "economic value... as ... a measure of wealth" (Bazley, Hancock, Berry
& Jarvis, 1999, 64). The argument rests on the principle that the economic value of any
item, such as the machine in Example 2.4, is best represented by the expected future
income stream to be derived from using that particular item. Under this approach wealth
is measured in terms of the present day value of the expected future income stream
which is discounted at an appropriate rate (Bazley, Hancock, Berry & Jarvis, 1999, 64).

Decision Making Issues in Management Accounting
Accounting research has traditionally focused on identifying the most useful
information for decision makers without considering what type of information m a y be
irrelevant and not useful for decision making (Shiozawa, 1999). Practically all
management accounting research is concerned with h o w individuals evaluate choices
from among alternatives. This research assumes that individuals will process
information as if they wish to maximize expected utility in terms of profit maximization
or cost minimization (Feltham & Demski, 1970). The flow of economic concepts
throughout management accounting is also evident in a pervasive focus on cost
minimization and profit maximization (Shiozawa, 1999).

Rational Choice in Management Accounting
In management accounting, rational choice models are based on the economic concepts
of marginal cost and wealth maximization (Scapens, 1991). The prescriptions for
decision making in the discipline of management accounting are therefore reliant on the
neo-classical view of rational choice as found in neo-classical and microeconomic
theory discussed earlier in this chapter.

Relevant Costing Derived from Economics
The concept of relevant costs prevalent in the management accounting textbooks
(Horngren & Foster, 1991; Hansen & M o w e n , 2000) can be traced to the economic
argument that only expected future costs that can be expected to differ between
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alternatives are relevant to decision making (McEachern, 1997; Terry & Forde, 1984;
Frank, 1998). Past or historical costs cannot be affected by any current decision and are
therefore irrelevant to that decision.

Sunk Costs Defined in Management Accounting
Management accounting textbooks inevitably devote whole chapters to identifying and
classifying costs and cost behaviour. Most decision models used in management
accounting texts are founded upon neo-classical economic constructs. There are m a n y
types of decisions that managers face in the course of operating a business. From the
potentially diverse number of issues there are two that are particularly linked to the neoclassical economic rational view: the production decision and the investment decision.
The management accounting tools or techniques associated with these specific
management decisions are presented in Table 2.6.

Table 2.6
M a n a g e m e n t Accounting Decision Techniques
Management

Decision

Output or production
eg•
make or buy;
•
select production
level of products;
•
produce beyond
split off
Investment and
disinvestment

General Technique

Specific Technique

Underlying Constructs

Return on
investment;
Break-even analysis;
Cost-volume profit
analysis

Contribution margin
analysis;
Differential analysis;
Incremental analysis.

Sunk costs irrelevant;
Opportunity costs
relevant;
Future revenues
relevant.

Return on
investment;
Pay back methods

Discounted cash flow
techniques; Sensitivity
analysis; Risk analysis
using objective or
subjective
probabilities;
Differential analysis;
incremental analysis.

Sunk costs irrelevant;
Opportunity costs
relevant;
Future revenues
relevant.

There is little research that explicitly addresses or demonstrates the irrelevance of sunk
cost to the financial decision-making process. The arguments pertaining to sunk cost are
largely axiomatic and presumed self evident. Banker, Data and Kekre (1988) m a d e the
point that conventional management accounting principles tend to assume deterministic
manufacturing environments when evaluating relevant costs of adding or deleting
products. Kaplan (1983) suggested that the simplistic traditional management
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accounting models were not applicable to the evolving complex manufacturing
operations and service organisations.

Table 2.7 presents an overview of the definitions of sunk cost in management
accounting textbooks, revealing that discussion of sunk costs appears consistently
throughout the editions from 1977 to the present. Unlike the micro-economic textbooks,
the discussion is not limited to the axiomatic statement that "past costs are irrelevant
for future investment decisions." In addition, the nature of rational decision making is
conceptualized in terms of the relevant costs and revenues.

Table 2.7
S u n k Cost Defined in M a n a g e m e n t Accounting Textbooks 1977-2001
Text Author
Horngren (1977)

Moriarity & Allen (1987)

Rayburn (1989)

Horngren & Foster (1991)

Maher (1997)

Horngren, Sundem &
Stratton (1996)
Horngren, Foster, Datar,
Black & Gray (1996)
Raiborn, Barfield &
Kinney(1999)

Blocher, Chen & Lin
(1999)
Weygandt, Kieso &
Kimmel (1999)
Hansen & M o w e n (2000)

Jiambalvo (2001)

Sunk Cost ~ definitions
Ch lip 357
"a past cost that is unavoidable because it cannot be changed no matter what
action is taken."
Ch 5 p.222
"A sunk cost is a cost that has been incurred in the past and cannot be
changed."
Chl8p.911
"Sunk costs ... are historical expenditures for equipment or other productive
resources which have no economic relevance to the present decision-making
process."
Chllp.368
"Past costs that are unavoidable because they cannot be changed no matter
what action is taken."
Chl4p.418
"an expenditure made in the past that cannot be changed by present or future
decisions."
Ch 5 p. 168
"A cost that has already been incurred and, therefore, is irrelevant to the
decision making process."
Chllp.419
"Past costs that are unavoidable because the past cannot be changed no matter
what action is taken."
Ch 6 p.242
"Costs incurred in the past to acquire an asset or a resource - called sunk costs
- are not recoverable and cannot be changed, regardless of what current
circumstances exist or what future course of action is taken. A current or future
selling price may be present for an asset, but that is the result of current or
future conditions and is not a recouping of an historical cost."
Ch 3 p.73
"Sunk costs are costs that have been incurred or committed in the past, and are
therefore irrelevant."
Ch 9 p.346
"Costs that have already been incurred and will not be changed by any future
decision."
Chl7 p. 688
"Sunk costs are past costs. They are always the same across alternatives and
are, therefore, always ir relevant."
Ch 6 p.202
"Costs that are sunk (i.e. already incurred and not reversible) are never
incremental costs, because they do not differ among the decision alternatives.
Therefore, they are not relevant in making a decision.
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A consistent theme in the definitions presented in Table 2.7 is the idea that sunk costs
are "past expenditures or undertakings that cannot be changed regardless of which
choice is made"

(that is, they are historical by nature, cannot be recovered, and have no

bearing on the present decision). T h e concept of sunk cost in management accounting is
more diverse than in microeconomic textbooks and more detailed than in finance
textbooks.

Applying Sunk Cost in Management Accounting
Sunk costs, according to accounting textbooks, are resources that have been committed
and subsequently cannot be reversed— for example, most fixed overhead costs such as
rent (Horngren & Foster, 1991; Hansen & M o w e n , 2000). T o illustrate this point, the
following make-or-buy example was derived from M a h e r (1997, 443). T h e method used
to determine the optimal outcome is differential analysis.

Example 2.5 (Make or Buy Problem)
M a k e - o r - B u y Decision 1

Net Minder Manufacturing produces tennis rackets. It currently makes a cover for each
racket at the following cost:
Per unit

10,000 units

$2.00

$20,000

Direct labour

1.00

10,000

Variable manufacturing overhead

0.75

7,500

Costs that can be directly assignedtothe product:
Direct materials

Fixed manufacturing overhead
Common costs allocated to this product line

2,500
15,000
$55,000

Normal production is 10,000 units, so the full product cost is $5.50 ($55,000/10,000).

Net Minder has received an offer from an outside supplier to supply any desired volume
of covers for $4.10 each.
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Solution:
Buy

Make

Difference

(Status Quo)

(Alternative)

$20,000

$41,000

$21,000 higher

10,000

0

10,000 lower

Variable overhead

7,500

0

7,500 lower

Fixed overhead

2,500

0

2,500 lower

15,000

15,000

0

$55,000

$56,000

$ 1,000 higher

Direct Costs
Direct materials
Direct labour

Common costs
Total Costs

Comment:
In this situation the alternative to making the covers will cost the firm more and
therefore the alternative is not acceptable. As the analysis shows that the buy option
causes $1,000 more in costs, the rational decision should be to continue to "make".

Applying Opportunity Cost in M a n a g e m e n t Accounting
W h e n making choices, a decision maker is confronted with having to forego one or
more alternative courses of action. A n example of early developmental work on the
theory of opportunity costs is found in Eiriksson (1954). Opportunity costs are defined
generally as "those benefits which could have been received had an alternative course
of action been chosen" (Thompson, 1973, 263). McEachern (1997) m a d e the point that
when people say that they "had nothing better to do ", they are implying that they had
no alternatives more attractive so they are sacrificing very little in undertaking the
chosen activity. In other words, they evaluate their action in accordance with an
expected utility and m a k e their choices in a rational manner.

T o illustrate the concept that opportunity costs are relevant to the determination of the
most optimal outcome, Example 2.6 continues the scenario from Example 2.5 with the
inclusion of opportunity costs. T h e addition of opportunity costs in the scenario changes
the outcome of the analysis and the "buy" option becomes the optimal choice (Maher,
1997, 443).
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Example 2.6
Make-or-Buy Decision 2 ~ with opportunity costs
Additional Information (opportunity cost):
Assume that the facilities to make the covers could be used to assemble a cheaper
version of the racket that Net Minder presently produces. This cheaper version would
provide a $4,000 contribution. The opportunity cost of using the facility to make covers
is therefore $4,000.

Revised Solution:

Total Costs
Opportunity cost of using facilities to

Make
(Status Quo)
$55,000

Buy
(Alternative)
$56,000

Difference
$1,000 higher

4,000

0

4,000 lower

$59,000

$56,000

3,000 lower

make covers
Total costs, including opportunity cost

Comment:
By taking into consideration the opportunity cost, the firm is able to obtain a further
$3,000 contribution to income. The rational decision should be to "buy".

The addition of opportunity costs in the scenario changes the outcome of the analysis
and the "buy" option becomes the optimal choice.

The proposition that individuals act rationally and always select the optimal alternative
implies the existence of an opportunity cost in the comparison of choice between
alternatives. This proposition ignores the potential for other logical possibilities to
explain the behaviour of the decision maker, w h o seldom k n o w the actual value of the
foregone alternative (McEachern, 1997, 27). Further, the assumption that the decision
maker has all the relevant information is questionable because acquiring information
about alternatives is often costly and time consuming. A s a result, individuals usually
m a k e choices based on limited or even incorrect information (McEachern, 1997, 27).

Comparison with Financial Accounting
According to management accounting textbooks, management accounting is future
orientated while financial accounting is concerned with the past (Horngren & Foster,
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1991). Financial accounting data is based on historical cost— for example the book
value of an asset is the historical cost less any accumulated depreciation— and this is
the sunk cost (Brealey & Myers, 1988). Decision making based on financial accounting
data will include sunk costs and this is normatively incorrect. Historical cost is used in
the accounting rate of return method to analyse investment projects (Brealey & Myers,
1988, 264; Horngren, Foster & Datar, 1994, 701). T h e accounting rate of return method
is criticized for ignoring the time value of m o n e y and, more importantly, for treating
sunk costs as relevant to decision making.

Errors of Historical Costs
The use of historical cost, derived from financial accounting records, leads to the
c o m m o n mistake of including sunk costs in the decision making analysis. A n example
that typifies the erroneous use of historical cost is the simple evaluation of an
investment property. This conversation is typical of m u c h discussion a m o n g investors,
and even a m o n g qualified accountants.

Example 2.7 Historical Cost Decision Error
"I bought m y investment property in 1984 for $200,000 and the annual rent is $30,000
so the rental yield is 1 5 % ($30,000/$200,000). That's better than I can get by investing
anywhere else, so I a m very happy with the property."

However, the current market value for property in the same area is $600,000. The
market value represents the opportunity cost that is being foregone. That is, should the
person choose to sell the property he/she would have $600,000 to reinvest. Therefore,
the appropriate rental yield should be taken as 3.33% (30,000/600,000), which is not
such a good return. This measure is logically comparable with yields on alternate
investments (for example, current bank interest rates).

The historical cost (financial accounting method) involves a sunk cost (a price paid in
1984) which is irrelevant for the purpose of current analysis. T h e example shows that
reliance on historical cost (sunk cost) is misleading in determining wealth at a given
point in time.
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Summary of Normative Decision Models
Consistency between Disciplines
The term sunk cost has significant meaning and a long history in management
accounting as well as for cost analysis in economic and finance theory. A sunk cost is
defined and treated similarly across the disciplines of economics, management
accounting and finance. That is, a sunk cost is an irrevocably committed resource or
asset that cannot be changed and is therefore irrelevant to future activities. A s such,
sunk costs are not included in the process of rational decision making in these
disciplines. However, it was apparent that sunk costs are still in use for decision making
purposes a m o n g investors schooled in the conventions of financial accounting.

Same Basic Concept for Dealing with Sunk Costs
Normative decision-making theory prescribes that past costs are irrelevant to rational
decision making. In the context of management accounting, the exclusion of sunk costs
from decision making equates to the decision rule to maximize profit or minimize loss.
The normative theory of decision making underriskis based on the expected utility
model. This model consists of a set of axioms which provide the criteria for rational
decision making. W h e n faced with ariskyset of options, a rational decision maker is
expected to select the prospect that offers the highest expected utility.

The principle that sunk costs are irrelevant to decisions and that an optimal decision
should be based on expected utility theory is inherent in the discipline of economics.
Finance theory emphasises the relationship in terms of outlays or outflows and
management accounting theory emphasises the relationship in terms of past costs.
Adherence to the normative approach is evident in the methods and techniques
prescribed in the various textbooks of these disciplines for decision making under sunk
costs.

Chapter Summary
This chapter introduced the perspective of the normative model of rational decision
making in which sunk costs are deemed to be irrelevant to economic decisions. F r o m an
economic perspective, rational behaviour is considered to follow a utility function.
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Expected utility theory forms the basis for postulating h o w economic decisions should
be m a d e and what information should be relevant to the process of making choices.
Sunk costs are held to be irrelevant to the decision-making process.

Decision models in finance follow normative economic decision theory and implicitly,
rather than explicitly, are dismissive of sunk costs. Finance textbooks generally ignore
the issue of sunk cost. However, sunk costs, when they appear, are consistently treated
as irrelevant. Finance models necessitate the use of current market value and future cash
flows which focus on opportunity cost to compare alternative courses of action (for
example, investment projects). C o m m o n approaches to decision making in finance were
discussed and shown to be logically consistent in their treatment of sunk costs as
irrelevant.
The influence of normative economic decision theory within management accounting
was demonstrated, particularly with regard to the treatment of sunk costs. Examples
were used to highlight the normative approaches to c o m m o n decision problems dealt
with under management accounting. T h e examples serve to form the formal rational
(theoretical) basis for the decision problems used in the empirical investigation reported
in this thesis.

This review of the normative theory of sunk cost revealed that rational behaviour is
predicated upon the treatment of sunk cost as irrelevant and only opportunity cost as
relevant to economic decisions. Chapter 2 provides the foundation for the analysis of
evidence concerning non-rational behaviour which is presented in Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 3
Behavioural Theories of Sunk Cost
Chapter Introduction
This chapter surveys the various competing theories that question the predictive
capacity of the normative model of rational decision making. Frisch and Clemen (1994,
46) suggested that the "central role of behavioural decision research is to evaluate the
quality of people's decisions". Behavioural research regarding decision-making
behaviour focuses on examining people's preferences and identifying possible
explanations for preference behaviour (Rabin, 1998). A number of researchers
demonstrated empirically that human judgement and decision-making behaviour do not
always follow the assumptions of the normative theories in expressing those preferences
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Arkes & Blumer, 1985). In view of the assumption of
rationality in expected utility theory, this behaviour could be viewed as being
"irrational" (Ellsberg, 1961).

In particular, anomalies are found when the circumstances of the alternative courses of
action involve decision making under sunk costs (Thaler, 1980; Staw, 1981). This
phenomenon has been labelled the "sunk cost effect". The sunk cost effect was first
defined by Arkes and Blumer (1985, 124) as the individual's "...tendency to continue
an endeavour once an investment in money, effort, or time has been made." Parayre
(1991, 23) defined the sunk cost effect as "the tendency to persist with a committed
course of action beyond what economic rationality, based on marginal costs and
benefits, would dictate." Research by economists, accountants and organisational
behaviourists found that decision makers tended to use sunk cost information (Becker,
1962; Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Awasthi & Pratt, 1990; Thaler, 1990) despite the clear
normative prescriptions that only present and future costs should be used (Horngren,
Foster & Datar, 1994). The sunk cost effect is also observed as occurring in personal
and business decision making.

Whatever the behavioural origins of the sunk cost effect, it is reasonable to assume tha
it arises as a consequence of the decision-making process and therefore has a
psychological element. In order to explore possible explanations for the sunk cost effect,
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the behavioural models of decision making are reviewed in Chapter 3 across the
categories of motivational, social learning and cognitive theories. F r o m the review of
cognitive theories, one model in particular provides an alternative framework to
expected utility and rational decision theory. Prospect theory, due to its predictive
capacity as a heuristic model of decision making, can account for irrational decisions. In
the final part of the chapter, the research issues relevant to this dissertation are
addressed.

Psychology of Decision Making
Psychology is defined as "...the study of behaviour and experience pursued by methods,
the status of which is continually under review" (Ribeaux & Poppleton, 1978). O n e of
the most significant contributions of psychology is its focus on the individual as a
source of explanation of behaviour during the process of making decisions (Jennings &
Wattam, 1998, 58). Beach (1990) suggested that there are three key approaches to
research of the psychology of decision making. The first approach is prescriptive
decision theory which assumes that the decision maker maximizes expected value. The
second approach is behavioural decision theory which assumes that w h e n the decision
maker's cognitive processes are congruent with expected utility and probability theory,
an optimal decision is achieved. T h e third approach is naturalistic theory which, whilst
influenced by utilitarian prescriptions, recognises that decision makers encounter
difficulty in comprehending events and tend to simplify matters. These latter
behavioural approaches provide an alternative perspective to the simplistic notion that
decision makers only maximize expected value.

The most common approaches to the study of the decision-making process are the study
of rational decision processes and incremental decision processes. In the former, the
decision-making process is taken as a whole and in the latter, the decision is seen as
being derived from a number of decision points that cumulatively lead to the "decision"
or "decision outcome". M a c C r i m m o n and Taylor (1976) and Steers (1981) both
describe the decision-making process as the procedures taken to select from available
alternatives. Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) describe decision making as the solving of
problems by matching options. Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Theoret (1976) suggested
that the process should be analysed from the perspective of a particular setting where
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individuals interact with specific issues. Confronted with an anomalous event, a
decision maker is more likely to attempt to place the event in a context to derive
meaning.

Economic theories are based on different models of the decision-making process than
those held in psychology. Economics is primarily concerned with the mapping of the
flow of inputs that result in choices. T h e view of the decision process in economics is
that information is processed according to Bayesian statistical principles (perception of
rationality), that preferences are primitive, consistent and immutable (preference
rationality), and that the cognitive process is simply preference maximization subject to
market constraints (process rationality) (McFadden, 1999). B y contrast, the psychology
of decision making is concerned with the nature of decision elements, h o w they are
established and modified by experience, and consequently h o w they determine values.
The dominant view of the decision process in psychology is that behaviour is local,
adaptive, learned, dependent on context, mutable, and influenced by complex
interactions of perceptions, motives, attitudes and affect (McFadden, 1999).

Behavioural Theories of Decision Making
Until the mid-1950s, little attention was given to explaining behaviour during the
decision-making process. Edwards (1954) raised the issue of behaviour as a specific
research concern in theory development for decision making. Allais (1953) recorded
inappropriate decision-making behaviour in what is referred to as the "Allais paradox".
The Allais paradox consists of two pairs of choices (prospects) with two alternative
choices. For the first pair of choices, one prospect is a sure thing and the other is risky;
theriskyprospect has three possible outcomes. T h e following is an example of the first
pair of choices (Li, 1994):

First Pair:
Prospect A

complete certainty of a good outcome

$lm

Prospect B

.10 probability of a very good outcome

$5m

.89 probability of a good outcome

$lm

.01 probability of a bad outcome

$0
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The second pair of choices are obtained by eliminating the fixed chance of winning a
specific amount from both prospects and are represented by the following example (Li,
1994):

Second Pair:
Prospect C

Prospect D

.11 probability of a good outcome

$ lm

.89 probability of a bad outcome

$0

.10 probability of a very good outcome

$5m

.90 probability of a bad outcome

$0

Allias demonstrated that in the first pair of choices "A" was chosen most often. This
choice is represented by the formula .llu(l,000,000) > .10u(5,000,000). In the second
pair of choices, " D " was chosen most often. This choice is represented by the formula
.llu(l,000,000) < 10u(5,000,000). This reverse inequality is a contradiction (paradox)
and violates the "sure thing" principle.

Savage (1954) responded to Allais (1953) by maintaining that the inappropriate human
behaviour must be corrected as rational theory was soundly based. Savage's (1954)
conclusions were that the normative theory provides a standard against which behaviour
could and should be measured for correctness. A n y inconsistencies were paradoxical
and therefore should be corrected. This approach to behavioural findings contrary to
normative theory is still contested (Keren, 1996). Further research to explain the
breaches of normative theory resulted in a variety of behavioural theories of decision
making. T h e behavioural decision-making literature has drawn on advancements in the
cognitive information-processing paradigm (Keren, 1996).

Behavioural decision-making research has two main streams identified as the
"motivational" and the "cognitive" disciplines (Heath, Larrick & W u , 1999). In
psychological terms, cognitive biases and motivational biases affecting decision making
are considered to be different (Caplan, 2000). Motivational biases depend on the
emotions of an individual, while cognitive biases refer to the thought processes involved
(Nisbett & Ross, 1980). There are also behavioural explanations for decision making
which rely on the psychological theories of social learning and reinforcement behaviour
during the decision-making process.
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K e y Concepts in Behavioural Decision M a k i n g
Before considering the three types of behavioural decision-making theory, a number of
key concepts of the psychology of decision making need to be defined and discussed:
framing, experience, mental accounting, valence and the endowment effect. These
concepts are all constructs used in operationalising the empirical investigation reported
in this thesis.
Framing Effects on Decisions
The notion of a decision "framing effect" was introduced by Kahneman and Tversky
(1979; 1982) as an extension of, and modification to, subjective expected utility theory.
Subjective expected utility theory combines a subjective probability function with a
utility function to represent risky preferences (Payne, 1985, 3). The decision frame was
defined by these researchers as the "set of issues that form a decision maker's
conception of the problem". Research provided compelling evidence that the w a y
individuals cognitively represent a particular decision problem (framing) has a strong
influence on their preferences and the subsequent decision that is m a d e (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1981; Brewer & Kramer, 1986). Empirical research also demonstrated that
decisions are affected by h o w outcomes are framed in the presentation of information to
the decision maker (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Fagley & Miller, 1987; Miller &
Fagley, 1991; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; 1992).

The use of alternative wordings (positive or negative) for decision problems is
"semantic framing". A n example used to explain semantic framing is the metaphor of
the glass which m a y be labelled as being either "half-full" or "half-empty" (Bazerman,
1990; Paese, 1995). Hartman and Nelson (1996) postulated that individuals' risk-taking
behaviour differs depending on whether they perceive themselves to be in a "negative
domain" or a "positive domain". W h e n problems, choices or alternatives are framed in
terms of losses, individuals tend to berisk-seeking.However, when the same problem is
framed in terms of gains, individuals tend to be risk-averse.

Tversky and Kahneman (1981) suggested that just as changes in perspective can reverse
the perceived relative apparent size of objects, imperfections of h u m a n perception are
also responsible for the w a y individuals determine the relative desirability of options
when making decisions. Bazerman (1984) replicated the experiments of Tversky and
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Kahneman (1981) and found that subjects showed preferences for one alternative over
another, despite identical utilities. Studies by Gilovich (1981) and Kahneman and
Tversky (1984) showed that framing concealed the probabilities between alternatives
while studies by Schurr (1987) and Metzger and Krass (1988) demonstrated that
framing caused uncertainty a m o n g decision makers regarding preferences between
alternatives.

Individuals are likely to have preferences derived from past experience (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1984). Therefore, framing effects provide further evidence against the
descriptive validity of utility theory. Framing effects challenge the principle of
description invariance, which holds that the manner in which a situation is described
should not affect one's decision (Frisch, 1993, 401). Tversky and Kahneman (1981)
reported that they had obtained systematic reversals of preference by varying the
framing of acts, contingencies, and outcomes over a variety of problems and with
different groups of respondents. Whether the framing effect is evidence of an
individual's limitations or the limitations of utility theory is still debated.

Machina (1987) conducted a review of research into decision making and offered two
explanations for the reported deviations from expectations in terms of subjective
expected utility theories of decision making. First, he suggested that the level of
uncertainty regarding decisions diminished as individual decision makers acquired or
learned through experience. In effect, a form of adaptive utility or induced preference
accounts for particular observed framing effects. Second, framing effects were
explainable as a special application of expected utility models. These findings were
supported by the later review of framing effects by Kuhberger (1998), w h o found that
framing was a reliable phenomenon and definitely an influence on decision making.
Whilst these propositions offer alternative avenues for research, there appear to be no
studies reporting such a focus.

Slovic, Fischoff and Lichtenstein (1982) applied the framing concept to analyse
previous research findings on decision making. They suggested that the frame limited
accessibility to data, causing the decision makers to use only information explicitly
presented in the problem. Thus, in instances where relevant data had to be inferred, such
data was largely ignored by the decision maker. Their second observation was that in
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evaluating alternatives, decision makers deliberated on reasons to justify both the
framing and their preferences in making the decision. Bierman (1989) found that
subjects w h o received an explanatory note that highlighted the differences in
probabilities m a d e decisions that were more consistent with utility model expectations.
Bierman (1989) also showed that subjects could be "immunised" against framing
effects.

This finding introduced a possible new direction for research on framing effects. Prior
research required subjects to be divided into two groups and then respond to different
versions of a decision problem in order to establish the framing effect. Bierman's
research required all subjects to respond to both versions of a decision problem, thereby
examining the consistency of each individual's response as a means of determining the
existence of any framing effect. Levin, Schneider and Gaeth (1998) reviewed the
framing effect literature and proposed a typology to distinguish between three different
kinds of framing:riskychoice, attribute, and goal framing. The methodological
differences that distinguish these three categories of framing manipulations are
presented in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1
Risky Choice, Attribute and Goal Framing Manipulations
Frame

Category

Risky Choice
Attribute

Goal

What is Framed

What is Affected

How Effect is
Measured
Set of options with
Risk preference
Comparison of choices
different risk levels
for risky options
Object/event attributes
Item evaluation
Comparison of
or characteristics
attractiveness ratings
for the single item
Consequences or
Impact of persuasion
Comparison of rate of
implied goal behaviour
adoption of the
behaviour
Source: (Adapted from Levin, Schneider and Gaeth, 1998, 151)

Mental Accounting
Mental accounting (also referred to as "mental depreciation") is a form of decision
framing in which individuals appraise the costs and benefits of outcomes (Thaler, 1980;
1985; 1999). Effectively, individuals form accounts (psychological accounts) regarding
the advantages and disadvantages of an event or option. A n example of h o w individuals
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perform mental accounting was provided by Reid (1994, 99-100), w h o described a bad
party he attended in his first year as a student at Harvard Business School.

Tickets were quite expensive ($60) and the party was unimpressive. The promised buffet
was a meagre spread of cold cuts, the facilities were shabby, and the band uninspired.
However, there was an open bar and this provided the impetus for a number of his

classmates to seek to amortise the ticket price against the bar. "Have one drink and yo
paid $60 for it; have ten and they are only six bucks apiece ", afar more reasonable
price. I ran into a barely coherent guy in the men's room who claimed to have hit the

$3.52 mark. "If I can put away three more beers before last call, then sixty bucks isn't
bad price, " he said triumphantly.

Historical costs, such as the ticket price, are sunk costs and should be ignored because
they are not relevant. Heath and Fennema (1996, 95) observed that "mental
depreciation is likely to distort marginal decisions because when people spread the
historicalfixedcost they create a warped view of marginal costs and benefits." Whyte
(1986, 316) defined mental accounting as "...an account which includes only the direct
consequences of the act" to explain the process by which individuals frame (evaluate)
the cost of an action. However, research treats mental accounting as a separate issue to
the framing effect. For example, Lipe (1993) examined the evaluation of performance
from traditional variance analysis and presented a framework that suggested the
cognitive impact on decisions was the result of both mental accounting and framing.
This implies that mental accounting is a separate construct to framing and thus is in
keeping with the explanation of the role of mental accounting.

Mental accounting describes a process of assessing advantages against disadvantages,
which does not explain preference. B y comparison, the framing of a particular decision
is a matter of preference; in experimental settings it is the construct manipulated to
influence the outcome of a decision. This sets the two constructs apart in so far as
mental accounting is an explanation of an internal cognitive process and specific to an
individual, while framing is manipulated on an external basis and thus is part of the
experimental design or circumstances of the decision. T h e process of mental accounting
is seemingly consistent with the theory of mental models of decision making.
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Expertise and Experience
The concept that expertise and experience are contributing factors in decision making
has received attention in the literature of business disciplines and the psychology of
decision making. Klein et al. (1993) proposed a naturalistic paradigm of decision
making, choosing to reject the strictly formal process in favour of an anthropological
approach with observations in real settings. This n e w paradigm is referred to as
"naturalistic decision making" and examines h o w experienced individuals m a k e
decisions in real-time situations.

Lesgold et al. (1988) examined the nature of expertise in diagnosing x-ray pictures.
They found that experts were able to focus on critical areas of specific cases and
disregard irrelevant information which novices related to in their diagnosis. Similarly,
studies in auditing (Biggs & M o c k , 1983; B o u w m a n , 1984; Biggs, Messier & Hanson,
1987) found that expert auditors used strategies to acquire relevant information
compared to novice auditors w h o examined information sequentially, thereby exposing
themselves to irrelevant information. Shanteau (1993) and Lesgold et al. (1988)
suggested that the main distinguishing feature was the ability of the expert to recognise
irrelevant information prior to making the decision. However, Neale and Northcraft
(1986) discovered that experts were susceptible to framing bias.

Research concerning expert and novice problem-solving strategies indicated that the
order of presentation of information to auditors had an impact on the development of the
"mental model" of the situation and on the decision process (Lindsay, 1986; Frederick,
1991). Mental models are m e m o r y structures, compiled over time from experience and
training, which assist in problem solving and related to mental accounting. Chi, Glaser
and Farr (1988) identified key characteristics of the performance of experts in terms of
h o w expertise is acquired and the conditions that enhance, as well as limit, the
development of high levels of cognitive skills. Table 3.2 summarises the various
domains in which expertise has been studied.
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Table 3.2
S u m m a r y of Research on Domains of Expertise
Ability demonstrated

Authors

Concept

T o excel in their o w n
domain.

Johnson, Duran,
Hassebrock, Moller,
Prietula, Feltovich &
Swanson(1981)
McKeithen, Reitman,
Rueter&Hirtle(1981)

Demonstrated the recognition of
diseases in medical diagnosis by
physicians.

T o perceive large
meaningful patterns in their
domain.
T o solve problems or
perform faster than novices
in their domain.
That experts have superior
short-term and long-term
memory.

Chase(1983)

Chase and Ericsson (1982)

That experts perceive a
problem in their domain
differently from novices.

Chi, Feltovich and Glasser
(1981)

That experts perform a
qualitative analysis to gain a
better understanding.
That experts are more aware
than novices of when they
have m a d e an error.

Paige and Simon (1966)

Larkin (1983)

Showed programmer's ability to
recall key programming language
and subroutines.
Found that experienced cab drivers
could recognise a shorter route to a
destination.
Found that trained memory experts
could recall more than 80 digits in a
short-term m e m o r y task and 809 0 % of digit groups from a week
earlier.
Found that experts in physics used
principles of mechanics to
categorise a problem whereas
novices used literal objects to
categorise the same problem.
Examined different approaches to
solving an algebra word problem.
Found that experts in physics would
often check their answer and
abandon certain solution attempts.

The literature suggests that experienced decision makers have highly developed
knowledge structures and use directed strategies to focus only on relevant information.
B y contrast, novices process information piecemeal and their judgements are influenced
by irrelevant information even if the difference is presented in an easily discernible
format. A n underlying assumption of this approach is that the decision maker is
expected to understand or comprehend all important factors related to the decision. This
concept is referred to as "intellectual capacity" (Lindblom, 1959). Intellectual capacity
enables decision makers to evaluate all possible choices and their impact on the decision
outcome (Provan, 1989). However, it is not always possible for decision makers to be
aware of, or comprehend, all the factors related to a decision problem. The
unpredictability and complexity of the consequences of a decision suggests that there
are limits to the intellectual capacity of decision makers.
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Time Preference
The concept of time is supposed to be irrelevant to rational decision making. However,
time does play a crucial role in choice situations (Elster, 1986). The consequences of
almost any given action can be spread over time. For example, one alternative might
yield immediate gains while another might yield larger gains, but the benefits are
delayed. W h e n choosing between alternatives whose consequences have different
temporal patterns, an individual must have a rationally justified w a y of comparing or
weighing benefits that accrue at different points in time. Strotz (1955) showed that time
preference leads to inconsistency, such as choice reversal, particularly if it has a nonexponential form. Non-exponential time preference implies that some of the future gains
lose their value more rapidly than others (Elster, 1986). Conversely, time preference is
exponential w h e n the present value of the future decays at a constant rate as time
progresses.

The point is that learning does take place and the memory from past decisions
influences present decision making. For example, Payne, Bettman and Johnson (1993)
stressed that decision strategies are learnt and provide the basic information-processing
skills applied in decision making. M o r e importantly the outcomes of past decisions are
likely to influence the application of a decision strategy. Garling et al. (1997) proposed
that m e m o r y of past outcomes was a prerequisite for influences on decisions in the
present. They referred to this effect as a form of 'integration across time'. A time-line is
useful for understanding the possible influences of past experience on decision
behaviour. Figure 3.1 provides a graphical representation of the integration of decision
outcomes across time.

Figure 3.1 illustrates that where an outcome (Oi) of a prior decision (Di) is
remembered, it m a y influence the evaluation and choice from the set of alternative
outcomes ([O2]) of the decision (D2) being considered at the present time (to). This
explanation is closely related to phenomena such as "prior outcomes" (Thaler &
Johnson, 1990); "sunk cost effects" (Arkes & Blumer, 1985); "multi-stage betting"
(Funk, Rapoport & Jones, 1979); and "escalation" (Brockner, 1992). This also suggests
that effects of prior outcomes involving risky choices m a y be a contributing factor.
Therefore, these factors should be included in research aimed at better understanding
the decision-making process.
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Figure 3.1
Integration of O u t c o m e s Across T i m e

Di

O,

-2

t-1

D2

*<)

[OJ

t+1

Time
Source: (Adapted from Garling et al., 1997)

Valence
Valence is a measure of an individual's evaluation of reward desirability (Gray & WertGray, 1999). Thus, valence represents the decision maker's preference of a particular
outcome. Kessler, Ford and Bailey (1996) defined valence as:
...a decision object's relation to particular goals, which could be seen as either
desirable or undesirable depending on the personal or situational concerns of a

decision maker. For example... for managers, gaining negative publicity is undesirable
because it can decrease a firm's value, whereas the loss of it could increase its value.
Valence is a term used in psychology to denote the different emotional experience
derived from pleasure as distinct from pain (Elster, 1998, 51).
The point is that losses are not always associated with a negative outcome just as gains
are not always associated with a positive outcome. Therefore, w h e n considering the
predicted influence of the framing effect, one must also be aware of the desirability of
the decision object— that is the valence. A n individual'sriskpreference is not
determined simply by the frame of reference; valence acts to moderate the framing
behaviour of individuals. This suggests that valence is yet another dimension to risk
preference.

Kessler, Ford and Bailey (1996) found that valence significantly moderated the
relationship between the frame of reference and risk preference. Individuals were found
to berisk-aversew h e n faced with value-increasing contingencies and risk-seeking when
faced with value-decreasing contingencies. They proposed thatriskpreference was not
determined by the frame alone and concluded that valence significantly moderated the
relationship between the frame of reference and risk preference. Figure 3.2 presents a
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graphical presentation of the concept ofriskpreferences as a function of both frame and
valance.

Figure 3.2
Risk Preference as a Function of F r a m e a n d Valence
Risk Seeking

Potential
Loss

Potential
Gain
Risk Averse
Source: (Adapted from Kessler, Ford & Bailey, 1996)

In effect, undesirable objects potentially create a paradox because the framing effect
predictsriskpreferences that are inconsistent with the certainty effect. In light of the
information presented in the figure, Kessler, Ford and Bailey (1996, 245) m a d e the
observation that:
... individuals' risk preferences are a function of the frame of reference moderated by

the valence of the decision object (i.e. value), where value-decreasing scenarios resul
in more risk-seeking preferences and value-increasing scenarios result in more riskaverse preferences.

In exploring another anomaly of valence, Hasen (1990) concluded that individuals were
at best described as quasi-rational in that they strive toward rational ends but are
influenced by cognitive constraints regarding their decision making underriskor
uncertainty. T h e reference to cognitive constraints is also a link back to the role of
mental models as raised with regard to the process of mental accounting.

Endowment

Effect ~ Loss Aversion

Behaviour in which an individual demands more compensation to give up an object than
they would be willing to pay for it is generally referred to by the term "endowment
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effect" (Thaler, 1980). The endowment effect is considered a manifestation of loss
aversion (van Dijk & van Knippenberg, 1996). Loss aversion refers to the concept that
losses loom larger than gains in the individual's mind (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
This phenomenon suggests that once a person possesses a good, it is immediately
considered more valuable than before they possessed the item; therefore, they are
reluctant to exchange the item for something else (Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, 1990).

This reluctance to trade was demonstrated in several experiments. In the first example,
subjects endowed with coffee m u g s were reluctant to trade with subjects endowed with
Swiss chocolate bars, and vice versa (Knetsch, 1989). In a similar study, subjects
endowed with coffee m u g s were reluctant to trade with subjects endowed with pens, and
vice versa (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990). The differences in perceived cost
were demonstrated empirically by Thaler (1980) and are described in the example
below.
Mugs worth approximately $5 were randomly given to one group of students. Minimal
selling prices were elicited from those given the mugs (with an incentive compatible
procedure that ensured honest reports). Minimal prices, sums of money such that they
would choose that sum rather than the mug, were elicited from another group of subjects

not given mugs. These two groups, sellers and choosers, faced precisely the same choice
between money and mugs, but their reference points differed. Those who were randomly
given mugs treated the mugs as part of their reference levels or endowments, and
considered leaving without a mug to be a loss, whereas individuals not given mugs
considered leaving without a mug as remaining at their reference point. In one
experiment the median value placed on the mug was $3.50 by choosers but $7.00 by
sellers.
The present body of research of the endowment effect provides strong evidence that the
endowment effect is robust across individuals and situations (Thaler, 1999; Haan, 1997;
Mackenzie, 1997).

Summary of Behavioural Concepts
The behavioural concepts involved in decision making m a y roughly be described as
mental models constructed by individuals to provide a general understanding of events.
Framing effects serve to place events in a context that provides meaning within an
individual's prior experience and the frame m a y be either positive or negative. A n
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individual assesses the desirability of an event outcome or goal through these mental
processes. Other behavioural concepts demonstrated to affect decision behaviour were
past experience, valence (desirability of the outcome) and the endowment effect. Thus,
behaviour m a y be viewed as a consequence of framing, experience, mental accounting,
valance and the endowment effect. These behavioural concepts provide an insight into
w h y individuals are likely to m a k e decisions that contradict not only the normative
model of rational decision making but also the explanations of other behavioural
theories examined in this chapter which seek to address the sunk cost effect.

Motivational Theories of Decision Making
Motivational theories and research concerning motivation are directed to identifying
factors that underlie behavioural actions such as decision making. Motivation is defined
as a cognitive state that generates behaviour and biases attention towards particular
goals (Kolasa, 1969, 249). Motivation is also considered as the driving force within
individuals that impels them to take a particular action (Schiffman & Kanuk, 1997).
There are various motivational theories concerning decision making which distinguish
between "rational motives" and "emotional motives". Motives cannot be easily inferred
from behaviour and empirical research requires a theoretical framework from which to
infer the appropriate motives for observed behaviour.

There are four key motivational theories that deal with decision-making behaviour:
expectancy theory, regret theory, hindsight bias, and self-justification theory.

Expectancy Theory
Expectancy theory is based on the notion that individuals acting in self-interest adopt
courses of action to maximize the probability of desirable outcomes for themselves
(Vroom, 1964; Isaac, Zerbe & Pitt, 2001). Decision makers assess the probability of,
and the value of, the goal outcomes for alternative courses of action and select the one
with the greatest subjective expected utility. Decision makers are presumed to focus on
future outcomes and the probability of achieving them, even after suffering setbacks to
the valence outcome with regard to rewards. Research using subjective probability as a
predictor (Arvey, 1972; Motowidlo, Loehr & Dunnette, 1978) provided only modest
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support for expectancy theory (Matsui, Okada and Mizuguchi, 1981). Mento, Cartledge
and Locke (1980) found that expectancy theories of motivation were less predictive of
performance than goal-setting theories. Staw and Ross (1978) found that expectancy
theory did not provide the capacity to predict the occurrence of entrapment or escalation
to commitment. Therefore, Klein (1989) suggested that expectancy theory did not
adequately describe or explain most motivational situations.
attribute in an effort to satisfy their aspirations.

In a meta-analysis of 64 expectancy studies, Ouelette and Wood (1998) found that the
frequency of past behaviour added significantly to the prediction of both intentions and
future behaviour, indicating experience is a variable. In a meta-analysis of 87 studies,
Shepherd, Hartwick and Warshaw (1988) found that 4 6 % of the variance in intention
was explained by the theory. A strong link between the intention to carry out a
particular act or m a k e a particular choice and the subsequent behaviour has been found
in most research using the theory of reasoned action.

Regret Theory
The idea that emotions play a part in decision making is not unusual. Regret theory
provides a framework for examining this phenomenon. Janis and M a n n (1977)
examined the role played by emotions in decision making and maintained that the fear
of future regret influences behaviour, thereby inducing people to m a k e more rational
choices. They proposed that an individual computes the m a x i m u m of possible regret for
each option and then chooses the option with the smallest m a x i m u m regret. Acker
(1997) proposed a modification of regret theory by including the concept of "tempered
regrets", in which zero regrets are replaced by a score representing the rejoicing felt
when the outcome obtained is better than the foregone outcome.

The assumption is that people experience emotions as a consequence of comparing the
actual outcome with the foregone outcome, had they m a d e a different choice. These
feelings cause people to experience regret when the foregone outcome might have been
better. Conversely, people rejoice when the foregone outcome might have been worse.
Further, the emotional consequences of decisions are anticipated and therefore taken
into account when making decisions. This implies that an important determinant of
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decision making is a tendency on the part of an individual to avoid negative postdecisional feelings such as regret, disappointment and self-recrimination in favour of
positive feelings such as rejoicing, elation and pride (Loomes & Sugden, 1982).

The corollary of this assumption is that anticipated regret leads to risk-aversion (Josep
et al., 1992; Richard, van der Pligt & de Vires, 1996). In a review of regret theory,
Kardes (1994,448) m a d e the statement that "Concern about regret that may follow a
bad decision promotes extreme risk-aversion." Regret theory postulates that utility
depends upon feelings evoked by the outcomes of the rejected options (Loomes &
Sugden, 1982), in addition to the possible pain and pleasure assigned to the outcomes of
particular options. Research provided evidence that individuals m a y be more
appropriately thought of as "regret-averse" rather than "risk-averse" (Larrick & Boles,
1995; Zeelenberg & van Dijk, 1997).

In order to assess regret as a motivating factor, the following scenario adapted from
Heyne (1997) provides an example of regret relating to a sunk cost.
Consider the plight of David and fane who pay $250,000 to acquire a block of land and
build a home overlooking the beautiful Lake lllaway. They expect to derive more than
$250,000 worth of benefits from living in their magnificent new home with its

breathtaking view. However, soon after taking up residence they notice that in additio
to the view Lake lllaway provides an odour. The smell gets progressively worse.
Finally, David and fane can't stand the odour any longer and decide to sell. However,
the best offer they receive is a mere $60,000. What should they do?

David and Jane should compare marginal benefits and marginal costs by weighing the
benefits of a reduction in odour against the cost of continuing to live in the house, which
is $60,000 foregone. In other words, would they choose to buy the house knowing what
they k n o w n o w , if the total price were $60,000? If not, then they should sell. W h a t of
the remaining $190,000 they invested? That is the loss they have incurred by paying
$250,000 for something that has turned out to be worth only $60,000. They can't avoid
the loss by staying in the house. David and Jane m a y regret their initial decision to buy
the land and then build the house. This m a y lead them to think more carefully before
making any further decisions, thus becoming risk-averse.
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The sunk cost effect is predicated upon the influence of past costs, such as the loss
referred to in the example and the unwillingness of individuals to let go of those past
costs (Teger, 1980; Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Northcraft & Neale, 1986; Garland, 1990).
Regret m a y be responsible for the intensity of the feeling that an individual has toward
sunk costs. Regret for having incurred a sunk cost leads to irrational behaviour. The
construct of regret has received minimal attention in prior research, possibly due to the
difficulty in its measurement and the close relationship to the concept of subjective
utility.

Hindsight Bias
The hindsight bias (Fischhoff, 1975) or the "knew-it-all-along effect" (Wood, 1978) is
also k n o w n as the "outcome bias" (Baron & Hershey, 1988). Hindsight addresses the
tendency of people to alter their perception of the inevitability of an event after the
outcome of that event is known. Research revealed that decision makers find difficulty
ignoring intervening events or outcomes (Fischhoff, 1975; W o o d , 1978; Arkes et al.,
1981; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). Demakis (1997, 190) defined hindsight bias as "a
tendency to exaggerate one's ability to have foreseen the outcome of an event, after
learning the outcome." For example, B r o w n and Solomon (1987) found that the
decision of a capital budgeting committee was evaluated differently after a project's
success or failure was reported than before the outcome data were available. In a study
of students and members of the Institute of Management Accountants (US), Lipe (1993)
found that managers making variance investigation decisions were evaluated more
favourably w h e n investigations revealed problems in the system. Accordingly, hindsight
bias does not offer an appropriate avenue for investigating escalation to commitment or
sunk cost effects. This is because hindsight bias occurs after the event and the sunk cost
phenomenon occurs during decision making.

Self-Justification Theory
Self-justification theory— attributed to Aronson ( 1 9 7 6 ) — was inspired by cognitive
dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) and proposed as a possible explanation for
escalation to commitment (Staw, 1976). Self-justification theory posits that individuals
are driven by the need to maintain the appearance of rational behaviour. The implication
is that people do not want to admit that their past decisions were incorrect and therefore
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they maintain their commitment to the chosen course of action to reaffirm the
correctness of the original decision. Staw and Ross (1978) applied self-justification
theory to circumstances in which individuals "may also increase their commitment of
resources to a course of action in order to protect themselves from suffering the
psychological costs of failure." This suggests that w h e n negative feedback regarding the
outcome of the initial resource allocation and the high need to justify the correctness of
the initial allocation of resources jointly occur, the likelihood of escalation of
commitment should be greatest (Brockner, 1992).

The contribution of self-justification theory is most apparent in the retrospective
analysis of circumstances involving entrapment or escalation to commitment (Rubin &
Brockner, 1975; Staw, 1976; Teger, 1980). T h e theory has also been applied to explain
circumstances involving cognitive rationalisation or behavioural inaction (Staw & Ross,
1978). In a similar approach, Bazerman (1984) reassessed earlier research on decision
making by focusing on escalation to commitment and group decisions concerning what
is referred to as "risky shift". Bazerman proposed that the escalation to commitment
observed in prior research was due to experimental cases being framed differently
between the groups. In regard to the research concerning risky shift, he suggested that
the decision was framed as a potential gain. A s a result, he argued a framing effect was
evident and that results of prior research that did not note these framing effects were not
conclusive.

A major problem with research based on self-justification theory is that the findings
m a y be open to alternative interpretations. B o w e n (1987) argued that prior escalation
studies did not demonstrate the phenomenon. Competing theories later emerged which
challenged self-justification theory and offered alternative explanations at the individual
level (expectancy theory and prospect theory) and the interpersonal and group levels
(group polarisation, modelling processes and self-presentation theory).

Summary of Motivational Constructs
Motivational theories provide an insight into the w a y an individual's behaviour m a y be
influenced. For that reason alone, motivation as a driving factor is important to the
examination of decision behaviour. The various motivating factors m a y be drawn
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together to provide a general overall perspective for examining behaviour. However,
certain motivational theories are less relevant to the observation of the sunk cost
phenomenon. In an attempt to identify the potential of a multi-theoretical application of
motivation theories, Staw and Ross (1978) constructed a model (depicted in Figure 3.3).
The model is based on the relationship between motivational factors and commitment to
prior decisions.

The model provides an insightful analysis of the relationship between motivational
factors for financial decision-making research. However, the model has not been
applied to the sunk cost effect, most likely because of the number of constructs and the
degree of monitoring and testing required to justify the model. Nevertheless, the model
provides a solid basis for understanding the complexity of motivational factors that
influence h u m a n behaviour.
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Figure 3.3
A Multi-theoretical Model of Commitment to a Course of Action

Source: (Staw & Ross, 1978)
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Social Learning Theories
Social learning theories are concerned with behaviour patterns that individuals develop
in response to environmental contingencies (Atkinson et al., 1987, 370). The cognitive
processes described in these theories are based on the assumption that because
individuals can represent situations symbolically, they are able to foresee the probable
consequences of their actions. Therefore, they are likely to alter their behaviour
accordingly. The emphasis in these theories is on the role of cognitive processes and
learning. Social learning theory suggests that learning takes place vicariously and
through imitation (Bandura 1965; 1976). Vicarious learning is learning by observation
where behaviour patterns are learned by watching the behaviour of others and observing
the consequences that result (Atkinson et al., 1987, 370).

To the extent that learned behaviour influences an individual's decision-making
behaviour, three social learning theories are examined in this section: reinforcement,
learned helplessness, and illusion of vulnerability. The discussion focuses on
explanatory powers for decision-making behaviour where sunk costs are involved.

Reinforcement Theory
Reinforcement theory addresses the consequences that are likely to influence behaviour
(Skinner, 1969). The theory suggests that 1) negative consequences or outcomes lead
decision makers to commit fewer resources to a prior course of action, perhaps in favour
of a n e w project and 2) that commitment to a course of action is a function of one's
experience from previous reinforcement (Gross, 1991). There are three basic principles
derived from this theory. First, consequences that give rewards increase a particular
behaviour. Second, consequences that give punishments decrease a particular behaviour.
Third, consequences that give neither rewards nor punishments extinguish a particular
behaviour.

The model predicts that systems of emotion can be used to explain the responses of an
individual in any situation (Wilson, Barrette & Gray, 1989; M a c A n d r e w & Steel, 1991;
Corr, 2001). However, this theory originated from research involving animals and has
received only minor attention in studies seeking to apply the concepts to h u m a n
behaviour (Corr, 2001). Singer and Singer (1986) found that individuals w h o were
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responsible for negative outcomes tended to either reduce or maintain their commitment
to a previously chosen course of action. However, as with expectancy theory, the
explanatory power of reinforcement theory lacks consistency.

Learned Helplessness Theory
Another social learning theory is "learned helplessness", generally applied to the
phenomenon of helplessness in humans (LaForge, 1989). A n individual suffering from
learned helplessness is likely to repeat the same behaviour, even though the behaviour
m a y be inappropriate for the type of decision being m a d e (Gross, 1991). The theory has
been applied to a variety of situations: advertising and sales promotion (Hart, 1983),
marketing (Hart & Moncrief, 1985) and performance deficits (Martinko & Gardner,
1982). The theory proposes that individuals w h o experience repeated failure from their
decision making m a y consider that no relationship exists between their actions and the
consequences. Therefore, the individual tends to ignore relevant information in
subsequent decision making. However, there is a lack of prior research concerning the
applicability of the theory to the sunk cost effect and escalation to commitment.

Illusion of Invulnerability
The third social learning theory deals with the "illusion of vulnerability" found in
decision making. The illusion of invulnerability theory posits that if a decision maker
has experienced an extended series of successes, a set-back will not necessarily cause
the individual to take a realistic view of the circumstances (Janis & M a n n , 1977). This
theory predicts that the same negative behaviour as espoused under the learned
helplessness theory will occur. While the underlying cause of the behaviour is the
opposite to the driver underlying learned helplessness both theories refer to learned
behaviour affecting decision making. The illusion of invulnerability is used to describe
one of the symptoms responsible for "group think" (Janis, 1989). In the group think
model, the illusion of invulnerability is applied to explain h o w experts in a group feel
that nothing can go wrong after making a decision because "everything is going to work
out all right because we are a special group and nothing can go wrong" (Janis, 1989).
However, as with the learned helplessness theory, there is a lack of prior research
concerning the applicability of the illusion of invulnerability to the sunk cost
phenomenon or escalation to commitment.
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S u m m a r y of Social Learning Theories
Social learning theories offer insights into h u m a n behaviour that assist in explaining
irrational decision behaviour that has been observed, such as the sunk cost effect. T h e
assumption underlying these theories is simply that individuals learn from experience.
W h a t an individual leams from experience is likely to influence a person's perception of
a decision task and the subsequent choice. T h e effects of experience m a y be manifest in
terms of reinforcement, learned helplessness, or the illusion of invulnerability. Thus,
experience can have a positive or a negative influence on the cognitive processes of an
individual and influence the outcome of the decision process.

Cognitive Theories of Decision Making
Cognitive theories employ information-processing models to explain h o w people m a k e
decisions. T h e w a y a person organises information is referred to as their cognitive style
(Cronbach, 1960). In particular, the research is concerned with h o w people process
information and then act on that information (Mason & Mitroff, 1973; Vasarhelyi,
1977). There are three key cognitive approaches heuristic/analytic reasoning, image
theory and prospect theory.

Heuristic/Analytic Reasoning
Heuristic reasoning involves the search for analogies that share characteristics with
familiar solved problems. Analytical reasoning involves reducing the problem to a core
set of causal relationships to determine some optimal outcome. H u y s m a n (1968, 51)
employed a heuristic/analytic framework to test for different cognitive decision styles
and found heuristic reasoning a difficult approach to define beyond characterising the
resulting decisions as being consistent with the prevailing internal and external
environment. Heuristic models have a wide range of application and relevance to the
types of decisions faced in economic and financial activities in which sunk costs are
prevalent.
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Image Theory
Beach (1990) proposed that decision makers apply their stored knowledge (referred to
as images) to set standards to guide decisions concerning what to do (goals/outcomes)
and h o w to go about achieving the outcomes (plans). The stored knowledge is further
partitioned into three categories representing the decision maker's vision of the course
of events (Beach, 1993, 165). The three categories are value image, trajectory image
and strategic image. Value image considers the principles of the decision maker in terms
of values, morals and ethics and is the basis for establishing goals worthy of pursuit.
Trajectory image relates to the agenda that underlies the goals. Strategic image implies
tactics and forecasts which relate to the goals (Beach, 1990; Beach & Mitchell, 1990;
Mitchell & Beach, 1990). The prediction is that a decision m a d e by an individual is a
function of the perceptions of the three images (Mitchell, Rediker & Beach, 1986;
Dunegan, Duchon & Ashmos, 1995).

These images are relevant to making decisions concerning adoption and progress
choices. Adoption decisions are concerned with n e w projects, plans or activities.
Progress decisions are related to deliberations concerning projects, plans or activities
already commenced. Dunegan, Duchon and A s h m o s (1995, 32) indicated that in both
adoption and progress decisions, image compatibility acts as a catalyst for differentiated
actions. W h e n information is perceived as positive, the trajectory and strategic images
are compatible and no change in course of action is deemed to be warranted by a
decision maker. Conversely, when information is perceived as negative, images appear
more incompatible and the decision maker is more likely to take action intended to
rectify the situation (Beach et al., 1992).

Dunegan, Duchon and Ashmos (1995) found that image compatibility acted as a
moderating variable, influencing the degree to which information was used by a
decision maker in choosing a course of action. They also found that the use of a
problem space image to guide resource allocation decisions varied with perceptions of
image compatibility. Typically, when image compatibility was high, information use
declined; when compatibility was low, information use increased. Image theory,
however, does not address the concept of imagination nor the processes by which
images are created and sustained. Unlike the proposed framework of Teigen and Brun
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(1995), image theory does not m a k e the link between causal considerations and
perceived realism in the framing of the scenario.

Prospect Theory
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) introduced prospect theory in response to the
shortcomings of research into decision making based on expected utility theory. Under
expected utility theory, ariskyprospect is considered to be equal to the expected utility
of its outcomes, obtained by weighting the utility of each possible outcome by its
probability (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 264; Sinn, 1985, 185). Accordingly, a rational
decision maker prefers the prospect that offers the highest expected utility (von
N e u m a n n & Morgenstern, 1947; Savage, 1954; Raiffa, 1961; Fishburn, 1984). Prospect
theory predicts that people prefer the sure option when choosing between two
alternative courses of action framed in terms of gains and prefer theriskyoption when
choosing between two alternatives framed as losses (van Schie & van der Plight, 1995).
The theory has been used to explain observed behaviour in fields such as economics
(Benartzi & Thaler, 1995; Odean, 1998), medicine (McNeil, Pauker & Tversky, 1988),
consumer behaviour (Thaler, 1985), social psychology and political science (Kramer,
1989; Quattrone & Tversky, 1988).

There are two aspects that set prospect theory apart from expected utility theory
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). First, in prospect theory, outcomes are expressed as
positive or negative deviations (gains or losses) from a neutral reference point, which is
assigned a value of zero. Second, in prospect theory, the value of an uncertain outcome
is multiplied by a decision weight— a monotonic function. Prospect theory
acknowledges that the process of making choices consists of two phases: an initial
editing phase followed by an evaluation phase (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 274). The
function of the editing phase is to allow for the information to be organised and
reformulated, thereby simplifying the subsequent evaluation and choice. The evaluation
phase is based upon the assumption that values are attached to changes rather than final
states and that decision weights do not coincide with stated probabilities (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979, 277).
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Prospect theory predicts that when outcomes are framed in a positive manner (gains),

there is an observable propensity for decision makers to be risk-averse, and conversely
when the frame is negative (losses), decision makers are more likely to be risk-seeking
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; 1986; 1991; 1992). In other
words, decision makers will prefer a sure gain over a gamble of equal expected value,

yet will reject a sure loss in favour of a gamble of equal expected value (Paese, 1995).
The framework of prospect theory is reliant on the integration of these various
constructs underlying the two basic phases as depicted in Figure 3.4.

Figure 3.4
Overview of Prospect Theory Constructs

Phase 1
(Editing)

Phase 2
(Evaluation)

I

I

Coding:
(Gain or loss relative to
some neutral reference point)
Combination:
(Simplify by combining
problems with identical
outcomes)
Segregation:
(Segregate anyriskless
component from the
risky component)

Decision

Value Function:
~ Deviations from reference point
~ Concave for gains & convex for losses
~ Steeper for losses than gains
Weighting Function:
~ The value of each outcome is
multiplied by a decision weight
~ Decision weights are inferred from
choices between prospects
~ Decision weights measure the impact
of event on desirability, not merely
perceived likelihood of the events

Cancellation:
(Discard components that
are shared by the offered
prospects - isolation effect)
Simplification:
(Rounding probabilities
or outcomes)
Detection of Dominance:
(Scanning prospects and
automatically reject
dominated alternatives)
Source: (Adapted from K a h n e m a n & Tversky, 1979)

Tversky and Kahneman (1981) showed that the concept of a gain or a loss is highly
subjective and that two different descriptions of the same outcomes can elicit different
choices.
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Prospect theory is similar to expected utility theory in that a decision maker is assumed
to first assign a utility or value v(o) to each outcome o, before choosing the option with
the highest s u m of values across all outcomes. However, under prospect theory there is
an assumption that a decision maker edits options prior to assigning values to outcomes.
This editing takes the form of framing of outcomes as gains or losses relative to a
reference point. T h e evaluation phase employs a value function v(») and a probability
weighting function 7t(«). For example, consider a choice between three outcomes: a with
probability/?, b with probability q, and the status quo with probability l-p-q.

The

prospect theory value of the choice is represented by:
n(p)v(a) + n(q)v(b)

The argument of the value function is that the choice payoff is the change in, but not the
level of, wealth. In prospect theory, the conveyor of utility is gains and losses measured
against s o m e implicit reference point. The value function is assumed to be concave in
gains and convex in losses, a pattern consistent with the experimental evidence on
domain-sensitiveriskpreferences. T h e curvature of the value function is also consistent
with the psychometric theory that states that as deviations from a reference point
increase, deviations occur with diminishing marginal sensitivity (Laibson &
Zeckhauser, 1998). T h e value function proposed by prospect theory is close to an " S "
shape. Figure 3.6 depicts this value function on the axis of positive/ negative values and
amount of losses/gains. T h e consistency of this " S " curve is contested. Salminen (1994)
suggested that the " S " shaped value functions of prospect theory were valid only for
convex preferences.

Garland, Sandefur and Rogers (1990,721) provided an explanation of the value
function calculation of a decision maker as depicted in Figure 3.5:
Thefirstalternative is riskless, whereas the second offers either a potential gain in

utility of Y units (should the entire investment be recovered and the individual winds up

at point B) or an additional loss ofY'-Y units (should the individual fail to receive an
return and wind up at point C). The convex shape of the value function under loss
assures that Y' - Y will always be less than Y. Given an even chance of additional loss

or complete recovery of the entire investment, the individual ought to prefer additional
investment to withdrawal.
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Figure 3.5
Prospect Theory Value Function with Incurred S u n k Costs and Alternatives of
Reinvestment and Withdrawal
Positive Value
Units

Losses

Negative Value
Units

Source: (Adapted from Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Garland, Sandefur & Rogers, 1990)

Under prospect theory, outcomes are expressed as positive or negative deviations (gains
or losses) from the reference point. However, Kessler, Ford and Bailey (1996, 245)
argued that "...a model in which gains are the only means to positive value and losses
are the only means to negative value is inconsistent with a subjective, contextually
grounded conception of decision making." They reasoned that the framing effect should
not be limited to desirable decision objects or outcomes and that incorporating valence
as a third dimension of theriskpreference evaluation framework would address the
issue. Figure 3.6 incorporates the additional value function related to the notion of
desirable and undesirable outcomes (also referred to as object valence) associated with
the choice.
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Figure 3.6
Prospect Theory Value Function Extended to Include Object Valence
Positive Value

Desirable
Alternative
(Risk Averse)

Undesirable
Alternative
(Risk Averse)

Amount
of Gains

Amount
of Losses

Desirable
Alternative
(Risk Seeking)

Undesirable
Alternative
(Risk Seeking)
Negative Value
Source: (Adapted from Kessler, Ford & Bailey, 1996)

According to Kessler, Ford and Bailey (1996)riskpreference is a function of the frame

effect moderated by valance. Thus, the criticism that prospect theory has focused on one

dimension - perceived desirability - is addressed by the inclusion of valance associate
with the options being considered. This provides for an alternative explanation of risk
behaviour that was otherwise not consistent with the risk preference predicted by
prospect theory.

W h y t e (1986, 316) compared prospect theory with the theory of self-justification and
argued that a distinct difference existed with regard to the role of sunk costs within the
two theories. Prospect theory relegated sunk costs to a component of the reference
point. T h e self-justification model included sunk costs in the computation that
determined whether the benefits of a particular course of action exceeded the costs or
not. A s a result of this difference, Whyte (1986, 317) proposed a model based on
prospect theory as an alternative to Staw's self-justification theory model. Whyte's
model is replicated in Figure 3.7.
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Figure 3.7
C o m m i t m e n t of N e w Resources to a Failing (or Successful) Course of Action
Reference
Level
t

1'
Action

1
r
Consequences

Decision to commit
further resources
as a choice between
losses.

fc

—

•

Risk seeking behaviour
Option with the
possibility of return
to reference point
preferred to option
of sure loss with
higher expected value;
Result is tendency to
commit n e w resources
to the s a m e negative
course of action.

Risk averse behaviour:
Sure gain preferred to
a possible gain of
higher expected value;
Result Is tendency to
commit n e w resources
based upon a criterion
more conservative than
that of standard economic
rationality.

Decision to commit
1
•

as a choice between
gains.

—

*•

Source: (Whyte, 1986,317)

The risk preferences of prospect theory depend on whether outcomes are framed as
gains or losses. T o capture loss aversion, the value function is assumed to kink at the
reference point, with a slope ratio of two to one between losses and gains respectively.
The value function was depicted in Figure 3.5 on page 75.

There are two important implications of the probability weighting function, a major
component of prospect theory. First, when small probabilities are over-weighted,
decision makers will m a k erisk-seekingchoices when there is low probability and highreward choice. Second, when high probabilities are under-weighted, complete insurance
is very attractive to the decision maker. Kahneman and Tversky's (1979, 1982)
experimental results suggest that the probability weighting function also exhibits
diminishing marginal sensitivity.

Risk & Uncertainty in Prospect Theory
The focus on negative or positive outcomes m a y be linked to the phrasing of the risk
evaluation. Table 3.3 provides an illustration of the predictive nature of prospect theory
in terms of the implied occurrence or non-occurrence of an event.
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Table 3.3
Influence of Phrasing in Appraising Uncertain Events
Type of

Outcome

Occurrence

Non-occurrence

Positive
(gains, successes, achievement
of goals)

Opportunity Orientation

Uncertainty Orientation

Negative
(losses, failures)

Risk Orientation

Safety Orientation

Source: (Adapted from Teigen & Brun, 1995)

Consistent with prospect theory, the outcome from an event can be either positive or
negative. T h e phrasing has close alignment with an image of attainment or success in
the case of a positive outcome and the occurrence is perceived as having an opportunity
or positive potential orientation. B y contrast, doubts regarding the likelihood of the
positive outcome (non-occurrence) suggest a lack of assurance or an uncertainty
orientation. With a negative outcome, the phrasing has connotations of loss or failure.
The occurrence is perceived as having ariskorientation while non-occurrence is more
in keeping with a safety orientation. According to prospect theory, decision makers tend
to berisk-aversein events framed as gains. This is explained in Table 3.3 as relating to
the possible non-occurrence— the decision maker is concerned with missing out on the
gain. T h e table matrix posits that different orientations are responsible for different
behaviour of decision makers.

Reference Points in Prospect Theory
The concept of a reference point is derived from the psychology of perception which
states that w h e n evaluating alternatives, h u m a n perceptual mechanisms appear to
consider differences rather than absolute levels (Festinger, 1957). A reference point acts
as a target level w h e n evaluating risky choices. T h e theory of rational decision making
postulates that individuals have a preference function to rank specific characteristics of
alternatives. Fisher (1930) noted "our present behaviour can only be affected by the
expected future...not the future as it will turn out but the future as it appears to us." In
order to be consistent in the measurement of alternatives, it is important to use the same
reference point.

The measurement of costs and benefits is affected by changing reference points when
applying preference ranking. W h e n the specific characteristics measured are dollar
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values, the change in reference point is especially important when determining profit or
wealth. Gains or losses are determined relative to the psychologically neutral reference
point that represents an individual's current or potential wealth. Outcomes under the
prospect theory model are expressed as gains or losses from this neutral reference point
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).

There is little evidence, other than reliance on economic and statistical research, to
support the claim that manipulation of the reference point through framing leads
conclusively to identification ofriskattitude. T h e statistical evidence in various research
articles supports the conclusion that the reference point influences a majority of decision
makers. T h e profile of the individual's propensity forrisktaking orriskaversion is not
strictly explained, rather it is interpreted from group behaviour. However, the findings
presented in the literature with regard to the influence from the reference point and
framing effects are very convincing.

Research relied on the assumption that managers use average industry performance as
the preferred reference point in assessingrisk(Figenbaum, 1990; Figenbaum &
Thomas, 1986; 1988; Jegers, 1991; W i s e m a n & Bromiley, 1991). Gooding, Goel and
W i s e m a n (1996) challenged previous research that assumed a single fixed reference
point w h e n defining two decision contexts. Extending the argument to decision making
in a broader context, this is consistent with circumstances where more than one
alternative is being examined. A single fixed reference point m a y not be possible in
such a situation and a decision maker m a y well employ more than one reference point.

Figenbaum, Hart and Schendel (1996, 223) were critical that no formal theory existed
for the formulation of reference points. Organisational strategic decision making
concerning the acquisition of assets is better explained by the notion of the reference
points within prospect theory according to these researchers. Bernstein (1986)
concluded that valuation of a risky opportunity depended far more on the reference
point from which the possible gain or loss could occur, than on the final value of the
assets. T h e implication was that the present wealth of an organisation acts as a reference
point against which future benefit is measured. March (1988a) and March and Shapira
(1987; 1992) proposed the concept of a variable reference point tied to expectations and
assumptions of the firm rather than the individual decision maker.
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Framing Effects in Prospect Theory
Studies provide evidence that the framing effect depends on task, content, and context
variables inherent in choice problems which themselves m a y involve distinct
psychological mechanisms (Fagley & Miller, 1987; Highouse & Paese, 1996; Levin et
al., 1985; Petrinovich & O'Neil, 1996; Roszkowski & Snelbecker, 1990). Kuhberger
(1998) conducted a meta-analysis of the influence of framing onriskydecisions and
found that a positive frame led torisk-aversionwhile a negative frame led to riskseeking, as predicted by the prospect theory model. While providing evidence that the
framing effect was a reliable phenomenon, the study highlighted the need to distinguish
between outcome salience manipulations and reference point manipulations as well as
drawing attention to the considerable effect that procedural features of the experimental
settings had on the size of the framing effect.

Fagley and Miller (1997), Jou, Shanteau and Harris (1996) and Wang (1996b) found
that individuals were morerisk-seekingwhen dealing with h u m a n life problems than
with m o n e y problems of the same probability structure. This phenomenon does not fit
the predicted value function of prospect theory. W a n g , Simons and Bredart (2001)
suggested that in socially unfamiliar or naive situations, framing effects could be an
indication of indecisiveriskpreference. There is evidence to suggest that the framing
effect is not a complete explanation of the influences exerted on individuals. Li and
A d a m s (1995) and Fagley and Miller (1997), using similar scenarios as reported by
K a h n e m a n and Tversky, failed to replicate the framing effect. Kessler, Ford and Bailey
(1996) questioned the certainty effect posited to be responsible for the concave (riskaverse) shape of a decision maker's value function above the reference point and
convex (risk-seeking) shape below the reference point. They proposed that risk
preference was not determined by the framing effect alone.

Framing, Risk Propensity and Risk Perception
U p o n reviewing prior research involving framing effects Pablo (1997) argued that
framing manipulations were unintentionally confounded with historical influences on
risk propensity; in particular providing small success or failure experiences that fostered
particular tendencies toward risk taking. In support of these claims, Pablo (1997, 6)
pointed to research that failed to find any framing effects (Cohen, Jaffray & Said, 1987;
Fagley & Miller, 1987) and research that found risk behaviour opposite to that predicted
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by prospect theory (Fishburn & Kochenberger, 1979; Hershey, Kunreuther &
Schoemaker 1982; Fagley & Miller, 1990). These consistent findings suggest that a
model ofriskbehaviour needs to examine variables beyond merely situational variables
(Pablo, 1997).

A review of the literature on the effect of risk on decision behaviour was conducted by
Sitkin and Pablo (1992). They concluded that prospect theory was not supported by all
the research findings. The implication drawn was that the contradictory findings m a y be
an artefact of the research methods used or that risk perceptions m a y be correlated with
a unidentified variable. Sitkin and Pablo (1992, 26) proposed that the unidentified
variable was likely to be risk propensity and then proceeded to develop a model to
support their assumption. Risk propensity is defined as the cumulative general tendency
of the individual to either take or avoid risks.

Sitkin and Pablo (1992) and Pablo, Sitkin and Jemison (1996) concluded that risk
propensity was a general tendency, rather than a universal propensity, on the part of an
individual to take or avoidrisks.In other words, individuals are not deemed to have one
singleriskpropensity, ratherriskpropensity m a y vary according to the prevailing
situation. Another key supporter ofriskpropensity was Wehrung (1989). Sitkin and
Pablo (1992) questioned the validity of prospect theory as an all-encompassing model
for observed deviations ofriskbehaviour. However, they also acknowledged that the
framing of the problem was a key determinant ofriskperception.

To explain the anomalies Sitkin and Pablo (1992) juxtaposed previously unrelated
research to compare risk propensity (risk-averse behaviour versus risk-seeking
behaviour) againstriskperceptions (positive perceptions versus negative perceptions).
They proposed alternative theories such as threat-rigidity (Staw, Sandelands & Dutton,
1981) and hypervigilance (Janis & M a n n , 1977) to explainrisk-aversebehaviour in a
negative frame and attention to opportunities (March & Shapira, 1987) for risk-seeking
behaviour in a positive frame. Threat-rigidity (Staw, Sandilands & Dutton, 1981)
hypothesises that w h e n an individual perceives a situation to be threatening the result
will be conservative, risk-averse behaviour. Threat-rigidity was found to be more
closely linked with considerations of uncertainty and uncontrollability while prospect
theory was linked with the consideration of loss (Ocasio, 1995). Hypervigilance (Jannis
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& M a n n , 1977) also posits that when a situation is perceived in negative, threatening
terms an individual will exhibitrisk-aversebehaviour. Therefore, w h e n a threat is
perceived, decision makers are more likely to respond in a conservative or protective
manner, preferring to remain with the status quo (Palmer, Danforth & Clark, 1995).
Attention to opportunities (March & Shapira, 1987) is based on the premise that when
an individual perceives a situation to be positive, they will focus their attention on the
opportunities inherent in that situation and will exhibitrisk-takingbehaviour.

Sitkin and Weingart (1995) found that risk propensity and risk perception moderated the
effect onriskbehaviour of framing and Pablo (1997) demonstrated thatriskpropensity
influencedriskbehaviour by moderating the perceived characteristics of a situation.
These findings highlight the importance ofriskperception in the decision-making
process. Clearly, the framework that Sitkin and Pablo (1992) developed provided an
explanation for observations ofriskbehaviour that contradicted the predictions of
prospect theory. O f the two major theories discussed in this section, prospect theory is
useful to predictriskpropensity and image theory provides insight intoriskperception,
which has been shown to moderate risk propensity. These two theories are incorporated
in the theoretical model proposed in Chapter 4.

Summary of Cognitive Theories
Cognitive biases are assumed to enter the decision process through the individual's
reliance on biased heuristics (Etzioni, 1988, 118). T h e models discussed m a y be viewed
as cognitive heuristics that are basically information-processing shortcuts (Wang,
1996a) which appear to be efficient and yet still seem to lead to systematic decision
biases and errors (Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982). Inherent in the heuristic
approach is the idea that in coping with uncertainty, individual decision makers use
some form of judgmental heuristics as general strategies for simplifying complex
decision tasks. A s a result of this over-simplified view of information processing, there
is an emphasis on the limited capacity of cognitive processes. T h e theoretical models
subjected to application and review provided suitable avenues for continued research.
F r o m the models presented in the literature, prospect theory and image theory, are the
most c o m m o n l y applied theories concerning behavioural analysis of decision making
and therefore were used in this research study.
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Applications to Management Accounting
Behavioural research in accounting differs from the economics and finance research
tradition in a number of ways (Watts, 1995). First, the focus is on the decision-making
process of the individual, rather than imposing the notion of maximizing expected
utility as the overriding calculus. Second, behavioural research in accounting tends to
use laboratory experiments or surveys, as distinct from economic research which
focuses on observation and econometric techniques. Third, behavioural research in
accounting draws from a diverse number of disciplines, such as cognitive and social
psychology.

Contextual Factors in Decision Making in Accounting
Factors not otherwise explicitly considered in the behavioural theories of decision
making under uncertainty influence the degree to which individuals become more or
less susceptible to the sunk cost effect. A n awareness evolved that contextual factors
influence decision making in systematic and predictable ways in a variety of decisionmaking contexts (Neale et al, 1987; Greenburg & Greenburg, 1997) for example:
accounting knowledge and opportunity costs (Vera-Munoz, 1998); acceptance of total
quality management (Fok, et al., 2000); entrapment in waiting situations (Rubin &
Brockner, 1975); and ambiguity preferences (Curley & Yates, 1985). Greenburg and
Greenburg (1997) examined three contextual variables with regard to transfer pricing
decisions: the cost situation (increased cost versus decreased costs), the role of the
player (buyer versus seller) and the prior relationship between the players (positive
versus negative).

A few issues need to be discussed before moving ahead to the application of prospect
theory and image theory in the management accounting context. T h e following sections
explore sunk cost and accounting information, opportunity cost, and the interplay
between sunk cost and opportunity cost.

Accounting Information Processing
A problem with early accounting decision research is the reliance on an input-output
paradigm. T h e input-output paradigm takes the simple view that information is the input
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that is then processed under some form of analysis which leads to the decision, or the
output (Mock, 1976, 141). It is acknowledged that decision making involves processes
more complex than the input-output paradigm can accommodate. A n early attempt was
m a d e by Ijiri, Jaedicke and Knight (1966) to establish a basis for researching the role of
accounting information through the use of a linear model of decision making. This
approach did not provide a useful framework since the model was concerned more with
the information and resultant decision than with the process itself.

The decision-making processes of individuals are of particular importance to the desig
of accounting information systems (Libby & Lewis, 1977). Research on patterns of
information processing found that individuals adapt their processing patterns according
to changes in the characteristics of the decision problem (Payne, 1976) as well as
different decision environments (Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1993). The work of Driver
and M o c k (1975) introduced the "human information processing system". They focused
on the decision style of individuals with the intention of determining the most suitable
accounting system to provide for information needs. The problem was that in an
organisation in which a number of decision makers existed, consideration of moderating
or confounding variables— such as the existence of more than one decision style— was
lacking. These findings provided evidence that there are individual differences in the
way people respond torisk,their attitudes toward money, and their patterns of
information processing during decision making.

Costing Dilemmas
The argument concerning the exact nature of a sunk cost is in need of clarification. A s
defined in Chapter 2, a sunk cost is devoid of value at the point in time when a decision
is to be made. This poses a quandary, since an item m a y well have value in terms of
continued use. W h a t then, is the nature of the value that is implied in the economic
definition and assumed in management accounting? In an endeavour to understand this
anomaly, the following example is proposed. This scenario is based on observations of
people's behaviour.
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Example

3.1

S u n k Cost Decision Scenario
A person is intent on buying a new car. The choice is narrowed d o w n to 2 particular
models; a Mazda 323 and a Mazda 626. A decision is made and the new Mazda 323 is
purchased at a cost of $20,000. O n e week later the person decides that the Mazda 323 is
not suitable; it is too small, and under powered (it really does not matter what the
reasons are since once a person has convinced him or herself that the car is not
acceptable any number of reasons could be found).

As a result the person returns to the dealership from whom the car was purchased and
seeks to trade the existing Mazda 323 for a new Mazda 626. However, the trade
allowance placed on the Mazda 323, even after much negotiation, is $19,000 which is
$1,000 less than the price paid just one week prior. This causes some degree of unease,
tension and uncertainty within the person. In effect, this means that in order to attain the
Mazda 626 the person must n o w accept a loss of $1,000. The important issue is h o w
much value the person places on the alternative- which is the Mazda 626. If there is a
perceived greater value (utility) then the rational choice should be to buy the new car
and ignore the $1,000 loss, because it can not be recovered.
Conclusion - the $20,000 is a sunk cost, the market value of the asset is $19,000
therefore the decision facing the person is whether to put this $19,000 towards the
purchase of a n e w Mazda 626.

Note, the $20,000 cannot be recovered as even if the person attempts to sell the vehicle
privately, a buyer is not likely to pay the exact same price for the vehicle when they
could just as easily go to a dealer and buy a new vehicle. In other words, there is no
incentive to buy the car at full price. The Mazda 323 still has value it is just that the
value has reduced as far as exchanging it for a new Mazda 626.

This example makes the point that a sunk cost is the past value of an item and the
present market value is the only relevant consideration in making a decision. Another
interpretation is that the utility or value perceived in an alternative is an opportunity
cost. This m e a n s that the opportunity cost in this circumstance is related to the utility
foregone if the choice is m a d e not to purchase the desired vehicle. Utility does not have
to be expressed in terms of profits nor in dollar value. There m a y well be other factors
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that underlie the reasoning for preferring one option to another. These factors m a y be
contextual to the decision being faced or to the person making the decision.

Costing in Economic Theory
The literature regarding sunk cost and opportunity cost suggests that the two types of
costs are related— an opportunity cost today will become a sunk cost tomorrow (Ansic
& Keasey, 1994, 185). This raises the question "What about a prospective sunk
cost?"— for example, w h e n a firm is considering whether to purchase a specialised
asset such as an item of equipment. The firm must decide whether the investment in the
specialised equipment is cost-effective. A n issue for consideration is whether the item
of equipment is so specialised that it can not be used for any other alternative use. This
is a characteristic referred to as asset specificity. Transaction cost economics provides a
theoretical framework from which to examine asset specificity.

Transaction Cost Economic Theory
Transaction cost economics asserts that there are rational economic reasons for
arranging s o m e transactions one w a y and some transactions another (Williamson, 1985,
52). Transaction cost economics is distinguished from other forms of economic
evaluation by the concept of asset specificity (Williamson, 1985, 52). Asset specificity
refers to durable investments that are incurred in support of a particular transaction; the
opportunity cost of such an investment is deemed to be m u c h lower in best alternative
uses or by alternative users should the original transaction be prematurely terminated
(Williamson, 1985, 55).

Five categories of asset specificity were identified by Williamson (1989,143):
/. Site specificity, as where successive stations are located in a cheek-by-jowl relation
each other so as to economize on inventory and transportation expenses;
2. Physical asset specificity, such as specialized dies that are required to produce a
component;
3. Human asset specificity that arises in a learning-by-doing fashion;
4. Dedicated assets, which are discrete investments in general purpose plant that are
made at the behest of a particular customer; and
5. Brand name capital.
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Problems with Expected Utility Theory
Violations of Expected Utility Theory
Violations of expected utility highlight the subjective nature of decision making in real
world settings. T h e subjective nature of the various anomalies suggest that the
underlying principles are more likely to restrict research than to provide explanations of
actual decisions (Schwartz, 1998, 93). This normative assumption of utility
maximization as a description of rational decision making was refuted by recent
research (Bagozzi, 2000). Herrnstein (2000, 356) observed that the utility maximizing
paradigm "...accounts only poorly for actual behaviour" with violations reported with
regard to the discarding of sunk costs, judgement of fairness, escalation of commitment
and principles of marginal analysis.

The main focus of utility theory (explored in Chapter 2) is to explain consumption at th
level of the individual decision maker. Keen (2001, 22-53) provided a critique of the
inconsistencies of utility maximization. In order to better understand this phenomenon,
Ellsberg (1961) proposed that probability ambiguity gaveriseto choice behaviour that
was inconsistent with expected utility theory. H e found that individuals were often
ambiguity-averse (that is, they preferred risk to ambiguity). In view of these findings,
Machina (1987, 1999) showed that expected utility theory failed a variety of empirical
tests. Bagozzi (2000, 95) suggested that research should include the psychological
conceptualisations of behaviour.

Subjective Expected Utility Theory
Frisch and Clemen (1994) credited Savage (1954) with developing "Subjective
Expected Utility Theory" by modifying and extending expected utility theory to cover
circumstances in which probabilities are not given. Subjective expected utility arrives at
the same m a x i m u m expected utility decision rule; however, the probabilities are the
decision maker's personal or subjective probabilities for uncertain outcomes. Hence, the
subjective nature of the expected utility is relevant to outcomes. A more extensive
discussion of subjective expected utility theory and expected utility theory is found in
von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986).
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Explaining the S u n k Cost Effect
Research suggests that the rational decision model posited by normative theory
overlooks the influence of an individual's personal biases and cognitive capacity for
decision making, thus providing a number of alternative explanations for the sunk cost
effect. The rationale for the observed behavioural differences varies from the desire to
avoid waste (Arkes & Blumer, 1985); the commitment to and need to justify prior
decisions (Staw, 1981; Brockner, 1992); and the tendency to berisk-seekingas a result
of previous losses (Whyte, 1986; Garland & Newport, 1991). Sunk costs, therefore, m a y
be viewed as appearing relevant rather than irrelevant to decision makers in certain
circumstances.

Staw (1976) and Whyte (1991) found that the sunk cost effect was more likely to occur
when the decision maker felt personally responsible for negative consequences which
might result from the original decision. In contrast, Simonson and N y e (1992) found
that accountability for prior decisions decreased the sunk cost effect. However, these
results were questioned by Larrick, Morgan and Nisbett (1990) on the grounds that the
findings were likely biased by the use of business students as subjects w h o were
formally trained to avoid sunk costs. In addition, Arkes and Blumer (1985) found no
consistent relationship between the sunk cost effect and responsibility for the decision.
The findings from these studies indicate that the relationship between sunk cost
behaviour and personal responsibility remains unclear and requires further investigation.

Baron (1999) suggested that the inclusion of sunk cost information in a decision is a
cognitive bias in decision making. If all factors on which the decision is based are equal,
then greater utility should be achieved by ignoring past costs and focusing solely on
future consequences. In cases involving sequential decisions, Arkes and Blumer (1985)
identified a behavioural bias and found that individuals do include sunk costs in their
evaluation process. In such cases, they found there was a tendency to escalate the
commitment of resources, despite the existence of information suggesting such a
decision had a high probability of failure. However, observed sunk cost behaviour might
indeed be rational when the decision is to avoid waste. This implies that the behaviour
is rational in the sense that there is an increase in overall utility by including sunk costs.
The increase in utility in this case is due to minimizing loss.
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Roodhooft and Warlop (1999) studied the role of sunk cost information in a c o m m o n
management accounting scenario: the decision to outsource or to continue with internal
production. This decision scenario is a "make or buy" decision; one with which most
accountants are conversant. They found three significant influences with regard to an
outsourcing decision task presented to hospital managers. First, asset specificity had an
influence on the decision process. Second, sunk cost information also influenced the
decision not to outsource. Third, prior commitment to internal production systematically
reduced the willingness to outsource. The scenario provides further opportunities to
examine the relationship between sunk cost and framing effects within a task that is
relevant to current decision-making trained financial professionals, such as managers
and accountants.

Examples of the Sunk Cost Effect
A classic example of the sunk cost phenomenon demonstrating irrational decision
making was developed by Thaler (1980). In his example, a prominent individual paid
$5,000 to join a major tennis club and developed tennis elbow after a short period.
Rather than give up tennis in favour of a less strenuous sport, the individual persisted
with tennis, thus refusing to quit. The individual continued to the point of incurring
medical and pharmaceutical costs far in excess of the $5,000 sunk cost to join the club,
not to mention incurring intangible social costs of pain and suffering. Normative theory
suggests that this behaviour is irrational because sunk costs should not be a
consideration in the decision taken as to whether or not to give up the sport.

Business literature deals with sunk cost under two broad categories. First, there is an
approach which is concerned with the physical magnitude of the sunk cost in
comparison to the size of the firm or the project. For example, a sunk cost of $10,000 to
managers of a large firm with total assets of $10,000,000 would consider the sunk costs
to represent a small percentage of total capital. However, the same sunk cost amount of
$10,000 to a firm with only $100,000 total assets represents a m u c h larger percentage of
total capital. T h eriskand the potential loss looms larger for the small firm than for the
large firm. T h e concept that "losses loom larger than gains" is a pivotal notion raised
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by K a h n e m a n and Tversky (1982); it was suggested that this principle will impact on
the decision-making process.

Second, there is an approach where issues pertaining directly to the decision maker are
more complex; there m a y be any number of factors underlying the individual's process
of rationalising a decision. O n e such factor is the notion of self-interest. Self-interest
underpins the theory of utility maximization and suggests that survival is a strong
motivating factor in the explanation of h u m a n behaviour. Other issues pertaining to the
decision maker take into consideration the personality or cognitive attributes of the
individual in order to provide an explanation of the decision-making process. This
category of research primarily relies on the economic model of utility maximization to
explain the expected use of sunk cost information.

Finally, there is the theory that individuals tend to treat gains and losses asymmetric
(Fershtman, 1996). T o explain this concept in the framework of prospect theory, the
aggravation that a person "... experiences in losing a sum of money appears to be
greater than the pleasure associated with gaining the same amount" (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979, 279). This phenomena is also referred to as loss-aversion. Loss-aversion
involves the integration of the decision rather than the segregation of the decision which
results in a decision under sunk cost.

Prospect Theory and Utility Issues
Prospect theory is a descriptive model of decision making capable of explaining
violations of normative decision theory. A distinguishing feature of the theory is the
utility function. Under prospect theory, the utility function is defined as changes in
wealth relative to a reference point, unlike the utility function in expected utility theory
which is simply defined as final wealth states (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979,277). The
reference point is usually assumed to correspond with the status quo or an individual's
current asset level (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 286). Prospect theory further posits
that in certain circumstances the reference point can be affected by the manner in which
alternatives are expressed— a phenomenon k n o w n as framing (Tversky & Kahneman,
1981,453).
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Expected utility theory assumes that all decision makers arerisk-averse(March, 1988a,
5; Rabin & Thaler, 2001, 219). This means that a decision maker has a utility function
that is uniformly concave or that departure fromrisk-aversebehaviour will only occur
under unusual circumstances (Altaf, 1993, 91; Rabin, 2000, 1282). Under prospect
theory, the value function is assumed to be steeper in the domain of losses than in the
domain of gains, suggesting that losses have greater subjective impact than gains of an
equivalent magnitude (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 279). Research relating to decisionmaking in finance has focused on the tendency by investors to sell assets that have
gained value (winners) and retain assets that have lost value (losers) (Shefrin &
Statman, 1985). The main concern of financial behavioural research is loss aversion.
The study of this phenomenon can be found under the names of disposition effect, status
quo effect and endowment effect (discussed earlier in Chapter 3).

Summary of Decision Factors in Prospect Theory
Prospect theory attempts to explain aspects of decision behaviour (irrational behaviour)
that violate expected utility theory. Prospect theory differs from expected utility theory
because the theory proposes that an editing phase occurs in the decision-making
process. The editing phase serves to reduce the cognitive requirements in the evaluation
of decision alternatives or prospects. This is achieved through reformulating prospects
through several editing operations (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 274). The
reformulation, in turn, affects the decision frame and ultimately the decision reached.

The evidence suggests that in conditions of choice under uncertainty, the structure of
tasks not only causes inconsistencies in expression of preference, but actual consistent
reversals of preference. A number of factors are indicated as affecting an individual's
capacity to m a k e choices. The factors appear to be the complexity of the task as
represented by the number of alternatives and the number of dimensions per alternative;
the extent to which dimensions are commensurable; the order of information
presentation (viewing alternatives in sequence versus simultaneous presentation of the
information); missing information concerning dimensions on particular alternatives;
familiarity with the kind of decision task; and the importance of the choice (Hogarth,
1980).
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Applying Prospect Theory
The issues pertaining to prospect theory raised in the literature m a y be categorised
according to three general areas of interest. T h e first area is research concerned with the
testing of the underlying constructs and modelling of the influences in the decisionmaking process. T h e second area is research which tests the existence of the
phenomenon, in particular the impact on decision making of sunk cost, opportunity cost,
and escalation to commitment. T h e third area is research that questions constructs or
introduces alternative frameworks focused on particular aspects within prospect theory
or the failings of prospect theory.

The manner or context in which information is provided represents a potential source of
bias that m a y affect the decision maker's formulation of the problem, the decision frame
adopted, and ultimately the decision choice. Studies such as Staw and Ross (1978)
considered the possibility of personality and motivations in examining the relationship
between decisions and cognitive ability. However, the relationship w a s marginalized or
discarded for the lack of a valid instrument and the difficulty in applying psychological
tests with so m a n y subjects involved. Staw and Ross (1978, 60) concluded:
The present data did not show any consistent effects of personality variables on
investment behaviour and unfortunately provided few research leads in this
area... Some caution must be exercised in coming to this conclusion, however,
since these personality scales were not administered to the entire sample and
the instruments varied in their internal validity.

In essence, prospect theory represents one component of a jigsaw puzzle concerning
decision making involving the sunk cost effect. Other theories provide further snippets
of the puzzle, yet even w h e n these are assembled together they are not completely
representative of the reasons for observed irrational behaviour. Behavioural theories
offer a tantalising one-sided view that is concerned with cognitive issues and heuristic
processing models. However, even the limited opportunities offered by behavioural
theories are far m o r e enticing for empirical research than research employing
motivational theories.
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Figure 3.8 presents an overview of two main streams pertaining to the constructs and
their variations, which evolved from research concerning prospect theory.
Figure 3.8
Prospect Theory's Underlying Issues
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Reference Point in Prospect Theory Applications

The reference point is the point from which the individual assesses the starting poin

their value function according to prospect theory. The reference point can be neutral
it can be influenced by the perceived present position in terms of wealth. Sunk costs

have been shown to influence the reference point in terms of escalation to commitment.

Framing Effect in Prospect Theory Applications

The framing effect also plays an important role in prospect theory. By introducing the

concepts of gains or losses an individual's value function can be influenced so that t
commitment to a course of action can be explained in terms of the framing effect. The
following steps are identified in Figure 3.9.
Stepl
Create a task with a reference point that includes a sunk cost.
•
This identifies the reference point for the decision maker
•
This assist in measuring the framing effect
Step 2
Create two versions of the task by incorporating a framing effect such as gains or losses.
•
A decision maker confronted with the different task frame should n o w perceive the situation
differently from the same reference point
Step 3
Duplicate the task; however, change the sunk cost amount which should move the reference
point.
•

This provides a different reference point from which a decision maker is likely to perceive
the task.
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•

This assists in measuring the influence of the sunk cost effect

Step 4
Duplicate the task and change the sunk cost amount which should move the reference point and
produce two versions of each with a framing effect such as gains or losses.
•

This assist in measuring the influence of the framing effect at different levels of sunk cost.

Figure 3.9
Framing Effects and Reference Point Manipulation
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Framing Effect
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Stepl

Value

Value

Reference Point

Framing Effect

Losses

Gains

Sunk Cost

Sunk Cost

Applying Prospect Theory to Issues and Questions
Thus, through the investigation of prospect theory undertaken to this point, the
following research issues and questions could be addressed.
Why do individuals make irrational decisions? For example, why choose not to
outsource when the optimal choice is to outsource?
•

T o address this type of question, a task specifically designed to address outsourcing
decisions can be developed with the inclusion of prospect theory constructs.

Why do individuals escalate commitment

to a failing course of action? Reasons may be

due to:
•

Sunk cost effect, which can be tested in terms of the reference point.

•

Framing effect, which can be tested in terms of gains or losses.
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Prospect theory provided a model that enabled the sunk cost effect on decision-making
behaviour to be tested and measured. The work of Dunegan (1993) provided a useful
basis for extending sunk cost research by examining the role of the reference point and
the framing effect. Dunegan's scenario encompassed a number of constructs specific to
prospect theory and decision making under sunk costs. Scenarios were constructed in
context of continued investment in light of sunk cost. This specific research study
formed the basis for the empirical surveys undertaken in this research.

Unanswered Problems/Issues of Sunk Costs
Decision research tends to emphasis rational, or at least analytical processes, rather than
intuition and holistic thinking. Smith and Kida (1991, 487) argued that "conclusions
drawn regarding specific professional judgements should...be based on investigations
using tasks and subjects representative of those contexts." The research reported in this
thesis employed tasks that were contextual to the particular subjects and focused on the
effects of sunk cost and opportunity cost information. The effect of age, gender,
experience, and expertise of subjects was also examined.

To conclude, there were a number of issues which posed interesting questions
concerning the role of framing in examining the sunk cost phenomenon. First, h o w does
experience and expertise affect decision making? Are experts more or less likely to be
influenced by framing effects— a matter, which receives scant attention in the literature.

Second, opportunity costs are the antithesis of sunk costs. While sunk costs are past an
are irrelevant, opportunity costs occur in the future and are relevant for decisions. This
provides an interesting conundrum. Are decision makers really likely to treat the two
costs differently in their decision making process?

Contextual factors may also be responsible for observed variations in the sunk cost
effect. T h e literature offered a number of plausible alternatives, the most prominent
being expertise, experience and prior knowledge. T h e proposition that contextual factors
m a y be moderating or confounding variables of the sunk cost effect was examined from
the perspective of different professional groups. Three surveys were delineated on the
basis of three groups: hospital managers, accountants and financial planners.
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Chapter Summary
Behavioural theories offered a broader view of the factors likely to be involved in
influencing an individual's cognitive processes w h e n making a decision. The variety of
explanations allowed for the existence of a complex world in which events m a y never
be exactly the same. This provided a framework for more insightful research than was
possible under the narrow economic perspective of rational decision making. This
literature review revealed, contrary to the assumptions espoused by normative theory,
that people do not always act in what academics refer to as a "rational manner" w h e n
making financial decisions. Sunk cost information is taken into consideration by people
and results in "irrational" behaviour, such as escalation of commitment. Researchers
attempt to explain such behaviour in ways that can be understood using theories that
focus on motivation and theories concerned with the cognitive decision process of
individuals.

The cognitive theories provided the most compelling evidence concerning the role of
sunk cost information. Prospect theory, in particular, provided an insightful structure
from which to conduct an empirical analysis. T h e two main constructs of prospect
theory are the reference point against which an individual compares the prospects and
the framing effect that relates to the w a y that those prospects are perceived. The
reference point is consistent with the notion of a level of wealth against which gains or
losses can be measured. Prospect theory holds that "losses loom larger than gains" so
that the negative utility associated with a loss will be greater than the positive utility for
a gain of the same amount. The framing effect holds that the w a y in which a prospect of
a decision is framed will influence an individual's propensity forrisk.T h e proposition is
that a negative frame for a prospect will causerisk-seekingbehaviour while a positive
frame will result inrisk-aversebehaviour.

The literature confirmed the existence of the "sunk cost effect". Issues identified by th
review indicated that further research could provide support for the existence of this
effect across a wide population of professionals. Prior research tended to employ an
experimental method. There was an opportunity to broaden the research through the use
of surveys. Replication of prior research in different circumstances on different

Page

96

Chapter 3 ... Behavioural Theories of Sunk Cost

populations also provided an opportunity for the validity of the findings and the
existence of effects of perceived sunk cost to be explored.
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CHAPTER 4
Research Design and Method
Chapter Introduction
This chapter describes the research design and methods used for data collection and
analysis. T h e issues of reliability and validity of the research study were addressed by
following a set of tactics at specific stages of the research process and these tactics are
presented in some detail. A multiple survey approach involving the replication of prior
research w a s employed to further enhance validity of the survey instruments.

Constructs relevant to the sunk cost effect were operationalised from the literature
reported in Chapter 3. Variables in the survey instruments are categorised as
independent or dependent according to the structure of the tasks. A framework was
implemented to address instrumentation bias and measurement error. Selection of each
sample followed a process appropriate for the population size and the intended target
population for the sample frame.

Response rates for each survey are reported and were considered to be within
acceptable parameters for the nature of the empirical research. Selection of methods for
conducting analysis of the data collected were based on classification of variables and
statistical techniques deemed appropriate according to the research literature. Details of
the statistical methods are also outlined in detail in this chapter.

Overview of Research Design and Method
The procedures and methods associated with survey research were developed and
refined over a long period of use in disciplines such as psychology, sociology and
statistics (Kerlinger, 1986, 377), as well as in the business disciplines. Survey research
is a specific type of field study that involves the collection of data from a sample drawn
from a well-defined population (for example, all accountants operating in Queensland)
through the use of a questionnaire (Visser, Krosnick & Lavrakas, 2000, 223). Mail
surveys as a means of data collection are widely used in accounting research. Surveys
are frequently used to obtain perception data from user groups with respect to annual
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report content and usage (Courtis, 1989). Three direct mail surveys were used in this
research as the means for collecting data.
Types of Survey Research
There are two major types of survey research (Kerlinger, 1986). The first type is
"exploratory" in which the objective is to become more familiar with a topic. There is
usually no model in exploratory research and the constructs of interest need to be better
understood and measured. A n exploratory survey is useful in determining, for instance,
the benefits that m a y be associated with adopting n e w accounting systems and problems
that impede its successful implementation. The resulting data is then refined to identify
n e w possibilities or constructs and thus a model or framework for subsequent research
is developed. Exploratory surveys are described as indispensable in the early stages of
studying a phenomenon due to this potential for theory building (Dubin, 1978).
Evolution of research concerning a phenomenon increases understanding or the
certainty with respect to knowledge.

The second type of survey research is "explanatory research". This type of survey is
directed at finding causal relationships among variables, which is achieved by applying
theory-based expectations on h o w and w h y variables should be related (causality).
Hypotheses m a y be basic (that defined relationships exist) or m a y be directional (the
relationships between variables are positive or negative) (Kerlinger, 1986). For instance,
an explanatory study could explain, hypothesise, and test for a positive relationship
between the existence of an Activity Based Costing system and success in cost
management. Results then are interpreted and in turn contribute to further theory
development or refinement.

The ultimate aim of most survey research is theory development (Fowler, 1988, 1993;
Kerlinger, 1986). That is, survey research should better explain or predict a
phenomenon. T o do so, consistent relationships between the various theoretical
concepts need to be established and verified through continuous testing and extension.
Kerlinger (1986) recommended that the unit of analysis should be clearly defined from
the outset and that all questions in the instruments should be designed to collect
information at a level consistent with the specified unit of analysis. The most c o m m o n
survey design is cross-sectional where information is collected at one point in time from
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a sample chosen to represent the population. In this research study, the unit of analysis
was clearly identified for each survey and the questions were specifically focused at the
level of the targeted unit of analysis.

Surveys are used in accounting research because they offer several advantages. They are
a cost-effective and efficient means of collecting research data (Courtis, 1989) and large
amounts of data can be obtained from a sample (Kerlinger, 1986). They provide a
means of collecting information anonymously and from geographically dispersed
individuals. Finally, mail surveys provide a w a y of gathering data from individuals w h o
m a y not be accessible through other means (Courtis, 1989).
Validity and Reliability of Survey Research
Surveys tend to be weaker with regard to matters of validity and strong concerning
reliability (Litwin, 1995). T o be valid, a survey needs to be accurate in regards to the
measurement of the variable(s), and to be reliable, a survey merely needs to be
consistent in the application of the instrument (Fink, 1995c, 4). A valid and reliable
survey can yield critical information and provide important insights into the topic being
studied (Litwin, 1995).
Validity in Survey Research
Validity refers to the degree to which a survey instrument assesses the constructs that
the instrument is intended to measure (Fink, 1995a, 46). A survey's constructs are
measurable if two or more people can easily agree on all the words and terms used to
describe the purpose of the survey (Fink, 1995c, 2). There are three primary types of
validity: construct validity, internal validity and external validity.

Construct validity
Construct validity is a measure of h o w meaningful the scale or survey instrument is
when applied to measure a construct or trait (Litwin, 1995,43). Construct validity is
established experimentally to demonstrate that the survey instrument distinguishes
between people w h o do and do not have certain characteristics (Fink, 1995a, 51).
Construct validity m a y be established in one of two ways:
1. The researcher hypothesises that the new measure correlates with one or more measures
of a similar characteristic (convergent validity) and does not correlate with measures of
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dissimilar characteristics (discriminant validity). This form of construct validity is most
appropriate to instruments that purport to measure attitudes or personality variables.
2. The researcher hypothesises that the measure can distinguish one group from another on
some important variable. This form of construct validity is more appropriate to survey
instruments that seek to measure differences between groups due to manipulation of the
variables within the survey instrument itself.

Internal validity
Internal validity is concerned with the establishment of causal relationships (Fink,
1995a, 49). Internal validity error addresses the question of whether differences in the
dependent variable were solely caused by the independent variable (that is, the
experimental treatment) or whether other variables could be confounding the predicted
relationships (Malhorta & Graver, 1998, 414; Zikmund, 1989, 284). In experimental
designs using survey research, it is possible to control extraneous effects on the
dependent variable by using experimental controls or by homogenising the sample
groups (Malhorta & Graver, 1998, 414; Alreck & Settle, 1985, 68). Formal methods
such as follow-up interviews with respondents can eliminaterivalexplanations for the
findings (Malhorta & Graver, 1998,414).

The specific issues of internal validity are addressed within each of the three individual
studies. T h e systematic replication method added to the validity of the variables and
constructs. The random assignment of subjects provided assurance that, at least prior to
the study, all groups were equivalent thereby minimising threats to internal validity
(Abemathy et al., 1999, 17).

External validity
External validity is concerned with the conditions for generalising the research findings
from the sample to the population (Drucker-Godard, Ehlinger & Grenier, 1999, 213).
External validity tends to be inversely related to internal validity, because the controls
required to improve internal control are often counter-productive to external validity
(Robson, 2000,72). For example, a laboratory experiment provides the best control for
internal validity and yet it is difficult to generalise to any setting that does not
approximate the laboratory conditions. Since the laboratory setting does not necessarily
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reflect the real world, the extent to which the findings validly represent the reality of the
outside world are not k n o w n conclusively (Sekaran, 1992, 127).

Both quantitative and qualitative research require the sample to be studied and the
population targeted to be defined in order to determine the generalisation boundary for
the results (Drucker-Godard, Ehlinger & Grenier, 1999). T o achieve this, quantitative
research draws on the process of statistical generalisation (Yin, 1989). Techniques for
improving the level of external validity involve including control variables inn the
instrument to delimit and accurately characterise the population being studied (DruckerGodard, Ehlinger & Grenier, 1999).
Reliability in Survey Research
Reliability of a survey is determined by assessing the level of possible "error" (Fink,
1995a, 46). In survey research, there are two possible types of error, random error and
measurement error (Litwin, 1995, 5). R a n d o m error is primarily related to the
representative nature of the sample and is addressed by sampling techniques.
Measurement error concerns the degree of precision or lack of precision with which a
particular variable is measured within the survey instrument (Litwin, 1995).
Controlling for Validity and Reliability
Table 4.1 summarises the tactics adopted to control for validity and reliability. The
tactics derived from suggestions for controlling and improving validity and reliability of
research in general (Kerlinger, 1986; Sekaran, 1992) and survey research in particular
(Fink, 1995a, 1995b; 1995c; Litwin, 1995).
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Table 4.1
Tactics to Address Validity and Reliability Issues
Issues

Tactical approach

Research Phase

Construct
Validity

(1) Convergent ~ show that measures that should
be related are in reality related.
(2) Discriminant ~ show that measures that
should not be related are in reality not related.
(1) Control extraneous effects on the dependent
variable by using experimental controls or by
homogenising the sample groups;
(2) Observation of multicollinearity a m o n g the
variables can eliminate rival explanations for the
findings.
T o generalise the results from the sample to the
population:
(1) sample error ~ representative sample from
k n o w n population;
(2) statistical power ~ application of appropriate
statistical methods.
(1) B e specific regarding the target respondent in
the cover letter;
(2) Incorporate questions in the survey which
attempt to identify if, in fact, the target respondent
was the person completing the questionnaire.

(1) Statistical analysis of data
stage.
(2) Statistical analysis of data
stage.
(1) Design of survey instrument
stage.

Internal
Validity

External
Validity

Reliability

(2) Statistical analysis of data
stage.

(1) Selection of sampling
method.
(2) Selection of statistical
methods.
(1) Design and creation of
correspondence.
(2) Selection and design of
instrument.

Multiple Survey Approach
The notion of a multiple survey approach was based on the more c o m m o n research
designs identified as multiple-experiment (Hersen & Barlow, 1976) and multiple-case
study (Yin, 1994). The evidence derived from multiple-experiments and multiple-case
studies is generally considered more compelling and robust (Herriott & Firestone, 1983)
because of the analogy with confirmation provided by replication of a study (Yin,
1994).
Designing Multiple Surveys
T o satisfy the requirements of a multiple survey approach, the same concepts of
conducting a replication or comparative study apply. That is, the variables being
examined and measured need to retain a certain level of consistency and conformity
allowing for any changes that are necessary due to contextual issues pertaining to the
different sample (Robson, 2000, 73). Replication of a study with a different target
population is a method of assessing reliability of the findings; however, in practice no
replication is ever exactly the same (Robson, 2000, 73).
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Validity of Replication Studies
Various textbooks concerned with research methods refer to replication as integral to
the justification and strength of scientific and empirical research (Huck, Cormier &
Bounds, 1974; Sekaran, 1992). Successful replication provides confidence in the
original findings and m a y lead to further insights into the phenomenon being studied.
Graziano and Raulin (1997, 205) raised the issue of replication of prior research as a
general control procedure to increase the validity of findings. Replication provides
criterion validity by providing evidence in support of the findings of the previous
research. If the particular phenomenon cannot be readily replicated, then "we must ask
whether they exist at all" (Graziano & Raulin, 1997, 205).

Sidman (1960) suggested four distinct methods or techniques for replication involving
the use of different subjects. T h e first technique is inter-group replication and involves
the application of the same research method to two or more different groups. T h e
second technique is inter-subject replication and involves the application of the same
experimental design and independent variable to two or more subjects or individuals.
The third technique is intra-group replication and involves a repeated application of
different processes or experimental conditions to the same group. T h e fourth technique
is intra-subject replication and involves the repeated measurement of the same subject
for at least two or more experimental conditions.

Sidman (1960) also suggested two types of replication for research activity itself: direct
and systematic. Direct replication involves the exact replication of procedures in a
replicated study. This demonstrates the generality of procedures being used. A n y of the
four techniques of replication m a y also be applied with direct replication. Systematic
replication involves making slight modifications to the independent variable(s). This
gives the researcher the same advantage of generality while yielding additional
information, not otherwise obtainable from a direct replication. Systematic replication
m a y also be called quasi-replication since other techniques or research strategies can be
employed to investigate the same phenomenon. T h e approach adopted in this thesis was
consistent with the systematic type of intergroup replication. Replication of prior
research was conducted using different groups with slight modifications to the
independent variables.
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Measurement Error
Measurement error m a y be one of the most significant sources of error in survey
research (Churchill, 1979). Inappropriate measurement can be due to a number of
factors including poorly worded questions, length of the instrument and bias induced by
inappropriate method. While measurement error is almost inevitable, the primary
question for researchers is the extent to which these errors affect the findings.
Fortunately, validation techniques are available to reduce measurement error. A
framework for doing this, modified from Churchill (1979) was used in the research to
control for error. The process outlined in Figure 4.1 is applicable to multi-item measures
of a variable (Churchill, 1979, 66). T o insulate the survey instruments against
systematic bias and random error, the steps recommended by Alreck and Settle (1985,
113) were also followed.
Figure 4.1
F r a m e w o r k for Addressing Measurement Error

Source: (Adapted from Churchill, 1979)

Detailed attention to instrumentation through careful questionnaire development in
survey research promoted cooperative efforts and permitted confirmatory follow-up
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researchers to use a proven and valid instrument. Validated instruments of both
independent and dependent variables alleviated possible confounding effects in
determining the true relationship a m o n g variables.
Use of Prior Research
Prior studies established various approaches to identify and test the relationships
between the variables used in this research project. T h e review of literature in Chapters
2 and 3 provided the justification for the gathering and analysis of the data using
instruments from prior studies. For the first survey, the task was an outsourcing
decision. D u e to the differences between hospital managers and accountants, there was a
variation in the nature of the outsourcing task. For Survey 1 (hospitals), the task details
related to outsourcing of food catering by the hospital, while in Survey 3 (accountants),
the task details related to outsourcing of the payroll function of a large organisation.
Full descriptions are provided in Chapters 5 and 7 and the instruments are presented in
the Appendix. In the second (financial planners) and third (accountants) surveys, the
task was concerned with the investment of funds to an existing project. D u e to the
differences between accountants and financial planners there was a variation in the
description, but not the nature, of the investment task.
Triangulation in Multiple Studies
Triangulation was broadly defined by Denzin (1978: 291) as "the combination of
methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon."

The use of triangulation can be

traced back to the concept of "multiple operationalism" introduced and applied in the
social sciences by Campbell and Fiske (1959). T h e concept is a metaphor derived from
military strategy and navigation that involves the use of multiple points of reference to
locate an object's exact position (Smith, 1975, 273). Conceptually, triangulation
involves the collection of different types of data and different methods of analysis
which provides for the validation of judgements pertaining to the phenomenon being
examined. Therefore, agreement between methods increases the level of reliance on the
results as being valid and not merely due to the method (Bouchard, 1976). Belkaoui
(1987) introduced the concept of triangulation to the discipline of management
accounting research as a useful means for testing the veracity of theories and the
underlying constructs.
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Design of the Survey Instruments
In order to conduct the multiple surveys, the instruments, or questionnaires, were
constructed to operationalise the construct of sunk costs in the context of decisionmaking tasks. This section outlines the variations in the instruments adapted from prior
research for use in this thesis. Then, the issues of validation and pre-testing of the
instruments are addressed.
Operationalising the Constructs of Sunk Cost
The constructs investigated in this thesis were derived from the theory and research
reviewed in the literature as reported in Chapters 2 and 3. The overall approach to the
constructs involved the use of tasks that incorporated sunk cost information pertaining
to an outsourcing task and an investment task. Table 4.2 summarises the constructs
included in the tasks across the three surveys.

Table 4.2
Overview of Tasks and Subjects
Subjects
Decision/Focus
Survey 1
(Chapter 5)

Survey 2
(Chapter 6)

Public Hospital
Management;
Private Hospital
Management
Financial Planners in
Public Practice

Survey 3
(Chapter 7)

Accountants in Public
Practice

Outsourcing decision
(Make-or-Buy)

Investment decision
(problem space inventory
elements)
(1) Outsourcing decision
(Make-or-Buy);
(2) Investment decision
(problem space inventory
elements)

Constructs
Sunk Costs;
Asset Specificity
(Transaction Cost
Economics)
Sunk Costs;
Opportunity Costs;
Framing (Positive/Negative).
Sunk Costs;
Asset Specificity
(Transaction Cost
Economics);
Framing
(Positive/Negative).

The constructs addressed in each survey are discussed in more detail in the appropriate
chapter (Chapters 5, 6 and 7) together with a minor literature review, development of
the null hypotheses and method discussion. Further issues pertaining to validity are also
presented within each of these chapters. T h e basis for the operationalisation of the
constructs used in these surveys, with the details of the prior research from which they
were derived, are presented in Table 4.3.
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Table 4.3
S u m m a r y of Major Constructs Operationalisec in the Surveys
Construct
Sunk Cost

Operationalised
Category
Past cost or prior Treatment effect.
investment.

Framing

Manipulation of
wording.

Treatment effect.

Problem Space

Likert scale
questions.
Likert scale
questions.

Independent
(predictor)
Independent
(predictor)

Outsourcing
Decision

Decision task.

Dependent
(criterion)

Investment
Decision

Decision task.

Dependent
(criterion)

Image
Compatibility

Levels
High;
Low;
Nil.
Positive;
Negative;
Nil (neutral).
8 separate
questions.
4 separate
questions.

2 choices:
1- Internal
(make)
2- Outsource
(Buy).
Multiple choices:
from $0 to
$100,000.

Prior Research
Arkes & Bulmer,
1985;
Staw, 1976
Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979
Payne, 1985;
Dunegan, 1993
Beach, 1990;
Dunegan,
Duchon &
Ashmos, 1995
Roodhooft &
Warlop, 1999

Dunegan, 1993

Independent Variables
The independent variables used in the survey instruments were sunk cost information
and framing of the task. Manipulation of the sunk cost information was included as
"high sunk cost", "low sunk cost" or "nil sunk cost". The framing of the task was also
manipulated by provision of information categorised as: "successful" (positive),
"unsuccessful" (negative) or "nil". Framing was not employed in the outsourcing task
applied to hospitals in Survey 1. A further independent variable was asset specificity
which was applied to the outsourcing task for both hospitals (Survey 1) and accountants
(Survey 3). The asset specificity manipulation was categorised as either being "present"
or "not present" in the task.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in the surveys was the decision made by the subject. In the
outsourcing task, a binary decision was involved. Subjects were required to choose
between internal production or external outsourcing; this type of task is consistent with
the traditional "make or buy" task in management accounting. In the investment task,
the decision was to allocate from $0 to $100,000.
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Classifying Variables in the Multiple Studies
The research design took into consideration a number of variables that were shown in
prior research to be representative of sunk costs and related to the treatment of sunk

costs. Figure 4.1 depicts the sunk cost construct with the classification details of th
variables used to examine the sunk cost phenomenon. Sunk cost information in the
survey tasks was manipulated as being present or not present. In order to test the

strength of the sunk cost effect, a further manipulation involved a lower amount of sun

cost. Against this backdrop of sunk cost information, Figure 4.2 shows that a number of
independent variables were also employed.
Figure 4.2
T h e Overarching Classification of Variables
Independent
Variables

Not
manipulated
(continuous)

Problem space

Not
manipulated
(continuous)

Image
Compatibility

Continuous

Binary
(successful /
unsuccessful)

Binary

Binary

Continuous

Domain
(Prior knowledge
of sunk cost effect)

Framing (outcome
history)

Exhibited
Sunk Cost
Effect

Classic Framing
(outcomes)

Decision Task:
-outsourcing /
investment

Decision Style
(rational versus
heuristic)
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T h e variables presented in Figure 4.3 are identified according to the decision task and
the diagram demonstrates the consistency in variables across the three surveys.

Figure 4.3
C o m p a r i s o n of Constructs E x a m i n e d Across Chapters
Survey 1
(Chapter 5)
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Having established the degree of consistency across the survey instruments the next
issue w a s the conceptualisation of the theoretical model underpinning the research.
Peters (1993, 385) suggested that a strategy of combining models and theories would
strengthen the understanding of accounting decision making. This research structure
was designed to test the combination of a model (the information processing model) and
theories (prospect theory, image theory and expected utility theory) as suggested by
Peters (1993).

Prior research did not conceptualise h o w behavioural theories of decision making could
be synthesised with an information processing model to test rational choice within the
context of financial decision making. T h e rational decision making model assumes that
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decision makers are guided by the available information (Heracleous, 1994; Hogarth,
1980). According to Simon (1979) decision makers are assumed to have acquired all
available information, as information plays a key role in reducing uncertainty (March,
1988b). Prior research has not established the role that information plays in rational
choice (Rich & O h , 2000). The argument in this thesis is that information is affected by
a variety of factors, which in turn influences the degree of uncertainty and the
perception ofrisk.B y combining the information processing model with behavioural
theories, a research model was developed for testing the predicted rational choice.

There were three stages to the development of the theoretical research model. The first
stage was to define a simple information-processing model that could be applied to
study the variables of rational choice. The information-processing model (Figure 4.4)
was derived from Libby and Lewis (1977; 1982). This model provided the initial basis
for testing constructs from behavioural theories, as reported in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. The
information-processing model assumes that when an individual is confronted with a
choice, the input is the relevant information set or data which is combined or processed
by the individual to choose from a m o n g the alternative courses of action (prospects)
(Libby & Lewis, 1977). The model focuses on the ability of decision makers to use the
information presented. In this regard, the model was consistent with the objective of this
dissertation.

Figure 4.4
Simple Information Processing M o d e l
Independent
Variable
Input
Information set
(cues)

Intervening
Variable

Moderator
Variable
Process

Control
Variable

Dependent
Variable
Output
Decision
Outcome

Source: (Adapted from Libby & Lewis, 1977; 1982)

The second stage of the development of the theoretical research model conceptualised
the relationship between theories from which variables were derived. The theories were
discussed in the literature reviews of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. There were three steps
involved in this stage. First, prospect theory was adopted to provide a basis for
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interpretation of the information set. The problem frame and reference point formed the
basis for manipulating the task and predicting theriskpropensity for a particular task.
Second, image theory was adopted to explain the mental image or perception of the risk
associated with the task. Image theory posits that perception can be measured in terms
of problem space and image compatibility. Finally, expected utility theory was used to
predict the optimal choice for a particular task. Expected utility theory posits that the
rational decision is the optimal choice. The relationship between the decision theories is
represented in Figure 4.5.

Figure 4.5
Proposed Relationship Between Decision Theories
Prospect Theory

Image Theory

Normative

Theory

[Expected Utility Theory]

Problem Frame
- Positive
- Negative
Risk Propensity
- Risk-averse
- Risk-seeking

Risk Perception
- Problem Space
- Image Compatibility

Decision Behaviour
- Rational Choice

Reference Point
- Sunk Cost
- Opportunity Cost
- Asset Specificity

W h e n the simple information processing model was overlaid with the model of the
behavioural theories (prospect theory and image theory) and the normative theory of
rational choice (expected utility theory) a theoretical research model (Figure 4.6) was
produced.
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Figure 4.6
Theoretical Research M o d e l
(Decision Theories)
Prospect Theory

Image

Theory

Normative

Theory

[Expected Utility Theory]

Problem Frame
- Positive
- Negative
Risk Propensity
- Risk-averse
- Risk-seeking

Risk Perception
- Problem Space
- Image Computability

Decision Behaviour
- Rational Choice

Reference Point
- Sunk Cost
- Opportunity Cost
- Asset Specificity

(Information Processing Model)

Output
Decision Outcome

The model developed in Figure 4.6 provides for the examination of variables not
considered in prior research. Specifically, the theoretical research model proposed in
this thesis provides a better framework to conceptualise the relationship between the
input or information set (in prospect theory this is the problem frame and reference

point) the process (in prospect theory is the risk propensity and in image theory the ri
perception) and the output or decision outcome (in expected utility theory this is the
optimal choice). This model met the research objective, which was to test the ability of
decision makers to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant information (the sunk
cost effect) as well as measure the influence of the manipulation of information (the
framing effect) on the decision outcomes. This model applied to the survey results was a
means for testing the use of information— manipulated through the inclusion of sunk
cost information and framing— with the interplay of various intervening and
moderating variables, where the decision outcome was determined according to the
optimal decision outcome.
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Instrument Testing
O n a broad level, survey research is carried out in a systematic and programmatic
manner (Hunter, Schmidt & Jackson, 1983; Flynn et al., 1990). Careful pre-testing of
instruments in the field serves as a reality check, indicating to the researcher h o w well
conceptualisations of the problem match the actual experience of the practitioner.
Careful adherence to such standards prevents survey research studies from becoming
isolated and the field from becoming fragmented— that is, without a cumulative
tradition of prior work that is essential for knowledge building.

Campbell and Stanley (1963) and Cook and Campbell (1979) recommended that a
process of pre-testing be employed to avoid a poorly constructed questionnaire,
containing questions that were likely to be left unanswered or that would produce
inappropriate and unusable responses. Cooper and E m o r y (1995) recommended the use
of two or more pre-tests and revisions to eliminate biased and ambiguous words and
questions, before putting the questionnaire into its final form. This procedure is also
endorsed by Kerlinger (1986) and Fowler (1993, 1995). T o avoid a possible threat to
internal validity, the instruments used were derived from previously published research
and subjected to pre-testing and minor revision.

The instrument used in Survey 1, pertaining to private and public hospitals, was
administered to a small number of experts in the specific industry/sector. T w o
accountants, one from a private hospital the other from a public hospital, and three
management level staff, one from a private hospital and the other two from a public
hospital, tested the instrument. The purpose of the pre-test was to determine adequacy
and clarity as well as relevance to the sector, particularly terminology or jargon. The
pre-test did not involve a manipulation of independent variables. A minor amendment
was made, the particulars are discussed in Chapter 5.

The instrument used in Survey 2, pertaining to financial planners (investment
managers), was almost identical in content to the task used for Survey 3. The changes
did not alter the financial data, only the nature of the position of the person making the
decision to bring the task in line with the role of an "investment manager". Details of
the issues and discussion of the minor modifications are presented in Chapter 6.
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The instrument used in Survey 3, pertaining to accountants in public practice, was
administered to 32 undergraduate students w h o were final year accounting majors. Their
comments and suggestions identified issues for consideration pertaining to the wording
and task details. A s a result, further advice was also sought from the leading author of
the original study. This pre-test did involve the manipulation of the independent
variables. Details of the issues and communication with the leading author are presented
in Chapter 7.

Litwin (1995) suggested a number of activities to check survey instruments. The
activities adopted to check the survey instruments in the various stages of the research
project are summarised in Table 4.4 as they apply to the three surveys.

Table 4.4
Check List for Initial Survey Tests
Survey 1
A visual inspection
was conducted and
checked by a third
party for any errors.
The instruments were
prepared on M S W o r d
and the spell checker
was used to check for
errors.
D u e to the nature of
the instruments item
numbers were not
used.

Survey 2
A visual inspection
was conducted and
checked by a third
party for any errors.
The instruments were
prepared on M S W o r d
and the spell checker
was used to check for
errors.
D u e to the nature of
the instruments item
numbers were not
used.

The vocabulary and
jargon was relevant to
the particular target
group.
Check the length of the The survey
instruments were kept
survey
to one page by
utilising the full
capacity of the A 4
paper size.
T h e questions were
Check the degree of
specific to the
difficulty of the
research question and
questions.
were subject to pretesting.
The nature of the
Check the format of
the questions.
questions were
specific to the
research issues and
followed an
appropriate sequence.

The vocabulary and
jargon was relevant to
the particular target
group.
The survey
instruments were kept
to one page by
utilising the full
capacity of the A 4
paper size.
The questions were
specific to the
research question and
were subject to pretesting.
The nature of the
questions were
specific to the
research issues and
followed an
appropriate sequence.

Activity
Checkfor
typographical errors.

Check spelling.

Check that item
numbers make sense

Check vocabulary or
jargon is appropriate
for respondents.

Survey 3
A visual inspection
was conducted and
checked by a third
party for any errors.
T h e instruments were
prepared on M S W o r d
and the spell checker
was used to check for
errors.
D u e to the nature of
the instruments item
numbers were not
used.
The vocabulary and
jargon was relevant to
the particular target
group.
The survey
instruments were kept
to one page by
utilising the full
capacity of the A 4
paper size.
The questions were
specific to the
research question and
were subject to pretesting.
The nature of the
questions were
specific to the
research issues and
followed an
appropriate sequence.
Source: adapted from Litwin (1995)
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Conduct of the Surveys
A structured program was implemented to conduct the survey in this research to
maintain control over the survey process as recommended by Alreck and Settle (1985).
Sample Selection
The subjects for the three surveys were selected from the Australian Yellow Pages,
Telephone C D R o m 1999 edition. A full explanation of the procedures followed in each
survey is provided in the relevant chapter.

A criticism against the use of phone directories to select samples is that not every
person m a y have a phone or that not every person m a y be listed; for example, unlisted
phone numbers are not available for reasons of privacy (Berdie, Anderson & Niebuhr,
1986, 10; Nachmius & Nachmius, 1976,108). However, with regard to the hospitals,
accountants and financial planners, the nature of their business is such that not being
listed in the phone directory is highly unlikely.
Control of Sampling Bias and Error
Sampling bias can result from m a n y sources. O n e particular trouble with direct mail
surveys is inadequate sample size (Fink, 1995d). Mail surveys with response rates of
less than 4 0 - 5 0 % are not u n c o m m o n (Kerlinger, 1986; Cooper & Emory, 1995). Parten
(1950, 400) noted that "most mail questionnaires bring so few returns...that the
findings of such surveys are almost invariably open to question." While it is desirable to
have a high response rate, response rates less than 2 0 % are generally considered
undesirable (Yu & Cooper, 1983). Nachmias and Nachmias (1976,107) argued a
response rate of between 2 0 % to 4 0 % would be acceptable for analysis of most research
questions.

By selecting the person(s) most knowledgeable about the construct of interest and
directing the survey to that person the possibility of sampling error is reduced (Huber &
Power, 1985). Steps taken to address the potential for sampling error in the form of
attribute questions are presented in Table 4.5 which constitutes the check list relevant to
this study.
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Table 4.5
Check List for Sampling Error
Survey 1
Item
W a s the unit of analysis clearly
Yes
defined for the study?
Yes
Does the instrumentation
consistently reflect that unit of
analysis?
Are the respondent(s) appropriate Yes
for the research question?

Survey 2

Survey 3

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Enhancing Response to the Surveys
Practical methods used to increase response rates are preliminary notification prior to
sending out the survey and follow-ups and reminders after the initial survey is sent
(Fox, Robinson & Boardley, 1998); including a stamped self-addressed envelope for
returning the questionnaire (Cooper & Emory, 1995); enclosing monetary incentives
with the survey (Yu and Cooper, 1983) and contacting non-respondents by telephone
and requesting that they complete the questionnaire or encouraging them to answer the
survey while on the telephone (Fox, Robinson & Boardley, 1998). Although these
procedures tend to increase response rates, none of them alone has been found to
consistently improve them (Cooper & Emory, 1995). Bourque and Fielder (1995)
recommended the adoption of specific procedures in the conduct of surveys to motivate
respondents to reply. These suggestions formed the basis of the check list presented in
Table 4.6 and were used in the preparation of the correspondence pertaining to each
survey.
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Table 4.6
Check List for Motivating Responses
Activity
Explain the purpose of
the survey.

Describe who is
sponsoring the survey.

Survey 1
The purpose and
importance of the survey
was addressed in the
initial letter.
There was no actual
sponsor for the survey.

Use a letterhead.

Letterheads were used.

Date the letter to be
consistent with the
actual date of mailing.

Letters were post dated
w h e n printed to allow
for processing.

Provide a name and
phone number for the
respondent to contact
for further
information.
Personalise the
salutation, if feasible.

N a m e , phone, fax &
email details were
provided.

Explain how
respondents were
chosen and why their
participation is
important.
Explain when and how
to return the
questionnaire.
Provide a realistic
estimate of the time
required to complete
the questionnaire.
Explain how
confidentiality and
anonymity of
respondents' will be
protected.
Determine and state a
deadline date for
return of the
questionnaire.

A brief explanation was
provided.

Not possible due to the
nature of the database.

Instructions and return
envelopes were
provided.
A realistic estimate of
the time to complete was
gained from pre-testing.
Anonymity and
confidentiality was
assured from the nature
of the data.
A return deadline was
stated to encourage
return before a follow-

up.

Survey 2
The purpose and
importance of the
survey was addressed
in the initial letter.
There was no actual
sponsor for the
survey.
A letterhead was
used.
Letters were post
dated when printed
to allow for
processing.
N a m e , phone, fax &
email details were
provided.

Survey 3
The purpose and
importance of the
survey was addressed
in the initial letter.
There was no actual
sponsor for the
survey.
A letterhead was
used.
Letters were post
dated when printed
to allow for
processing.
N a m e , phone, fax &
email details were
provided.

Where thefirstn a m e
was available the
letter was
personalised.
A brief explanation
was provided.

Where thefirstn a m e
was available the
letter was
personalised.
A brief explanation
was provided.

Instructions and
return envelopes
were provided.
A realistic estimate
of the time to
complete was gained
from pre-testing.
Anonymity and
confidentiality was
assured from the
nature of the data.

Instructions and
return envelopes
were provided.
A realistic estimate
of the time to
complete was gained
from pre-testing.
Anonymity and
confidentiality was
assured from the
nature of the data.

A return deadline
A return deadline
was stated to
was stated to
encourage return
encourage return
before
a follow-up.
before a follow-up.
Source: (Adapted from Bourque & Fielder, 1995)

Follow-up Procedures
Bourque and Fielder (1995) also recommended a guide for researchers to use as followup procedures for mail surveys. The guidelines are presented in Table 4.7, together with
details of h o w these follow-up procedures were employed in each survey.
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Table 4.7
Follow-up Procedure Guidelines
Activity
Ten days after original
mailing, send follow-up.
Follow-up can be a post
card, letter, telephone
call, facsimile, or email.
Send a further
questionnaire by mail,
facsimile or email.

Follow-up message should
stress the importance and
purpose of study.
Reconfirm name and
telephone number for
contact should
information be required.
Follow-up in intervals of
ten days.

Record rate of return for
each follow-up method
used.

Survey 1
Follow-up was sent
10 days after initial
mailing.
A short reminder
letter was used.

Survey 2
Follow-up was sent
14 days after initial
mailing.
A short reminder
letter was used.

A further
questionnaire was
sent 10 days after the
due date.

A further
A further
questionnaire was
questionnaire was
sent 10 days after the sent 10 days after the
due date. Where
due date. Where
possible a fax was
possible a fax was
sent.
sent.
The issue of
The issue of
relevance to the
relevance to the
particular industry
particular industry
was stressed.
was stressed.
N a m e , phone, fax
N a m e , phone, fax
and email were
and email were
included in the
included in the
follow-up
follow-up
correspondence.
correspondence.
The 10 day interval
The 10 day interval
was used as a basis
was used as a basis
for all follow-up
for all follow-up
activity.
activity.
Returns were
Returns were
recorded as early or
recorded as early or
late using the due
late using the due
date as the basis.
date as the basis.
Source: (Adapted from Bourque & Fielder, 1995)

The issue of
relevance to the
particular industry
was stressed.
N a m e , phone, fax
and email were
included in the
follow-up
correspondence.
The 10 day interval
was used as a basis
for all follow-up
activity.
Returns were
recorded as early or
late using the due
date as the basis.

Survey 3
Follow-up was sent
14 days after initial
mailing.
A short reminder
letter was used.

Response Rates
The response rates for each of the studies exceeded 3 0 % . Table 4.8 presents a summary
of the response rates from the three surveys.

Table 4.8
Response Rates for Each Study
Survey

Total Sample

Size

Overall Response
Rate

Survey 1

381 (811 pop.)

56.95% (n=217)

Survey 2

265 (863 pop.)

32.5% (n=86)

Survey 3

600 (2102 pop.)

3 9 . 5 % (n=237)

Characteristics of Characteristics of
Respondents vs
Early vs Late
Non-respondents
N o significant
N o significant
difference.
difference.
N o significant
N o significant
difference.
difference.
N o significant
N o significant
difference.
difference.
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Reliability of Responses
Fowler (1993) noted that the responses to questionnaires are the product of complex
processes, each of which can have profound effects on the precision, accuracy, and
credibility of the results. There are various factors that affect the reliability of responses
to survey questionnaires (Fink, 1995c); one important factor concerns the person
responding to the questionnaire (Churchill, 1992). The answering of the questionnaire
by the specific targeted respondent is important, because people in different positions
have different opinions on the issues queried by the survey. This is of particular concern
with mail surveys because there is no one overseeing that the appropriate person is
responding to the questionnaire. T w o procedures to control for this problem are:
1.

B e specific regarding the target respondent in the cover letter. The covering letter used in
Survey 2 and Survey 3 was specifically addressed to the targeted respondent; and

2.

Incorporate questions in the survey which attempt to identify if the target respondent was the
person completing the questionnaire. The demographic data in Survey 1, Hospital managers,
and Survey 2, Financial Planners, provided confirmation that the targeted respondent was the
person w h o completed the survey.

A further issue likely to affect mail surveys concerns how respondents interpret
questions. People approach questions from different frames of reference and thus
perceive questions differently. W h e n this occurs, they m a y modify the question to fit
their frame of reference or change it so that it makes sense to them (Cooper & Emory,
1995). T o avoid this concern a frame of reference was incorporated in the survey. The
terminology and task details were specific to the particular field in which the target
subjects were familiar and the survey instruments pre-tested.
Non-Response Bias
The issue of non-response is another factor that contributes to sampling bias and results
from the fact that the sample m a y not be truly representative of the entire population
due to non-response from certain individuals. Wallace (1954) found that there were
some people w h o consistently responded to mail questionnaires, while others did not.
T o the degree that the responses of the participants m a y be different from those w h o do
not participate, the set of responses being gathered m a y not be representative of the
population (Sekaran 1992). Courtis (1989, p. 120) noted that in "non-response bias the
concern is that sampling estimates will lack external validity in that they will not
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accurately represent or describe the perception of the population". T o address concerns
regarding external validity, Kerlinger (1986) recommended ascertaining details about
the non-respondents for comparison with actual respondents. This approach was
employed in the study involving hospitals and is more fully discussed in Chapter 5.

Oppenheim (1992) proposed a test for non-response bias that is based on the assumption
that late respondents are fairly similar to non-respondents. A simple t-test is used to
compare the overall m e a n answers of late respondents to those of early respondents. In
the case of Survey 1 (the hospitals), the nature of the non-respondents' demographic
data, as well as organisational profile data, was available and was checked against those
w h o did respond. N o significant differences were found. For Survey 2 (the financial
planners) a comparison was m a d e based on the demographic data gathered and the
organisational profile data. For survey 3 (the accountants), the details were not as
readily available and a t-test was used to distinguish if there were differences between
early and late responders.

Data Analysis Methods
The nature of the numerical data collected impacts on the selection of the appropriate
statistical method and subsequent quantitative analysis of the variables. The data
obtained from the survey questionnaires was primarily of two types: nominal data
regarding the choice between two options and ordinal data derived from Likert-scale
responses to issues concerning the decision. Nominal data is a categorical scale assigned
to indicate the presence or absence of the attribute or characteristic under investigation
(Argyrous, 1996). Ordinal data not only categorises the data, it also allows for data to be
ordered by degree according to measurements the variable (Argyrous, 1996). Interval
data is comprised of constant units of measurement in which the differences between
any two adjacent points on any part of the scale are equal (Argyrous, 1996). Table 4.9
summarises the characteristics and statistical implications.
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Table 4.9
Characteristics and Implications of Data Measurement
Measurement

Scale

Nominal data

Ordinal data

Interval data

Characteristics

Statistical Implications

A scale that measures in terms of
names or designations of discrete units
or categories.
A scale that measures in terms of such
values as "more" or "less", "larger" or
"smaller", but without specifying the
size of the intervals.
A scale that measures in terms of equal
intervals or degrees of difference but
whose zero point, or point of
beginning, is arbitrarily established.

Can be used for determining
the mode, the percentage
values, or the chi-square.
Can be used for determining
the mode, percentage, chisquare, median, percentile
rank, or rank correlation.
Can be used for determining
the mode, the mean, the
standard deviation, the t-test,
the F test, and the product
m o m e n t correlation.
Source: (Adapted from Leedy, 1997, 33)

With regard to summated ordinal data, de Vas (1991, 314) highlighted a convention that
holds ordinal data as being close enough to interval level to justify the use of interval
level statistics. T h e justification for this approach is that (de Vas, 1991, 314):
...in most cases the same patterns occur regardless of whether the variable is treated as

ordinal or interval. Given this, the argument is that interval-level analysis ought to be
used since it opens up a whole range of more powerful and sophisticated techniques
that allow us to control more readily for the effect of extraneous variables.

The appropriate statistical test for analysis of the data depends upon the type of data.
Table 4.10 represents the statistical tests applicable to the type of data gathered in the
surveys reported in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.

Table 4.10
Test Selection Chart
Form of Data

Nominal

Interval

Ordinal

T w o independent
samples

Chi-squre test of
association;
Fisher exact test
Binomial test;
Chi-square test of
association

t-test for independent
samples;
Randomization test
t-test for matched
samples;
Walsh test;
Randomization test
Analysis of variance

Mann-Whitney U test;
Wald-Wolfowitz runs test;
Median test.
Wilcoxon signed-ranks test;
Sign test.

T w o related samples

M o r e than two
independent samples
M o r e than two related
samples
Correlation coefficients
(descriptive statistics)

Chi-square test of
association
Cochran Q test
Contingency
coefficient;
Cramer's statistic

Analysis of variance
Pearson product-moment
correlation

Kruskal-Wallis;
Median test.
Friedman test.
Spearman rho;
Kendall tau;
Kendall coefficient of
concordance.

Source: adapted from Reaves (1992)
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Further details of the methods used for data analysis using chi-square, A N O V A and
multiple regression are outlined in the following three sections.
Chi-Square
Nominal or categorical measurement was used to assign numbers to classify the
independent variables (sunk cost and assets specificity) as well as the dependent
variable (decision). For example, in the dependent variable the choice to continue with
internal production " 1 " is different from the choice to outsource "2". The method of
statistical analysis most commonly recommended for nominal coded data is the chisquare test (Huck, Cormier & Bounds: 1974, 216; Isaac & Michael, 1990,177; Sproull,
1995, 68).

A limitation arises when a cell frequency in the chi-square test is less than 5. Daniel
Terrell (1975, 292) suggest that there is debate about whether the m i n i m u m frequency
for a cell should be 1, as supported by Cochran (1952; 1954), or the more conservative
general rule that the m i n i m u m should be 5. Levin (1984,439) stated that incorrect
inferences m a y be m a d e if the cell frequency is less than 5 unless correction factors are
applied. Argyrous (2000,410) provided two alternative techniques: Yate's correction
for continuity and Fisher's exact probability test. Pett (1997, 156) provided a list of
published research which used the Fisher Exact Probability Test to justify conclusions
drawn from small cell samples. The statistical measure to overcome small frequencies
adopted in this research was the Fisher Exact Probability Test.
Cross-tabulation is the method used to show whether there is a relationship between two
variables (Robson, 2000, 331). The assumption is that there is a relationship between
two variables and this relationship means that the distribution of scores or values on one
of the variables is linked to the distribution of values on the second variable. That is,
higher scores on one variable tend to occur when there are higher scores on the second
variable (Robson, 2000, 331). The decision rule used for the chi-square test is shown
below.
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Decision Rule:
Reject the null hypothesis of independence at the level of significance "a" if the value
for the sample x 2 exceeds the value of the critical x 2 for the same degrees of freedom
(Mansfield, 1987, 357; Freund & Williams, 1982, 378).

Critical Assumptions of x for Two Independent Samples:
1. The data being analysed must be frequency data, not scores.
2. The variables being examined are categorical, with mutually exclusive levels.
3. The observations must be independent of one another.
4. If the two variables being examined are dichotomous, resulting in a 2 x 2 contingency
table with df = 1, all expected frequencies for the table should be 5. For larger tables
where df >1, no more than 2 0 % of the cells should have expected frequencies of less
than 5. [Note: this assumption is challenged in the literature and m a y be relaxed to an
expected frequency of 1 (Pett, 1997, 159)].

The x statistic and its "p" value resulting from a test provide little information
concerning the strength of the association between the two variables being examined
(Pett, 1997). A further limitation of the test is that the % 2 values cannot be compared
across studies of different sizes because the size of the statistic is directly influenced by
the size of the sample. Several c o m m o n l y used measures of association that are
generated from the chi-square statistic provide information concerning the strength of
the association between two categorical variables, for example, the phi coefficient, the
contingency coefficient, and Cramer's V.

The phi coefficient can be used to determine the strength of association between the two
variables (Pett, 1997). T h e values for the phi coefficient range between 0 and 1.00 for a
2 x 2 table, with 0 indicating n o relationship and 1.00 indicating a perfect relationship.
For interpretative purposes, the strength of the relationship can be assessed according to
the following ranges:
•

0 to .49 suggest a weak or low strength relationship;

•

.50 to .69 is a relationship of moderate strength;

•

.70 to .89 indicates a strong relationship; and

•

.90 to 1.00 suggests a very strong relationship.
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W h e n one dimension of the table is greater than 2 (that is, a 2 x k table), the value of the
phi coefficient m a y not lie between 0 and 1 because the value can be greater than the
sample size. T h e alternative statistic is the contingency coefficient, because the value of
this statistic will always lie between 1 and 0. However, because its value depends on the
number of rows and columns in the table, it will never attain the upper limit of 1 (Pett,
1997). T o address this problem, a variant of the contingency coefficient, Cramer's V, is
preferred because Cramer's V will always range between 0 and 1. For a 2 x 2 table
Cramer's V will have the same value as the phi coefficient (Pett, 1997).

Critical Assumptions of the Fisher Exact Probability Test:
1. Both independent and dependent variables are dichotomous, with two mutually
exclusive categories.
2. The data to be analysed are obtained from a random sample and represent frequencies,
not scores.
3. Because this is an exact test of probability, it is necessary to know the number of cases
in the marginals before the data are analysed (Pett, 1997, 151).

ANOVA
The statistical method used to test the null hypothesis that the means of several
populations are equal is called the A N O V A (one-way analysis of variance). A N O V A
uses a single factor, fixed effects model to compare the effects of one factor on a
continuous dependent variable. Unlike the t-test, which uses sample standard deviations,
A N O V A uses squared deviations or the variance so that computation of distances of the
individual data points from their o w n m e a n or from the grand m e a n can be summed.
Between-groups variance represents the effect of the treatment or factor. The withingroups variance describes the deviations of the data points within each group from the
sample mean, also referred to as error (Emory & Cooper, 1991, 547).

Decision Rule for ANOVA:
One way analysis of variance ~ Reject the null hypothesis that the population means are
all equal if the ratio of the between-group mean square to the within-group mean square
exceeds Fa, where a is the desired significance level (Mansfield, 1987,408).
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If there is a significant overall difference between the groups, there are various
additional statistics that can help to pinpoint which of the differences between particular
pairs of means are contributing to this overall difference. T h e alternative ways of
assessing significance level w h e n a sequence of similar tests are carried out on a data set
are the Fisher P L S D test, the Scheffe F-test and the Dunnett t-test. T h e Scheffe test is
considered the most stringent criteria for significance (Robson, 2000, 356).

Underlying Assumptions of ANOVA:
1. The contribution to variance in the total sample must be additive.
2. The observations within sets must be mutually independent.
3. The variances within experimentally homogenous sets must be approximately equal.
4. The variations within experimentally homogenous sets should be from normally
distributed populations (Isaac & Michael, 1990, 183).

Multiple Regression
Multiple regression is used in m u c h the same w a y as linear regression. That is, it is used
to provide a line of best fit and predictions through substitutions of different values of
xl and x2. However, its main use is to provide an estimate of the relative importance of
the different independent variables in producing changes in the dependent variable
(Robson, 2000).

Key Elements of Multiple Regression:
R-squared is the multiple coefficient of determination, and measures the proportion of
the variance in the dependent variable which is explained by the dependent variables in
the equation (Robson, 2000, 347).

The t-value of coefficients is a test to determine whether or not the associated beta
coefficient is significantly different from zero. T h e standard error of coefficients is a
measure of the accuracy of the individual regression coefficients ( 9 0 % and 9 5 % ) and is
useful in assessing the likely accuracy of predictions based on the regression equation
(Robson, 2000, 347).
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Decision Rule for Multiple Regression:
Reject the null hypothesis that the true regression coefficients are all zero if the ratio of
the explained mean square to the unexplained mean square exceeds Fa, where a is the
desired significance level (Mansfield, 1987, 508).
In bivariate linear regression, t and F tests produce the same result since t2 is equal to
In multiple regression, the F test has an overall role in the model, and each of the
independent variables is evaluated with a separate t test (Emory & Cooper, 1991, 605).
Construct Analysis
The following tables bring the research issues together and present the constructs used
in each of the survey tasks identifying the category of variable and the data
measurement scale. Table 4.11 identifies the constructs, and the categories of the data
gathered in regards to the outsourcing task of Survey 1.

Table 4.11
S u m m a r y of Outsourcing Task ~ Survey 1 (Hospitals)
Variable Category

Construct

Scale

Treatment Effect(Treatment Variables)

Framing
Sunk cost
Asset Specificity

Nominal
Nominal
Nominal

Demographic Variables:
(Independent Variables)
[Predictors]

Private vs Public
Job position
Years of experience
Age
Gender
Size of hospital
Previous considered
If 'yes' outsourcing 'yes/no'

Nominal
Interval / Ordinal
Interval / Ordinal
Interval / Ordinal
Nominal
Interval / Ordinal
Nominal
Nominal

Dependent Variables:
(Criterion Variables)

Choice - Internal /Outsource

Nominal

Table 4.12 identifies the constructs, and the categories of the data gathered in the
investment task of Survey 2.
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Table 4.12
S u m m a r y of Investment Task ~ Survey 2 (Financial Planners)
Variable Category

Number

Scale

Treatment Effect:
(Treatment Variables)

Framing
Sunk cost
Information
Problem space inventory
Image compatibility

Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Interval / Ordinal
Interval / Ordinal

Choice - level of funds

Nominal

Demographic Variables:
(Independent Variables)
[Predictors]
Dependent Variables:
(Criterion Variables)

Table 4.13 identifies the constructs and the categories of the data gathered in the
outsourcing task of Survey 3.

Table 4.13
S u m m a r y of Outsourcing Task ~ Survey 3 (Accountants)
Variable Category

Construct

Scale

Treatment Effect:
(Treatment Variables)

Framing
Sunk cost
Asset Specificity
Attitude to Outsourcing
Certainty of Decision
Rational vs Intuitive style

Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Interval / Ordinal
Interval / Ordinal
Interval / Ordinal

Choice - Internal /Outsource

Nominal

Demographic
Variables:
(Independent Variables)
[Predictors]
Dependent Variables:
(Criterion Variables)

Table 4.14 identifies the constructs, and the categories of the data gathered in the
investment task of Survey 3.
Table 4.14
S u m m a r y of Investment Task ~ Survey 3 (Accountants)
Variable Category

Number

Scale

Treatment Effect:
(Treatment Variables)

Framing
Sunk cost
Information
Problem space inventory

Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Interval / Ordinal

Choice - level of funds

Nominal

Demographic Variables:
(Independent Variables)
[Predictors]
Dependent Variables:
(Criterion Variables)
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Tables 4.11 to 4.14 provided a conceptual overview of the structure employed in the
approach to analysing the data gathered by the three surveys. The statistical analysis and
the results are reported in the following Chapters 5, 6 and 7.

Chapter Summary
This thesis involved the design and application of three separate surveys concerned with
the sunk cost phenomenon. T h e sampling techniques used to select subjects were based
on a stratified random sampling approach. T h e suggested methods for improving
reliability and validity in the survey instruments as well as reducing bias and nonresponse bias in the conducting of survey research were identified.

The research methods employed in the individual surveys are quantitative and involved
testing of statistical relevance. Appropriate statistical measures were selected according
to the classification of the data gathered. The basis for the statistical analysis were
derived from the overview presented in Tables 4.9 to 4.14 within this Chapter. The
results of the analysis of the survey data are presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.

Due to the nature of the multiple survey approach, triangulation was considered as a
method for furthering the discussion w h e n making comparisons of the results. These
conclusions are presented in Chapter 8.

Page

129

Chapter 5 ... Survey 1 Public & Private Hospitals

CHAPTER 5
The Role of Asset Specificity and Sunk Cost Information on
Outsourcing Decisions: A Survey of Australian Public and
Private Hospitals
Chapter Abstract
This survey explored the effect of asset specificity and sunk cost information on
decisions to outsource production m a d e by managers in public and private hospitals in
Australia. Outsourcing decisions involve a choice between internal production and
external supply; this is similar to the task commonly k n o w n as "make or buy" in the
management accounting discipline. Normative models of management accounting posit
that only future costs that differ between the decision alternatives should be considered,
while factors such as past experience and past (sunk) costs should not enter into the
decision process.

The results of the survey suggested that decision makers are influenced by asset specific
and sunk cost information. Sunk cost information influenced the decision both through
its presence and also by the level. However, they were not influenced by years of
experience, past experience with outsourcing, nor where there gender differences in the
decisions m a d e to outsource. In addition, neither the type of hospital (public or private)
or the size of the hospital had any bearing on the manager's decision to outsource.

Background to the Research
The health care sector plays an important role in the Australian economy. For the
financial period 2000-2001, funding provided under the Australian Health Care
Agreements was $6.3b ( A B S , 2002). The costs associated with the health sector have
been steadily growing for decades and the availability of quality health services is a
topic issue in the early 21 st century.

Page

130

Chapter 5 ... Survey 1 Public & Private Hospitals

Table 5.1 Comparison of Public and Private Hospitals Revenue and Recurrent
Expenditure for 1999-2000
Public

$m
Revenue
Recurrent
expenditure

1,223
14,350

Private

Total

$m

$m

4,204
3,957

5,427
18,307

Private Hospitals as a
percentage of total
%
77.5
21.6
(Source: ABS, 2002)

A comparison between private and public hospitals of revenue generated and recurrent
expenditure for the 1999-2000 period reveals that private hospitals generated higher
revenues while operating with lower recurrent expenditure (Table 5.1), indicating that
private hospitals were better able to capture cost savings than public hospitals. O n e
proposed method of costs savings is the decision to outsource various operational
functions.

Cost Saving and Outsourcing
Powell (1997) demonstrated that outsourcing operational functions is a growing
phenomenon. Developing an appropriate outsourcing strategy is essential for the longterm profitability of any organisation (Park, Reddy & Sarkar, 2000). Outsourcing is
becoming a c o m m o n practice in both the public and private sector world-wide (Hensley,
1997; Chin, 1997; Hurley & Schaumann, 1997; Vining & Globerman, 1999; Quinn,
2000). Fill and Visser (2000) documented that firms were contracting out a growing
number of central business activities, such as payroll, accounting, catering and
information technology during the past decade.

Prior research revealed that cost efficiency was the primary reason given by managers
for the decision to outsource (Fill & Visser, 2000,44). However, Chalos (1995) found
that m a n y companies reported an increase in costs rather than a decrease in costs as a
result of outsourcing. A strategic model proposed by Mclvor, Humphries and McAleer
(1997) adopted a "make or buy" approach to evaluate outsourcing decisions. Built into
this model was emphasis on the strategic issues confronting management such as
maintaining control over core activities within the business, benchmarking by looking
beyond products to the operating and management skills required, and identifying as
well as measuring all the actual and potential costs involved in outsourcing the activity.
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Outsourcing in Hospitals
Outsourcing in Private Hospitals
Outsourcing in the healthcare sector is increasing in frequency in the United States of
America (Hensley, 1997; Chin, 1997). Research has shown that the main reason for
outsourcing by hospitals is cost cutting (Hensley, 1997; Luevanos, 1997). The c o m m o n
services outsourced are support services such as housekeeping, provision of meals,
laundry, computer systems, and account collection (Kee & Matherly, 1996; Coles &
Hesterly, 1998). However, K e e and Matherly (1996) found that in addition to managing
costs, hospital managers also cited improvement of quality and more efficient delivery
of services as important reasons for choosing to outsource.

Outsourcing in the Australian Public Sector
In Australia, the public hospitals are the responsibility of the relevant State Government
and yet the majority of funding is derived either directly or indirectly from the Federal
Government. Initiatives over the last ten years in the Australian public sector, at both
Federal and State levels, were aimed at privatisation or corporatisation of public
organisations to improve financial effectiveness. Suggested changes included "targeting
budgeting" which provided rolling three year expenditure ceilings for forward financial
planning, and "global budgeting" which allowed discretion in the use of funds otherwise
allocated for a specific project (Nicholls, 1991). These budgetary changes imposed
responsibility on individual managers for their actions.

These initiatives later flowed through to the administration of public hospitals
throughout Australia (Harris, 1999; Chua, 1995). Managers are no longer constrained by
just the fiduciary requirements of the authority, the budgeting process allows
involvement at various levels of management, in particular middle management
(Forster, Graham & W a n n a , 1996). Managers in public hospitals are expected to adopt
private business values and their associated behaviours (Currie, 1996). A s a result of the
expected changes to managerial operations within the public sector, the decision to
outsource by management in public hospitals could be expected to be no different to
that of the private hospitals.
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Indications are that outsourcing is an important topic for research into decision making
for management accountants. Private ands public hospitals in Australia were selected
for Survey 1 because that they represent a sector in which management accountability is
affected by government attempts to introduce greater levels of self sufficiency, therefore
managers are more likely to assume accountability for profitable operations (Broadbent
& Guthrie, 1992; Chua, 1995; Funnell & Cooper, 1998; Harris, 1999).

Outsourcing Decisions in Management Accounting
The management accounting literature follows the norms of economic theory pertaining
to rational decision making. Normative economic theory posits that efficient firms
allocate their resources to the activities in which they have a comparative advantage
over their competitors (Shank & Govidajaran, 1992). In simple terms, a firm acting in
an economic rational manner should concentrate on its primary business activity to the
exclusion of all others. Managers need to be acutely aware of the difference between
relevant and irrelevant costs when making outsourcing decisions. F r o m the perspective
of management accounting, relevant costs are defined as "those costs that are pertinent
to or logically associated with a specific problem or decision and that differ between
alternatives" (Raibom, Barfield & Kinney, 1999, 242). In essence, cost information is
relevant w h e n it logically relates to a decision concerning possible future activities.

These principles set the parameters for analysing financial information when managers
are choosing between alternative courses of action, in particular whether to "make or
buy" (Horngren, Foster & Datar, 2000). A n y decision in which a manager must decide
on behalf of the firm whether to meet its needs internally or to acquire the goods or
services externally is a make-or-buy decision. According to management accounting
text books, these decisions are concerned with choice of the best use of available
resources or facilities (Hansen & M o w e n , 2000, 692). The main question of the m a k e or
buy decision is framed in terms of "What is the difference in relevant costs between the
alternatives?" (Horngren, Foster & Datar, 2000, 385).

Relevant Costs
Hansen and M o w e n (2000, 687) suggested that "...to be relevant, a cost must not only
be a future cost but must also differ from one alternative to another." Accordingly,
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relevant costs must be future expected costs and must differ between alternative
decisions or courses of action. Including opportunity costs in the decision process m a y
reduce the number of alternatives. Opportunity costs represent benefits that are
generally not recorded in the accounting system because they have not yet occurred nor
can they be accrued (Horngren, Foster & Datar, 2000, 389). If limited resources are
used for a particular purpose, the m a x i m u m available contribution to profit is forgone.
The method frequently used to analyse opportunity costs across alternative choices is
"differential analysis" which determines the net income contributed by each alternative.

Differential analysis compares the incremental revenues and costs of alternative
decisions. Differential refers to the difference between the choices and incremental
refers to the additional or extra amount associated with each alternative. Therefore
incremental revenue is the additional revenue resulting from a particular course of
action and incremental cost is the additional cost of that particular course of action.
Differential costs and incremental costs are the relevant costs in financial decision
making (Raiborn, Barfield & Kinney, 1999, 242; Horngren, Foster & Datar, 2000, 386).

Irrelevant Costs
Past costs that are unavoidable are deemed irrelevant to outsourcing decisions because
they can not be changed (Horngren, Foster & Datar, 2000, 379). In a m a k e or buy
analysis, past investments are irrelevant and are referred to as "sunk costs". The sunk
cost of an asset is not necessarily the present book value of a depreciable asset but rather
the unrecoverable portion of the asset's book value. This is determined by subtracting
the asset's current resale value from its present book value. T h e amount which could be
realised on the disposal of the asset is a cost of keeping this asset in operation. If the
decision is to keep the asset in operation, the opportunity to invest the resale value is
foregone.

Despite the prescription to ignore sunk cost information, evidence is mounting that there
is a "sunk cost effect" where managers include these costs in the process of making the
decision (Arkes & Bulmer, 1985).. Staw (1976) and W h y t e (1991) found that sunk cost
behaviour was more likely to occur w h e n the decision maker felt personally responsible
for negative consequences as a result of the original decision. Therefore, even though
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sunk costs are irrelevant from an accounting perspective, the decision maker (regardless
of experience) is likely to be influenced by the knowledge that sunk costs exist.

Asset Specificity
A n alternative approach to outsourcing analysis, focused on asset specificity, is found in
transaction cost economics where the limitations posed by the specific nature of the
assets impacts on decision making. Williamson (1985) argued that asset specificity is a
critical dimension for describing transactions between parties w h e n investment in n e w
or additional equipment was required. Investment in non-standard items of equipment
limits flexibility and increases risk (Williamson, 1985; 1986). Under transaction cost
economics, outsourcing issues are considered in light of costs associated with asset
specific investments, including monitoring external suppliers if the decision is m a d e to
buy Chalos, 1995). Research into outsourcing from the transaction cost perspective is
limited. T h e hospital industry provides a setting in which both physical and h u m a n
assets are important components of the production process and impact upon the decision
to m a k e or buy (Coles & Hesterly, 1998).

Asset specificity may be considered another form of sunk cost— a cost that will become
sunk as a result of the present choice. T h e definition of asset specificity is investment in
an asset which is required specifically to allow the outsourcing activity to function, is
dedicated to one use only, and can not be modified for any other purpose. Investments
that can be used for other purposes are not asset specific. T h e requirement to invest in
an asset that is specifically used for the duration of the outsourcing agreement can be
expected to have a negative impact upon the decision to outsource. Whether decision
makers are able to identify the relevance of investments that are specific to one purpose
is relevant to understanding the sunk cost effect.

Roodhooft & Warlop (1999) introduced asset specificity into the accounting literature
with their study of outsourcing decisions by managers in Belgian hospitals. According
to the theory of transaction cost economics, the degree of asset specificity is an
important consideration in the outsourcing decision. Outsourcing is only desirable w h e n
expected governance and coordination costs, which result from asset specific
investments, are lower than the production cost advantage of an external supplier
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(Chalos, 1995). In other words, not only must there be a production cost saving
(advantage) but the cost of doing business with an external supplier must be less than
the savings. T h e cost of doing business is the cost associated with the investment
required in assets specifically to enable the interaction with the external supplier. The
Belgian study suggested that a similar application to outsourcing decisions in Australian
public and private hospitals would be useful.

Manager's Experience
According to Bonner (1994), the individual decision maker's characteristics m a y be
important determinants of performance, suggesting that both the task and the
characteristics of the decision maker together impact on the performance of some
particular task. Awasthi and Pratt (1990) indicated that an individual's ability to
comprehend and apply a decision rule to solve a complex problem might be influenced
by level of training and experience in that particular field. McAulay, King and Carr
(1998, 174) m a d e the observation from prior research into management decision making
that " experiencefiguresas an important concern in studies offinancialexpertise".

Research Design
In order to examine these issues more closely, it was necessary to develop series of
hypotheses and a theoretical model to structure analysis of the variables.
Hypothesis Development
Following on from the literature review, a number of null hypotheses were developed
for testing in the survey. Even though sunk costs are irrelevant from an accounting
perspective, the decision maker, (regardless of experience) is likely to be influenced by
the knowledge that sunk costs exist. This led to the following null hypothesis to be
tested in Survey 1.
Hoi:

The decision to outsource will not be different because of the presence of past
investment (sunk costs).

This null hypothesis tests for the existence of the sunk cost effect discussed by Arkes
and Bulmer (1985). T o further test the sunk cost effect, the second null hypothesis tests
whether a difference in the amount of the sunk cost will influence the decision to
outsource.

Page

136

Chapter 5 ... Survey 1 Public & Private Hospitals

Ho 2 :

The decision to outsource will not be different because of the level of past
investment (sunk cost).

Two hypotheses were developed to test for differences between private and public
hospitals and the size of the hospital.
H 03:

The decision to outsource will not differ between private and public hospitals.

H 04:

The decision to outsource will not differ between hospitals of different size.

The effect of asset specificity was tested by the following hypothesis:
H05:

The decision to outsource will not be lower when asset specific information is
present in the scenario.

The final set of hypotheses tested the effects of the manager's experience in the areas of
years of experience, previous experience with outsourcing decisions and the effect of
gender.
H 06

The decision to outsource will not differ between respondents with different
years of experience.

H07:

The decision to outsource will not differ between decision makers w h o have
previously considered outsourcing.

H 08:

The decision to outsource will not differ between respondents of different
gender.

These null hypotheses address possible differences in the decision to outsource as a
result of various demographic details that have been identified in this research as
moderating, intervening and control variables. A n overview of the relationships between
the variables in Survey 1 is represented in Figure 5.1 in the next section.

Relationships Between the Variables for Testing
This research explored the relationship between a number of variables. T h e major
variables of concern in the research were the independent variables (sunk costs and
transaction costs) and the dependent variable (the decision to outsource). T h e model
presented in Figure 5.1 w a s used to structure the research and is derived from the
theoretical model presented in Chapter 4.
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Figure 5.1
Overview of Variables in the Research Study
Independent
Variables

Intervening
Variables

Dependent
Variable

Sunk
Costs
Experience

Outsource

.L

t

Transaction
Costs

Previous
O/S Decision

..
Gender
F/M

Age
O/S = Y/N
N/A
Moderator
Variable

Job Position

1
Years of
Experience

Control

Survey Instruments
There were six versions of the survey instrument, each with a task that differed in
details regarding sunk cost, opportunity cost and asset specific information. The
versions were based on Roodhooft and Warlop (1999), with a number of modifications
to suit the Australian environment and accommodate improvements suggested in the
literature. In particular, clarity of instructions, manipulation of the degree of difference
in monetary amounts and more specific indication of the time value of money were
addressed.

Two additional versions were created to test the effect of low levels of sunk cost and
asset specificity. The comparison between the financial data was improved by the use of
net present values with regard to future cash flows. The advantages and disadvantages
of relying on external suppliers included cost comparisons and factors not easily
quantifiable, such as dependability of suppliers and quality of service or goods. T o
minimise the effect of non-financial factors, the instructions in the letter and in the
wording of the scenario explicitly asked the subjects to consider only financial
information in order to reach their decision.

Pilot-Testing the Instrument Versions
The instrument was pretested by administering the questionnaires to a small number of
experts in the sector: two accountants (one from a private hospital, the other from a
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public hospital) and three management level staff (one from a private hospital and the
other two from a public hospital). The purpose of the pretest was to determine adequacy
and clarity as well as relevance to the sector, particularly terminology or jargon. The
pretest did not involve the manipulation of the independent variables.

Data Collection
Target Population and Sample Construction
A list of all public and private hospitals in Australia was obtained from the Australian
Yellow Pages Telephone C D R o m 1999 edition. A number of stages were involved in
developing the database. First, surgeries and clinics were deleted, leaving a total
population of 833 hospitals. This was done in the belief that the outsourcing issues
presented in the survey instruments would not be relevant to the operations of such
organisations. Second, the remaining hospitals were categorised as either public or
private, with 270 identified as private and 563 as public. This categorisation was
considered necessary to provide for analysis of results. Third, each group was sorted
into state order to avoid bias in allocation of instruments. Following the initial mail out,
surveys from 12 public and 10 private were returned with the notification that the
particular hospital was closed. This reduced the total population to 811.

When the actual population is known, the statistical method to determine the
appropriate sample size can be employed. The appropriate sample size for the two
populations were: public N = 5 5 0 , s= 226 and private N = 260, s = 155 (Leedy, 1997,
211). The response rates were 56.64% for public hospitals (128) and 57.42% for private
hospitals (89). Issues concerning sample error were considered in the preparation stage
through the process of sample selection described in Chapter 4.

Questionnaire - Mail Survey
A survey questionnaire was mailed to the sample of private and public hospitals
throughout Australia. The survey instrument was based on prior research and modified
to satisfy suggestions for improvement from prior research and to clarify the financial
focus by use of net present values. T h e instrument was kept to one page to keep the
survey task to a m i n i m u m amount of time for respondents to complete and the
administrative procedures adopted from Frazer and Lawley (2000, 79).
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Control for Non-Response

Bias

T o assess the potential non-response bias, two approaches were used to determine
whether responses from non-respondents would have been significantly different from
the data collected. Both approaches compared the association between (a) responses
from early and late respondents and (b) k n o w n characteristics of both respondents and
non-respondents. T h e likelihood of non-response bias was assessed using late responses
as a proxy for non-responses. A comparison of the variables provided little difference
between early and late respondents. T h e chi-square for early/late responses for public
hospitals was % 2 1.187 with df=l (Table 5.2). T h e chi-square for early/late responses for
private hospitals was % 2 0.953 with df=l (Table 5.3).
Table 5.2
Analysis of Early Late Responses ~ Public Hospitals
Chi-Square Tests

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correction
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases

a

Value
1.187°
.752
1.169

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.276
.386
.280

1

1.177

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.375

.192

.278

128
a- Computed only for a 2x2 table
b- 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is
10.55.

Table 5.3
Analysis of Early Late Responses ~ Private Hospitals
Chi-Square Tests
Value
.953b

Pearson Chi-Square
3

Continuity Correction

.559

Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test

.946

Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases

.942

df
1
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.329

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.366

.227

.455
.331

.332

89

a

- Computed only for a 2x2 table
- 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is
11.87.

b
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Tests for non-response bias, using the characteristics of size and location were also
carried out. The analysis of the association between a firm's response outcome (that is,
whether or not the firm responded) and firm characteristics indicated that there were no
significant differences between the characteristics of respondents and non-respondents.

Data Analysis
Statistical Methods
Nominal or categorical measurement was used to assign numbers to classify the
independent variables (sunk cost and asset specificity) as well as the dependent variable
(decision). For example, in the dependent variable the choice to continue with internal
production " 1 " is different from the choice to outsource "2". The method of statistical
analysis most commonly recommended for nominal coded data is the chi-square test
(Huck, Cormier & Bounds: 1974, 216; Isaac & Michael, 1990, 177; Sproull, 1995, 68).
A possible limitation of the testing method is the number of versions used (six in total).
S o m e of the survey responses resulted in a cell frequency in the chi-square test of less
than 5.

Daniel and Terrell (1975, 292) suggest that there is some debate about whether the
m i n i m u m frequency for a cell should be 1, as supported by Cochran (1952, 1954), or the
more conservative general rule that the m i n i m u m should be 5. Levin (1984,439) stated
that incorrect inferences m a y be m a d e if the cell frequency is less than 5 unless
correction factors are applied. Argyrous (2000,410) provided two alternative
techniques: Yate's correction for continuity and Fisher's Exact Probability Test. Pett
(1997, 156) provided a list of published research which used the Fisher Exact
Probability Test to justify research findings and conclusions drawn from small samples.
The statistical measure adopted to overcome a small frequency in this research was the
Fisher Exact Probability Test. The test results are reported for all tests where the cell
frequencies were below the m i n i m u m of 5.

Validity Issues
Construct validity is concerned with what the instrument is intended to measure
(Churchill, 1987, 384). The instruments used in this study were derived from prior
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research which provided confirmation that the data does measure the intended
constructs. Further discussion on construct validity was undertaken in Chapter 4.
Internal validity is concerned with the establishment of causal relationships. The
random assignment of subjects provided assurance that all groups were equivalent
thereby minimising threats to internal validity (Abemathy et al., 1999, 17). Other checks
conducted to improve validity included selection and application of appropriate
statistical tests and analysis of early and late responses.

Findings (Analysis & Evaluation)
Eight null hypotheses were generated with regard to the outsourcing decision versions.
These hypotheses called for the use of a chi-square test. T h e results and their
interpretation are discussed below. T h e specific details of the six different versions are
summarised in Table 5.2. Based upon conventional management accounting logic, the
rational choice in each case is to select the outsourcing option. In each version, the cost
to outsource is less than the cost of internal production and as such the economic
rational decision is to select the option which costs less. T h e expected result was for
respondents to select the outsource option based purely on the financial data presented.

Table 5.4
S u m m a r y of Survey 1 Details
Version
Make option
A
Production cost: $3,000,000
(pub=22)
(prv=20)
B
Production cost: $3,000,000
(pub=23)
(prv=14)
C
Production cost: $3,000,000
(pub=21)
Sunk investment: $1,400,000
(prv=17)
D
Production cost: $3,000,000
(pub=22)
Sunk investment: $1,400,000
(prv=13)
E
Production cost: $3,000,000
(pub=22)
Sunk investment: $500,000
(prv=12)
F
Production cost: $3,000,000
(pub=18)
Sunk investment: $500,000
(prv=13)
Details: pub = public hospitals; prv = private hospitals.
N (public hospitals)= 128; N (private hospita!s)= 89

Outsource (buy) option
Purchase price: $2,600,000
Investment (not asset specific): $300,000
Purchase price: $2,600,000
Asset specific investment: $300,000
Purchase price: $2,600,000
Investment (not asset specific): $300,000
Purchase price: $2,600,000
Asset specific investment: $300,000
Purchase price: $2,000,000
Investment (not asset specific): $300,000
Purchase price: $2,000,000
Asset specific investment: $300,000
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The results of the survey were not consistent with the expectations gained from the
literature and prior research. Table 5.5 presents the percentage of respondents w h o
selected the option to outsource for each of the six versions. For public hospitals, a
majority of respondents selected the outsourcing option only in versions A and E. For
private hospitals, a majority of respondents selected the outsourcing option only in
version E.
Table 5.5
Percentage of Respondents Selecting the Outsourcing Option
Version

A

Public
Private
R&W(1999)
68.2% (15)
60.0%(12)
59.3%

Details

NATC + NSC

B

34.8%(8)

35.7%(5)

40.0%

ATC + NSC

C

23.8%(5)

23.5%(4)

42.9%

NATC + SC

D

13.6%(3)

7.7%(1)

12.0%

ATC + SC

E

54.5%(12)

58.3%(7)

N/A NATC + SC

F

38.9%(7)

23.1%(3)

N/A ATC + SC

N A T C = N o Anticipated Transaction Cost (Not Asset Specific)
A T C = Anticipated Transaction Cost (Asset Specific)
N S C = N o Sunk Cost
S C = Sunk Cost

In comparison with the results reported by Roodhooft and Warlop (1999), the public
hospitals managers' response to version A appears to be the closest. The responses to
versions B , C and D were inconsistent with the expected rational decision-making
approach. In other words, the choice not to outsource was sub-optimal and irrational
according to the normative theory of rational decision making.
Hypothesis Testing of Sunk Cost
The versions relevant to test hypothesis Hoi were C, D, E, and F compared to A , and B.
The null hypothesis is repeated below.
HQ!:

The decision to outsource will not be different because of the presence of past
investment (sunk costs).

The results presented in Table 5.4 show that for those versions in which a sunk cost was
present (C, D, E, and F), the selection of the outsourcing option was generally less
frequent than the corresponding versions, which had no sunk cost.

To test Hoi a chi-square test was performed to determine whether or not the
observations of the two independent samples were significant. Table 5.6 presents the
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results of the 2 x 2 contingency table and Table 5.6a in the Appendix provides details of
the chi-square tests.

Table 5.6
Crosstabulation of Outsourcing Decision * S u n k Cost/No S u n k Cost
Sunk Cost

Outsource

No(AB)
Yes (CDEF)
Total

No
40
95
135

Yes
41
41
82

Total

81
136
217

Result:
yf sample = 9.049 (a =0.003, df = 1)
Decision:
Reject the null hypothesis.
2
Computed % exceeds the critical value: yf critical = 3.841 (a =0.05, df = 1)

The decision to outsource did systematically differ between versions with sunk costs
and those without. The null hypothesis was also rejected when the two types of
hospitals were tested independently.
Public Hospitals %2 sample = 4.232 (a =0.040, df = 1) Reject the null hypothesis.
Private Hospitals %2 sample = 5.179 (a =0.023, df = 1) Reject the null hypothesis

As this was a vital part of the study, further tests were conducted to examine the
relationship between the versions with no sunk cost and those with different levels of
sunk cost. Details of the differences between versions were summarised in Table 5.4
and the results of the tests are reproduced in Table 5.7.
Table 5.7
Test of S u n k Cost Effect on the Outsourcing Decision
Version

Public X

Private %

Combined %

Details

3.302

0.753

3.694

AvsC

5.222*

0.131

3.533

NATC + NSC vs HSC

A vsE

0.863

4.800*

0.673

NATC + NSC vs LSC

B vsD

0.069

1.008

0.562

ATC + NSC vs HSC

BvsF

1.513

0.011

1.012

ATC + NSC vs LSC

AB vs CD

* %2 critical = 3.841 (a =0.05, df = 1)

While the responses varied between versions, sunk cost could explain the differences in
choices to outsource or not. Decisions not to outsource are sub-optimal due to the
difference in favour of the cost savings. The respondents w h o chose not to outsource did
not exhibit rational behaviour in their decision. The extent to which the results from
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both the public hospitals and the private hospitals systematically differed provided
support for the existence of the sunk cost effect.
H02:

The decision to outsource will not be different because of the level of past
investment (sunk cost).

Testing for this null hypothesis involved comparing the results from versions C and D
(high level of sunk cost) against E and F (low level of sunk cost). T o test H02 a chisquare test was performed to determine whether or not the observations of the two
independent samples were significant. Table 5.8 presents the results of the 2 x 2
contingency table and Table 5.8a in Appendix D presents the details of the chi-square
tests.
Table 5.8
Crosstabulation of Outsourcing Decision * S u n k Cost High/Low
Sunk Cost
High (CD)
Low(EF)
Total

Outsource

No
61
34
95

Yes
13
28
41

Total

74
62
136

Result:
%2 sample = 12.198 (a =0.000, df = 1)
Reject the null hypothesis.
Decision:
Computed y2 exceeds the critical value: y2 critical = 3.841 (a =0.05, df = 1)

The decision to outsource was shown to systematically differ between versions with a
higher amount of sunk cost than those with a lower amount of sunk cost. The null
hypothesis was also rejected for each of the two groups separately when tested.
Public Hospitals %2 sample = 7.883 (a =0.005, df = 1) Reject the null hypothesis
Private Hospitals y2 sample = 4.065 (a =0.044, df = 1) Reject the null hypothesis

The level of sunk cost in the version did have an impact on the decision to outsource.
Versions E and F (low sunk cost) have a higher percentage of respondents choosing to
outsource than in the corresponding versions C and D (high sunk cost).

Hypothesis Testing of Asset Specificity
Ho3:

The decision to outsource will not differ due to asset specificity in the version.

The versions relevant to test this hypothesis were B, D, and F (asset specificity)
compared to A , C, and E (no asset specificity). The results presented in Table 5.4
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showed that for those versions in which asset specificity was present, the selection of
the outsourcing option was lower than occurred in the corresponding versions that did
not contain asset specificity. T o test H05 a chi-square test was performed to determine
whether or not the observations of the two independent samples were significant. Table
5.9 presents the results of the 2 x 2 contingency table and Table 5.9a in Appendix D
presents the details of the chi-square tests.
Table 5.9
Crosstabulation of Outsourcing Decision * Asset Specificity No/Yes
Asset
Specificity
No (ACE)
Yes (BDF)
Total

Outsource

No
60
75
135

Yes
54
28
82

Total

114
103
217

Result:
y2 sample = 9.377 (a =0.002, df = 1)
Decision:
Reject the null hypothesis.
Computed %2 exceeds the critical value: yj critical = 3.841 (a =0.05, df = 1)

Therefore, the decision to outsource did systematically differ between versions with
asset specificity against those without. T h e null hypothesis was also rejected for each of
the two groups w h e n tested separately.
Public Hospitals y2 sample = 5.736 (a =0.017, df = 1) Reject the null hypothesis.
Private Hospitals %2 sample = 3.787 (a =0.052, df = 1) Reject the null hypothesis.

Hypothesis Testing of Public versus Private Hospitals
HM:

The decision to outsource will not differ between private and public hospitals.

Analysis to test this null hypothesis focused on the difference between all the responses
from both the public and private hospitals. T o test H 0 3 a chi-square test was performed
to determine whether or not the observations of the two independent samples were
significant.

Table 5.10 presents the results of the 2 x 2 contingency table and Table 5.10a in
Appendix D presents the details of the chi-square tests.
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Table 5.10
Crosstabulation of Outsourcing Decision * Public/Private Hospitals
Hospitals

Outsource

Public
Private
Total

No
78
57
135

Yes
50
32
82

Total

128
89
217

Result:
y2 sample = 0.216 (a =0.642, df = 1)
Decision:
Cannot reject the null hypothesis.
2
Computed y does not exceed the critical value: y2 critical = 3.841 (a =0.05, df = 1)

Therefore, the decision to outsource did not systematically differ between public and
private hospitals.

Hypothesis Testing on Size of Organisation
H o5: The decision to outsource will not differ between hospitals of different size.
Analysis of the size of hospital was determined by categorisation based on the number
of beds. T h e number of beds was selected as an approximate indicator of the likely
number of patients and subsequently the possible level of demand for hospital meals. T o
test H04, a chi-square test was performed to determine whether or not the observations of
the four independent samples were significant. Table 5.11 presents the results of the 2 x
4 contingency table and Table 5.1 la in Appendix D presents the details of the chisquare tests.

Table 5.11
Crosstabulation of Outsourcing Decision * Size of Hospital
Size measured by
number of beds
Lowest - 100
101-200
201-300
301 to highest
Total

Outsource

No
97
19

Yes
50
13
10

12
135

82

Total

147
32
17
21
217

Result:
y2 sample = 4.430 (a =0.219, df = 3)
Decision:
Cannot reject the null hypothesis.
Computed y2 does not exceed the critical value: y2 critical = 7.815 (a =0.05, df = 3)

From the chi-square result, the decision to outsource did not differ between hospitals of
different size. T h e null hypothesis could not be rejected for each of the two groups
separately when tested.
Public Hospitals y2 sample = 3.295 (a =0.348, df = 3) Cannot reject the null hypothesis.
Private Hospitals y2 sample = 4.492 (a =0.213, df = 3) Cannot reject the null hypothesis.
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Hypothesis Testing of Experience
H o6:

The decision to outsource will not differ between respondents with different
years of experience.

Experience of respondents was determined by the number of years of service in hospital
management. T o gain more meaningful data, the years of experience were collapsed
into categories of a standard width. Collapsing or recoding nominal data is a c o m m o n
approach to acquiring useable data. Alreck and Settle (1985, 278) recommended three
rules to maintain validity and reliability of the data: (1) the categories must be all
inclusive; (2) the categories must be mutually exclusive; (3) there must be more
variation in the thing being measured between categories than within categories.
Transformation was performed in S P S S using the "recode into same variable" process.
O n e subject did not provide a response to the years of experience question and was
therefore excluded from this test. T o test H 0 6 ( a chi-square test was performed to
determine whether or not the observations of the six independent samples were
significant. Table 5.12 presents the results of the 2 x 6 contingency table and Table
5.12a in Appendix D presents the details of the chi-square tests.

Table 5.12
Years of
Experience

Lowest - 5
6-10
11-15
16-20
21-25
26 - highest
Total

Outsource

No
26
35
30
22
13
8
134

Yes
15
30
18
13
4
r

2

82

Total

41
65
48
35
17
10
216

Result:
y2 sample = 4.773 (a =0.444, df= 5)
Decision:
Cannot reject the null hypothesis.
2
Computed % does not exceed the critical value: y2 critical = 12.832 (a =0.05, df = 5)

Therefore, the decision to outsource did not differ between respondents with different
years of experience. T h e null hypothesis also could not be rejected for each of the two
groups separately when tested.
Public Hospitals y2 sample = 4.717 (a =0.451, df = 5) Cannot reject the null hypothesis.
Private Hospitals y2 sample = 3.270 (a =0.658, df = 5) Cannot reject the null hypothesis.
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A further influence on the decision maker is previous experience with similar
outsourcing choices.
H o7 : The decision to outsource will not differ between decision-makers who have
previously considered outsourcing.

T o test H07, a chi-square test was performed to determine whether or not the
observations of the two independent samples were significant. Table 5.13 presents the
results of the 2 x 2 contingency table and Table 5.13a in the Appendix presents the
details of the chi-square tests.

Table 5.13
Crosstabulation of Outsourcing Decision * Previously Considered Outsourcing
No/Yes
Previously
considered O/S

No
Yes
Total
O/S = Outsourcing

Outsource

No
25
110
135

Yes
13
69
82

Total

38
179
217

Result:
y2 sample = 0.251 (a =0.617, df = 1)
Decision:
Cannot reject the null hypothesis.
2
Computed y does not exceed the critical value: y2 critical = 3.841 (a =0.05, df = 1)

The decision to outsource did not systematically differ between decision makers with
prior experience in considering outsourcing proposals and those without by type of
hospital. A n interesting point is the high percentage of respondents that had previously
considered some form of outsourcing.

To further test H07 in the public hospital sample, a chi-square test was performed to
determine whether or not the observations of the two independent samples were
significant. Table 5.14 presents the results of the 2 x 2 contingency table and Table
5.14a in Appendix D presents the details of the chi-square tests.
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Table 5.14
Crosstabulation of Outsourcing Decision * Previously Considered Outsourcing *
Previous Decision to Outsource No/Yes (Public Hospitals)
Previously
considered O/S
Prev Dec N o
Prev Dec Yes
Total
O/S = Outsourcing

Outsource

No
26
34
60

Yes
10
30
40

Total

36
64
100

Public Hospitals y2 sample = 3.501 (oc =0.061, df = 1) Cannot reject the null hypothesis.

Analysis of the results for public hospitals suggests that the high percentage of
responses in favour of maintaining internal production was not significant. Applying the
same approach to the private hospitals to test Ho7, a chi-square test was performed to
determine whether or not the observations of the two independent samples were
significant. Table 5.15 presents the results of the 2 x 2 contingency table and Table
5.15a in Appendix D presents the details of the chi-square tests.

Table 5.15
Crosstabulation of Outsourcing Decision * Previously Considered Outsourcing *
Previous Decision to Outsource No/Yes (Private Hospitals)
Previously
considered O/S
Prev Dec N o
Prev Dec Yes
Total
O/S = Outsourcing

Outsource

No
19
30
49

Yes
12
17
29

Total

31
47
78

Private Hospitals y2 sample = 0.052 (a =0.820, df = 1) Cannot reject the null hypothesis.

Analysis of the results for private hospitals suggests that the high percentage of
responses in favour of maintaining internal production was not significant.

A finding arising from these results was that the high percentage of respondents w h o
previously considered the possibility of outsourcing chose not to outsource in this task.
Prior experience with outsourcing m a y offer some explanation for the high percentage
of respondents w h o chose internal production over outsourcing. This is especially
important since the financial details presented in each of the versions should have
resulted in the decision to outsource. Based on the financial data alone, a rational
decision-maker would have chosen to outsource. However, respondents appeared to be
influenced by factors and issues that they perceived as important due to their prior
experience.
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Table 5.16 provides details of issues which respondents identified as relevant in
addition to the financial data presented. These issues were n a m e d even though the
instrument and the accompanying letter specifically requested that only financial data be
considered and clearly stated that quality w a s guaranteed. A high number of
respondents still identified issues of quality, flexibility, experience and control as major
factors contributing to their decision.

Table 5.16
Legend of Summarised Decision Issues
Category of comments

1

Staff and union issues

2

Public

Private

16

4

Size of hospital or regional area does not warrant outsourcing

5

1

3

Government policy does not favour outsourcing

3

0

4

Cost reduction is too small or minimal

23

21

5

Quality; flexibility; experience; control issues

30

34

6

Write-off not warranted (due to sunk cost)

17

6

Another issue raised by a number of respondents was that sunk cost was relevant and
that to write off the item w a s not warranted (issue 6). This supports earlier research that
decision makers have their o w n view of the relevance of sunk costs which m a y not
follow the traditional concept of a rational decision maker. In addition, some
respondents considered the cost reduction as too small or minimal. This also contradicts
the traditional view that any saving is justification for a rational, or at least optimal,
decision. A further s u m m a r y showing the spread of comments across the different
versions by respondents from public and private hospitals is provided in Table 5.17.

Table 5.17
Comments from Respondents Regarding Decision Issues
Category
E
D
B
C
/t
1
2
3
4
5
6

X
X
F
Pub Prv Pub Prv Pub Prv Pub Prv Pub Prv Pub Prv Pub Prv
16
4
1
3
2
5
3
3^ 2
2
1
5
1
2
3
0
1
1
2
2 23 21
2
1
2
3
4
7
8
5
7
7 30 34
4
2
4
5
3
5
10
9
5
9
2
6
17
6
2
6
4
3
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Hypothesis Testing of Gender Differences
H 08:

The decision to outsource will not differ between respondents of different
gender.

Gender has been raised in prior research as a possible reason for differences in decision
making by management (Fagley & Miller, 1990). There were two respondents w h o did
not provide a response to this question and were deleted from this sample for the
purpose of testing this null hypothesis. T o test Ho8, a chi-square test was performed to
determine whether or not the observations of the two independent samples were
significant. Table 5.18 presents the results of the 2 x 2 contingency table and Table
5.18a in Appendix D presents the details of the chi-square tests.

Table 5.18
Crosstabulation of Outsourcing Decision * Gender
Outsource

Gender

Yes
41
40
81

No
64
70
13

Female
Male
Total

Total

105
110
215

Result:
y2 sample = 0.165 (a =0.685, df = 1)
Decision:
Cannot reject the null hypothesis.
Computed y2 does not exceed the critical value: y2 critical = 3.841 (a =0.05, df = 1)

The decision to outsource did not differ between respondents of different gender. This
indicates that there was no relationship between the two variables (gender and decision).
The gender distribution of respondents across all five versions of the instrument is
presented in Table 5.19.

Table 5.19
Gender of Respondents by Version
A

0.196

0.658

Fisher exact
test P=2 tail
0.751

B

0.169

0.681

C

0.186

D

Version

tf sample

a

M

F

Reject or Not

20

21 Cannot reject

0.736

15

21

0.666

1.000

15

23 Cannot reject

0.004

0.952

1.000

18

17 Cannot reject

E

0.185

0.667

0.738

19

15 Cannot reject

F

2.917

0.088

0.129

18

13 Cannot reject

Cannot reject

This finding was then tested for possible significance in the public and private hospitals
separately. T h e 2 x 2 contingency table showing the results for the public hospital are
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presented in Table 5.20 and Table 5.20a in Appendix D presents the details of the chisquare tests.

Table 5.20
Crosstabulation of Outsourcing Decision * Gender (Public Hospitals)
Gender

Outsource

No
41
26
67

Female
Male
Total

Yes
36
24
60

Total

77
50
217

Public Hospitals y2 sample = 0.019 (a =0.891, df = 1) Cannot reject the null hypothesis.

The 2x2 contingency table showing the results for the private hospitals are presented in
Table 5.21 and Table 5.21a in Appendix D presents the details of the chi-square tests.

Table 5.21
Crosstabulation of Outsourcing Decision * Gender (Private Hospitals)
Gender

Outsource

No
23
15
38

Female
Male
Total

Private Hospitals y

Yes
34
16
50

Total

57
31
88

sample = 0.529 (a =0.467, df = 1) Cannot reject the null hypothesis.

The null hypothesis could not be rejected for either of the two groups. Therefore, the
finding of no relationship between gender and decision was confirmed for the two
groups (public and private hospitals) separately.

Conclusions
In each of the six versions, a decision based on the financial data should have resulted in
the choice to outsource. However, with the exception of versions A and E, the majority
of subjects chose not to outsource. In other words, the majority of respondents chose
internal production when the optimal choice based on the financial data should have led
to the selection of the outsourcing option.

These results suggest that the decision makers w h o chose not to outsource did not make
the optimal choice. There were, however, versions that did have a high percentage of
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respondents that selected the option to outsource. These findings provided evidence that
the decision-making behaviour of the majority of subjects violated the rational decision
making model. T w o possible variables were tested and offered as explanations for this
observed behaviour: the sunk cost information and asset specificity.

The first possible explanation is that the behaviour may have been due to the sunk cost
information. Responses from the survey that contained a sunk cost significantly differed
from the survey that did not contain a sunk cost. Further evidence of the sunk cost effect
was found by testing responses from the survey with a lower level of sunk cost against
the responses from surveys with a higher level of sunk cost. T h e tests produced
significant statistical differences. These findings are consistent with the expectations of
a sunk cost effect being related to violation of the rational decision making model.

A second possible explanation is that asset specificity influenced the choice. Asset
specificity was found to have an influence in the choice to outsource. T h e intention to
outsource w a s lower for those versions in which asset specificity was present. This
effect was found to be systematically different between the responses of versions with
and without asset specificity. These findings are consistent with the expectations under
transaction cost theory that decision makers will take into consideration any additional
cost of doing business with an external supplier.

The most surprising result was that no significant difference could be found between the
public and private hospitals. T h e reason for this m a y be explained by the managerial
changes that have taken place in the public hospital sector. T h e lack of significant
differences suggests that the managerial style and the resultant decision making is closer
between the two sectors than anticipated. In particular, the attempts by the various State
Governments to corporatise and privatise government instrumentalities, seems to have
produced a change in the managerial style and risk propensity of the managers in the
public sector hospitals. Whether this is due to changes in management at public
hospitals or managerial changes in private hospitals is an issue for further research.

Contextual issues were examined and found not to be relevant factors in explaining the
differences in decisions between survey versions. First, previous experience with
making an outsourcing decision was not a contributing factor to the differences in
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decisions. T h e difference between respondents w h o had previously considered an
outsourcing option, and those w h o had not, was not statistically significant. This was
surprising, as a number of respondents raised concerns about issues of a non-financial
nature specifically and dissatisfaction with prior outsourcing arrangements. Second,
years of experience did not provide a significant difference. Third, the size of the
hospital did not have a bearing on the decision outcome. Limitations associated with
aggregating the data m a y have biased these results. However, the recommended method
for aggregating this type of data was strictly followed to overcome any such problems.
The final consideration was for possible differences due to gender. There were no
significant differences in the decision outcomes between genders.

The surveys asked respondents to provide comments regarding their decision. While not
all respondents provided a comment, those that did mostly raised concerns regarding
non-financial issues. Instructions provided with the survey clearly stated that only the
financial information presented in the version should be used to reach a decision. O f
major concern were issues of quality, flexibility, lack of control, and unsatisfactory
prior experiences. These responses are consistent with the literature and imply that
individuals m a y be conditioned or unduly influenced by past experiences w h e n
considering situations that are similar to prior decisions.
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CHAPTER 6
Contextual Effects on Decision Making by Financial Planners: Sunk
Cost, Framing and Cognitive Biases

Chapter Abstract
Recent research on financial decision-making situations indicates that contextual
aspects of the financial information, or frame, influence the outcome of the decision.
This study examined the effect of framing (negative or positive) on the problem of sunk
cost and the influence of cognitive biases related to problem space and image
compatibility. T o assess the relevance of the framing effects, three versions of an
investment task were submitted to financial planners for assessment. Financial planners
were selected because they provide expert analysis of financial information upon which
investment decisions are based. The cognitive biases of problem space and image
compatibility were examined to reveal theriskperceptions of respondents. D u e to their
training, they were expected to be less subject to cognitive biases. T h e lack of research
into decision making by financial planners was an added incentive.

A significant framing effect was identified as well as a significant sunk cost effect.
Lowering the sunk cost produced a higher m e a n funding outcome and the amount
granted was higher in the negative frame. A perception of responsibility was
significantly correlated with the amount of funding granted; this is consistent with the
theory that escalation behaviour is associated with feelings of responsibility. Both
perception of the problem space and analysis of image compatibility produced
unexpected results. T h e results indicated that positive-framed versions exhibited
stronger cognitive relationships to problem space perceptions than negative-framed
versions. Whilst low image compatibility was a significant predictor of the level of
funding, high image compatibility was also a significant predictor of the level of
funding granted.
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Contextual Influences on Financial Decision Making
Decision making involving issues of finance and investments are as m u c h a part of the
management accounting field as they are to financial planning. Financial planners are
charged with the responsibility of providing advice concerning investments intended to
provide future financial security. The portfolio theory used in financial planning
considers that all investors are "risk-averse" and seek to maximize their return for the
level ofriskthey are prepared to accept (Markowitz, 1959). Whether financial planners'
tolerance forriskis indicated by the nature of the investment choices they recommend is
yet to be tested.

Research suggests that decision outcomes made by individuals vary in accordance with
the positive or negative framing of an aspect in a problem. This framing of the situation
influences the conceptualisation of the problem by the individual and financial decisionmaking situations are no different. Prospect theory suggests that a person's level of risk
tolerance varies according to the w a y in which the prospects of the alternative courses
of action are f r a m e d — as either positive (gains) or negative (losses) (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979).

Survey 2 applied the constructs of prospect theory to an investment analysis by financial
planners. Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) is a decision model involving a
two-step process intended to explain h u m a n behaviour that violates expected utility
theory. Chapter 6 presents the data analysis and results of Survey 2. The survey
investigated the effect of framing and other contextual factors on decisions m a d e by
financial planners in an experimental setting. Financial planners were selected because
they are recognised as experts in investment analysis through a process of professional
training (Oskamp, 1965; Bradley, 1981; Sundali & Atkins, 1994).

Sunk Costs
According to finance theory, only future cash inflows and outflows should influence
decisions. Sunk costs are by definition "past and irreversible outflows. ... they cannot
be affected by the decision to accept or reject the project, and so they should be
ignored" (Brealey & Myers, 1991, 95). Portfolio theory and the net present value
method are c o m m o n l y used to assess alternative investment opportunities. In an
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investment decision, past costs (sunk costs) are deemed to be irrelevant. Despite this,
there is evidence that sunk costs are not always ignored as prescribed; this is described
as the "sunk cost effect" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Arkes & Blumer, 1985).

Tversky and Kahneman (1981) suggested that individuals form psychological accounts
regarding the advantages and disadvantages of an event or option in order to appraise
costs and benefits of outcomes. Therefore, even though sunk costs m a y be irrelevant
from an accounting perspective, the decision maker (regardless of experience) is likely
to be influenced by the knowledge that sunk costs exist.

Empirical research indicated that decision makers tend to evaluate prospects with
respect to some reference point (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman,
1981; 1986; 1991; Payne, Laughhunn & Crum, 1980). For example, Kahneman and
Tversky suggested that a person's perception of wealth is determined by experiences of
past and present stimuli. This suggests that past and present experiences, such as sunk
costs, can influence the location of the reference point against which a particular
outcome is judged as a gain or loss. In this study it was hypothesised that the inclusion
of sunk costs would act as a reference point for the decision to provide additional
funding and thus the decision outcomes would differ between the groups. The following
hypothesis tested this assumption:
Hoi:

The amount of funding granted will not be reduced by the level of past
investment (sunk costs).

The expectation was that the level of funding would be different between groups as a
consequence of the high and low sunk cost conditions (versions).

Framing Effects
Empirical research demonstrated that individuals are influenced by the w a y in which
information is presented (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). A frame according to Beach
(1990, 23) is "a mental construct consisting of elements, and the relationship between
them, that are associated with a situation of interest to a decision maker." The frame
m a y therefore be thought of in terms of a representation of a situation through which a
decision maker gains understanding or makes sense of the alternative courses of action
available. According to prospect theory, decision makers tend to berisk-seekingwhen
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the situation is framed in terms of losses butrisk-aversein situations involving gains
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). O n e explanation for this is that when a decision maker
focuses on the negative, there is a greater urgency to engage in preventative behaviour
rather than explore other options. March and Shapira (1992) suggested that individuals
are survival oriented w h e n focusing on losses which threaten to deplete their resources
and more aspiration oriented w h e n focused on positive goals. The assumption that
decision makers are more influenced by negative framing is supported by the findings
of prior research (Dunegan, 1993; Dunegan, Duchon & Ashmos, 1995).

This study was concerned with testing decision outcome differences within a negative
framed version to shed more light on behaviour in a situation involving losses in an
investment task. There is no empirical evidence that positive manipulation of the frame
derives a framing effect. Since "losses loom larger than gains" according to Kahneman
and Tversky (1979), it seemed useful to examine the extent to which the propensity to
takeriskswould be supported empirically by the responses of real life financial
planners. T o test this supposition, the following hypothesis was developed.
H02:

The amount of funding provided will not differ between subjects due to framing
of the version.

Escalation of Commitment as a Responsibility Factor
Staw (1976, 1981) found that individuals tend to escalate their commitment to previous
decisions, even if the behaviour is not rational. Abundant research has shown that
individuals w h o m a k e an initial decision are more likely to m a k e further decisions in a
biased w a y to justify their earlier decision (Staw & Ross, 1978; Teger, 1980; Bazerman,
Beekun & Schoorman, 1982; Bazerman, Guiliano & Appleman, 1984). A consequence
of this bias is that resources are committed to justify previous actions, whether or not
the rationale for those initial commitments is still valid (Brockner & Rubin, 1985;
Schoorman, 1988). The possibility that escalation to commitment m a y be occurring in
investment appraisal led to the following null hypothesis:
Ho3:

The amount of funding will not be significantly different between subjects due
to their perceived level of responsibility for the initial decision.

This null hypothesis tested whether escalation to commitment is a contributing factor to
observed decision behaviour.
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Problem Space
The role of cognition is well documented as a salient factor in decision making (Newell
& Simon, 1972; Lord & Maher, 1990). The information processing theory of Newell
and Simon (1972) consists of three major constructs: the information processing system,
the task environment and the problem space. The problem space refers to the conceptual
representation of the task constructed by the individual (Payne, 1980, 95). Problem
space provides further insight into the differences between decision outcomes made by
subjects. Payne (1980) referred to these perceptions collectively as the problem space or
the individual's cognitive representation of a task environment. The inclusion of
problem space in decision research also provides better understanding of behaviour
anomalies related toriskychoice. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggested these
anomalies are due to the manner in which the problem is coded, edited and represented
mentally by the decision maker. These issues are linked with the problem space
construct; research exploring these processes exists (Bowen, 1987; Lord, 1985).

Dunegan (1993) examined the influence of framing on the perceptual processes which
are thought to proceed the eventual actions of decision makers. The null hypothesis
below tests whether differences in perception of the problem space explain the decision
outcomes in view of Dunegan's (1993) call for more research on the extent to which
framing effects can influence cognitive processes.
H o4:

The perceptions of the problem space will not differ between versions due to
the framing effect.

The way in which decision makers process information can be measured by the
cognitive perception of the problem space which can be characterised and controlled in
automatic m o d e (Isen, 1984; Langer, 1989a, 1989b; Fazio, 1990; Maheswaran &
Chaiken, 1991; Louis & Sutton, 1991). W h e n controlled modes of cognitive processing
are used, information is subjected to more comprehensive, deliberate and thorough
analysis. W h e n automatic modes are used, the processing of information is limited,
there is reduced attention to detail, and fewer incoming cues contribute to a cognitive
representation of the task (Dunegan, 1993). Controlled processing is expected to
produce a significant relationship between problem space measures and decision
outcomes (funding) because problem space should be more easily recalled and used in
the controlled mode. In the automatic mode, the problem space is not easily recalled for
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conscious use and the relationship between problem space and decision outcomes
should be w e a k or non-significant.
Hos: The eight problem space variables will not significantly explain the variance in
funding. [S2]

This null hypothesis tests whether different perceptions of the problem space due to
framing would produce different decision outcomes.

The eight problem space items used in this survey are:
1. Indicate the level of risk you believe is associated with providing the additional funds.
Anchored by N o Risk - Too Risky
2. H o w responsible do you feel for the initial decision to undertake the project? Anchored by
Not Very Responsible - Very Responsible
3. H o w disappointed are you about the present conditions of the project? Anchored by Not
Too Disappointed - Very Disappointed
4. H o w important do you think this decision is? Anchored by Not Very Important - Very
Important
5. What is the likelihood you would fund the request? Anchored by Reject Request - Fund
Request
6. At this point, what would be more important? Anchored by Minimise Losses - Maximise
Gains
7. I have already invested so much it seems foolish not to continue. Anchored by Strongly
Disagree - Strongly Agree
8. Responsibility for the success of the project is. Anchored by Out of m y Control - Under m y
Control

I m a g e Compatibility
Image theory predicts that decisions m a d e by individuals are a function of the
perceptions of three images (Beach, 1990; Beach & Mitchell, 1990; Mitchell & Beach,
1990). T h e three images are value images, pertaining to a consolidation of morals,
principles and predispositions; trajectory images, pertaining to an individual's future
objectives or targets; and strategic images, consisting of current plans and tactics
(Mitchell, Rediker & Beach, 1986; Dunegan, D u c h o n & A s h m o s , 1995). These images
are relevant to decisions concerning adoption and progress choices. Adoption decisions
are concerned with n e w projects, plans, or activities. Progress decisions are related to
deliberations concerning projects, plans or activities already c o m m e n c e d . These are the
types of activities associated with investment appraisal. T h e model proposed by
Dunegan, D u c h o n and A s h m o s (1995) w a s adapted by allowing for specific types of
variable manipulation— framing and sunk c o s t — and classifying the variables
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according to the model. Figure 6.1 demonstrates the predicted relationships between the
problem space and image compatibility that were tested in this survey research.

Figure 6.1
Information Use, Image Compatibility and Problem Space
Dependent
Variable

Independent
Variables

Information
•Frame

Problem Space
Perceptions

ik

*

Decision
Outcome

•Sunk cost
Image
Compatibility

Intervening
Variable

Moderator
Variable

Source: adapted from Dunegan, Duchon & Ashmos (1995, 33)

Dunegan, Duchon and Ashmos (1995, 32) indicated that in both adoption and progress
decisions image compatibility acts as a catalyst for differentiated actions. W h e n
information is perceived as positive, the trajectory and strategic images are compatible
and no change in course of action is deemed to be warranted by a decision maker.
Conversely, when information is perceived as negative, images appear incompatible and
the decision maker is more likely to take action intended to rectify the situation (Beach
et al., 1992). Dunegan, Duchon and A s h m o s (1995) also found that image compatibility
acted as a moderating variable influencing the degree to which information was used by
a decision maker in choosing a course of action.

The following hypothesis tested the role of problem space and image compatibility.
H oe:

The perceptions of the problem space and perceived image compatibility will
not be the same for each individual subject.

Dunegan, Duchon and A s h m o s (1995) found that when image compatibility was high
and progress toward the goal on their trajectory image was perceived to be acceptable,
then the association between the problem space and funding levels was weak. W h e n
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image compatibility was low, the association between the problem space and funding
decisions was significantly higher. T h e following hypotheses tested these findings.
H o7:
H 08:

The perceived image compatibility will not differ between decision outcomes.
The perceptions of the problem space and decision outcomes will not be
stronger when perceived image compatibility is low.
The image compatibility items were preceded by the instructions:
Please mentally, conjure up two images of this project, a "current image" (reflecting
conditions as they are now) and a "target image " (the way you would eventually like
them to be).
The four image compatibility items used in this survey are:
1. H o w close is the "current image" to the "target image"? Anchored by Not Very Close Very Close
2. Is your "current image" of this project moving toward your "target image"? Anchored by
Definitely Not - Absolutely
3. Given your "current image" of this project, what is the likelihood that your "target image"
will be realised? Anchored by Very Likely - Not Very Likely
4. In terms of "ultimate" project objectives, how well is the project doing? Anchored by Not
Very Well - Very Well

Data Collection
Target Population and Sample Selection
The target population was selected from the category of financial planners in the
Australian Yellow Pages Telephone C D R o m 1999 edition. Several stages were
involved in developing the database for the sample. First, the search was restricted to
Queensland Financial Planners: a total population of 863. This was done to keep the
survey at a manageable level and in the belief that the issues presented in the survey
instruments would be relevant to financial planners, no matter where in Australia they
were situated. Second, as accountants were surveyed in a separate study, financial
planners w h o also offered accounting services were deleted from the population. Third,
a sample of 265 was randomly selected from the remaining population. The random
sampling method followed the steps prescribed by Sekaran (1992).

Design of Questionnaire and Survey
The wording of the instrument was modified to suit the financial planners and
investment advisors w h o were the designated subjects for this research. A s the
instrument was based on prior research and otherwise identical to the task used in
Chapter 7, which was tested no further testing was conducted.
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Validity and Reliability
The first goal of questionnaire design is to obtain information relevant to the purpose of
the survey (Fowler, 1988; Alreck & Settle, 1985). T o satisfy this requirement, the
specific task questions were based on prior studies from pertinent literature. The second
goal of questionnaire design is to collect information with m a x i m u m reliability and
validity (Alreck & Settle, 1985; Fowler, 1988). The development of the survey from
the literature were used as a means of addressing the need for adequate coverage of the
subject matter as well as providing for internal and content validity.

To be able to generalise to a particular population, the information must have external
validity. R a n d o m sampling was used to assure that the sample was representative of the
population (Kerlinger 1986). Reliability of a survey questionnaire depends on the
degree to which the instrument provides consistent results (Kerlinger, 1986). The
method most commonly used in mail survey questionnaires to test for consistency is the
split-half procedure. This involved checking the results from one half of the respondents
against the other half. The instrument was kept to two pages to minimize the amount of
time required of respondents and administrative procedures adopted in conformity with
the suggestions of Frazer and Lawley (2000, 79). T o improve response rate and
overcome the limitations of mail surveys (Sekaran, 1992, 201; E m o r y & Cooper, 1991,
334; Berdie, Anderson & Niebuhr, 1986, 42) the following techniques were used in this
study: short simple wordings, cover letter, incentive to return the survey for a report and
to avoid follow up, confidentiality, telephone fax and email contact.

Survey Instruments
The versions of the task for this research were based on research reported by Dunegan
(1993) with modifications derived from Dunegan, Duchon and A s h m o s (1995). In
Dunegan (1993), the task refered to a "Research and Development Manager" and in
Dunegan, Duchon and A s h m o s (1995), the decision maker was cast as "VicePresident/General Manager." In this research, the decision maker was referred to as the
"Fund Manager". This title was used to compliment the nature of financial planning and
investment advising consistent with the industry role of the subjects. T o enable
comparative analysis to be drawn between accountants and financial planners, the basic
format and the specific financial data was consistent with that used in Chapter 7.
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There were three versions each differing slightly with regard to specific details. The first
two contained the same amount of sunk cost, however, one had a positive frame and the
other a negative frame. T h e third version had a negative frame, and the amount of the
sunk cost was reduced. In addition to the framing and sunk cost manipulations there
were questions which addressed cognitive perceptions of problem space and image
compatibility in all three versions.

In introducing the instrument's task, the subjects were asked to adopt the role of a Fund
Manager w h o , having instigated an investment project sometime in the past, is n o w
confronted with a request for additional funds by the team responsible for the
investment project. T h e team is seeking an additional $100,000 as the investment
project is behind schedule and over budget. The sunk cost of the initial investment was
identified as $400,000. This was considered a reasonable amount to influence the
subjects as the $100,000 requested represented one quarter of this sunk cost. The Fund
Manager has $500,000 in unallocated funds; however these funds m a y be required for
other projects and there is some time left before the end of the current financial year.
The details of the differences between the sunk cost and framing for the three versions
are highlighted in Table 6.1 below.

Table 6.1
S u m m a r y of Survey 2 Details for Investment Decision (N=86)
Version

Wording

Framing

1 (n=31)

High Sunk Cost ($400,000)

Negative

2(n=33)

High Sunk Cost ($400,000)

Positive

3(n=22)

L o w Sunk Cost ($100,000)

Negative

The subjects were instructed that they believe there is a "fair chance" the project will
not succeed. T h e final statement given to the subjects specifically established the
pertinent framing effect. T h e positive frame stated that, " Of the projects undertaken by
this team, 30 of the last 50 have been successful", while the negative frame differed
with respect to the last part of the statement "Of the projects undertaken by this team, 2
of the last 50 have been unsuccessful". In both the negative and positive versions, the
ratios lead to the same result.

Page

165

Chapter 6... Survey 2 Financial Planners

Subjects were told that the actual time remaining till the end of the financial year was 6
months; this imposed a time frame that was considered a reasonable challenge to the
subject's perception ofrisk.The subjects could view the 6 months as half the year being
past or as half the year remaining (Dunegan, 1993). The variables for this version are
summarised in Table 6.2 below:

Table 6.2
S u m m a r y of Variables for Investment Decision
Variable Category

Number

Details

Treatment Effect:
(Treatment Variables)
Demographic Variables:
(Independent Variables)
[Predictors]
Dependent Variables:
(Criterion Variables)

Two

Framing (positive vs negative)
Sunk Cost (high vs low)
Problem space inventory
Image compatibility

Two
Two

Choice to provide NIL funds
Choice to provide a level of funds

Survey Response
Sample Size and Response Rate
Where the actual population is known, the statistical method for determining an
appropriate sample size can be employed. In this case the appropriate sample size was
determined to be 327 (N=850 s= 265) (Leedy, 1997, 211). Following the initial mail out
of surveys, 30 were returned with the notification that the address was no longer correct.
These were replaced by randomly selecting 30 replacements. Eighty-six useable
responses were received; the response rate was 32.5%. This response rate was
considered satisfactory for the size of the population and the purpose of the survey.
Non-Response Bias
The likelihood of non-response bias was assessed using late responses as a proxy for
non-responses. A comparison of the variables provided little difference between early
and late respondents. Because the data was a mixture of ordinal and nominal testing
early/late responses was conducted using the S P S S "Ordinal Regression" which
produced a chi-square of the model fit, %2 61.824 (a =0.308, df = 57), presented in
Table 6.3 below. A n independent samples t-test was also conducted to test the equality
of the means for each variable, Table 6.3a in Appendix E. N o items were significantly
different between early and late responses. The results of the early/late responses
suggest that the non-response bias was not to a threat to validity. Since the subjects were
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selected from a population that was k n o w n to be largely homogenous, major differences
between respondents was unlikely.

Table 6.3
Analysis of Early/Late Responses
Model Fitting Information
Model
Intercept Only
Final

-2 Log
Likelihood
61.825
.000

Chi-Square
61.824

df

Sig.

57

.308

Link function: Logit.

Data Analysis
Statistical Methods
The data obtained from the survey was primarily ordinal data derived from Likert-scale
responses to issues concerning the decision and the amount of funding provided.
Ordinal data not only categorises data, it also allows for data to be ordered by degree
(Argyrous, 1996). Data gathered using a Likert scale m a y be treated as ordinal or
interval according the type of data and the structure of the scale items in the survey
instrument (Sproull, 1995, 68; Huck, Cormier & Bounds, 1974, 216; Isaac & Michael,
1990, 177). Interval data is comprised of constant units of measurement in which the
differences between any two adjacent points on any part of the scale are equal
(Argyrous, 1996). The most appropriate inferential statistic for ordinal/interval data is
the F-test, one w a y analysis of variance (de Vaus, 1991).

Eight null hypotheses were generated with regard to the investment decision versions.
These called for the use of a t-test (for null hypothesis 1), A N O V A (for null hypotheses
1, 2 and 3), a M A N O V A (for null hypothesis 4) and multiple regression analysis (for
null hypotheses 6,7, and 8). A principal component factor analysis was conducted as an
additional test on the data regarding the perceptions of problem space and image
compatibility. The results and their interpretation are discussed below. The results of the
analysis of the data are presented in order of the null hypotheses established earlier in
this chapter.
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Results
Analysis of Reliability
Table 6.4 presents the m e a n and standard deviations for the funding amounts and the
total subjects in the sample for each of the versions that were administered.

Table 6.4
Descriptive Details ol' Investment Decision Versions
Version

N

Mean

1 Negative~S/C High

31

39,354

22,536

2 Positive~S/C High

33

53,484

25,601

3 Negative~S/C L o w

22

60,227

29,296

Total

86

50,116

26,667

Std. Deviation

S/C = Sunk cost

There was a difference between the means of the negative-framed and positive-framed
versions. Having established that the funding levels were significantly different between
the versions, the first null hypothesis examined the significance of the framing effect on
the amount of funding.

Testing the Sunk Cost Effect on Funding
Hoi:

The amount of funding will not be reduced by the level of past investment
(sunk costs).

T o test H02, a one w a y analysis of variance ( A N O V A ) was conducted with the funding
(decision outcome) as the dependent variable and framing ( d u m m y coded) as the
independent variable, Table 6.5. The versions relevant to the test were version 1
(negative framing with high sunk cost) and version 3 (negative framing with low sunk
cost).
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Table 6.5
A N O V A Details of Sunk Cost Effect on Funding
ANOVA

AMT
Between
Groups

(Combined)
Linear Term

S u m of
Squares
5.61 E+09
5.61 E+09

Unweighted
Weighted

Within Groups
Total

df
1
1

Mean Square
5606020722
5606020722

5.61 E+09

1

5606020722

3.33E+10
3.89E+10

51
52

652175694.3

F
8.596
8.596

Sig.
.005
.005

8.596

.005

Result: A N O V A between versions "1 & 3", F = 8.596, (p<0.005, df = 1)
Decision: Reject the null hypothesis.

The results show a significant difference between the mean of funding for the high sunk
cost frame and the low sunk cost frame versions. The direction of the difference was a
low level of funding ($39,354) in the high sunk cost versions and the high level of
funding ($60,227) in the low sunk cost versions, Table 6.6. This suggests that the
amount of sunk cost creates the sunk cost effect, as predicted.

Table 6.6
Means Testing of High and L o w Sunk Cost
Group Statistics

H02
AMT

N
31
22

1
3

Mean
39354.84
60227.27

Std. Deviation
22536.71
29296.40

Std. Error
Mean
4047.71
6246.01

Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances

F
AMT

Equal variance;
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed

2.434

Sig.
.125

t-test for Eaualitv of Means

t

Std. Error
Mean
Sig. (2-tailed) Difference Difference

df

9 5 % Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Upper
Lower

-2.932

51

.005 -20872.43

7119.15 35164.72 -6580.15

-2.804

37.689

.008 -20872.43

7442.89 35943.87 -5801.00
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Testing the Framing Effect on Funding
Funding (or resource allocation from $0 to $100,000) was the dependent variable and
framing ( d u m m y coded 1 or 2) was the independent variable in Ho2.
Ho2:

The amount of funding provided will not differ between responses due to
framing of the version.

A comparison of the means using a two-sample independent f-test (two-tailed) revealed
a significant difference between funding levels (t = 6.501, p <.001). This result indicates
that the frame manipulation was successful.

To test the difference between the experimental conditions (decision choices versus
positive and negative framing), an analysis of variance for repeated measures was
performed. Since each of the four groups was treated identically, except for framing;
differences were expected among them. The results of the A N O V A are presented in
Table 6.7. Further multiple comparisons are provided in Table 6.7a in Appendix E,
showing the direction of the significant differences between versions.
Table 6.7
A N O V A Details of Investment Task
ANOVA

AMT

Between
Groups

Within Groups
Total

(Combined)
Linear Term Unweighted
Weighted
Deviation

S u m of
Squares
6.21 E+09
5.61 E+09
5.94E+09
2.74E+08
5.42E+10
6.04E+10

df
2
1
1
1
83
85

Mean Square
3106817187
5606020722
5939277236
274357138.4
653436178.7

F
4.755
8.579
9.089
.420

Sig.
.011
.004
.003
.519

Result: Version 1 vs 2, A N O V A , F = 4.755, (p =0.011, df = 2)
Decision: Reject the null hypothesis.

The result confirms that the total variance in funding was significantly related to the
differences in framing. Table 6.8 compares version 1 against version 2. Further multiple
comparisons are provided in Table 6.8a and 6.8b in Appendix E, showing the direction
of the significant differences between versions.
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Table 6.8
Significant Differences in A m o u n t of Funding between Versions 1 and 2
Group Statistics

AMT

PAPER
1
2

N
31
33

Mean
39354.84
53484.85

Std. Deviation

Std. Error
Mean

22536.71
25601.66

4047.71
4456.68

Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances

F
AMT

Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed

1.327

Sig.
.254

t-test for Equality of Means

t

Mean
Sig. (2-tailed) Difference

df

Std. Error
Difference

9 5 % Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Upper
Lower

-2.338

62

.023

-14130.01

6044.75 -26213.30

-2046.72

-2.347

61.749

.022

-14130.01

6020.46 •26165.71

-2094.31

The sunk cost effect w a s significant with the m e a n for funding being greater in the
version with the lower sunk cost.
Testing the Perception of Responsibility on Funding
Ho3:

The amount of funding will not be different between respondents due to their
perceived level of responsibility for the initial decision.

T o test H 0 3, a one-way analysis of variance ( A N O V A ) was conducted with the problem
space item for responsibility, Table 6.9. Testing had funding (from $0 to $100,000) as
the dependent variable and perceived level of responsibility (scaled from 1 to 5) as the
independent variable.
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Table 6.9
A N O V A Details for Perception of Responsibility
ANOVA

AMT
Between
Groups

(Combined)
Linear Term

Unweighted
Weighted
Deviation

Within Groups
Total

S u m of
Squares
1.00E+10
9.73E+09
8.86E+09
1.16E+09
5.04E+10
6.04E+10

df

Mean Square

4 2504773405
1 9734188264
1 8862547207
3 385515470.9
81 622589427.0
85

F
4.023
15.635
14.235
.619

Sig.
.005
.000
.000
.605

Result: The result of the A N O V A was F = 4.023 (p =0.005, df = 4)
Decision: Reject the null hypothesis.

This result shows there were statistically significant differences between the perception
of responsibility and the amount of funding. The total variance of means is presented in
Table 6.8a in Appendix E, providing multiple comparisons which show the direction of
the significant differences between levels of perceived responsibility and funding
amounts.

The result in Table 6.10 below shows there were no statistically significant differences
between the perception of responsibility and the intention to fund.

Table 6.10
A N O V A Details for Perceived Responsibility/Intention to F u n d
ANOVA
LIKELY

Between Groups

Sum of
Squares
3.198

4

Mean Square
.799
.988

df

Within Groups

80.012

81

Total

83.209

85

F
.809

Sig.
.523
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LIKELY
Subset
for alpha
= .05
RESP
Scheffe^ 4
2
5
1
3
Sig.

1

N
26
13
12
15
20

3.35
3.38
3.58
3.73
3.80
.799

Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.
a- Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 15.854.
b. The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean
of the group sizes is used. Type I error levels are
not guaranteed.
Result: The result of the A N O V A was F = 0.809 (p =0.523, df = 4).
Decision: Cannot reject the null hypothesis.

The next section is concerned with examining the intervening and moderating variables
identified in the model presented in Figure 6.1. T h e focus of the following tests is on
perceptions of problem space and image compatibility.

Testing the Framing Effect on Perceptions of Problem Space
H o4:

The perceptions of the problem space will not differ between versions due to
the framing effect.

To test H04, a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted with
framing ( d u m m y coded) as the independent and eight (8) problem space items as
dependent variables; the details are presented in Table 6.11. T h e test w a s restricted to
version 1 (negative frame and high sunk cost) and version 2 (positive frame and high
sunk cost).

To compare version 2 against version 3 would introduce a confounding variable, as
version 3 consisted of a negative frame and a low sunk cost, which could invalidate the
findings.

Page

I73

Chapter 6... Survey 2 Financial Planners

Table 6.11
M A N O V A Details for Perceptions of Problem Space
Between-Subjects Factors

N
H01

1
2

31
33

Multivariate Test^
Effect
Intercept

H01

Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root

Value
.986
.014
70.400
70.400
.245
.755
.325
.325

F
484.002 3
484.002 3
484.002 3
484.002 3
2.235a
2.235a
2.235a
2.235a

Hypothesis df
8.000
8.000
8.000
8.000
8.000
8.000
8.000
8.000

Error df
55.000
55.000
55.000
55.000
55.000
55.000
55.000
55.000

Sig.
.000
.000
.000
.000
.038
.038
.038
.038

a

- Exact statistic

b. Design: lntercept+H01

Result: 1 vs 2 MANOVA F=2.235, p<.038
Decision: Reject the null hypothesis

The result indicates that the perception of problem space differs between version 1
(negative frame) and 2 (positive frame). There is a significant difference (at a = .05) due
to framing. Interestingly, the m e a n of the funding amount was lower in the negative
frame ($39,354) than in the positive frame ($53,484).

Having established the influence of a framing effect on the perceptions of problem
space, the next null hypothesis was concerned with testing the relationship between the
problem space items and the variance in funding allocation. Prior research suggested
that framing could be expected to act as a catalyst for different modes of cognitive
processing. Negative framing should elicit a higher use of controlled decision processes
and positive framing more automatic modes of decision processes. The first stage
involved performing multivariate regression analyses for each of the framing conditions
(versions). The results are presented in Tables 6.12, 6.13, and 6.14.
Ho5:

The eight problem space variables will not significantly explain the variance in
funding.
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T o test the null hypothesis, a multiple regression analysis was performed: one for each
framing condition with funding as the criterion variable and all eight problem space
variables simultaneously entered as predictors. The reason for entering all eight problem
space variables in the model simultaneously was to control for any shared variance
among the predictors. Details of the tests are shown in Table 6.12 below and Table
6.12a in Appendix E.
Table 6.12
Multiple Regression - Funding Regressed on A H Eight Problem-Space Measures
(Negative~l)
Measure
F
dfs R2
Adjusted
Standardised
R2

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Funding
Intentions
Risk
Disappointment
Importance
Responsibility
Minimise loss
Sunk costs
Control

2.149

8,22

.439

beta coefficients
.235
0.504
-0.192
-0.215
0.020
0.162
0.279
-0.028
-0.059

Model Summary
R
Model

1

NEG1= 1
(Selected)
.662a

R Square
.439

Adjusted
R Square
.235

Std. Error of
the Estimate
19717.59

a- Predictors: (Constant), CONTROL, DISAP, LIKELY, MINI,
RESP, RISK, IMPORT, S U N K

Result: 1 (negative frame) Multiple Regression F=2.149 (8,22), p<0.074
Decision: Cannot reject the null hypothesis.
While 4 3 . 9 % of the variance in funding was explained by the eight independent
variables in the negative-framed versions, the results are not significant. The
perceptions of problem space are not significantly related to the funding decision in the
negative-framed sample. This is a surprising and most unexpected result and
inconsistent with previous findings. Details of the tests are shown in Table 6.13 below
and Table 6.13a in Appendix E.
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Table 6.13
Multiple Regression - Funding Regressed on All Eight Problem-Space Measures
(Positive~ 2)

dfs

F

Measure

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Funding
Intentions
Risk
Disappointment
Importance
Responsibility
Minimise loss
Sunk costs
Control
leant
at p < 0.001
Signil

5.122*

8,24

R1

Adjusted
.631

Standardised beta
coefficients

.507
0.248
-0.559
0.002
0.254
0.289
0.193
0.206
-0.152

Model Summary

R
Model

1

POS2= 2
(Selected) R Square
.631
.794a

Adjusted
R Square
.507

Std. Error of
the Estimate
17966.99

a. Predictors: (Constant), C O N T R O L , RESP, DISAP,
LIKELY, MINI, RISK, SUNK, IMPORT
Result: 1 (positive frame) Multiple Regression F=5.122 (8,24), p<0.001
Decision: Reject the null hypothesis.

This means that 63.1% of the variance in funding was significantly explained by the
eight independent variables (perception of problem space) in the positive-framed
versions. Details of the tests are shown in Table 6.14 below and Table 6.14a in
Appendix E.

Table 6.14
Multiple Regression - Funding Regressed on All Eight Problem-Space Measures
Measure

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
;

Funding
Intentions
Risk
Disappointment
Importance
Responsibility
Minimise loss
Sunk costs
Control
Significant at p < 0.030

dfs

F
3.223*

8,13

R2
.665

Adjusted
R2
.459

Standardised beta
coefficients
0.358
-0.272
-0.329
-0.104
0.310
0.233
0.173
-0.139
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Model Summary

R
Model

1

NEG2= 3
(Selected)
.815a

R Square
.665

Adjusted
R Square
.459

Std. Error of
the Estimate
21556.78

a

- Predictors: (Constant), C O N T R O L , R E S P , RISK, S U N K ,
MINI, I M P O R T , LIKELY, DISAP

Result: 1 (negative frame, low sunk cost) Multiple Regression F=3.223 (8,13), p<0.030
Decision: Reject the null hypothesis.

This means that 6 3 . 1 % of the variance in funding was significantly explained by the
eight independent variables in the positive-framed versions. T w o of the framing
conditions were significant. The positive-framing condition accounted for 6 3 . 1 % of the
variance in funding allocations, F=5.122 (8,24), p<.001. The negative-framing condition
(low sunk cost) accounted for 6 6 . 5 % of the variance in funding allocations, F=3.223
(8,13), p<.030.

To determine whether significant differences existed between the predictive powers of
the regression models, a comparison was conducted of adjusted R values using Fisher's
transformation for multivariate R (refer Hayes, 1988, 644-645). The capacity of the
positive frame model was significantly greater.
Negative Frame = C R = 0.388; critical value = 1.96 , two-tailed test, not significant.
Positive Frame = C R = 2.08; critical value = 1.96 , two-tailed test, significant.
Negative Low Sunk Cost Frame = C R = 1.270 ; critical value = 1.96, two-tailed test, not
significant.

These results are not consistent with previously reported findings and indicate that the
positive-framed versions exhibited stronger cognitive relationships to the problem space
perceptions than the negative-framed versions. This is incongruent with the findings of
Dunegan Duchon and A s h m o s (1995). They found that negative framing resulted in a
stronger relationship to the amount of funding.

A number of possible explanations and observations are considered here. First, that the
negative-framing did not elicit the expected cognitive behaviour m a y be due to the
unexpectedrisk-avoidanceexhibited in the negative-framed outcomes. The negative
frame should cause decision makers to exhibitrisk-seekingbehaviour, which would be
manifest in the m e a n of the funding being larger (not smaller) than the positive-framed
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version outcomes. Second, the additional information and modifications to the wording
of the task m a y have been responsible. The respondents m a y have felt more certainty
about the financial situation; this could explain the higher funding in the positive framed
version. The significantly higher amount of funding in the positive frame suggests that
the information m a y well have influenced characteristics of the cognitive modes
exhibited by the subjects in their decision making.
Analysis of Internal Structure Image Compatibility
The internal structure of the four image compatibility items was explored by a principalcomponent analysis using an orthogonal Varimax rotation. B y specifying a minimum
eigenvalue of 1.0, a single factor for image compatibility was determined. The factor
accounted for 8 1 . 7 % of the variance in the four items. The items were collapsed into a
single measure of image compatibility. The procedure for collapsing the data involved
adding the scores of the four items to produce a single measure (Dunegan, Duchon &
Ashmos, 1995). The component matrix is reported in Table 6.15.

Table 6.15
Component Matrix
Component

1
Close
Terms
Moving

.923
.914
.909

Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis.
Only one component was extracted. The solution cannot be rotated.

Descriptive statistics for the survey items are shown in Table 6.16. These data indicat
that funding levels were significantly correlated with image compatibility and all but
three of the problem space items, Importance, Minimise Loss and Control.
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Table 6.16
Overall Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations (N=86)
M

SD

1 Funding

50.11

26.67

-

2

Image

17.84

6.08

.674*

3

Intentions

3.65

.97

.300*

.188

4

Risk

3.56

.99

-.446*

-.425*

.046

5 Disappointment

3.29

1.12

-.310*

-.258#

-.003

.448*

6 Importance

3.67

1.11

.081

.039

.079

.071

.286*

Responsibility

3.08

1.31

.383*

.291*

-.024

-.153

.032

.333*

8 Minimise loss

2.60

1.28

.155

.084

-.132

-.177

-.208

-.133

.005

9 Sunk costs

3.95

1.37

.243#

.170

.316*

.106

.124

-.018

.146 -.407*

4.27

1.54

-.064

-.014

.048

-.045

.119

.344*

.112

Variable

7

10 Control

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

.078

-.167

# Significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed)
* Significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Testing the Correlation Between Perceptions of Problem Space and Image
Compatibility
Ho6:

The perceptions of the problem space and perceived image compatibility will
not be the same.

To test the null hypothesis H05 two regression analyses were performed to control for
shared variance among problem space items. First, funding (decision outcome) was

regressed on the eight problem space items. Details of the tests are shown in Table 6.1
below and Table 6.17a in Appendix E.
Table 6.17
Multiple Regression Details for Problem Space and Image Compatibility
Model Summary

Model
1

R

R Square

Adjusted
R Square

Std. Error of
the Estimate

.503

.451

19758.86

.709a

a- Predictors: (Constant), C O N T R O L , RISK, LIKELY,
RESP, MINI, IMPORT, DISAP, S U N K

ANOVA"

1

S u m of
Sauares
3.04E+10
3.01 E+10
6.04E+10

Siq.
F
Mean Sauare
9.729
.000*
3798382587
8
390412682.0
77
85
a- Predictors: (Constant), CONTROL, RISK, LIKELY, RESP, MINI, IMPORT, DISAP,
SUNK
b
- Dependent Variable: AMT

Model

Regression
Residual
Total

df
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Result: Fifty percent of the variance in funding was predicted by the group of eight problem
space items (F=9.729, p<.000).
Decision: Reject the null hypothesis.

Second, image compatibility (collapsed measure) was regressed on the eight problem
space items. Details of the tests are s h o w n in Table 6.18 below and Table 6.18a in
Appendix E.

Table 6.18
Multiple Regression Details for P r o b l e m Space a n d I m a g e Compatibility
(Collapsed)
Model Summary
Model

R
.945a

1

R Square
.893

Adjusted
R Square
.882

Std. Error of
the Estimate

.79

a. Predictors: (Constant), C O N T R O L , RISK, LIKELY,
RESP, MINI, IMPORT, DISAP, S U N K
ANOVA"
Model

1

Regression
Residual
Total

S u m of
Squares
400.362
48.022
448.384

df
8
77
85

Mean Square
50.045
.624

F
80.244

Sig.
.000*

a- Predictors: (Constant), CONTROL, RISK, LIKELY, RESP, MINI, IMPORT, DISAP,
SUNK
D
- Dependent Variable: IMAGE
Result: Eighty-nine percent of the variance in image compatibility was predicted by the group
eight problem space items (F=80.244, p<.000).
Decision: Reject the null hypothesis.

These results indicate that there was a significant relationship between perceptions of
the problem space and perceived image compatibility. This finding is consistent with
Dunegan, D u c h o n and A s h m o s (1995).

The null hypothesis H07 was concerned with the relationship between the perceived
image compatibility and the decision outcome.
H 0 7:

The perceived image compatibility will not differ between decision outcomes.

Three steps were involved to test image compatibility as a moderating variable on
decision outcome. First, to test whether image compatibility added anything to the
predictive powers of the model used to test H 0 s, the same regression analysis was
performed (Table 6.19) — except that in this model, image compatibility (the factor
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condition) was added to the independent variables (that is, Funding = Intentions + Risk
+ Disappointment + Importance + Responsibility + Minimise loss + Sunk costs +
Control + Image).

Table 6.19
Regression Analysis for Perceived Image Compatibility
Model Summary

Model

R
.741a

1

R Square
.550

Adjusted
R Square
.496

Std. Error of
the Estimate
18922.99

a- Predictors: (Constant), IMAGE, LIKELY, CONTROL,
MINI, IMPORT, SUNK, RISK, DISAP, RESP
ANOVA"

1

S u m of
Squares
3.32E+10
2.72E+10
6.04E+10

Sig.
Mean Square
F
9
10.313
.000a
3692753995
76
358079621.8
85
a- Predictors: (Constant), IMAGE, LIKELY, CONTROL, MINI, IMPORT, SUNK, RISK,
DISAP, RESP
D
- Dependent Variable: AMT

Model

Regression
Residual
Total

df

Result: Regression Model R 2 = 0.550, F = 10.313 p<0.000.
Decision: Reject the null hypothesis.
This result showed that the model's ability to predict funding increased from 50% to
5 5 % with the addition of image compatibility. Second, the regression model was then
expanded to include the eight first-level interactions between image compatibility and
the problem space items, Table 6.20. The interaction variables were created by
multiplying each problem space item by the image compatibility factor, as reported by
Dunegan, Duchon and A s h m o s (1995, 35). The expanded model is represented by the
following [Funding = Intentions + Risk + Disappointment + Importance +
Responsibility + Minimise loss + Sunk costs + Control + Image + (Intentions * Image)
+ (Risk * Image) + (Disappointment * Image) + (Importance * Image) + (Responsibility
* Image) + (Minimise loss * Image) + (Sunk costs * Image) + (Control * Image)].

This result showed that the model's ability to predict funding increased from 55% to
5 9 % with the addition of the interaction items. This increase was significant at the p<.05
level. Therefore, these data indicate that image compatibility does moderate the
relationship between decision outcomes and problem space perceptions.
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Table 6.20
Regression Analysis for Perceived I m a g e Compatibility a n d Problem Space
Model Summary
Model

R
.770a

1

R Square
.594

Adjusted
R Square
.492

Std. Error of
the Estimate
19007.29

a. Predictors: (Constant), CI, MINI, LIKELY, RISK,
IMPORT, RESP, SUNK, DISAP, IMAGE, CONTROL, Ml,
Dl, LI, RE, II, SI, Rl
ANOVA b

1

Sum of
Squares
3.59E+10
2.46E+10
6.04E+10

Sig.
Mean Square
F
.000a
5.842
17
2110706028
68
361276981.5
85
a. Predictors: (Constant), CI, MINI, LIKELY, RISK, IMPORT, RESP, SUNK, DISAP,
IMAGE, CONTROL, Ml, Dl, LI, RE, II, SI, Rl
b. Dependent Variable: AMT

Model

Regression
Residual
Total

df

Result: Regression Model R 2 = 0.594, F = 5.842, p<0.000.
Decision: Reject the null hypothesis.
The null hypothesis H07, was concerned with determining the nature of the interaction
between image compatibility and the group of eight problem space items. T o test H07
the compatibility measure w a s split at the m e a n into two groups, a low compatibility
group and a high compatibility group consistent with the approach employed by
Dunegan, D u c h o n and A s h m o s (1995, 36). T h e same regression method as used in
testing H05 w a s applied to each of these groups, Table 6.21 and 6.22.
H o8:

The perceptions of the problem space and decision outcomes will not be
stronger when perceived image compatibility is low.
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Table 6.21
Regression of L o w Image Compatibility for Problem Space and Decision Outcomes
Model Summary
Model

R
.673a

1

R Square
.452

Adjusted
R Square
.337

Std. Error of
the Estimate
19204.04

a. Predictors: (Constant), CONTROL, DISAP, LIKELY,
RESP, MINI, RISK, SUNK, IMPORT
ANOVA"
Sum of
Squares
1.16E+10
1.40E+10
2.56E+10

Mean Square
F
1447691838
3.925
8
38
368794999.5
46
a. Predictors: (Constant), CONTROL, DISAP, LIKELY, RESP, MINI, RISK, SUNK,
IMPORT
b- Dependent Variable: AMT

Model

1

Regression
Residual
Total

df

Sig.
.0023

Result: Regression model for low image compatibility (F = 3.868, p < .002, R 2 = .485)
Decision: Reject the null hypothesis.

Table 6.22
Regression of High Image Compatibility for Problem Space and Decision
Outcomes
Model Summary
Model

R
.648a

1

R Square
.420

Adjusted
R Square
.265

Std. Error of
the Estimate
17372.52

a- Predictors: (Constant), CONTROL, SUNK, RISK,
RESP, LIKELY, MINI, DISAP, IMPORT
ANOVA b

1

S u m of
Squares
6.55E+09
9.05E+09
1.56E+10

Mean Square
F
2.714
819194705.7
8
301804488.7
30
38
a. Predictors: (Constant), CONTROL, SUNK, RISK, RESP, LIKELY, MINI, DISAP,
IMPORT
b. Dependent Variable: AMT

Model

Regression
Residual
Total

df

Sig.
.022a

Result: Regression model for high image compatibility (F = 2.403, p < .036, R 2 = .427)
Decision: Reject the null hypothesis.
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The first stage involved determining whether image compatibility added anything to the
predictive power of the model used to test H 0 4 , that is the predictive ability of problem
space items. High and low image compatibility predicted the level of funding, contrary
to expectations. However, when the image compatibility was low, the predictability in
the variance increased by a higher percentage.

Additional Tests of the Data
The internal structure of the eight problem spaces was explored by a principalcomponent analysis with an orthogonal Varimax rotation. B y specifying a m i n i m u m
eigenvalue of 1.0, three factors were determined to be contributing significantly to the
patterning of variables. These three factors accounted for 8 1 . 7 % of the variance. The
items and factor loadings for the three factors are shown in Table 6.23, which
demonstrates that no commonalities or overlapping occurred between the factors
identified by the principal- component analysis.

Table 6.23
Rotated C o m p o n e n t Matrix
1 ~ Sunk Cost
.854
*-.644
.584

Component
2 ~ Accountability

3 ~ Risk

Sunk
Minimise *
Intention
Importance
.801
Control
.661
Responsibility
.651
Risk
.830
Disappointed
.798
Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation.
Rotation converged in 5 iterations.
Cut off for components is .350
* The response scale for this item was reversed, therefore negative result indicates a positive correlation

The details of the component matrix for all three factors are presented in Table 6.23a in
Appendix E. The prominent item in the Component 1 was sunk cost and combined with
the other items in the factor suggested that the title "sunk cost" was an appropriate
descriptor. A s expected, the sunk cost was a major issue in the decision to commit to
further investment in the project. Positive correlation with the amount of funds is an
indication of sunk cost effect.
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The combination of items in Component 2 was suggestive of a management style
defined by items relating to personal feelings of importance, responsibility, and control.
Accordingly, the term "accountability" appeared to be an appropriate descriptor for this
factor. T h e person is responding to issues concerning the level of personal responsibility
and locus of control over the events and professionals are trained to be accountable for
their actions (Hansen & M o w e n , 2000, 517; Taylor & Pincus, 2000, 359). That all three
items were positively correlated is consistent with the notion that these are underlying
drivers which combined would motivate a person to commit further funds to an
investment.
The items in Component 3 were suggestive of the concept of the "risk" with
combination ofriskand disappointment. Accordingly, the term risk appeared to be an
appropriate descriptor for this factor. This component was intuitively consistent with
the notion ofriskutility, with both the level of perceived risk and the level of
disappointment in the progress of the project.

Separate descriptive statistics were computed for the data in each of the three framing
conditions. The results are presented in Table 6.23b-6.23d in Appendix E. A brief
examination of the tables indicates that only one problem space element (Intention) was
significantly correlated with funding when the problem space was negative (Table
6.23b), while two problem space elements (Risk and Responsibility) were significantly
correlated with funding w h e n the frame was positive (Table 6.23c). In addition, only
one problem space element was significantly correlated with funding when the problem
space was negative and the sunk cost lower (Table 6.23d).

Conclusions
First, the granting of additional funds was significantly higher in Version " 2 " (positive
frame) than in Version " 1 " (negative frame). This finding was contradictory to the
predictedriskpropensity of prospect theory. The interesting aspect of this result was
that the positive frame produced a higher m e a n funding outcome than the negative
frame, which implies that the positive frame elicitedrisk-seekingbehaviour and the
negative framerisk-aversebehaviour contrary to the predictions of prospect theory.
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Possible explanations for the contradictory results of the negative frame m a y be found
in the concepts of, threat-rigidity (Staw, Sandilands & Dutton, 1981) and hypervigilance
(Jannis & M a n n , 1977). In the case of the contradictory results of the positive frame,
attention to opportunities (March & Shapira, 1987), as discussed in Chapter 3, could
provide an explanation.

Threat-rigidity and hypervigilance posit that poor financial performance - negative
framed information - promotesrisk-aversebehaviour because perceived threats arouse
stress and anxiety and decision makers are then more likely to respond in a conservative
or protective manner, preferring to remain with the status quo (Palmer, Danforth &
Clark, 1995). Conversely, attention to opportunities predicts that w h e n information is
framed in a positive manner, decision makers are more likely to exhibit risk-seeking
behaviour because they perceive opportunities to arise from their good performance.
These explanations appear to be more strongly consistent with the results in terms of the
observed risk behaviour.

Second, when the amount of sunk cost was manipulated (reduced in the negative frame
only), the provision of additional funds was higher in Version " 3 " (negative frame) than
Version " 2 " (positive frame). This result suggests that the level of sunk cost acted as the
reference point as predicted by prospect theory as outlined in Chapter 3. The findings
also provide further evidence of the existence of the sunk cost effect.

Third, the perception of responsibility for the initial decision was found to exert an
influence over the amount of funding provided. Staw and Ross (1978) predicted that
responsibility for the initial decision would cause subjects to escalate their commitment
as a form of justification that the initial decision was correct. T h e results support this
theory since the level of responsibility was positively correlated with the level of
funding provided and emerged as a significant factor on analysis.

Fourth, the results concerning the problem space tests were not consistent with
previously reported findings. T h e results indicate that the positive-framed versions
exhibit stronger cognitive relationships to the problem space perceptions than the
negative-framed versions. This is incongruent with the findings of Dunegan, Duchon
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and A s h m o s (1995). They found that negative framing resulted in a stronger
relationship to the amount of funding.

A number of possible explanations and observations are considered here. First, that
negative framing did not elicit the expected cognitive behaviour m a y be due to the
unexpected risk-avoidance exhibited in the negative-framed outcomes. The negative
frame should cause decision makers to exhibit risk-seeking behaviour, which would be
manifest in the m e a n of the funding being larger (not smaller) than the positive-framed
version outcomes. Second, the additional information and modifications to the wording
of the task m a y have been responsible. The respondents m a y have felt more certainty
about the financial situation - in terms of attention to opportunities - resulting in the
higher m e a n of funding in the positive framed version. The significantly higher amount
of funding in the positive frame suggests that the information influenced characteristics
of the cognitive modes (explained in terms of threat-rigidity and hypervigilance)
exhibited by the subjects in their decision making. T h e next chapter further tests for this
problem space anomaly.

The problem space items were also subjected to additional testing. When subjected to
principal component analysis three distinct factors were identified, sunk cost,
accountability and risk. The factors provide additional support for the findings of a sunk
cost effect. The factor identified as risk by the principal component analysis also
supports the proposition thatriskbehaviour is contingent or modified byriskperception
(Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). The argument for the inclusion of the role ofriskperception
was discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.

Fifth, testing of image compatibility produced mixed results. Consistent with image
theory, low image compatibility was a significant predictor of the level of funding. The
unexpected finding was that high image compatibility was also a significant predictor of
the level of funding. However, the statistical significance was lower than that of low
image compatibility and the percentage increase in the R 2 was also less by comparison.
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CHAPTER 7
The Effect of Framing and Problem Space on Outsourcing and
Investment Decisions: A n Investigation of the Perceptions of
Accountants in Queensland

Chapter Abstract
Previous research on financial decision-making situations indicated that contextual
aspects of financial information, such as framing, problem space and asset specificity
influence the outcome. T o assess the influence of these factors, a combination of
outsourcing and research and development tasks were used to survey the perceptions of
accountants. Survey 3 examined the effect of framing (positive/negative) on the
inclusion of sunk and opportunity cost information across two types of decision tasks.
Additional questions provided information about theriskperceptions and cognitive
biases of the respondents, referred to as the "problem space". The respondents were also
faced with information regarding asset specificity - the extent to which assets are
inexorably tied to the specific project or outsourcing agreement.

In making the decision to outsource, the sunk cost effect, framing and asset specificity
were found to be significant factors in influencing the decision outcome. In the
investment decision, both sunk cost and the framing effect were found to be significant
influences. A factor related to the sunk cost effect, escalation of commitment,
significantly affected the allocation of funding in the investment task. The results did
not follow the predictions of prospect theory; the reverse effect was f o u n d — in the
negative frame, greater risk-avoidance was evident while in the positive frame, greater
risk-taking was evident.

Background to the Research
The purpose of the research was to examine whether accountants follow the rational
decision-making model w h e n making financial decisions. A key issue was whether the
"sunk cost effect" could be detected in the decisions m a d e by accountants. The
expectation was that accountants are less likely to be influenced by sunk cost
information due to the nature of their education which explicitly deals with the relevant
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costing approach to decision making. In addition, the expertise of accountants,
combined with their educational background, was considered to provide an ideal setting
to examine the influence of the "framing effect", as predicted by prospect theory. A
comparison was m a d e against the surveys of hospital managers and financial planners,
as reported in Chapters 5 and 6.

To achieve a desirable level of compatibility with the prior decision-making research,
accountants were asked to complete two tasks: an outsourcing decision task similar to
the task undertaken by hospital managers and an investment decision task similar to the
task undertaken by the financial planners. T o maintain consistency in the application of
the research, two separate sets of null hypotheses were developed. A unique identifier is
used to distinguish between the two tasks: "Tl" for the outsourcing task and " T 2 " for
the investment task. The identifier is located at the end of each null hypothesis.

Rational Decision Making Models
According to the economic theory of rational decision making, individuals are rational
actors as they are engaged in the process of optimising expected utility by selecting the
highest payoff from available alternatives (March, 1988a; Majone, 1989; Rich & Oh,
2000). The assumption that decisions should be rational is implicit in the neo-classical
economic theory of the "economic m a n " or the "rational m a n " (von N e u m a n n &
Morgenstern, 1944; Marsden, 1984; Provan, 1989; Boland, 1998). Rational actors do
not necessarily examine all possible alternatives but m a y merely search until they find a
solution that meets a certain acceptable level (satisficing) (March & Simon, 1958). This
behaviour suggests that individuals try to be rational, but are bound by cognitive
limitations. Simon (1979) distinguished between purely economic rational behaviour
and functional behaviour, which he referred to as "bounded rationality", which
recognises the cognitive limitations. Bounded rationality assumes that information is
essential in allowing individuals to compare alternatives (March & Simon, 1958).

According to March (1988b, 386), the main reason for using information in rational
decision making is to reduce uncertainty in making a choice from among a number of
alternative courses of action. In decision models that promote the maximization of the
individual's utility function, a lack of information is perceived as the reason for
seemingly "irrational" decisions (Cook & Levi, 1990). Elster (1983) concluded that if
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decision makers have insufficient information, rationality requires them to abstain from
considering alternative courses of action. Tversky and Shafir (1992) provided support
for existence of satisficing behaviour by demonstrating empirically that decision makers
end their search for alternatives once they find one that provides a ready justification for
the choice.

Rational Behaviour in Decision Making
Drawing on the notion of "rational behaviour", the rational disposition of the decision
maker becomes an important variable in assessing the overall decision. A rational
decision maker is expected to display behaviour that is consistent withrisk-avoidanceor
risk-minimization. Intuitive decision making was considered to often lead to irrational
choices (Bayoumi & Redelmeier, 2000).

Lee (1971) proposed that an appropriate means of describing "rational" behaviour when
applied to an individual was by reference to a continuum of rationality. Duchon,
Dunegan and Barton (1989) devised a self-assessment item based on this continuum.
Consistent with this approach, subjects were asked to m a k e a self-assessment of
themselves as either rational or intuitive decision makers by responding to a seven-point
Likert scale incorporated in the survey. Duchon, Dunegan and Barton (1989, 26) argued
that the term "intuitive" was a more appropriate antithesis to rational than "irrational"
because of the strong pejorative connotation associated with the word irrational. The
first null hypothesis in this study tested whether the choices m a d e by rational decision
makers differ from intuitive decision makers.
HOIA:

There will be no difference in the outsourcing decisions made between people
who perceive themselves as rational decision makers and those who perceive
themselves as intuitive decision makers as measured by a Likert scale self
assessment. [Tl]

Risk Perception and Framing Effects
There is an argument (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) that positive or negative (framing)
of decision information m a y cause potential bias in the decision outcome (the framing
effect). This proposition suggests that framing can alter the perception ofriskand that
negative framing invokes a strong tendency toward risk-seeking or risk-taking.
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Therefore, h o w decision makers respond to the positive or negative framing of a
problem task m a y be due to the perception of their o w n level of rationality in making
decision. In this dissertation all subjects were assumed to be of a "rational" disposition
due to their education and experience and more importantly because this is the view
espoused by normative theory.

Research has shown that individuals are influenced by the way in which information is
presented (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). A frame, according to Beach (1990, 23), is "a
mental construct consisting of elements and the relationship between them that are
associated with a situation of interest to a decision maker." The frame m a y therefore be
thought of in terms of a representation of a situation through which a decision maker
gains understanding or makes sense of the alternative courses of action available.
Decision makers are predicted to be risk-averse in situations involving gains, but riskseeking w h e n the same situation is framed in terms of losses (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979). O n e explanation is that when a decision maker focuses on the negative, there is a
greater urgency to engage in preventative behaviour rather than explore other options.
March and Shapira (1992) suggested that individuals become more survival oriented
when focusing on losses which threaten to deplete their resources and are more
aspiration oriented w h e n focused on gains.

The basis for considering the framing effect as an influence in decision making can be
traced to K a h n e m a n and Tversky (1979). Framing effects are reported in the literature
of behavioural decision and negotiation fields (Mellers, Schwartz & Cooke, 1998; Neale
& Bazerman, 1991; Camerer, 1995) and the attitude-change field (Cialindi, 1988; Eagly
& Chaiken, 1993). T h e assumption that decision makers are likely to be influenced by
the positive or negative framing of alternative choices suggested the following null
hypotheses for Survey 3.
HQ2A:

The decision to outsource will not differ between responses due to framing of
the version. [Tl]

HoiB:

The amount of funding provided will not differ between responses due to
framing of the version. [T2]
These null hypotheses test the existence of framing effects in the outsourcing
task and the investment task.
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Issues of Relevant Costs in Decision Making
Relevant costs and relevant revenues are defined as "those expected future costs and
expected future revenues that differ among the alternative courses of action being
considered' (Horngren, Foster & Datar, 2000, 378). There are two key elements worth
noting in this definition of relevant costs and revenues. First, the costs and revenues
must occur in the future. The argument is consistent with normative model of rational
decision making: that nothing can be done about the past and every decision deals with
selecting a course of action for the future. Second, relevant costs and revenues must
differ a m o n g the alternative courses of action. The argument in this instance is that if
the costs and revenues do not differ, then there is no rational economic basis for
determining a difference between the alternative course of actions.

Opportunity Costs
Opportunity costs are considered relevant to m a k e or buy decisions, also referred to as
outsourcing decisions (Burch & Henry, 1970). The proposition that individuals act
rationally and always select the optimal alternative implies that if an opportunity cost
exists in the choice between alternatives, rational decision makers will include them in
their analysis. Opportunity costs are defined generally as "those benefits which could
have been received had an alternative course of action been chosen" (Thompson, 1973,
263) and in management accounting text books as the "maximum

available contribution

to profit that is forgone (rejected) by using limited resources for a particular purpose "
(Horngren & Foster, 1991, 374). There is a further assumption that all opportunity costs
are k n o w n to decision makers (perfect information).

The extent to which decision makers are able to distinguish between implicit
opportunity costs, as distinct from explicit opportunity costs was the subject of the
research by Roodhooft and Warlop (1999). In the case of explicit opportunity costs, the
information is provided in an unambiguous manner. That is, the details of the
opportunity cost are stated as being relevant to one of the alternatives being considered.
In contrast, w h e n information is ambiguous, the opportunity cost is considered to be
implied or implicit. Roodhooft and Warlop's (1999) findings suggest that decision
makers m a y miss or underweight the importance of implicit opportunity costs. This
conclusion is consistent with the findings of Becker, Ronen and Sorter (1974), Friedman
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and N e u m a n n (1980), Hoskin (1983), and Northcraft and Neale (1986) that individuals
only include opportunity costs when explicit information is provided.

Sunk Costs
Sunk costs are by definition past costs that are unavoidable and are deemed irrelevant to
decision making because they can not be changed (Horngren, Foster & Datar, 2000,
379). According to economic and accounting theory only incremental costs, not sunk
costs, should influence decisions. In a m a k e or buy analysis, past investments are
deemed to be irrelevant. There is evidence that managers tend to include irrelevant
costs, such as sunk costs, into their decision making information; thus there exists what
is k n o w n as the "sunk cost effect". Research into the sunk cost effect demonstrated that
individuals are inclined to be influenced by past costs (Arkes & Blumer, 1985). Even
though sunk costs m a y be irrelevant from an accounting perspective, the decision maker
(regardless of experience) is likely to be influenced by the knowledge that sunk costs
exist. Staw (1976) and W h y t e (1991) found that the sunk cost effect was more likely to
occur w h e n the decision maker felt personally responsible for any negative
consequences resulting from the decision.

It was hypothesised in Survey 3 that the perception of negative consequences will be
more significant in the negative frame than in the positive frame. This assumption,
together with the prior research findings, led to the development of the following
hypotheses to be tested in this study:
HO4A:

The decision to outsource will not be reduced by the presence of past
investment (sunk costs). [Tl]

HQ2B:

The amount of funding will not be reduced by the level of past investment (sunk
costs). [Tl]
These null hypotheses test the existence of the sunk cost effect.

Asset Specificity
According to the theory of transaction cost economics, the degree of asset specificity is
an important consideration in making outsourcing decisions (Chalos, 1985).
Investments that can not be used for any other purposes and have no alternative value
are asset specific to the particular option. Conversely, investments that can be used for
other purposes are not asset specific. The requirement to invest in an asset that is
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specifically to be used for the duration of the outsourcing agreement was expected to
have a negative impact upon the decision to outsource. Outsourcing is only desirable
w h e n expected governance and coordination costs, which result from asset specific
investments, are lower than the production cost advantage of an external supplier
(Chalos, 1995). Asset specificity m a y be interpreted as another form of sunk cost; that is
a cost that will become sunk as a result of the present choice and led to the following
hypothesis:
HO3A:

The decision to outsource will not differ due to asset specificity in the
version. [Tl]
This null hypothesis tests the role of asset specificity in the outsourcing
decision.

Contextual Factors Influencing Decisions
Escalation of Commitment

as a Responsibility Factor

Extensive research demonstrated that individuals w h o m a d e the initial decision are more
likely to m a k e further decisions in a biased w a y to justify their earlier decision (Staw &
Ross, 1978; Teger, 1980; Bazerman, Beekun & Schoorman, 1982; Bazerman, Guiliano
& Appleman, 1984; Brockner & Rubin, 1985; Schoorman, 1988). Staw (1976, 1981)
found that individuals tend to escalate commitment to previous decisions, even if the
behaviour is not consistent with the model of rational behaviour. A consequence is that
resources are committed to justify previous actions whether or not the rationale for
those initial commitments is still valid. It was surmised that the extent of commitment to
escalation m a y be due to the perceived degree of responsibility or ownership of the
original decision to invest in the project. This assumption led to the following null
hypothesis:
Ho 3B :

The amount of funding will not be different between respondents due to their
perceived level of responsibility for the initial decision. [T2]

This null hypothesis tests whether personal feelings of responsibility act as a
contributing factor to escalation to commitment. This null hypothesis is also
concerned with the possible influence of the level of perceived responsibility
for the initial decision to invest and the amount of additional funding to be
provided.
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Verbal Probabilities and Framing Effects
Teigen and Brun (1995) examined verbal probabilities, which are phrases that express
different levels and varieties of probability and uncertainty. For example, terms such as
"perhaps", "possible", "doubtful" and "not certain". They found that these linguistic
expressions could be divided into two distinct categories: those referring to the
occurrence and those referring to the non-occurrence of a targeted outcome. The
implications of these verbal and numerical probabilities were identified in a variety of
decision-making contexts (Fischhoff & D e Bruin, 1999; Larichev & Brown, 2000).
Teigen and Brun (2000) and Teigen (2001) found that individuals interpret verbal and
numerical probability estimates differently. Teigen and Brun (2000) concluded that the
direction of numerical probabilities— as distinct from verbal phrases— is context
dependent as well as biased towards a positive interpretation. These findings suggest
that different framing effects m a y be elicited through the use of verbal probabilities.
This led to the development of the following null hypothesis:
Ho4B:

The amount of funding will not differ between investment versions due to the
provision of explicit details. [T2]

This null hypothesis tests the degree to which the presentation and manipulation
of information may impact upon the framing effect.

This matter was of interest due to feedback from pretesting the survey instruments and
also the concern that too m u c h information influences the respondent's perception of the
problem space.

Problem Space and Framing Effects
The role of cognition is well documented as a salient factor in decision making (for
example; Newell & Simon, 1972; Lord & Maher, 1990). The information processing
system refers to the individual's cognitive model of problem-solving behaviour (Newell
and Simon 1972) and the task environment refers to the problem itself. The problem
space refers to the internal representation of the task used by an individual (Payne,
1980, 95). The concept of problem space provides further insights into the differences
between choices m a d e by respondents (Payne, 1980). The inclusion of problem space in
decision research m a y provide better understanding of behaviour anomalies related to
risky choice. K a h n e m a n and Tversky (1979) suggested these anomalies m a y be due to
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the manner in which the problem is coded, edited and represented by the decision
maker. These issues are linked with the problem space construct.

Dunegan (1993) examined the influence of framing on the processes that are thought to
proceed the eventual actions of a decision maker. H e called for more research on the
extent to which framing effects influence cognitive processes, in particular, the
processes that result in perceptions about conditions regarding the decision (Lord, 1985;
B o w e n , 1987). The w a y in which a decision maker processes information can be
measured by the cognitive perception of the problem space (Maheswaran & Chaiken,
1991; Louis & Sutton, 1991; Fazio, 1990; Langer, 1989; and Isen, 1984). The use of
problem space was consistent with the theoretical model developed in Chapter 4.

When controlled modes of cognitive processing are used, information is subjected to a
more comprehensive, deliberate and thorough analysis. W h e n automatic modes are
used, the processing of information is limited and there is a reduced attention to detail
with fewer incoming cues creating a cognitive representation of the task (Dunegan,
1993). Controlled processing is expected to produce a significant relationship between
problem space measures and decision outcomes (funding) because problem space
should be more easily recalled and used in the controlled mode. In the automatic mode,
the problem space is not easily recalled for conscious use and the relationship between
problem space and decision outcomes should be weak or insignificant. T w o hypotheses
were raised:
H OSB:

The perceptions of the problem space will not differ between versions due to the
framing effect. [T2]
This null hypothesis tests whether framing produces different results in different
perceptions of the problem space.

Ho6B: The eight problem space variables will not significantly explain the variance in
funding. [T2]
This null hypothesis tests whether different perceptions of the problem space
due to framing produces different decision outcomes.
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Data Collection
Target Population and Sample Selection
The target population was selected from the category Accountants in the Australian
Yellow Pages Telephone C D R o m 1999 edition. A number of stages were involved in
developing the database for the sample population. A s accountants in public practice are
subject to the same standards across Australia, the issues raised in the survey should be
relevant to all accountants, no matter which state in Australia they were situated.
Therefore, the search was restricted to Queensland accountants; a total population of
2116 was identified. W h e r e the actual population is known, the statistical method for
determining an appropriate sample size can be employed. In this case the appropriate
sample size was determined to be 327 (N=2200 s= 327) (Leedy, 1997, 211). Second, a
sample of 600 was randomly selected from this population. Third, a sample of 100 was
randomly assigned to each of the six versions of survey instruments. The selection of
the larger sample size of 600 allowed for an equal distribution over the six separate
versions and better representation to address possible sampling bias. Following the
initial mail out of surveys, 14 were returned with the notification that the address was no
longer correct. This reduced the sample population to 586. A total of 237 responses
were received. The overall response rate of 3 9 . 5 % was considered satisfactory for the
size of the sample and population.

Validity and Reliability
A goal of questionnaire design is to collect information with m a x i m u m reliability and
validity (Alreck & Settle, 1985; Fowler, 1988). The development of the survey from the
literature and pretesting were used as a means to address adequate coverage of the
subject matter as well as providing for internal and content validity. T o be able to
generalise to a particular population, the information must have external validity.
R a n d o m sampling was used to assure that the sample was representative of the
population. In this study, the appropriate population was identified and a random sample
was derived using the procedures suggested by Kerlinger (1986).

Reliability of a survey questionnaire depends on the degree to which the instrument
provides consistent results (Kerlinger, 1986). The method most commonly used is the
split-half procedure. This involved checking the results from one half of the responses
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against the other half. Recommendations to improve response rate were used in this
study: short simple wordings, cover letter, incentive to return the survey for a report and
to avoid follow up, confidentiality, telephone fax and email contact (Sekaran, 1992,
201; E m o r y & Cooper, 1991, 334; Berdie, Anderson & Niebuhr, 1986,42). The
instrument was kept to two pages to minimise the amount of time required, as well as
administrative procedures in conformity with the suggestions of Frazer and Lawley
(2000, 79).

Survey Instruments
Each survey instrument contained two different tasks. The first task concerned an
outsourcing decision of which four versions were used. The second task concerned an
investment decision pertaining to a research and development project. There were six
versions of this task used. The survey instruments also differed in details regarding the
explicit or implicit nature of sunk costs.

Task 1 ~ Outsourcing
The first task was based on outsourcing decisions (Roodhooft & Warlop, 1999), framing
effects (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and self-evaluation questions (Northcraft &
Neale, 1986; Duchon, Dunegan & Barton, 1989). The task was derived from a simple
exercise presented in Langfield-Smith, T h o m e and Hilton (1998, E x 16.35). This
exercise was extended and developed to include aspects of sunk cost consistent with the
outsourcing task. The task involved a choice between outsourcing or continuing the
operations of the payroll function of an insurance company. The annual cost associated
with operating the payroll department was $133,000— all identified as avoidable
costs— while the submission for external payroll services was $134,000 annually fixed
for three years. From this perspective, the outsourcing is not a rational choice.

Additional information provided details of an opportunity cost pertaining to the
alternative use of floor space and a sunk cost with regard to office furniture and
equipment. Under the rational decision-making model, the inclusion of the opportunity
cost from the alternative use of the floor space— a saving of $1,900 per year— should
lead to the decision to outsource. The inclusion of the saving in the evaluation of the
relevant costs reduces the annual cost of the outsourcing option to $132,100 ($134,000 -
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$1,900 = $132,100). With the identification of relevant costs, the outsourcing option is
the rational choice.

A further opportunity cost was associated with the sale of office furniture and
equipment, which was stated as costing $30,000 to acquire and the wording was
manipulated to produce a framing effect. The negative frame was presented as a loss
("will result in a $20,000 loss on disposal") while the positive frame was presented in
terms that refer to the attainment of cash ("will realise $10,000 on disposal"). In either
case, the net result was the s a m e — the office furniture and equipment on disposal
would realise $10,000 cash resulting in a $20,000 loss.

To test the relevance of the sunk cost and the framing effect, all reference to sunk cost
was deleted in the third and fourth versions of this task. In the fourth version, an
investment was required for equipment to process the pay slips. The amount of $500
was not enough to change the overall financial benefit in favour of outsourcing. This
asset, however, could not be used by the firm nor by any other payroll provider and had
no resale value. T h e investment was asset specific to the outsourcing option.

The subjects were asked to rate their attitude to the outsourcing of the payroll function
on a seven point Likert scale anchored as 1 (Very Negative) and 7 (Very Positive).
Having m a d e this self-assessment, the subjects were then asked to m a k e a choice to
either outsource or continue the internal payroll function. The next question asked the
subjects h o w sure they were of this decision, based on a seven point Likert scale
anchored as 1 (Certain it should be Internal) and 7 (Certain it should be External). For
additional insight into the cognitive perceptions which were likely to influence the
decision making, subjects were asked whether they considered themselves (in general)
to be a rational decision maker or an intuitive decision maker. A seven point Likert
scale anchored as 1 (A Rational Decision Maker) and 7 (An Intuitive Decision Maker)
was used. Duchon, Dunegan and Barton (1989, 26) argued that the term "intuitive" was
a more appropriate antithesis to rational than irrational, because of the strong pejorative
connotation associated with the word "irrational".

Four versions of task one were presented to subjects and were distinguished according
to (1) the existence of a positive frame, (2) the existence of a negative frame, (3) the
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absence of sunk cost and no frame, and (4) the absence of sunk cost, no frame and
additional asset. The variables are summarised in Table 7.1 below:

Table 7.1
S u m m a r y of Variables for 1 'ask O n e (Outsourcing Decision)
Variable Category

Number

Details

Treatment Effect:
(Treatment Variables)

Three

Demographic Variables:
(Independent Variables)
[Predictors]
Dependent Variables:
(Criterion Variables)

Three

Framing (positive vs negative vs nil)
Sunk cost vs no sunk cost,
Asset specific investment.
Attitude to Outsourcing Decision.
Certainty of Decision.
Rational vs Intuitive Decision style.
Choice A - Internal (Make)
Choice B - Outsource (Buy)

Two

Task 2 ~ Investment Project
The second task was based on research by Dunegan (1993). The task relates to a
Research and Development Manager, w h o having instigated a project in the past, is
confronted with a request for additional funds for that project by the team responsible
for the continuance of the project. The team is seeking an additional $100,000, as the
project is behind schedule and over budget. The R & D manager has $500,000 in
unallocated funds; however these funds m a y be required for other projects and there is
some time before the end of the current financial year. The subjects were instructed that
the manager believes there is a fair chance the project will not succeed. The final
statement given to the subjects was the pertinent framing effect. The positive frame
stated that, "Of the projects undertaken by this team, 30 of the last 50 have been
successful", while the negative frame differed with respect to the last part of the
statement "Of the projects undertaken by this team, 20 of the last 50 have been
unsuccessful". Note that in both tasks, the ratios are the same.

Pilot Testing
Pilot testing of the instrument provided feedback that pointed to the lack of enough
specific details with comments that the details were insufficient or too vague to allow a
valid decision. After considering the implications of alternatives for the details, an email was sent to Professor Dunegan seeking confirmation regarding the vagueness of
the details in the original task. Dunegan advised that the task was deliberately vague in
order to elicit a more relevant response on the perceptions under the problem space
items. Maintaining the focus of the subjects on their decision-making process was
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achieved by such vagueness. However, there was theriskthat some subjects might
perceive the task as incomplete or ill-defined in comparison to real world situations and
therefore would not treat the matter with any level of seriousness. These concerns were
based on comments raised in the pretesting.

To test whether additional information would make a difference to the outcome of this
research, changes were m a d e in key areas identified by the pretesting. The actual sunk
cost of the initial investment was identified as $400,000; this was considered a
significant enough amount to influence the subjects. The $100,000 requested n o w
represented one quarter of this sunk cost. With regard to the actual time remaining until
the end of the financial year, a time frame of 6 months was considered to represent a
challenge to the subject's perception ofrisk.The subjects could view the 6 months as
half the year gone or half the year remaining (Dunegan, 1993). The original task used
the term "fiscal year"; the more c o m m o n term in use in Australia is "financial year"—
the terminology was amended to maintain relevance in the Australian setting.

A further issue concerned the use of the term "fair" which was applied in describing the
evaluation of the situation "... you believe there is a fair chance the project will not
succeed". The term "fair" was considered to imply that the chance referred to in the task
was 5 0 % or more. The alternative term "moderate" was viewed as implying that the
chance was 5 0 % or less and likely to influence the decision-making process. Allowing
for the suggested changes, six versions of the task were used in the research. The first
two versions were based on the original research with modifications to Australian
conditions. These versions maintained the vagueness and differed only in the positive
and negative framing. T h e second two versions were changed to include all the
suggested modifications and otherwise differed only in the positive and negative
framing.

To test the relevance of the reference point (sunk cost information), these modifications
followed the suggestions of Professor Dunegan. In order to test a lower amount of sunk
cost, two additional versions were developed. A fifth version using a positive frame,
expanded wording and a lower amount of sunk cost ($100,000 rather than $400,000)
was employed; directly comparable to the second version. A sixth version using a
negative frame, expanded wording and a lower amount of sunk cost ($100,000 rather
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than $400,000) was directly comparable to the fourth version. The variables for task two
are summarised in Table 7.2

Summary of Variables for Task T w o (Investment Decision)
Variable Category

Number

Details

Treatment Effect:
(Treatment Variables)

Three

Demographic Variables:
(Independent Variables)
[Predictors]
Dependent Variables:
(Criterion Variables)

Two

Framing (positive vs negative)
Reference point (positive vs negative)
Detailed information
(sunk cost - specified or not)
(sunk cost - high or low)
(time remaining in financial year)
(fair vs moderate - chance)
Problem space inventory.
Rational vs Intuitive Decision style.

Two

Choice to provide NIL funds
Choice to provide a level of funds

Non-Response Bias
The likelihood of non-response bias was assessed using late responses as a proxy for
non-response and compared with early responses. The early versus late responses were
tested using two different methods due to the nature of the data. A chi-square test was
conducted for Task One; the results were not significant %2 0.139 (a =0.710, df = 1),
Table 7.3.
Table 7.3
Analysis of Early/Late Responses ~ Task O n e Outsourcing Decision
Chi-Square Tests

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correction3
Likelihood Ratio

Value
.139b
.048
.139

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.710

.138

N of Valid Cases

237

1

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.762

.415

.826
.709

Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

.710

a

- Computed only for a 2x2 table
D
- 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is
23.22.

For Task T w o , the data was a mixture of ordinal and nominal. Testing early/late
responses was conducted using the S P S S "Ordinal Regression" which produced a chi-
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square of the model fit, %2 52.443 (a =0.457, df = 52), Table 7.4. A n independent
samples t-test was also conducted to test the equality of the means for each variable,
Table 7.4a in Appendix F. Only the problem space item "Importance of the decision"
was significantly different between early and late responses. Even though there was a
difference in one variable, this was not deemed to be a major limitation as the number
of late responses was not a high percentage of the overall responses. The results of the
early/late responses suggest that the non-response bias was not to a threat to validity.
Table 7.4
Analysis of Early/Late Responses ~ Task T w o Investment Decision
Model Fitting Information
Model
Intercept Only
Final

-2 Log
Likelihood
272.090
219.647

Chi-Square
52.443

df

Sig.

52

.457

Link function: Logit.

Data Analysis
Nominal or categorical measurement was used to classify the variables in the decision
to outsource. For example, internal production " 1 " is a separate category from
outsourcing "2". T h e method of statistical analysis most commonly recommended for
use with nominal coded data is the chi-square test (Sproull, 1995, 68; Huck, Cormier &
Bounds: 1974, 216; Isaac & Michael: 1990, 177). The data derived from the investment
project decision was a combination of nominal, ordinal and interval measurements. This
mix of data allowed for more robust statistical analysis and a wider variety of methods
applied.

Results ~ Task One Outsourcing Decision
Four null hypotheses were generated with regard to the outsourcing decision task. These
called for the use of a chi-square test on all the null hypotheses. The results and their
interpretation are discussed below.

The only differences in the versions of the task was the framing of the amount to be
realised from the disposal of the asset (office furniture and equipment) specific to the
payroll department. The task details are summarised in Table 7.5. In each version, the
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total cost of outsourcing was less than the cost of internal production and as such the
economic rational choice was to select the option with the m i n i m u m cost. The expected
result was that respondents would select the option to outsource based purely on the
relevant financial data presented.

Table 7.5
Summary of Task O n e Details for Outsourcing Decision (N=237)
Version

Make option

Outsource (buy) option

A

Production cost: $ 133,000
Sunk investment: $ 30,000

B

Production cost: $ 133,000
Sunk investment: $ 30,000

C

Production cost: $ 133,000
Sunk investment: Nil

D

Production cost: $ 133,000
Sunk investment: Nil

Purchase price: $ 134,000
Opportunity Costs:
$ 1,900 Rent saving p.a.
$10,000 Revenue from sale of asset
(one-off framed as $10,000 revenue on disposal)
Purchase price: $ 134,000
Opportunity Costs:
$ 1,900 Rent saving p.a.
$10,000 Revenue from sale of asset
(one-off framed as $20,000 loss on disposal)
Purchase price: $ 134,000
Opportunity Costs:
$ 1,900 Rent saving p.a.
Purchase price: $ 134,000
Opportunity Costs:
$ 1,900 Rent saving p.a.
Asset Specificity:
$ 500 pay slip machine.

The results of the survey were consistent with the expectations gained from the
literature and prior research. Table 7.6 presents the percentage of respondents w h o
selected the option to outsource for each of the two survey instruments. In the negativeframed version, the majority of respondents rejected the outsourcing option (60.2%).
For the positive-framed version, the majority of respondents selected the outsourcing
option (82.6%). In the version with no sunk cost and no framing manipulation, 80.0% of
respondents selected the outsourcing option. In the version with an asset specific
investment, no sunk cost and no framing manipulation, 57.6% of respondents selected
the outsourcing option.
Table 7.6
Percentage of Respondents Selecting the Outsourcing Option (N=237)
Details
Outsource
Make
Version
A (n=83)

60.2%

39.8%

Sunk Cost & Negative Frame

B (n=86)

17.4%

82.6%

Sunk Cost & Positive Frame

C (n=35)

20.0%

80.0%

N o Sunk Cost & N o Frame & N A T C

D(n=33)

42.4%

57.6%

N o Sunk Cost & N o Frame + A T C

NATC = No Anticipated Transactioni Cost

- ATC = Anticipated Transaction Cost (Asset Specific)
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Hypothesis Testing of Rational Decision Makers
T h e null hypothesis is repeated below.
H0iA:

There will be no difference in the outsourcing decisions made between people
who perceive themselves as rational decision makers and those who perceive
themselves as intuitive decision makers. [Tl]

In order to test this null hypothesis, the responses were sorted into categories. First,
respondents w h o had self-evaluated themselves as a 1 or 2 on the Likert scale were at
the higher level of the rational scale and allocated to the category "rational".
Conversely, respondents w h o had self-evaluated themselves as 6 or 7 on the Likert scale
were at the higher level of the intuitive scale and allocated to the category "intuitive".
This effectively removed those respondents w h o did not consider themselves as either
strongly rational or strongly intuitive. T h e number of responses was reduced to 56 for
" A " (49 rational & 7 intuitive), 51 for " B " (44 rational & 7 intuitive), 25 for " C " (20
rational & 5 intuitive) and 22 for " D " (17 rational & 5 intuitive). There was a high
proportion of respondents w h o perceived themselves as rational. These results were
expected from a professional group such as accountants w h o are trained to be rational
decision makers.

A chi-square test was performed for each of the versions to determine whether or not
the observations were significant. Table 7.7 presents the results of the 2 x 2 contingency
table. T o test the relationship in each of the different versions, a chi-square test was
conducted for each separately. T h e results for these are contained in Appendix F as
Tables 7.7a. 7.7b, 7.7c, 7.7d and 7.7e.
Table 7.7
Crosstabulation of Outsourcing Decision * S u n k Cost H i g h / L o w
Outsource
Rational
Intuitive
Total

No
45
8
53

Yes
85
16
101

Total

130
24
154

Result:
y2 sample = 0.015 (a =0.903, df = 1)
Decision:
Cannot reject the null hypothesis.
Computed y2 does not exceed the critical value: y2 critical = 3.841 (a =0.05, df = 1)
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The findings are summarised below.
•

There was a significant difference in the decision to outsource between rational and
intuitive decision makers in version "A" of the survey.

•

There was no significant difference in the decision to outsource between rational and
intuitive decision makers in version " B " of the survey.

•

There was a significant difference in the decision to outsource between rational and
intuitive decision makers in version " C " of the survey.

•

There was a significant difference in the decision to outsource between rational and
intuitive decision makers in version " D " of the survey.

The findings are summarised in Table 7.8 below.

Table 7.8
S u m m a r y of Differences Between Rational & Intuitive Decision Makers
Version
Reject / Accept
df
a
y.2
A
1
8.711
0.003 :. reject the null hypothesis.
B
1
0.137 /. cannot reject the null hypothesis.
2.208
1
0.031
4.640
C
:. reject the null hypothesis.
0.051 .•. reject the null hypothesis.
1
D
3.891
Hypothesis Testing of Framing
T o test this null hypothesis, the versions A (negative frame) and B (positive frame) were
compared using a 2 x 2 contingency table.
Ho 2A :

The decision to outsource will not differ between responses due to framing of the
version. [Tl]

A chi-square test was used to determine whether there was a significant difference
between responses to the positive and negative-framed versions. Details of the statistical
tests are shown in Table 7.9a in Appendix F.

Table 7.9
Crosstabulation of Decision to Outsource
A B * O U T S R C Crosstabulation
Count

OUTSRC
2

1
AB
Total

1
2

50
15
65

33
71
104

Total
83
86
169

Result: For the sample " A vs B", the obtained y2 = 32.688, df = 1, was significant at a =0.000.
Decision: The null hypothesis was rejected.
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The intention to outsource significantly differs between versions where the opportunity
costs were framed either positively or negatively. This confirms that the framing effect
did impact on the decision outcome. Further tests were carried out to examine the
difference between versions " A " and " B " compared to the version with no frame "C". A
2 x 2 contingency table was developed to test each of these. Details of the statistical
tests are shown in Table 7.10a in Appendix F.

Table 7.10
Crosstabulations of Outsourcing " A " and " C "
A C * O U T S R C Crosstabulation
Count
OUTSRC

2

1
AC

1
3

33
28
61

50
7
57

Total

Total
83
35
118

Result: For the sample " A vs C " the obtained y2 = 15.965, df = 1, was significant at a =0.000.
Decision: The null hypothesis was rejected.

There was a significant difference in the intention to outsource between the negativeframed version and the version with no frame. Details of the statistical tests are shown
in Table 7.1 la in Appendix F.

Table 7.11
Crosstabulations of Outsourcing " B " and " C "
BC * O U T S R C Crosstabulation
Count
OUTSRC

2

1
BC
Total

2
3

15
7
22

71
28
99

Total
86
35
121

Result: For the sample "B vs C " the obtained y2 = 0.109, df = 1, was not significant at a =i
Decision: The null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
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These findings are consistent with the expected framing effect predicted by prospect
theory, in particular that positive and negative framing produces different responses to
outsourcing versions that were identical except for the framing.

Hypothesis Testing of Sunk Cost
The versions relevant to test hypothesis H Q 3 A were " A " and " B " compared to "C". The
null hypothesis is repeated below.
Ho 3A :

The decision to outsource will not be reduced by the presence of past investment (sunk
costs). [Tl]

This null hypothesis was tested by comparing the responses to versions "A" and "B",
sunk cost present, against those of version "C", with no sunk cost. Details of the
statistical tests are shown in Table 7.12a in Appendix F.

Table 7.12
Crosstabulations of Outsourcing " A " and " B " vs " C "
A B V C * O U T S R C Crosstabulation
Count
OUTSRC
2

1
ABVC 1
2
Total

65
7
72

104
28
132

Total
169
35
204

Result: For the sample " A B vs C " the obtained y2 = 4.327, df = 1, was significant at a =0.038.
Decision: The null hypothesis was rejected.

This result is consistent with the existence of the sunk cost effect.
Hypothesis Testing of Asset Specificity
The versions relevant to test hypothesis Ho3A were C compared to D. The null
hypothesis is repeated below.
Ho4A:

The decision to outsource will not differ due to asset specificity in the version. [Tl]

Details of the statistical tests are shown in Table 7.13a in Appendix F.
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Table 7.13
Crosstabulations of Outsourcing " C " and " D '
C V D * O U T S R C Crosstabulation
Count
OUTSRC

2

1
CVD
Total

3
4

7
14
21

28
19
47

Total
35
33
68

Result: For the sample "C vs D " the obtained y2 = 4.001, df = 1, was significant at a =0.045.
Decision: Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected.

This result is consistent with the theory of transaction cost economics that asset
specificity will have a negative influence over a decision to outsource.

Summary

of Results ~ Task One Outsourcing Decision

There are four key points arising from the results of Task O n e with the outsourcing
decision. First, rational decision makers did differ from intuitive decision makers in
their decision to outsource. For the combined versions, the results were inconclusive.
W h e n the four versions were analysed individually, " A " and " C " were significantly
different, " D " was considered significantly different at a = 0.051, however, " B " was not
significantly different. A possible explanation m a y lie with the framing effect of version
"B". The positive frame m a y have negated differences between rational and intuitive
decision making styles. The results suggest that the decisions of the rational decision
makers were more closely associated with those of intuitive decision makers under the
positive frame rather than under the negative frame.

Second, the decision to outsource was significantly different between positive- and
negative-framed versions of the task. For versions " A " against "B", the results were
inconclusive. W h e n the framed versions were compared to the neutral version, " A "
against " C " was significantly different, however, " B " against " C " was not significantly
different. A possible explanation m a y be the sunk cost effect. Version " C " had no frame
and no sunk cost while version " B " had a positive frame and a sunk cost. Under
prospect theory, a positive frame was expected to induce risk-averse behaviour— this
was not observed. T h e results clearly indicated that the decision to outsource was
significantly higher in the positive frame with a sunk cost than in the negative frame
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with a sunk cost. This finding is contrary to therisk-takingbehaviour predicted to occur
by prospect theory in tasks with a negative frame. In addition, the difference between
versions " B " and "C", which contained no frame and no sunk cost, was not significant.

Third, in accordance with transaction cost theory, the decision to outsource was found
to be influenced by the presence of an asset specific investment. Inclusion of an asset
specific investment was not expected to have any significant influence on the decision
by accountants. However, the results confirm that there was a distinct impact upon the
outsourcing decision— this suggests that accountants are not i m m u n e from the effects
of asset specificity.

Fourth, the decision to outsource was significantly different between versions with sun
cost and the version with no sunk cost. This provides confirmation of the sunk cost
effect. The negative-framed version " A " was significantly different from version "C".
However, w h e n version "B", which had a sunk cost and a positive frame, was compared
to version "C", with no sunk cost and no frame, the difference was not significant.

Results ~ Task Two Investment Project Decision
Five null hypotheses were generated with regard to the investment project task. These
called for the use of a t-test (for null hypothesis 1), an A N O V A (for null hypotheses 1,
2, 3 and 5) and a chi-square test (for null hypothesis 4). A principal components factor
analysis was conducted as an additional test on the data regarding the perceptions of
problem space. Application of the investment project decision task to the accountants in
public practice is consistent with the call by Duchon, Dunegan and Barton (1989) for
research to be conducted on "real decision makers". The manipulations to the versions
were based upon the suggestions by Duchon, Dunegan and Barton (1989) to manipulate
sunk costs and by Dunegan (1993) to test a manipulation on terminology. The
manipulations to the versions are summarised in Table 7.14.
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Table 7.14
S u m m a r y of Task T w o Details for Investment Decision (N=237)
Version

Wording

Framing

XI (n=51)

Minimal

Positive

X 2 (n=32)

Expanded

Positive

Yl (n=41)

Minimal

Negative

Y2 (n=45)

Expanded

Negative

Zl(n=35)

Expanded & Reduced Sunk Cost

Positive

Z2 (n=33)

Expanded & Reduced Sunk Cost

Negative

T o better illustrate the differences between the six versions of task 2, a diagrammatic
overview is presented in Figure 7.1. The figure shows the different levels of
manipulation that distinguish the six versions. The sunk cost variable has two different
levels— high and l o w — the variable "wording" has two levels— minimal and
expanded— and finally the variable "frame" has two levels— positive and negative.

Figure 7.1
Comparison of Investment Decisions
XI n=51
Frame

>

/

•/

Yl n=41

Wording
&
/

X2n=32

/
^

\ Frame
Y2n=45

Zl n=35

Z2 n=33
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Hypothesis Testing of Framing
Research on the effect of framing of decisions concerning resource allocation suggested
that more funds are likely to be allocated in versions with positive framing than in
versions with negative framing (Bateman & Zeithami, 1989; Dunegan, 1993). This is
consistent with prospect theory. Testing involved framing ( d u m m y coded 1 or 2) as the
independent variable and funding (or resource allocation from $0 to $100,000) as the
dependent variable.
Ho1B:

The amount of funding provided will not differ between responses due to framing of the
version. [T2]

A t test was performed comparing funding levels to determine whether the manipulation
of the team's past record had any effect. The funding allocations were significantly
different (t = 6.501, p <.001), with means of $33,837 for negative frame and $68,373 for
the positive frame. This test established the existence of a framing effect.

To test the difference between the experimental conditions (decision choices versus
positive and negative frames), an analysis of variance for repeated measures was
performed. Since each of the four groups was treated identically, except for framing;
differences were expected among them. The multiple comparison table, Table 7.15a, is
in Appendix F.

Table 7.15
A N O V A for Framing of All Groups
ANOVA
AMOUNT

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

S u m of
Squares
6.43E+10
2.36E+11
3.00E+11

df

5
231
236

Mean Square
1.285E+10
1021769805

F
12.580

Sig.
.000

Result: The difference between groups is significant (F = 12.580, p =0.001, df = 5).
Decision: Reject the null hypothesis.

In further tests between the versions with comparative conditions, XI (minimal wordi
and positive frame) was compared to Y l (minimal wording and negative frame) and X 2
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(expanded wording and positive frame) was compared to Y 2 (expanded wording and
negative frame). The results of the tests are presented in Tables 7.15 to 7.17. Details of
the statistical tests are shown in Tables 7.15a- 17.17a in Appendix F.

Table 7.16
A N O V A for Framing of X I to Y l
ANOVA
AMOUNT1
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

S u m of
Squares
2.23E+10
1.13E+11
1.35E+11

df

1
90
91

Mean Square
2.233E+10
1251338807

F

Siq.
.000

17.847

Result: The difference between groups is significant (F = 17.847, p =0.000, df = 1).
Decision: Therefore, reject the null hypothesis.

Table 7.17
A N O V A for Framing of X 2 to Y 2
ANOVA
AMOUNT2

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

S u m of
Squares
2.86E+10
6.55E+10
9.40E+10

df

1
75
76

Mean Square
2.856E+10
872817592.6

F

Sig.
.000

32.717

Result: The difference between groups is significant (F = 32.717, p =0.000, df = 1).
Decision.-Therefore, reject the null hypothesis.

Table 7.18
S u m m a r y of Analysis of Variance
Source

HQIB

F

df

Sig.

Combined

3

15.808

0.000

XI vs Yl

1

17.847

0.000

X 2 vs Y 2

1

32.717

0.000

Hypothesis Testing of Sunk Cost
The next null hypothesis was concerned with examining the sunk cost effect. To achieve
the desired comparison, six versions of the task were constructed. The details of the
manipulations were outlined in Figure 7.1. Of particular interest to the testing of the
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sunk cost effect were versions Zl and Z2. Version Zl consisted of a positive frame;
version Z 2 was a negative frame. The major manipulation in Zl and Z 2 was the
reduction in the sunk cost amount. While the amount was the same in both Zl and Z2, it
was lower than the sunk cost amount presented in versions X I , X 2 , Y l and Y2. The
purpose of this manipulation was to test the impact on the sunk cost effect of the level
of sunk cost.

The versions relevant to test hypothesis HQ2B were X2 (high sunk cost, expanded
wording and positive frame) compared with Zl (low sunk cost, expanded wording and
positive frame) and Y 2 (high sunk cost, expanded wording and negative frame)
compared to Z 2 (low sunk cost, expanded wording and negative frame). The null
hypothesis is repeated below. Testing involved funding (or resource allocation from $0
to $100,000) as the dependent variable and sunk cost (dummy coded 1 or 2) as the
independent variable.
H o2B :

The amount of funding will not be reduced by the level of past investment (sunk
costs). [Tl]

To test the null hypothesis, a one-way multivariate analysis of variance was perfor
comparing the versions in which the level of sunk cost differed, while the frame was
held constant. The A N O V A was performed on X 2 against Zl and then Y 2 against Z2.
First, the effect of the high sunk cost against low sunk cost was tested in the positive
frame versions (X2 vs Zl). Details of the statistical tests for Table 7.19 are shown in
Table 7.19a in Appendix F.

Table 7.19
A N O V A for Sunk Costs of X 2 to Zl
ANOVA
AMOUNT1

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

S u m of
Squares
8.30E+08
4.46E+10
4.54E+10

df
1
65
66

Mean Square
829585554.4

F
1.210

Sig.
.275

685710164.8

Result:(ANOVA) X 2 vs Zl F= 1.210 (p<0.275, df = 1)
Decision: Therefore the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
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The result confirms that there was no sunk cost effect observed between versions with
the same positive frame. Second, the effect of the high sunk cost against low sunk cost
was tested for the negative frame (Y2 vs 72). Details of the statistical tests for Table
7.20 are in Table 7.20a in Appendix F.

Table 7.20
A N O V A for S u n k Costs of Y 2 to Z 2
ANOVA
AMOUNT2

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of
Squares
2.46E+10
7.88E+10
1.03E+11

df
1
76
77

Mean Square
2.465E+10
1037331207

F
23.759

Sig.
.000

Result: ( A N O V A ) Y 2 vs Z 2 F= 23.759 (p<0.000, df = 1)
Decision: Therefore the null hypothesis was rejected.

This result shows that there was a significant sunk cost effect observed in the versio
with a negative frame; however, in the positive frame the sunk cost was not a significant
factor. The mean for the amount of funding was higher in version Z 2 ($69,090) which
had low sunk cost, than in the comparative version Y 2 ($33,111). Means of all versions
are presented in Table 7.21.

Table 7.21
Descriptive Details of Investment Decision Versions
Version
W

Mean

Std. Deviation

51
32
41
45
35
33
237

1X1 +
2X2 +

65,980
34,293
72,187
23,757
34,634
36,680
3Y14Y233,111
33,016
5Zl + #
65,142
28,218
6Z2-#
69,090
31,060
55,464
Total
35,671
+ = positiveframe;- = negative frame; +# = positiveframewith lower sunk cost; -# negativeframewith lower sunk
cost.

Hypothesis Testing of Perception of Responsibility
HO3B:

The amount of funding will not be different between respondents due to their
perceived level of responsibility for the initial decision. [T2]

A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted. Funding (or resource
allocation from $0 to $100,000) was the dependent variable and perceived level of
Page

215

Chapter 7 ... Survey 3 Accountants

responsibility (scaled from 1 to 5) was the independent variable. Perception of
responsibility was tested against the decision outcome for all the versions. Details of the
statistical tests for Table 7.22 are shown in Table 7.22a in Appendix F.

Table 7.22
A N O V A for Perceived Level of Responsibility/Funding
ANOVA
AMOUNT

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

S u m of
Squares
6.43E+10
2.36E+11
3.00E+11

df
5
231
236

Mean Square
1.285E+10
1021769805

F
12.580

Sig.
.000

Result: F = 12.580, (a =0.000, df = 5)
Decision: Reject the null hypothesis.

There were statistically significant differences between the amount of funding and the
perception of responsibility. The total variance of the means is presented in Table 7.22b
of Appendix F, providing multiple comparisons showing the direction of the differences
between levels of perceived responsibility and funding amounts.

Second, perception of responsibility was tested against the intention to fund the requ
intention to fund (scaled from 1 to 5) was the dependent variable and perceived level of
responsibility (scaled from 1 to 5) was the independent variable. Details of the tests for
Table 7.23 are shown in Table 7.23a in Appendix F.

Table 7.23
A N O V A for Perceived Responsibility on Intention to F u n d
ANOVA
LIKELY

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

S u m of
Squares
76.838

df

508.326
585.165

5
231
236

Mean Square
15.368
2.201

F
6.984

Sifl.
.000

Result: The result was F = 6.984 (a =0.000, df = 6)
Decision: Reject the null hypothesis.
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There were statistically significant differences between the intention to fund and the
perception of responsibility. The total variance of the means is presented in Table 7.23b
in Appendix F, providing multiple comparisons showing the direction of the significant
differences between levels of perceived responsibility and funding amounts.

Hypothesis Testing of Difference in Information Details
T o test this null hypothesis, a one-way analysis of variance ( A N O V A ) was conducted.
The information wording (explicit or minimal) of details ( d u m m y coded as 1 or 2) was
the independent variable and the amount of funding (from $0 to $100,000) was the
dependent variable.
Ho4B:

The amount of funding will not differ between investment versions due to the provision
of explicit details. [T2]

The versions with the manipulation of terminology (wording of details) were compared.
T o compensate for framing effects the comparisons were made between versions that
shared the same frame manipulation. X I was compared against X 2 and Y l was
compared against Y 2 . First, X I was compared against X 2 the d u m m y coding for these
positive-framed versions was 1 for X I and 2 for X 2 . Details of the statistical tests for
Table 7.24 are shown in Table 7.24a in Appendix F.

Table 7.24
A N O V A of Manipulation of Wording X I to X 2
ANOVA
AMOUNT1

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

S u m of
Squares
7.58E+08
7.63E+10
7.71 E+10

df

Mean Square

1 757566294.6
81 941948832.0
82

F
.804

Sig.
.372

Result: The result was F = 0.804, p =0.372, df=1
Decision: Cannot reject the null hypothesis.

Differences in the amount of funding were not related to the differences between the
information provided as explicit or minimal within the positive-framed versions.
Second, Y l was compared against Y 2 , the d u m m y coding for these negative-framed
versions was 3 for Y l and 4 for Y 2 . Details of the statistical tests for Table 7.25 are
shown in Table 7.25a in Appendix F.
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Table 7.25
A N O V A of Manipulation of Wording Y l to Y 2
ANOVA
AMOUNT1

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

S u m of
Squares
49764291
1.02E+11
1.02E+11

df

Mean Square
49764290.67
1211713770

1
84
85

F
.041

Siq.
.840

Result: The result was F = 0.041, p =0.840, df = 1
Decision: Cannot reject the null hypothesis.

Differences in the amount of funding were not related to the differences between the
information provided as explicit or minimal in the negative-framed versions. There was
no significant difference between the decision outcomes as a consequence of the
manipulation of terminology. Therefore, this null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
However, further tests were conducted to test the influence of the explicit details against
the perceptions of respondents. The impact of explicit information (manipulation of
wording of details) on the perceptions of the problem space was examined using the
M a n n Whitney U test and the Wilcoxon W test, The results are reported in Tables 7.25b
7.25c, 7.25d, and 7.25e in Appendix F.
For XI against X 2 there were no significant differences.
For Yl against Y 2 there were no significant differences.

Further testing of the comparisons within positive and negative frames using the chisquare test produced the results shown in Table 7.26.

Table 7.26
Impact of Explicit Information against Perceptions of Problem Space
Problem Space
Item
Intention
Risk
Disappointment
Importance
Responsibility
Minimize

XI vs X2 (positive)
Chi-square
df
4.082
5.922
2.778
3.796
0.423
8.446

6
3
3
2
3
6

a
0.666
0.115
0.427
0.150
0.935
0.207

Yl vs Y2 (negative)
Chi-square
df
14.784
4.299
10.881
4.239
6.800
4.774

6
4
3
3
4
6

a
0.022*
0.367
0.012*
0.237
0.147
0.573
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Sunk Cost
Control

10.504
3.312

6
6

0.105
0.769

5.011
1.835

significant at p < 0.05

6
6

0.542
0.934

The results of the comparison of positive versions (XI vs X 2 ) were not significant;
however, the negative versions (Yl vs Y 2 ) showed significant differences in level of
intention and disappointment.

Hypothesis Testing of Problem Space
H o5B: The perceptions of the problem space will not differ between versions due to the
framing effect. [T2]
A one-way multivariate analysis of variance was performed comparing the two sets of
versions in which the framing differed. First a one-way multivariate analysis of variance
( M A N O V A ) w a s performed on X I vs Y l followed by X 2 vs Y 2 , Table 7.27.

Table 7.27
M A N O V A Testing of F r a m i n g Effect o n Problem Space
Between-Subjects Factors
N
PAP1

1
3

51
41

Multivariate Tests*5
Effect
Intercept

PAP1

Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root

Value
.989
.011
89.645
89.645
.175
.825
.212
.212

F
930.0633
930.063a
930.0633
930.0633
2.204a
2.2043
2.2043
2.2043

Hypothesis df
8.000
8.000
8.000
8.000
8.000
8.000
8.000
8.000

Error df
83.000
83.000
83.000
83.000
83.000
83.000
83.000
83.000

Sig.
.000
.000
.000
.000
.035
.035
.035
.035

a. Exact statistic
b. Design: lntercept+PAP1

Result: XI vs Yl MANOVA F=2.204, p<0.034
Decision: Reject the null hypothesis.

Page

219

Chapter 7 ... Survey 3 Accountants

The result indicates that the perception of problem space differs between X I (positive
frame and minimal wording) and Y l (negative frame and minimal wording). There is a
significant difference (at a = .05) due to framing.

Second, a one-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed on X2
vs Y 2 , Table 7.28.

Table 7.28
M A N O V A on Specific Tasks X 2 to Y 2
Between-Subjects Factors

N
PAP2

2
4

32
45
Multivariate Tests'5

Effect
Intercept

PAP2

Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root

Value
.990
.010
97.282
97.282
.480
.520
.922
.922

F
826.897a
826.897a
826.897a
826.897a
7.839a
7.839a
7.839a
7.839a

Hypothesis df
8.000
8.000
8.000
8.000
8.000
8.000
8.000
8.000

Error df
68.000
68.000
68.000
68.000
68.000
68.000
68.000
68.000

Siq.
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000

a

- Exact statistic

b

- Design: lntercept+PAP2

Result: X 2 vs Y 2 M A N O V A F=7.839, p<0.000
Decision: Reject the null hypothesis.

The perception of problem space differed between X2 (positive frame and expanded
wording) and Y l (negative frame and expanded wording). Therefore, there is a
significant difference (at a = .0001) due to framing. T o further examine the effect of
framing on perception of problem space, t-tests were undertaken to examine the
differences between positive and negative frames. The results presented in Tables 7.27a
and 7.27b in Appendix F pertain to the comparison between X I and Yl. The results
presented in Tables 7.28a and 7.28b in Appendix F pertain to the comparison between
X 2 and Y 2 .
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The perception of the level ofriskwas significantly different between all comparative
versions. However, the manipulation of positive versus negative frames was limited to
the comparisons between X I v Y l and X 2 v Y 2 , which also produced significant
differences. This is consistent with the notion that the framing effect will exert a greater
influence over the decision process when the frame is constructed to provide a contrast
between positive and negative. Having established the influence of a framing effect on
the perceptions of problem space the next null hypothesis was concerned with testing
the relationship between the variance in funding allocation and the problem space items.
H06B:

The eight problem space variables (independent) will not significantly explain
the variance in funding. [T2]

A multiple regression analysis was performed, one for each framing condition, with
funding as the criterion variable and all eight problem space variables simultaneously
entered as predictors. B y including all eight problem space measures in the multivariate
model simultaneously, any shared variance among predictors would be controlled
(Cohen & Cohen, 1983). The results are presented in Tables 7.29, and 7.30.
Table 7.29
Multiple Regression - Funding regressed on all Eight Problem Space Measures
(Positive ~ X 1 + X 2 )
F
Adjusted
Standardised beta
Measure
Dfs R1
R2

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Funding
Intentions
Risk
Disappointment
Importance
Responsibility
Minimise loss
Sunk costs
Control
* Significant at p < 0.000

20.672 *

8,74

.691

coefficients
.657
0.579
-0.327
0.099
-0.012
-0.037
0.075
0.153
0.026

Result: X I vs X 2 Multiple Regression F=20.672 (8,74), p<0.000
Decision: Reject the null hypothesis.

This means that 69.1% of the variance in funding was significantly explained by the
eight independent variables in the positive-framed versions.
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Table 7.30
Multiple Regression - Funding regressed on all Eight Problem Space Measures
(Negative ~ Y 1 + Y 2 )
Measure
F
dfs R2
Adjusted
Standardised beta
coefficients

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Funding
Intentions
Risk
Disappointment
Importance
Responsibility
Minimise loss
Sunk costs
Control
* Significant at p < 0.000

53.936*

8,77

.849

.833
0.779
-0.043
0.033
0.096
0.066
0.103
0.162
-0.041

Result: Y l vs Y 2 Multiple Regression F=53.936 (8,77), p<0.000
Decision: Reject the null hypothesis.

This means that 84.9% of the variance in funding was significantly explained by the
eight independent variables in the negative-framed versions. T o determine whether
significant differences exist between the predictive powers of the regression models, a
comparison was conducted of adjusted R 2 values using Fisher's transformation for
multivariate R (Hayes, 1988, 644-645). The capacity of the negative frame model was
significantly greater. A total of 8 predictor variables were present in the Fisher
transformation calculation.
Positive Frame = C R = 5.93; critical value = 1.96, two-tailed test, significant.
Negative Frame = C R = 9.77; critical value = 1.96, two-tailed test, significant.
These results support the previously reported findings, that the difference in framing of
information influences characteristics of the cognitive modes exhibited by the subjects
in their decision making.

Additional Tests of the Data
A factor analysis was conducted to determine the level of correlation between the
problem space items. Factor analysis is used to examine whether a smaller number of
c o m m o n factors can account for the pattern of correlations in a larger number of
variables. T h e eigenvalue statistic is the c o m m o n measure used to determine which
factors to keep (de Vaus, 1991, 261). The eigenvalue indicates the amount of variance
in the pool of original variables that the factor explains. A factor rotation is used to
clarify which variables belong to the n e w component. The analysis involved the use of
the principle component extraction method and resulted in identification of four
"

'
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components. Table 7.31 demonstrates that no commonalities or overlapping occurred
between the factors identified by the principal component analysis.

Table 7.31
Rotated Component Matrix
1 ~ Sunk Cost
.916
.861
.755

Sunk
Minimise
Intention
Responsibility
Control
Disappointed
Importance
Risk
Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation.
Rotation converged in 5 iterations.
Commonalities at .350

Component
2 ~ Accountability

3 ~ Risk Utility

.899
.865
.823
.801
.419

The first component consisted of sunk costs, which when combined with other items, is
consistent with the results reported in Chapter 6. The descriptor "Sunk Cost" was used
for this item to maintain consistency with Chapter 6. The details of the component
matrix which constitutes this item are presented in Table 7.32.

Table 7.32
C o m p o n e n t 1 ~ S u n k Cost
+/Sunk Cost
(too much invested to quit)
Minimise
(wish to minimise loss)
Intention
(Likely to invest)

+.916
+.861
+.755

The perception that there was too m u c h invested to quit is a strong indicator of the sunk
cost effect. The wish to minimise loss is consistent with the literature on the sunk cost
effect. The intention to provide further funding is an indicator of the commitment to
escalation trap associated with the sunk cost effect. This component is consistent with
the proposition that non-rational behaviour is due to "the unwillingness of individuals to
let go ofpast costs (or wealth) ".
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Table 7.33
C o m p o n e n t 2 ~ Accountability
+/Responsibility
(for initial investment)
Control
(over success of project)

+.899
+.865

This component is consistent with cognitive and personality variables which suggest an
accountable side to the behaviour of an individual. In the case of accountability - a
central notion in management accounting (Hansen & M o w e n , 2000, 517) - the person is
responding to issues concerning the level of personal responsibility and their perception
of the locus of control over the events (Taylor & Pincus, 2000, 359). That these two
items are positively correlated is consistent with the notion that they are underlying
drivers, which when combined would motivate a person to commit further funds to an
investment.

Table 7.34
C o m p o n e n t 3 ~ Risk Utility (feelings about risk)
+/Disappointed
(with present condition)
Importance
(importance of decision)
Risk
(perceived risk level)

+.823
+.801
+.419

This component is consistent with the notion of utility; the feelings of disappointment
are likely to influence the perception of the importance of the decision with the
compounding effect of the perception ofrisk.The level of importance placed upon the
decision is associated with the level of disappointment regarding the poor performance
of the project. The perceived level ofriskfurther adds to the consideration of utility.
The components were tested against the decision outcome using A N O V A and produced
the results presented in Table 7.35. The sunk cost and accountability components were
significant at the 0.000 level, however theriskutility component was not significant
(0.065).
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Table 7.35
Components Tested against Decision O u t c o m e
Component
1 ~ Sunk cost
2 ~ Accountability
3 ~ Risk Utility

F

P value

29.684
4.097
1.664

0.000
0.000
0.065

Separate descriptive statistics were computed for the data in each of the different
framing versions. The results are presented in Tables 7.36, 7.37, 7.38 and 7.39. A brief
examination shows that five problem space items were significantly correlated with
funding decisions when a positive frame was used and six items were significantly
correlated when the negative frame was used. Interestingly,riskperception was
significantly correlated to funding in the positive frame but not in the negative frame.
The perception of responsibility and control were significantly correlated to funding in
the negative frame but not in the positive.
Table 7.36
X I & X 2 Positive F r a m e ~ means, standard deviations and correlations (N=83)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Variable
M
SD
Funding
68.37
30.65
Intentions
3.70
1.39
Risk
3.51
.89
Disappointment
4.23
.67
.64
Importance
4.20
Responsibility
.91
3.75
1.32
Minimise loss
4.95
4.84
1.33
Sunk costs
1.46
Control
4.53
# Significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed)
* Significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed)

1
-

2

.733*
-.399*
.230#
.101
-.129
.378*
.531*
.014

-.112
.153
.084
-.099
.296*
.500*
.043

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

.069
.030
.070
-.031
-.046
-.087

.403*
-.104
.357*
.301*
-.263#

.174
.300*
.139
-.079

-.041
-.063
.516*

.598*
-.107

-.089

-

Table 7.37
Y l & Y 2 Negative F r a m e ~ means, standard deviations and correlations (N=51)
Variable

M

SD

1

34.61
33.83
.893*
2.84
1.59
.060
1.01
3.73
.78 -.252#
4.28
.057
.76
4.22
.385*
.93
3.71
.444*
3.52
1.47
.652*
1.40
3.52
.428*
1.54
4.21
# Significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed)
* Significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed)

1 Funding
2 Intentions
3 Risk
4 Disappointment
5 Importance
6 Responsibility
7 Minimise loss
8 Sunk costs
9 Control

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

.046
-.383*
-.077
.422*
.345*
.562*
.447*

.171
.017
-.121
.262#
.232#
-.069

.554*
-.228#
-.181
-.060
-.246#

-.041
-.021
.067
.051

.001
.136
.592*

.619*
.231*
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Table 7.38
Z l Positive F r a m e (Expanded wording/Low sunk cost) ~ means, standard
deviations anc correlations (N=35)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Variable
M
SD
Funding
65.14
28.21
Intentions
4.29
1.58
Risk
3.29
.96
4.34
Disappointment
.64
Importance
4.26
.70
Responsibility
3.14
.94
Minimise loss
5.09
1.48
Sunk costs
5.11
1.53
Control
3.49
1.44
# Significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed)
* Significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

.938#
-.176
.005
.273
.480#
.650#
.674#
.714#

-.017
.075
.277
.444*
.629*
.642*
.711*

.412#
.326
-.047
-.225
-.224
-.146

.586*
.063
-.063
.049
.037

.165
.120
.246
.251

.495*
.579*
.682*

.968*
.764*

.814*

-

8

9

Table 7.39
Z 2 Negative F r a m e (Expanded wording/Low sunk cost) ~ means, standard
deviations anc correlations (N=33)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Variable
M
SD
69.09
Funding
31.06
4.03
1.31
Intentions
Risk
3.18
1.01
.80
4.09
Disappointment
.77
3.97
Importance
2.94
.86
Responsibility
1.27
4.06
Minimise loss
1.21
4.09
Sunk costs
1.32
3.24
Control
# Significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed)
* Significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Summary

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

.807#
.402#
-.072
.482#
.604#
.389#
.427#
.690#

.348#
-.092
.465*
.581*
.317
.472*
.716*

-.059
.167
.191
.209
.241
.455*

.206
.008
-.006
.184
-.021

.279
.448*
.440#
.375#

.316
.185
.669*

.707*
.566*

.533*

of Results ~ Task Two Investment Project Decision

Task T w o involved a decision regarding investment in an on-going project with some
chance of failure. The results indicated that framing produced significantly different
choices in the amount of funding provided (null hypothesis Ho 3 ). However, the
direction of the difference was not consistent with the expectations of prospect theory.
The negative frame was expected to producerisk-seekingbehaviour accompanied by
escalation to commitment and a higher average amount of funding. Conversely, the
positive frame was expected to producerisk-avoidancebehaviour and a lower average
amount of funding. This finding, while contradictory to the assumptions of prospect
theory, is consistent with the findings of Bateman and Zeithaml (1989) and Duchon,
Dunegan and Barton (1989). The findings, regarding the frame effect, are also
consistent with the results reported in Chapter 6. A n explanation for this type of
behaviour was discussed in the conclusion section of Chapter 6 which drew upon the
literature reviewed in Chapter 3 particularly related to the argument presented by Sitkin
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and Pablo (1992). These findings suggest that incorporation of the explanations for
alternativeriskbehaviour provides a more robust model of prospect theory.

Second, testing the sunk cost effect on decision outcome (allocation of funds) produced
an unexpected result. In the positive frame, the decision outcomes from the versions
with high sunk cost were not significantly different to the decision outcomes from the
versions with low sunk cost. The presence of a high sunk cost and low sunk cost in the
positive frame did not produce a significant difference. This could have been due to the
amount of the sunk cost not being large enough to cause a difference. However, there
was a significant difference found in the negative-framed versions. This m a y have been
due to the nature of theriskbehaviour, which was not consistent with the framing effect
as predicted by prospect theory. These results suggest that the framing effect m a y act as
a catalyst for different modes of cognitive processing as proposed by image theory.

Third, the perceived level of responsibility for making the initial decision was found to
be a contributing factor in the decision to provide additional funds, as well as the
intention to provide additional funds. This was tested through the null hypothesis H05.
This result is consistent with motivational theories that posit a relationship between
feelings of ownership for a decision and the desire to avoid accepting that the initial
decision m a y have been wrong (another aspect of accountability).

Fourth, funding levels were not significantly different between versions that shared the
same positive or negative frame and with more specific (explicit) details. The findings
suggest that additional information did not result in different decision outcomes.
However, w h e n the different versions were tested against the problem space items,
some significant results appeared. These differences occurred only in the negativeframed versions and m a y be explained by the predicted risk propensity under prospect
theory. Further examination revealed that the differences were related to the level of
intention and disappointment expressed by the respondents. A s a greater diversification
was predicted by the theory of verbal probabilities, the findings only provided limited
evidence for the existence of an influence on the cognitive reasoning of decision
makers. T h e cognitive reasoning was represented by the respondents' perceptions of the
problem space.
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Fifth, testing of the problem space produced significant results in both positive and
negative frames, although the negative frame was stronger. Further analysis of the
predictive power provided evidence that the negative frame outcomes were significantly
greater than in the positive frame. The evidence was not as clear cut as Dunegan's
(1993) findings. However, the framing effect did have an impact on problem space
items. T h e items affected in both the explicitly and minimally worded versions were the
desire to minimize loss, perception of sunk cost and intention to provide funding. In
addition, the perception ofriskwas also affected in the explicitly worded version. These
findings provide evidence that the framing influenced the perception of problem space.
Principle component analysis produced three distinct factors from the problem space
items. These factors closely approximate the factors produced in Chapter 6 and were
therefore, categorised using the same descriptors - that is sunk cost, accountability and
risk.

Conclusions
The sunk cost effect was found to be significant in both the outsourcing decision task
and in the negative frame of the investment decision task but not in the positive frame of
the investment decision task. O n e possible explanation for this anomaly — that the
difference between the amount of sunk cost was not large enough — was discounted
since the differences in sunk cost were the same in the negative-frame versions. The
only difference was the framing, suggesting that the framing effect m a y be responsible
for this anomaly.

Although framing was found to be significant, the direction of the results was not
consistent with prospect theory. T h e outcomes of tests of the framing effect in the
outsourcing task were contradictory to the direction ofriskbehaviour predicted by
prospect theory. T h e results of the investment task also produced contradictory findings.
Negative framing, which should have producedrisk-takingbehaviour resulted in riskavoidance behaviour. Positive framing, which should have elicited risk-avoidance
behaviour resulted inrisk-takingbehaviour. A higher percentage of respondents should
have chosen the outsourcing option in the negative frame than in the positive frame
under prospect theory. Risk-avoidance was interpreted to m e a n that respondents would
be less likely toriskchanging from the existing situation. The anomaly found in the
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investment task, reported in Chapter 6 was therefore not limited to one professional
group, but extended in survey 3 to the accountants.
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusions and Implications of the Research
Chapter Introduction
In this chapter, conclusions and contributions are drawn from the empirical analysis of
the central research question of this thesis:
Are trained professionals adversely influenced by sunk cost when making
financial decisions ?
The chapter commences with a synthesis of the normative treatment of sunk cost. This
is followed by a discussion of the observed violations to expected utility theory. The
rational decision model inherent in traditional management accounting and the concept
of relevant costs are re-considered in view of the findings. T h e results are then analysed
for indications of support for the behavioural predictions of image theory and prospect
theory. T h e findings relating to decision behaviour and h u m a n judgement are also
discussed.

The contribution of the theoretical research design is reflected upon and discussed. In
addition, the answers to the research issues, which were used to guide the study, are
compared with regard to the major findings. This is followed by a discussion of the
limitations of the scope of the research, suggestions for future research and implications
for society.

Normative Theories
The normative treatment of sunk cost, as discussed in Chapter 2, is based on the premise
that past costs are irrelevant to decision making. Whether this premise is explicitly
stated, as found in the economic and management accounting literature, or implicit, as
identified in finance models - sunk costs are consistently deemed irrelevant to financial
decision making. A s well, the form a sunk cost takes is not restricted to an asset with a
financial value. T h e literature extends the concept of what is meant by past costs to
encompass the everyday activities, for example time spent waiting in a shopping queue
Normative theory assumes that the actions of individuals should fit the predictions of
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expected utility theory, which consists of a set of axioms devised by V o n N e u m a n n and
Morgenstem (1947), Savage (1954) and others, that postulate the criteria for rational
decision making behaviour. Individuals are thus hypothesised to be self-maximizers
whose ultimate goal is to maximize expected utility (Robson, 2001). Within this
framework the only consideration is to identify which alternative course of action will
maximize utility in the future, given the present as a point of reference while the past is
irrelevant. T h e past (a sunk cost) is irrelevant because it cannot be changed, and the
present (market value) serves to identify opportunities.

The normative approach to the treatment of sunk cost provides an important insight into
rational decision models of economics, finance and management accounting. A
contribution of this thesis is the documentation of the normative origin for the treatment
of sunk cost by these three disciplines. Rational decision making is based on choosing
the prospect that offers the highest expected utility, which is considered the optimal
payoff. In the rational choice model, instinct, experience and emotions are excluded
from the process since the basis for making the rational choice is predetermined and
predicated upon a logically structured and deductive process.

Rational Decision Models
Normative models provide people with a formula for rational decision behaviour,
however, normative models cannot compensate for h u m a n nature. The findings
indicated that the process of rational decision making was not always followed in
practice w h e n sunk cost information was included in the decision process. The issues
raised by the research suggest that decision makers are most certainly influenced by
information other than relevant costs.

The results of the three surveys confirmed that a majority of decision makers did not
adhere to the rational decision model. Since rational choice is devoted to utility
maximisation and therefore the maximisation of payoffs, the individual decision maker
should not be influenced by extraneous variables such as past experience. However, the
behaviour of individuals observed in this research and in prior research suggests that
past experience does influence decision making. T h e optimal choice was not selected by
all the respondents— contrary to the assumptions of the rational choice model.
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According to the invariance axiom, rational decisions should lead to the same optimal
choice. If all the respondents m a d e the optimal choice, then the normative predictions of
rational choice would be upheld. However, as prior research reported, not all individuals
follow the rational model. The findings of this thesis add to the growing amount of
evidence that attests to the continued violation of rational choice models.
Expected Utility Theory
A s predicted by prior research, violations of expected utility theory were observed in the
results of the surveys. These findings were reported in detail in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. In
particular the axioms of dominance and invariance were violated. Contrary to the
dominance axiom, the dominant option in the outsourcing task was not chosen by all
respondents, while in the investment task the majority of respondents escalated
commitment. The dominant option in the outsourcing task was to select the outsourcing
option. Based on the financial information outsourcing maximized profit (that is,
minimized cost). Contrary to the invariance axiom, different representations of the
same choice (created by framing), in both the outsourcing task and investment task,
yielded different preferences.
Influence of Sunk Cost Information
Sunk cost was found to influence decision making in both outsourcing and investment
tasks. T h e decisions of the respondents were found to be more aligned to the
propositions of behavioural theories than normative models of rational behaviour. This
thesis builds upon the research of Dunegan (1993) and Dunegan, Duchon and A m o s
(1995), although the findings were not entirely consistent with these previous American
studies. The surveys in this thesis represent the first time these propositions have been
tested in the Australian environment. A n important difference between the studies lies
in the conclusions regarding the role of sunk cost information and the additional test by
manipulating the level of sunk cost.

The findings of the research showed that there was a demonstrable sunk cost effect
measured in the data from the surveys. W h e r e sunk cost information was present, the
decision outcomes were shown to be sub-optimal. The research demonstrated that the
decision makers were adversely influenced by the presence of sunk cost information and
did not m a k e decisions that maximized utility (that is, maximize profit or minimize
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cost). These findings violate the normative propositions of traditional management
accounting that only relevant costs should influence decisions. A n y other model leads to
sub-optimal outcomes. Evidence of the existence of the sunken cost effect was found
across all three professional groups studied.

Behavioural Theories and Experimental Evidence
Previous experimental research demonstrated that individuals, when making decisions,
do not always follow the normative prescription to ignore sunk cost. The extant
literature highlights the differences between actual behaviour and normative rational
decision models. Factors such as emotions, past experience and other intervening
influences were found to affect the decision behaviour of individuals.

Various behavioural theories emerged to explain the observed behaviour. The main
contribution of this thesis was to test the sunk cost effect through a series of surveys.
The analysis of the results provides evidence that trained professionals were influenced
by sunk cost w h e n making financial decisions. The discussion of the findings is directed
at examining the implications of the observed behaviour within the context of normative
and behavioural theories.

Image Theory
Image theory (Beach, 1990) posits that the perception of the problem space and the
image compatibility that decision makers cognitively develop should be consistent with
the level of responsibility that they feel toward the original decision.

Problem Space
Perceptions emerging from the process of information assimilation and evaluation are
collectively referred to as the problem space (Payne, 1980). O n e problem space item,
the perception of responsibility for the initial decision, was found to exert an influence
over the amount of funding provided in the reinvestment decision. Staw and Ross
(1978) predicted that responsibility for the initial decision would cause subjects to
escalate their commitment as a form of justification that the initial decision was correct.
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The results are consistent with image theory, with the level of responsibility found to be
positively correlated with a higher level of funding provided.

The perceived level of responsibility for making the initial decision was found to be a
contributing factor in the decision to provide additional funds, as well as the intention to
provide additional funds. This was consistent with motivational theories that posit a
relationship between feelings of ownership for a decision and the desire to avoid
accepting that the initial decision m a y have been w r o n g — leading to an escalation of
commitment to the original decision.

Image Compatibility
Image compatibility refers to a person's subjective assessment of the progress of a
project relative to current performance and future goals (Dunegan, 1993, 1995). Testing
of image compatibility produced mixed results. Consistent with the findings of
Dunegan, Duchon and A s h m o s (1995), low image compatibility was a significant
predictor of the level of funding. The unexpected finding was that high image
compatibility was also a significant predictor of the level of funding. However, the
statistical significance was smaller compared to that of low image compatibility and the
percentage increase in the R 2 was also smaller by comparison. Image theory posits that
information use can be inferred by a significant relationship between information and
decision outcomes. These results confirm that the reduction in information use was
more significant as image compatibility increases.
Prospect Theory
Prospect theory posits that there are two phases (editing and evaluation) in the decision
making process (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In the evaluation phase the value
function is determined relative to deviations from the reference point (the status quo or
current asset level) (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 286). The reference point is
acknowledged as being susceptible to a phenomenon k n o w n as framing (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1981,453).

Reference Points and Sunk Cost
The manipulation of the level of sunk cost was expected to affect the reference point.
Testing the sunk cost effect on decision outcome (allocation of funds) produced an
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unexpected result. In the positive frame, the decision outcome from the versions with
high sunk cost was not significantly different to the decision outcome from the versions
with low sunk cost. Succinctly, the comparison between high sunk cost and low sunk
cost in the positive frame did not produce a significant difference. A s the reference
point was considered to be representative of the status quo (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979), manipulation of the amount of sunk cost was expected to produce a significant
difference.

An argument worth considering is that the amount of sunk cost was not great enough to
cause a difference. However, as there was a significant difference found between the
negative-framed versions in which the amount of sunk cost was reduced this argument
does not appear to be valid. Another explanation m a y lie with the specific positive
frame effect observed in this research the nature of this effect is discussed in the next
section.

Framing Effect
The testing of the framing effect also produced unexpected results. Low-risk behaviour
was found to occur in the negative-framed versions of the surveys, while high-risk
behaviour was found to have occurred in the positive-framed versions. The results
indicate that framing produced significantly different choices in the amount of funding
provided. However, the direction of the difference was not consistent with the
expectations of prospect theory. That is, the negative frame was expected to produce
risk-seeking behaviour accompanied by escalation to commitment and subsequently a
higher average amount of funding. Conversely, the positive frame was expected to
producerisk-avoidancebehaviour and a lower average amount of funding. This finding,
while contradictory to the assumptions of prospect theory, was consistent with the
findings of Bateman and Zeithaml (1989) and Duchon, Dunegan and Barton (1989).

When the sunk cost effect in the investment task was tested for significance between
framing conditions, there were further unexpected results. The framing phenomenon
observed in this research is depicted in Figure 8.1 (based on Sitkin & Pablo, 1992),
showing the relevant findings from the two surveys of the investment task (reported in
Chapters 6 and 7). Figure 8.1 shows that most of the results produced findings that were
contradictory to the direction ofriskbehaviour predicted by prospect theory. The
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negative-framed tasks of Survey 2 and 3 producedrisk-aversebehaviour rather than
risk-seeking behaviour. The positive-framed tasks of Survey 2 and 3 produced riskseeking behaviour rather thanrisk-aversebehaviour. The only findings that were
consistent with prospect theory were derived from negative-framed tasks with low sunk
costs in both Surveys 2 and 3, depicted in quadrant 4 of Figure 8.1.
Figure 8.1
Results of Framing Effects Juxtaposed against Predicted Risk Behaviour
Positive
Prospect Theory

Risk Averse

Risk
Propensity

Risk Seeking

Task Frame C haracteristics
Negative
Threat-rigidity/Hypervigilance

[Quadrant 1]
Prediction:
L o w Risk Behaviour

[Quadrant 2]
Prediction:
L o w Risk Behaviour

Attention to Opportunities

Findings:
Survey 2 $39,354 -F; H S/C
Survey 3 $34,634 -F; H S/C
$33,111-F;H S/C
Prospect Theory

[Quadrant 3]
Prediction:
High Risk Behaviour

[Quadrant 4]
Prediction:
High Risk Behaviour

Findings:
Survey 2 $60,227-F; L S/C
Survey 2 $53,484+F; H S/C
Survey 3 $69,090-F; L S/C
Survey 3 $65,980+F; H S/C
$72,187+F;H S/C
$65,142+F;L S/C
H S/C = High sunk cost; L S/C = L o w sunk cost; -F = negative frame; +F = positive frame

A n explanation for this type of observed behaviour, as suggested by Sitkin and Pablo
(1992), is that the framing effect m a y be a catalyst for different modes of cognitive
processing. This appears to be consistent with the predictions of image theory that when
controlled modes of cognitive processing are used, information is subjected to a more
comprehensive, deliberate and thorough analysis. Alternatively, w h e n automatic modes
are used, processing of information is limited, there is a reduced attention to detail, and
fewer incoming cues contribute to creating a cognitive representation of the task. The
automatic m o d e appears to offer a plausible explanation for the observed results.
Importantly, these results suggest thatriskpropensity was moderated byriskperception
and this is consistent with the theoretical model, depicted in Figure 8.2, developed in
this thesis.
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Other Behavioural Issues
Rational vs Intuitive Decision

Making

The results suggest that the decisions of the self-assessed "rational" decision makers
were more closely associated with those of the self-assessed "intuitive" decision makers
under the positive frame, than under the negative frame. The results also showed that
the decision to outsource was significantly different between positive- framed and
negative-framed versions of the task.

Asset Specificity
According to the theory of transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1979), the degree of
asset specificity will be an important consideration in an outsourcing decision. In
testing transaction cost theory, the presence of an asset-specific investment was found to
influence the decision to outsource. In Survey 1 (Hospitals ~ Outsourcing Task), the
effect w a s found to be systematically different between the responses of versions with
and without asset specificity. The findings are consistent with transaction cost theory
which posits that decision makers are influenced by any additional cost of doing
business with an external supplier. The same influence was found to exist in Survey 3
(Accountants ~ Outsourcing Task). The results suggest that an outsourcing decision
m a d e by hospital managers and accounting professionals can be influenced by asset
specificity.

Mental Accounting
The findings suggest that people have different approaches to constructing mental
accounts w h e n considering alternative courses of action. In particular there appears to
be difficulty in distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant information. This
inability to process information m a y be responsible for people adopting mental
strategies that simplify the procedure and sometimes this could lead to biases in
judgement.
Triangulation of Survey Results
For the purpose of this research, triangulation involved the comparison of the findings
from the three different surveys. Table 8.1 identifies the issues and the findings from the
three surveys.
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Table 8.1
Comparison of the Results of the Hypothesis Testing

Survey 1

Sunk
Cost
Significant

Asset
Specificity
Significant

Survey 2

Significant

Survey 3

Significant

Framing
Not applicable

Problem
Space
Not applicable

Image
Compatibility
Not applicable

Not applicable

Significant*

Significant

Significant

Significant

Significant*

Significant

Not applicable

Effect

* Although significant some aspects of these results were not consistent with the prediction of prospect theory.

These findings provide confirmation of the existence of the sunk cost effect in the three
professional groups surveyed.

Conclusions Regarding Research Design
The use of multiple surveys to test various aspects of the sunk cost phenomenon proved
to be a major project requiring a great deal of monitoring and planning. The
compilation, processing and analysis of such a diverse set of data was also time
consuming and cumbersome. However, the wealth of information provided arichand
diverse source for investigation and the results produced some unexpected findings. The
simple information processing model provided a useful reference point from which to
develop the research and to determine the role of the various variables identified in the
surveys.
Critique of the Theoretical Model Variables
The theoretical model proposed in Chapter 4 proved to be useful in examining the sunk
cost effect and the relationship of the variables. This model contributes to the
development of a conceptual framework for empirically testing the sunk cost effect and
to an understanding of the conceptual links between prospect theory and image theory.
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Figure 8.2
Theoretical Research Model
(Decision Theories)
Prospect Theory

Image

Theory

Normative

Theory

[Expected Utility Theory]

Problem Frame
- Positive
- Negative
Risk Propensity
- Risk-averse
- Risk-seeking

Risk Perception
- Problem Space
- Image Computability

Decision Behaviour
- Rational Choice

Reference Point
- Sunk Cost
- Opportunity Cost
- Asset Specificity

(Information Processing Model)

Input
Information Set

Process

Output
Decision Outcome

The model successfully allowed the combination of prospect theory, image theory and
expected utility theory for the purpose of the survey research. Risk propensity predicted by prospect theory to be influenced by the problem frame and reference point
- was shown to be moderated by the cognitive perception of risk. The results indicate
that the model is capable of accommodating the effects of framing, sunk cost, problem
space and image compatibility as well as other variables, such as asset specificity and
opportunity costs. The model provides a framework for testing the predicted outcomes
of expected utility theory - that is the optimal or rational choice - that can be adapted to
allow for further manipulation of variables.

Limitations of the Research
Issues Regarding Operationalisation of Constructs
Because the studies were cross-sectional, cause and effect relationships can be difficult
to establish (Robson, 2000). Although the items chosen to represent the problem space
and image compatibility were justified on the basis of prior research, there remains the
possibility that other, more salient items, were not considered or included. The
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magnitude of the dollar amounts used in the studies might not have been significant to
all respondents.
Issues Regarding Decision Tasks
The less information provided, the more likely decision makers are to exhibit
desirability bias or wishful thinking (Dunegan, 1993). This implies that when there are
too few cues or if the cues are too vague to rely upon, decision makers are more likely
to interpret the data according to their o w n reference point— thereby confounding the
manipulation of the reference point. A high level of ambiguity can also be responsible
for stronger than expected framing effects (Frisch, 1993).

In attempting to create tasks that were consistent with situations likely to occur in
context of the industry, certain difficulties arise. Context cues not directly related to the
decision task m a y influence decision maker's perceptions about the nature of the task.
Information communicated with the task often comes with a presumed guarantee of
relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 1986). A s a consequence, a seemingly unrelated cue m a y
influence decision makers to place greater significance on that single cue. Mandel
(2001) argued that where there were two types of context cues used in an investment
task a reflection effect could occur. For example, if a decision maker's attention is
focused on the probabilities, they could perceive the task as a statistical problem
however, should their focus be on the gains or losses they could perceive the task as a
financial problem (Mandel, 2001). T h e possibility of this reflection effect was not tested
in this research.

Future Research
Further research related to this thesis could involve expanding the study to a wider
variety of professional g r o u p s — or even non-professional g r o u p s — that possess varying
degrees of training or experience in accounting thereby investigating the sunk cost
effect in context of the influencing variables. Research could employ multiple reference
points or more complex framing of the task. Individuals could also be required to repeat
the task, with a control group repeating the same task and other groups having different
manipulations. These alternatives would provide wider generalisability through
comparison with the findings of this study.
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The level of sunk cost in this research clearly resulted in different decision outcomes.
Whether these findings can be translated to situations in which the sunk cost is not
measured in terms of dollar amounts would provide valuable insight into the sunk cost
effect. Future research could incorporate and manipulate different types of sunk cost such as time - where the influence of time could be varied and tested.

Finally, in terms of the influence of sunk cost on the cognitive process, wider emphasis
could be given to the perception ofrisk.This could be achieved by further development
of instruments to better measure problem space and image compatibility with items that
are more directly related to sunk cost or aspects of the tasks concerning sunk cost
information.

Implications for Society
Decision making in the context of this thesis was concerned with outcomes regarding
the allocation of scarce resources. The efficient allocation of resources has long-term
effects on society (Brealey & Myers, 1996; Horngren & Foster, 1991). Improved
understanding of the behavioural aspects of decision making by various sections of the
business community provide opportunities for reflection and change in the training of
decision-making professionals. Both the public sector and private sector need to
improve decision making under sunk cost because of the potential for enormous costs to
society that can arise from erroneous decisions. For this reason the sunk cost effect is
extremely important and needs to be better understood.

There are examples where social costs were incurred because the sunk cost effect led to
wrong decisions being made. For example, the escalation of commitment in the case of
the mismanagement of the administration of Eastern Airlines by the U S Bankruptcy
Court which cost the taxpayers an additional two billion dollars (US) because of the
inability of the court to ignore sunk costs (Weiss & Wruck, 1998, 64). A further
example is the Taurus information technology project commissioned by the London
Stock Exchange at an initial cost of £50 million and after the costs had blown out to £80
million was abruptly cancelled exacerbating the waste (Drummond, 1998). The impact
on society was far greater as the City of London incurred an estimated £400 million loss
through preparing for the implementation of Taurus (Drummond, 1998, 913).
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Implications for the Accounting

Education

There are several possible implications for Management Accounting education arising
from this dissertation. The results of this research m a y be discouraging to accounting
educators because rational decision models have been found to be disregarded— not
just by hospital managers and financial planners— but by a majority of accountants.

Management accounting courses traditionally include the topic of relevant costing,
which emphasises the importance of incremental and opportunity costs and discuss the
irrelevance of sunk costs. However, theresultsindicated that there is a high proportion
of accountants w h o do not adhere to the normative prescriptions to use only relevant
costs during the process of rational decision making. This suggests that there is a need
for a different approach to education and training. Educators m a y have to rethink their
explanations of decision making in the context of relevant costing and m a k e a more
convincing case for the irrelevance of past costs.

Implications for Business and Management
For the past twenty years textbooks in economics, finance and management accounting
have defined sunk costs as irrelevant to decision making. Yet people have generally or
at least frequently failed to apply the rational decision model when confronted with a
sunk cost. While managers have become more conversant with financial mathematics,
such as net present value calculations, the more fundamental treatment of sunk cost has
remained particularly problematic in outsourcing or investment decisions. Even finance
professionals can be wrong about the relevance of a sunk cost. For example, the
Western Australian Treasury recently produced a guide for public sector managers on
evaluating outsourcing decisions that included an error of the basic principle in the
treatment of a sunk cost (Johnstone, 1999, 38). This guide had the potential to direct
public sector managers to m a k e erroneous outsourcing decisions.

The research presented in this dissertation highlights the potential for managers,
financial planners and accountants to m a k e sub-optimal decisions because of a sunk
cost. Decisions that result from such biases can have adverse consequences for
corporations and their stakeholders (Ashton & Ashton, 1995). Education is required to
raise greater awareness in managers of the significant implications of the sunk cost
effect on business decisions. Managers in both the private and public sector need to
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better understand the issue that a sunk cost is irrelevant in order to avoid wasting
valuable resources and failing to arrive at the optimal financial decision.
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Letter of Remittal
2 February 2000
The Chief Executive Officer
"Hospital"
"Address"
"City" "State"
"Postcode"
Dear Sir/Madam,

This letter is to invite your co-operation in a research study concerning outsourcing decisions
Almost all private and public sector entities n o w outsource part of their operations. The
potential financial and other consequences, both positive and negative, of a decision to
outsource are often very large. The purpose of this study is to examine the general attitudes
(possibly biases) and financial thinking of people involved in making outsourcing decisions.
This will assist in our understanding of what motivates outsourcing and h o w people can be
better equipped to m a k e well considered choices between in-house and external providers.

I request that you, or an appropriate officer, complete the attached questionnaire and return i
m e at your earliest convenience. It would be appreciated by 2 n d March. The questionnaire
should take less than ten minutes to complete. This survey is part of a controlled experiment.
Please consider only the circumstances described, even if they appear simplistic. Y o u are not
required to disclose any information of a confidential nature and your response will be kept
completely confidential. Only grouped data will be used in the analysis process.
While your response is confidential, the questionnaire has been numbered for administrative
purposes only, to facilitate follow-up procedures that prevent bothersome unnecessary
reminders.

The authors of this study will provide a description and interpretation of overall results to a
survey respondents. It is expected that this information will be ready for distribution in 3-4
months.
You can send your reply through any of the following media:
• Fax to Attention: Greg Laing on (07) 5430-1210
• Fax to special E-fax number 00 111 240 414 7443, which will cost no more than normal
mail or fax.
• Return mail to Greg Laing
Reply Paid No.95
Faculty of Business
University of the Sunshine Coast
Maroochydore D C Q L D 4558
Thank you for your co-operation in this research study.
Yours sincerely,

Greg Laing
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Reminder Card

The Chief Executive Officer,

Just a short note to remind you that the questionnaire I sent to you on the 2nd Febru
important.
Please excuse this reminder if you have already returned your questionnaire.
Thank you
Greg Laing
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Follow-up Letter

20 March, 2000
The Chief Executive Officer
"Hospital"
"Street"
"City' "State" "Postcode"

Dear Sir/Madam,
I am concluding the data collection phase of the research study concerning outsourcing
decisions and have not yet received your reply. Perhaps you are not the person to
w h o m the survey should have been addressed; if so, will you please hand the survey
to the appropriate m e m b e r of your staff. Perhaps the original survey has gone astray.
To avoid delay enclosed is another for your convenience. Please return the survey by
the 30th March.
This research has highlighted a number of interesting issues from the responses that
have so far been received. However, to gain more meaningful data on what motivates
decisions regarding outsourcing a wider cross section of responses is necessary.
Please help as I believe this extremely valuable study should yield useful and insightful
information for all segments of hospital administration.
To minimise your valuable time, this one page survey, can be faxed directly to (07)
5430-1210, without the need for any cover sheet.

Yours sincerely,

Greg Laing
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Version 1
Please provide your response to the following questions.
Your position is best described as: Chief Executive Officer / General Manager / Financial
Controller / Accountant / Operations Manager / Other please specify:
How many years experience do you have in management within the hospital sector?
Please give the last two digits of the year in which you were born?
Please specify your gender. Female n Male •
Approximately how many beds does your hospital/organisation have?

Have you previously examined the possibility of outsourcing any part of the operations of this
any other hospital?
YES
o
NO a
If your answer was "yes" did you decide to outsource?
YES

•

NO

a

Scenario Details:
You are the manager of a hospital/resthome/nursinghome and have to m a k e a decision
regarding the outsourcing of patient meals. The choice is between internal production and
outsourcing. Your decision is to be m a d e primarily upon financial grounds.
This decision relates to the next five (5) years, which is the expected remaining life of the
existing kitchen equipment and also the contract period for outsourcing.
The present value of costs of future internal preparation is $3,000,000.
An external company will prepare and sell the meals at a cost of $2,600,000 (measured as a
present value) and would employ the current kitchen personnel of the hospital. The quality of
meals would remain the same. Warming up the externally produced meals on site would require
the purchase of a warming oven for $300,000. This equipment could be used for warming up
internally prepared meals or meals of other external catering companies.
Please place a tick to indicate your selection:
• Internal production of patient meals.
D Outsource production of patient meals.
Please briefly explain your reasoning for this decision:
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Version 2
Please provide your response to the following questions.
Your position is best described as: Chief Executive Officer / General Manager / Financial
Controller / Accountant / Operations Manager / Other please specify:
How many years experience do you have in management within the hospital sector?
Please give the last two digits of the year in which you were born?
Please specify your gender. Female o Male Q
Approximately how many beds does your hospital/organisation have?

Have you previously examined the possibility of outsourcing any part of the operations of this
any other hospital?
YES
0
NO a
If your answer was "yes" did you decide to outsource?
YES

n

NO

D

Scenario Details:
You are the manager of a hospital/resthome/nursinghome and have to m a k e a decision
regarding the outsourcing of patient meals. The choice is between internal production and
outsourcing. Your decision is to be m a d e primarily upon financial grounds.
This decision relates to the next five (5) years, which is the expected remaining life of the
existing kitchen equipment and also the contract period for outsourcing.
The present value of costs of future internal preparation is $3,000,000.
An external company will prepare and sell the meals at a cost of $2,600,000 (measured as a
present value) and would employ the current kitchen personnel of the hospital. The quality of
meals would remain the same. Warming up the externally produced meals on site would require
the purchase of a warming oven for $300,000. However, this equipment could not be used if the
hospital changes to another external catering company.
Please place a tick to indicate your selection:
• Internal production of patient meals.
D Outsource production of patient meals.
Please briefly explain your reasoning for this decision:
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Version 3
Please provide your response to the following questions.
Your position is best described as: Chief Executive Officer / General Manager / Financial
Controller / Accountant / Operations Manager / Other please specify:
How many years experience do you have in management within the hospital sector?
Please give the last two digits of the year in which you were born?
Please specify your gender. Female • Male •
Approximately how many beds does your hospital/organisation have?

Have you previously examined the possibility of outsourcing any part of the operations of this
any other hospital?
YES
•
NO n
If your answer was "yes" did you decide to outsource?
YES

D

NO

D

Scenario Details:
You are the manager of a hospital/resthome/nursinghome and have to m a k e a decision
regarding the outsourcing of patient meals. The choice is between internal production and
outsourcing. Your decision is to be m a d e primarily upon financial grounds.
This decision relates to the next five (5) years, which is the expected remaining life of the
existing kitchen equipment and also the contract period for outsourcing.

The present value of costs of future internal preparation is $3,000,000. The hospital purchase
new cooking equipment 2 years prior to this decision, at a total cost of $1,400,000. This
equipment would have no other use and can only be sold for scrap value which is a negligible
amount.
An external company will prepare and sell the meals at a cost of $2,600,000 (measured as a
present value) and would employ the current kitchen personnel of the hospital. The quality of
meals would remain the same. Warming up the externally produced meals on site would require
the purchase of a warming oven for $300,000. This equipment could be used for warming up
internally prepared meals or meals of other external catering companies.
Please place a tick to indicate your selection:
D Internal production of patient meals.
D Outsource production of patient meals.
Please briefly explain your reasoning for this decision:
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Version 4
Please provide your response to the following questions.
Your position is best described as: Chief Executive Officer / General Manager / Financial
Controller / Accountant / Operations Manager / Other please specify:
How many years experience do you have in management within the hospital sector?
Please give the last two digits of the year in which you were born?
Please specify your gender. Female D Male o
Approximately how many beds does your hospital/organisation have?
Have you previously examined the possibility of outsourcing any part of the operations of this
any other hospital?
YES
•
NO n
If your answer was "yes" did you decide to outsource?
YES

D

NO

D

Scenario Details:
You are the manager of a hospital/resthome/nursinghome and have to m a k e a decision
regarding the outsourcing of patient meals. The choice is between internal production and
outsourcing. Your decision is to be m a d e primarily upon financial grounds.
This decision relates to the next five (5) years, which is the expected remaining life of the
existing kitchen equipment and also the contract period for outsourcing.

The present value of costs of future internal preparation is $3,000,000. The hospital purchased
new cooking equipment 2 years prior to this decision, at a total cost of $1,400,000. This
equipment would have no other use and can only be sold for scrap value which is a negligible
amount.
An external company will prepare and sell the meals for $2,600,000 (measured as a present
value) and would employ the current kitchen personnel of the hospital. The quality of meals
would remain the same. Warming up the externally produced meals on site would require the
purchase of a warming oven for $300,000. However, this equipment could not be used if the
hospital changes to another external catering company.
Please place a tick to indicate your selection:
D Internal production of patient meals.
D Outsource production of patient meals.
Please briefly explain your reasoning for this decision:
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Version 5
Please provide your response to the following questions.
Your position is best described as: Chief Executive Officer / General Manager / Financial
Controller / Accountant / Operations Manager / Other please specify:
How many years experience do you have in management within the hospital sector?
Please give the last two digits of the year in which you were born?
Please specify your gender. Female D Male n
Approximately how many beds does your hospital/organisation have?

Have you previously examined the possibility of outsourcing any part of the operations of this
any other hospital?
YES
D
NO D
If your answer was "yes" did you decide to outsource?
YES

a

NO

a

Scenario Details:
You are the manager of a hospital/resthome/nursinghome and have to m a k e a decision
regarding the outsourcing of patient meals. The choice is between internal production and
outsourcing. Your decision is to be m a d e primarily upon financial grounds.
This decision relates to the next five (5) years, which is the expected remaining life of the
existing kitchen equipment and also the contract period for outsourcing.

The present value of costs of future internal preparation is $3,000,000. The hospital purchase
in n e w cooking equipment 2 years prior to this decision, at a total cost of $500,000. This
equipment would have no other use and can only be sold for scrap value which is a negligible
amount.
An external company will prepare and sell the meals for $2,000,000 (measured as a present
value) and would employ the current kitchen personnel of the hospital. The quality of meals
would remain the same. Warming up the externally produced meals on site would require the
purchase of a warming oven for $300,000. This equipment could be used for warming up
internally prepared meals or meals of other external catering companies.
Please place a tick to indicate your selection:
• Internal production of patient meals.
• Outsource production of patient meals.
Please briefly explain your reasoning for this decision:
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Version 6
Please provide your response to the following questions.
Your position is best described as: Chief Executive Officer / General Manager / Financial
Controller / Accountant / Operations Manager / Other please specify:
How many years experience do you have in management within the hospital sector?
Please give the last two digits of the year in which you were born?
Please specify your gender. Female • Male a
Approximately how many beds does your hospital/organisation have?

Have you previously examined the possibility of outsourcing any part of the operations of this
any other hospital?
YES
n
NO n
If your answer was "yes" did you decide to outsource?
YES

•

NO

D

Scenario Details:
You are the manager of a hospital/resthome/nursinghome and have to m a k e a decision
regarding the outsourcing of patient meals. The choice is between internal production and
outsourcing. Your decision is to be m a d e primarily upon financial grounds.
This decision relates to the next five (5) years, which is the expected remaining life of the
existing kitchen equipment and also the contract period for outsourcing.

The present value of costs of future internal preparation is $3,000,000. The hospital purchase
new cooking equipment 2 years prior to this decision, at a total cost of $500,000. This
equipment would have no other use and can only be sold for scrap value which is a negligible
amount.
An external company will prepare and sell the meals for $2,000,000 (measured as a present
value) and would employ the current kitchen personnel of the hospital. The quality of meals
would remain the same. Warming up the externally produced meals on site would require the
purchase of a warming oven for $300,000. However, this equipment could not be used if the
hospital changes to another external catering company.
Please place a tick to indicate your selection:
• Internal production of patient meals.
• Outsource production of patient meals.
Please briefly explain your reasoning for this decision:
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Letter of Remittal

25 May 2000
"Manager"
"Company"
"Street"
"City' "State" "Postcode"

Dear Sir/ Madam,
This letter is to invite your co-operation in a research study concerning financial
decision making. I a m undertaking this study for completion of a P h D , through the
University of Wollongong. The providing of financial advice and investment appraisal
is an area of growing concern and little research has focused on the specialist area of
financial planning. The potential consequences, both positive and negative, of a
decision based on financial information are often very large. The purpose of this study
is to examine the general attitudes in financial decision-making.
I request that you, or an appropriate officer, complete the attached questionnaire and
return it to m e at your earliest convenience. I realise that you have m a n y demands on
your time, and this should take less than ten minutes to complete. Please consider only
the circumstances described, even if they appear simplistic. Y o u are not required to
disclose any information of a confidential nature and only grouped data will be used in
the analysis process.

This survey is part of a controlled experiment. All responses to the questionnaire will
kept strictly confidential. If you have any questions, please feel free to phone m e on
(07) 5430-1263.

It would be appreciated if you can complete and return the questionnaire by the 22 June
A pre-paid self-addressed envelope is enclosed for your convenience.
Thank you for your time and co-operation in this research study.
Yours sincerely,

Greg Laing
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Reminder Card

"Manager"
"Company"

Just a short note to remind you that the questionnaire I sent to you on the 25th M a y is
important.
Please excuse this reminder ifyou have already returned your questionnaire.
Thank you
Greg Laing
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Follow-up Letter

10 July 2000
"Manager"
"Company"
"Street"
"City' "State" "Postcode"

Dear Sir/ M a d a m ,

Further to my letter, of the 25th May, regarding a survey of decision making. Perhaps
you were not the person to w h o m the questionnaire should have been addressed, and
you m a y have delegated the matter or perhaps the questionnaire has been misplaced or
lost in the mail. At any rate, I a m enclosing another questionnaire and reply paid
envelope for your convenience. Would you please complete the survey and return it in
the envelope provided, by the 20th July.

Thank you for your time and co-operation and should you have any questions please
contact m e by phone on (07) 5430-1263, fax (07) 5430-1212 or email glaing@usc.edu.au.

Yours faithfully,

Gregory K. Laing
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Version 1
As a fund manager, one of your project teams has come to you requesting an additional $100,000 in funds for an
investment project you instituted several months ago. The project is already behind schedule and over budget,
$400,000 has already been spent. However, the team remains confident it will be a success and well worth the
investment.
You currently have $500,000 remaining in your budget that is unallocated. These funds must carry you for the
rest of the financial year (6 months). Lowering the balance by an additional $100,000 might jeopardise flexibility
to respond to other opportunities. Evaluating the situation, you believe there is a fair chance the project will not
succeed, in which case the additional funding would be lost; if successful, however, the money would be well
spent.
Of the investment projects undertaken by this team, 20 of the last 50 have been unsuccessful.
In regards to this decision please circle the number which represents your response to each of the following:
Indicate the level of risk you believe is associated with providing the additional funds.
N o Risk

1

2

3

Too Risky
5

4

H o w responsible do you feel for the initial decision to undertake the project?
Not Very Responsible

Very Responsible

12 3 4
H o w disappointed are you about the present conditions of the project?
Not Too Disappointed

5

12 3 4
H o w important do you think this decision is?
Not Very Important

5

12 3 4
What is the likelihood you would fund the request?
Reject Request
1
2
3
At this point, what would be more important?
Minimise
Losses
1
2
3
4
I have already invested so much it seems foolish not to continue.
Strongly
Disagree

5

Very Disappointed

Very Important

Fund Request
5

4

Maximise
5

6

Gains
7
Strongly Agree

7
1
2
3
4
5
6
Responsibility for the success of the project is
Under my
Out of m y
Control
Control
7
1
2
3
4
5
6
Please mentally, conjure up two images of this project, a "current image " (reflecting conditions as they are now) and a "target
image " (the way you would eventually like them to be).
H o w close is the "current image" to the "target image"?
Not Very
Close
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Is your "current image" of this project moving toward your "target image"?
Definitely
Not
2
3
4
5
6
7
1
Given your "current image" of this project, what is the likelihood that your "target image" will be realised?
Very Likely
1
2
3
4
5
In terms of "ultimate" project objectives, how well is the project doing?
Not Very
Well
1
2
3
4
5

7

Very Close
9
Absolutely
9
Not Very
Likely
9
Very Well
9

It is time to m a k e a decision. H o w much additional funding, if any, would you provide for the request, (from nil to any
amount up to $100,000) please specify:

END OF QUESTIONNAIRE
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND CO-OPERATION
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Version 2
As a fund manager, one of your project teams has come to you requesting an additional $100,000 in funds for an
investment project you instituted several months ago. The project is already behind schedule and over budget,
$400,000 has already been spent. However, the team remains confident it will be a success and well worth the
investment.
You currently have $500,000 remaining in your budget that is unallocated. These funds must carry you for the
rest of the financial year (6 months). Lowering the balance by an additional $100,000 might jeopardise flexibility
to respond to other opportunities. Evaluating the situation, you believe there is a fair chance the project will not
succeed, in which case the additional funding would be lost; if successful, however, the money would be well
spent.
Of the investment projects undertaken by this team, 30 of the last 50 have been successful.
In regards to this decision please circle the number which represents your response to each of the following:
Indicate the level of risk you believe is associated with providing the additional funds.
N o Risk
1
2
3
4
H o w responsible do you feel for the initial decision to undertake the project?
Not Very Responsible

Too Risky
5
Very Responsible

12 3 4
H o w disappointed are you about the present conditions of the project?
Not Too Disappointed

5

12 3 4
H o w important do you think this decision is?
Not Very Important

5

Very Disappointed

Very Important

12 3 4
5
What is the likelihood you would fund the request?
Reject Request
Fund Request
1
2
3
4
5
At this point, what would be more important?
Minimise
Maximise
Losses
Gains
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
I have already invested so much it seems foolish not to continue.
Strongly Agree
Strongly
Disagree
7
1
2
3
4
5
6
Responsibility for the success of the project is
Under my
Out of m y
Control
Control
7
1
2
3
4
5
6
Please mentally, conjure up two images of this project, a "current image" (reflecting conditions as they are now) and a "target
image" (the way you would eventually like them to be).
H o w close is the "current image" to the "target image"?
Not Very
Close
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Is your "current image" of this project moving toward your "target image"?
Definitely
Not
2
3
4
5
6
7
1
Given your "current image" of this project, what is the likelihood that your "target image" will be realised?
Very Likely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
In terms of "ultimate" project objectives, how well is the project doing?
Not Very
Well
I
2
3
4
5

Very Close
9
Absolutely
9
Not Very
Likely
9
Very Well

6

7

9

It is time to make a decision. H o w m u c h additional funding, if any, would you provide for the request, (from nil to any
amount up to $100,000) please specify:
END OF QUESTIONNAIRE
T H A N K Y O U FOR Y O U R TIME A N D CO-OPERATION
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Version 3
As a fund manager, one of your project teams has come to you requesting an additional $100,000 in funds for an
investment project you instituted several months ago. The project is already behind schedule and over budget,
$100,000 has already been spent. However, the team remains confident it will be a success and well worth the
investment.
You currently have $500,000 remaining in your budget that is unallocated. These funds must carry you for the
rest of the financial year (6 months). Lowering the balance by an additional $100,000 might jeopardise flexibility
to respond to other opportunities. Evaluating the situation, you believe there is a fair chance the project will not
succeed, in which case the additional funding would be lost; if successful, however, the money would be well
spent.
Of the investment projects undertaken by this team, 20 of the last 50 have been unsuccessful.
In regards to this decision please circle the number which represents your response to each of the following:
Indicate the level of risk you believe is associated with providing the additional funds.
N o Risk

1

2

3

Too Risky

4

5

H o w responsible do you feel for the initial decision to undertake the project?
Not Very Responsible

Very Responsible

12 3 4 5
H o w disappointed are you about the present conditions of the project?
Not Too Disappointed

Very Disappointed

12 3 4 5
H o w important do you think this decision is?
Not Very Important

Very Important

12 3 4 5
What is the likelihood you would fund the request?
Fund
Reject Request
Request
1
2
3
4
5
At this point, what would be more important?
Minimise
Maximise
Gains
Losses
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
I have already invested so much it seems foolish not to continue.
Strongly
Strongly Agree
Disagree
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Responsibility for the success of the project is
Out of m y
Under my
Control
Control
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Please mentally, conjure up two images of this project, a "current image" (reflecting conditions as they are now) and a "tar
image" (the way you would eventually like them to be).
H o w close is the "current image" to the "target image"?
Not Very
Close
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Is your "current image" of this project moving toward your "target image"?
Definitely
Not
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Given your "current image" of this project, what is the likelihood that your "target image" will be realised?
Very Likely
'

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very Close
9
Absolutely
8

Not Very
Likely

8

In terms of "ultimate" project objectives, how well is the project doing?
Not Very

Well
1

2

3

4

5

9

9
Very Well

6

7

8

9

It is time to make a decision. How much additional funding, if any, would you provide for the request, (from nil to
amount up to $100,000) please specify:
END OF QUESTIONNAIRE

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND CO-OPERATION
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Letter of Remittal

12th October, 2000
"Manager"
"Membership"
"Company"
"Street"
"City' "State" "Postcode"

Dear Sir/ Madam,
This letter is to invite your co-operation in a research study concerning financial
decision making. I a m undertaking this study for completion of a P h D , through the
University of Wollongong. The providing of financial advice and investment appraisal
is an area of growing concern in the accounting profession. The potential consequences,
both positive and negative, of a decision based on financial information are often very
large. The purpose of this study is to examine the general attitudes in financial decisionmaking.

I request that you, or an appropriate officer, complete the attached questionnaire and
return it to m e at your earliest convenience. I realise that you have m a n y demands on
your time, and this should take less than ten minutes to complete. Please consider only
the circumstances described, even if they appear simplistic. Y o u are not required to
disclose any information of a confidential nature and only grouped data will be used in
the analysis process.

This survey is part of a controlled experiment. All responses to the questionnaire wil
kept strictly confidential. If you have any questions, please feel free to phone m e on
(07) 5430-1263.
It would be appreciated if you can complete and return the questionnaire by the 14th
November. A pre-paid self-addressed envelope is enclosed for your convenience.
Thank you for your time and co-operation in this research study.
Yours sincerely,

Greg Laing
"Membership"
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Reminder Card

"Manager"
"Company"

Just a short note to remind you that the questionnaire I sent to you on the 12th October
is important.
Please excuse this reminder ifyou have already returned your questionnaire.
Thank you
Greg Laing
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Follow-up Letter

2 8 m November, 2000
"Manager"
"Membership"
"Company"
"Street"
"City' "State" "Postcode"

Dear Sir/ M a d a m ,

Further to my letter, of the 12th October, regarding a survey of decision making. Pe
you were not the person to w h o m the questionnaire should have been addressed, and
you m a y have delegated the matter or perhaps the questionnaire has been misplaced or
lost in the mail. At any rate, I a m enclosing another questionnaire and reply paid
envelope for your convenience. Would you please complete the survey and return it in
the envelope provided, by the 12th December.

Thank you for your time and co-operation and should you have any questions please
contact m e by phone on (07) 5430-1263, fax (07) 5430-1212 or email glaing@usc.edu.au.

Yours faithfully,

Gregory K. Laing
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Version 1

XI
This research is concerned with decision-making all details are strictly confidential and only
grouped data will be used for reporting purposes.

Please read the following scenario and then complete the requirements.
Trusty Insurance Company is considering the elimination of its payroll department. Management has
received an offer from an outside firm to process all of Trusty's payroll. The cost of running the payroll
department includes $9,100 for rent per annum for floor space. If the payroll department is eliminated,
the freed space will be used to store insurance files, currently in storage at a near by warehouse costing
$11,000 per year.
The cost of operating the payroll department is $120,000 wages and $13,000 for overheads all of these
are avoidable costs. The office furniture and equipment, in this department, has a book value of
$30,000. Offers, to buy, have been received from three firms and the best valuation will result in a
$20,000 loss on disposal.

The external payroll firm has made a submission to provide the payroll services for the next three year
a fixed price of $134,000 per annum.

REQUIRED:
Please rate your attitude to outsourcing the payroll function:
Very
Negative
1

2

3

4

5

Very
Positive
7

6

Please indicate your recommendation:
Option A • Trusty Insurance Company should continue to operate the payroll department.
Option B • Accept the offer and outsource the payroll function.

Please indicate h o w sure you are of your decision to outsource or not to outsource the payroll function:
Certain
it should be
Internal
1

2

3

Certain
it should be
External
7

In general do you consider yourself to be:
A rational
Decision
Maker
1

2

3

An Intuitive
Decision
Maker
7

Please turn the page over.
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As R & D manager, one of your project teams has come to you requesting an additional $100,000 in funds
for a project you instituted several months ago. The project is already behind schedule and over budget,
$400,000 has already been spent. However, the team still believes it can be successfully completed. You
currently have $500,000 remaining in your budget unallocated, but this must carry you for the rest of the
fiscal year. Lowering the balance by an additional $100,000 might jeopardise flexibility to respond to other
opportunities.
Evaluating the situation, you believe there is a fair chance the project will not succeed, in which case the
additional funding would be lost; if successful, however, the money would be well spent.
Of the projects undertaken by this team, 30 of the last 50 have been successful.

In regards to this decision please circle the number which represents your response to each of the fo
Indicate the level of risk you believe is associated with providing the additional funds.
N o Risk
1
2
3
4
H o w disappointed are you about the present conditions of the project?
Not Too
Disappointed
1
2
3
H o w important do you think this decision is?
Not Very Important

Too Risky
5

Very Disappointed
5

Very Important
5

1
H o w responsible do you feel for the initial decision to undertake the project?
Not Very
Responsible
2
3
1

Very Responsible
5

I want to minimise the amount of lossfromthe initial allocation.
Strongly
Disagree
1
2
3
4

Strongly
Agree
7

I have already invested so much it seems foolish not to continue.
Strongly
Disagree
1
2
3
4

Strongly
Agree
7

Responsibility for the success of the project is
Out of m y
Control
1
2
3

Under m y
Control
7

What is the likelihood you would fund the request?
Reject Request
1
2

Fund Request
5

H o w much, if any, would you provide in funds for the request.
(from nil to any amount up to $100,000) please specify ~
Please briefly list any other factors which influenced you in this decision?

END OF QUESTIONNAIRE
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND CO-OPERATION
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Version 2
X2
This research is concerned with decision-making all details are strictly confidential and only
grouped data will be used for reporting purposes.

Please read the following scenario and then complete the requirements.
Trusty Insurance Company is considering the elimination of its payroll department. Management has
received an offer from an outside firm to process all of Trusty's payroll. The cost of running the payroll
department includes $9,100 for rent per annum for floor space. If the payroll department is eliminated,
the freed space will be used to store insurance files, currently in storage at a near by warehouse costing
$11,000 per year.
The cost of operating the payroll department is $120,000 wages and $13,000 for overheads all of these
are avoidable costs. The office furniture and equipment, in this department, has a book value of
$30,000. Offers, to buy, have been received from three firms and the best valuation will result in a
$20,000 loss on disposal.

The external payroll firm has made a submission to provide the payroll services for the next three years
a fixed price of $134,000 per annum.

REQUIRED:
Please rate your attitude to outsourcing the payroll function:
Very
Negative
1

2

3

4

5

6

Very
Positive
7

Please indicate your recommendation:
Option A • Trusty Insurance Company should continue to operate the payroll department.
Option B • Accept the offer and outsource the payroll function.

Please indicate h o w sure you are of your decision to outsource or not to outsource the payroll function:
Certain
it should be
Internal
1

2

3

Certain
it should be
External
7

In general do you consider yourself to be:
A rational
Decision
Maker
1

2

3

A n Intuitive
Decision
Maker
7

Please turn the page over.
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As R & D manager, one of your project teams has come to you requesting an additional $100,000 in funds
for a project you instituted several months ago. The project is already behind schedule and over budget,
$400,000 has already been spent. However, the team still believes it can be successfully completed. You
currently have $500,000 remaining in your budget unallocated, but this must carry you for the rest of the
fiscal year (6 months). Lowering the balance by an additional $100,000 might jeopardise flexibility to
respond to other opportunities.
Evaluating the situation, you believe there is a moderate chance the project will not succeed, in which
case the additional funding would be lost; if successful, however, the money would be well spent.
Of the projects undertaken by this team, 30 of the last 50 have been successful.

In regards to this decision please circle the number which represents your response to each of the fo
Indicate the level of risk you believe is associated with providing the additional funds.
N o Risk
1
2
3
4
H o w disappointed are you about the present conditions of the project?
Not Too
Disappointed
1
2
3
H o w important do you think this decision is?
Not Very Important

Too Risky
5

Very Disappointed
5

Very Important
5

1
H o w responsible do you feel for the initial decision to undertake the project?
Not Very
Responsible
2
3
1

Very Responsible
5

I want to minimise the amount of lossfromthe initial allocation.
Strongly
Disagree
1
2
3
4

Strongly
Agree
7

I have already invested so much it seems foolish not to continue.
Strongly
Disagree
1
2
3
4

Strongly
Agree
7

Responsibility for the success of the project is
Out of m y
Control
1
2
3

Under m y
Control
7

What is the likelihood you would fund the request?
Reject Request
1
2

Fund Request
5

H o w much, if any, would you provide in funds for the request.
(from nil to any amount up to $100,000) please specify ~
Please briefly list any other factors which influenced you in this decision?

END OF QUESTIONNAIRE
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND CO-OPERATION
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Version 3
Yl
This research is concerned with decision-making all details are strictly confidential and only
grouped data will be used for reporting purposes.

Please read the following scenario and then complete the requirements.

Trusty Insurance Company is considering the elimination of its payroll department. Management ha
received an offer from an outside firm to process all of Trusty's payroll. The cost of running the payroll
department includes $9,100 for rent per annum for floor space. If the payroll department is eliminated,
the freed space will be used to store insurance files, currently in storage at a near by warehouse costing
$11,000 per year.
The cost of operating the payroll department is $120,000 wages and $13,000 for overheads all of
are avoidable costs. The office furniture and equipment, in this department, has a book value of
$30,000. Offers, to buy, have been received from three firms and the best valuation will realise $10,000
on disposal.

The external payroll firm has made a submission to provide the payroll services for the next thr
a fixed price of $134,000 per annum.
REQUIRED:
Please rate your attitude to outsourcing the payroll function
Very
Negative
1

2

3

4

5

Very
Positive
7

6

Please indicate your recommendation:
Option A D Trusty Insurance Company should continue to operate the payroll department.
Option B • Accept the offer and outsource the payroll function.

Please indicate how sure you are of your decision to outsource or not to outsource the payroll f
Certain
it should be
Internal
1
2

3

4

Certain
it should be
External
7

5

In general do you consider yourself to be:
A rational
Decision
Maker
1

An Intuitive
Decision
Maker
2

3

4

5

6

7

Please turn the page over.
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As R & D manager, one of your project teams has come to you requesting an additional $100,000 in funds
for a project you instituted several months ago. The project is already behind schedule and over budget,
$400,000 has already been spent. However, the team still believes it can be successfully completed. You
currently have $500,000 remaining in your budget unallocated, but this must carry you for the rest of the
fiscal year. Lowering the balance by an additional $100,000 might jeopardise flexibility to respond to other
opportunities.
Evaluating the situation, you believe there is a fair chance the project will not succeed, in which case the
additional funding would be lost; if successful, however, the money would be well spent.
Of the projects undertaken by this team, 20 of the last 50 have been unsuccessful.

In regards to this decision please circle the number which represents your response to each of the f
Indicate the level of risk you believe is associated with providing the additional funds.
N o Risk
1
2
3
4
H o w disappointed are you about the present conditions of the project?
Not Too
Disappointed
1
2
3
H o w important do you think this decision is?
Not Very Important

Too Risky
5

Very Disappointed
5

Very Important
5

1
H o w responsible do you feel for the initial decision to undertake the project?
Not Very
Responsible
1
2
3

Very Responsible
5

I want to minimise the amount of lossfromthe initial allocation.
Strongly
Disagree
1
2
3
4

Strongly
Agree
7

I have already invested so much it seems foolish not to continue.
Strongly
Disagree
1
2
3
4

Strongly
Agree
7

Responsibility for the success of the project is
Out of m y
Control
1
2
3

Under m y
Control
7

What is the likelihood you would fund the request?
Reject Request
1
2

Fund Request
5

H o w much, if any, would you provide in funds for the request.
(from nil to any amount up to $100,000) please specify ~
Please briefly list any other factors which influenced you in this decision?

END OF QUESTIONNAIRE
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND CO-OPERATION
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Version 4

Y2
This research is concerned with decision-making all details are strictly confidential and only
grouped data will be used for reporting purposes.

Please read the following scenario and then complete the requirements.
Trusty Insurance Company is considering the elimination of its payroll department. Management has
received an offer from an outside firm to process all of Trusty's payroll. The cost of running the payroll
department includes $9,100 for rent per annum for floor space. If the payroll department is eliminated,
the freed space will be used to store insurance files, currently in storage at a near by warehouse costing
$11,000 per year.
The cost of operating the payroll department is $120,000 wages and $13,000 for overheads all of these
are avoidable costs. The office furniture and equipment, in this department, has a book value of
$30,000. Offers, to buy, have been received from three firms and the best valuation will realise $10,000
on disposal.

The external payroll firm has made a submission to provide the payroll services for the next three y
a fixed price of $134,000 per annum.

REQUIRED:
Please rate your attitude to outsourcing the payroll function:
Very
Negative
1

3

2

4

5

6

Very
Positive
7

Please indicate your recommendation:
Option A • Trusty Insurance Company should continue to operate the payroll department.
Option B D Accept the offer and outsource the payroll function.

Please indicate how sure you are of your decision to outsource or not to outsource the payroll function:
Certain
it should be
Internal
1

2

3

Certain
it should be
External
7

In general do you consider yourself to be:
A rational
Decision
Maker
1

2

3

A n Intuitive
Decision
Maker
7

Please turn the page over.
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As R & D manager, one of your project teams has come to you requesting an additional $100,000 in funds
for a project you instituted several months ago. The project is already behind schedule and over budget,
$400,000 has already been spent. However, the team still believes it can be successfully completed. You
currently have $500,000 remaining in your budget unallocated, but this must carry you for the rest of the
fiscal year (6 months). Lowering the balance by an additional $100,000 might jeopardise flexibility to
respond to other opportunities.
Evaluating the situation, you believe there is a moderate chance the project will not succeed, in which
case the additional funding would be lost; if successful, however, the money would be well spent.
Of the projects undertaken by this team, 20 of the last 50 have been unsuccessful.
In regards to this decision please circle the number which represents your response to each of the
Indicate the level of risk you believe is associated with providing the additional funds.
N o Risk
1
2
3
4
H o w disappointed are you about the present conditions of the project?
Not Too
Disappointed
1
2
3
H o w important do you think this decision is?
Not Very Important

Too Risky
5

Very Disappointed
5

Very Important
5

1
H o w responsible do you feel for the initial decision to undertake the project?
Not Very
Responsible
1
2
3

Very Responsible
5

I want to minimise the amount of lossfromthe initial allocation.
Strongly
Disagree
1
2
3
4

Strongly
Agree
7

I have already invested so much it seems foolish not to continue.
Strongly
Disagree
1
2
3
4

Strongly
Agree
7

Responsibility for the success of the project is
Out of m y
Control
1
2
3

Under m y
Control
7

What is the likelihood you would fund the request?
Reject Request
1
2

Fund Request
5

H o w much, if any, would you provide in funds for the request.
(from nil to any amount up to $100,000) please specify ~
Please briefly list any other factors which influenced you in this decision?

END OF QUESTIONNAIRE
T H A N K Y O U FOR Y O U R TIME A N D CO-OPERATION Y3
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Version 5

zi
This research is concerned with decision-making all details are strictly confidential and only
grouped data will be used for reporting purposes.

Please read the following scenario and then complete the requirements.
Trusty Insurance Company is considering the elimination of its payroll department. Management has
received an offer from an outside firm to process all of Trusty's payroll. The cost of running the payroll
department includes $9,100 for rent per annum for floor space. If the payroll department is eliminated,
the freed space will be used to store insurance files, currently in storage at a near by warehouse costing
$11,000 per year.
The cost of operating the payroll department is $120,000 wages and $13,000 for overheads all of these
are avoidable costs.

The external payroll firm has made a submission to provide the payroll services for the next three ye
a fixed price of $134,000 per annum. There are no additional costs or investments required.

REQUIRED:
Please rate your attitude to outsourcing the payroll function:
Very
Negative
1

3

2

4

5

6

Very
Positive
7

Please indicate your recommendation:
Option A • Trusty Insurance Company should continue to operate the payroll department.
Option B D Accept the offer and outsource the payroll function.

Please indicate how sure you are of your decision to outsource or not to outsource the payroll function:
Certain
it should be
Internal
1

2

3

Certain
it should be
External
7

In general do you consider yourself to be:
A rational
Decision
Maker
1

2

3

A n Intuitive
Decision
Maker
7

Please turn the page over.
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As R & D manager, one of your project teams has come to you requesting an additional $100,000 in funds
for a project you instituted several months ago. The project is already behind schedule and over budget,
$400,000 has already been spent. However, the team still believes it can be successfully completed. You
currently have $500,000 remaining in your budget unallocated, but this must carry you for the rest of the
fiscal year (6 months). Lowering the balance by an additional $100,000 might jeopardise flexibility to
respond to other opportunities.
Evaluating the situation, you believe there is a moderate chance the project will not succeed, in which
case the additional funding would be lost; if successful, however, the money would be well spent.
Of the projects undertaken by this team, 30 of the last 50 have been successful.

In regards to this decision please circle the number which represents your response to each of the fo
Indicate the level ofriskyou believe is associated with providing the additional funds.
No Risk
1
2
3
4
H o w disappointed are you about the present conditions of the project?
Not Too
Disappointed
1
2
3
H o w important do you think this decision is?
Not Very Important

Very Disappointed
5

Very Important
5

1
H o w responsible do you feel for the initial decision to undertake the project?
Not Very
Responsible
2
3
1
I want to minimise the amount of loss from the initial allocation.
Strongly
Disagree

1

Too Risky
5

2

3

4

Very Responsible
5

Strongly
Agree
7

I have already invested so much it seems foolish not to continue.
Strongly
Disagree
1
2
3
4

Strongly
Agree
7

Responsibility for the success of the project is
Out of m y
Control
1
2
3

Under m y
Control
7

What is the likelihood you would fund the request?
Reject Request
1
2

Fund Request
5

H o w much, if any, would you provide in funds for the request.
(from nil to any amount up to $100,000) please specify ~
Please briefly list any other factors which influenced you in this decision?

END OF QUESTIONNAIRE
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND CO-OPERATION
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Version 6

Z2
This research is concerned with decision-making all details are strictly confidential and only
grouped data will be used for reporting purposes.

Please read the following scenario and then complete the requirements.
Trusty Insurance Company is considering the elimination of its payroll department. Management has
received an offer from an outside firm to process all of Trusty's payroll. The cost of running the payroll
department includes $9,100 for rent per annum for floor space. If the payroll department is eliminated,
the freed space will be used to store insurance files, currently in storage at a near by warehouse costing
$11,000 per year.

The cost of operating the payroll department is $120,000 wages and $13,000 for overheads all of these
are avoidable costs.

The external payroll firm has made a submission to provide the payroll services for the next three y
a fixed price of $134,000 per annum. To produce the payroll slips would require the purchase of a special
machine for $500. However, this equipment could not be used if the company changes to another external
provider and would have no resale value.

REQUIRED:
Please rate your attitude to outsourcing the payroll function:
Very
Negative
1

3

2

4

5

6

Very
Positive
7

Please indicate your recommendation:
Option A • Trusty Insurance Company should continue to operate the payroll department.
Option B D Accept the offer and outsource the payroll function.

Please indicate how sure you are of your decision to outsource or not to outsource the payroll function:
Certain
it should be
Internal
1

2

3

Certain
it should be
External
7

In general do you consider yourself to be:
A rational
Decision
Maker
1

2

3

A n Intuitive
Decision
Maker
7

Please turn the page over.
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As R & D manager, one of your project teams has come to you requesting an additional $100,000 in funds
for a project you instituted several months ago. The project is already behind schedule and over budget,
$100,000 has already been spent. However, the team still believes it can be successfully completed. You
currently have $500,000 remaining in your budget unallocated, but this must carry you for the rest of the
fiscal year (6 months). Lowering the balance by an additional $100,000 might jeopardise flexibility to
respond to other opportunities.
Evaluating the situation, you believe there is a moderate chance the project will not succeed, in which
case the additional funding would be lost; if successful, however, the money would be well spent.
Of the projects undertaken by this team, 20 of the last 50 have been unsuccessful.

In regards to this decision please circle the number which represents your response to each of the f
Indicate the level ofriskyou believe is associated with providing the additional funds.
N o Risk
1
2
3
4
H o w disappointed are you about the present conditions of the project?
Not Too
Disappointed
1
2
3
H o w important do you think this decision is?
Not Very Important

Too Risky
5

Very Disappointed
5

Very Important
5

1
H o w responsible do you feel for the initial decision to undertake the project?
Not Very
Responsible
2
3
1

Very Responsible
5

I want to minimise the amount of lossfromthe initial allocation.
Strongly
Disagree
1
2
3
4

Strongly
Agree
7

I have already invested so much it seems foolish not to continue.
Strongly
Disagree
1
2
3
4

Strongly
Agree
7

Responsibility for the success of the project is
Out of my
Control
1
2
3

Under m y
Control
7

What is the likelihood you would fund the request?
Reject Request
1
2

Fund Request
5

H o w much, if any, would you provide in funds for the request.
(from nil to any amount up to $100,000) please specify ~
Please briefly list any other factors which influenced you in this decision?

END OF QUESTIONNAIRE
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND CO-OPERATION
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Table 5.2a
Analysis of Early Late Responses ~ Public Hospitals

EARLT * INOUT Crosstabulation
Count
INOUT

1
EARLT

1
2

Total

2
64

37

14

13
50

78

Total
101
27
128

Chi-Square Tests

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correction3
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases

Value
1.187D

df

.752
1.169

1.177

1
1
1

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.276
.386

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.375

.192

.280

1

.278

128

a

- Computed only for a 2x2 table

b- 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is
10.55.

Case Processing Summary
Cases

EARLT* INOUT

Valid
Percent
N
128
100.0%

N

Missinq
Percent

0

.0%

Total
Percent
N
100.0%
128
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Table 5.3a
Analysis of Early Late Responses ~ Private Hospitals

EARLT * INOUT Crosstabulation
Count
INOUT

1
EARLT

2

1

38

18

Total
56

2

19

14

33

57

32

89

Total

Chi-Square Tests

df

Value
Pearson Chi-Square

.953D
3

Continuity Correction

.559

Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases

.946

.942

1
1
1

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.329
.455

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.366

.227

.331

1

.332

89

a

- Computed only for a 2x2 table

b- 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is
11.87.

Case Processing Summary
Cases
Missinq

Valid

N
E A R L T * INOUT

89

Percent
100.0%

N

Percent

0

.0%

N

Total
Percent
89
100.0%

Page

309

Appendix D ... Supporting Statistics for Chapter 5

Table 5.6a
Crosstabulation of Outsourcing Decision * S u n k Cost/No S u n k Cost
Sunk cost
No(AB)
Yes (CDEF)
Total

Outsource

No
40
95
135

Yes
41
41
82

Total

81
136
217

Result:

%2 sample = 9.049 (a =0.003, df = 1)

Decision:

Reject the null hypothesis.

Computed %2 exceeds the critical value: x 2 critical = 3.841 (a =0.05, df = 1)
Chi-Square'rests

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correction?
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases

Value
9.049D
8.199

df

8.979

9.007

1
1
1

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.003
.004
.003

1

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.004

.002

.003

217

a

- Computed only for a 2x2 table
b- 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is
30.61.
Symmetric Measures

Nominal by
Nominal

Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient

N of Valid Cases

Value
-.204
.204
.200
217

Approx. Sig.
.003
.003
.003

a Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null
hypothesis.
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Table 5.8a
Crosstabulation of Outsourcing Decision * S u n k Cost H i g h / L o w
Sunk cost
High (CD)
L o w (EF)
Total

Result:

Outsource

No
61
34
95

Yes
13
28
41

Total

74
62
136

% sample = 12.198 (a =0.000, df = 1)

Decision: Reject the null hypothesis.
Computed %2 exceeds the critical value: %2 critical = 3.841 (a =0.05, df = 1)

Chi-Square Tests

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correction*
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases

Value
12.198°
10.922

df

12.338

12.108

1
1
1

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.000
.001
.000

1

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.001

.000

.001

136

a

- Computed only for a 2x2 table

b- 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is
18.69.

Symmetric Measures

Nominal by
Nominal

Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient

N of Valid Cases

Value
.299

Approx. Siq.
.000

.299

.000

.287

.000

136

a

- Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b- Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null
hypothesis.
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Table 5.9a
Crosstabulation of Outsourcing Decision * Asset Specificity N o / Y e s
Asset
Specificity
No (ACE)
Yes (BDF)
Total

Outsource

No
60
75
135

Yes
54
28
82

Total

114
103
217

Result:

% sample = 9.377 (a =0.002, df = 1)

Decision:

Reject the null hypothesis.

Computed % 2 exceeds the critical value: % 2 critical = 3.841 (a =0.05, df = 1)
Chi-Square Tests

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correction3
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association

Value
9.377b

df

8.538
9.500

1
1
1

9.334

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.002

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.003

.002

.003
.002

1

.002

217

N of Valid Cases

a. Computed only for a 2x2 table
b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is
38.92.

Symmetric Measures
Value
Nominal by
Nominal

Phi

-.208

Cramer's V

.208

Contingency Coefficient

.204

N of Valid Cases

Approx. Sig.
.002
.002
.002

217

a- Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b- Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null
hypothesis.
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Table 5.10a
Crosstabulation of Outsourcing Decision * Private/Public Hospitals
Hospitals
Public
Private
Total

Outsource

No
78
57
135

Yes
50
32
82

Total

128
89
217

Result:

%2 sample = 0.216 (a =0.642, df = 1)

Decision:

Cannot reject the null hypothesis.

Computed % 2 does not exceed the critical value: % 2 critical = 3.841 (a =0.05, df = 1)
Chi-Square Tests

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correction1
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases

Value
.216°
.104

df

.216

.215

1
1
1

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.642

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.671

.374

.747
.642

1

.643

217

a- Computed only for a 2x2 table
b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is
33.63.

Symmetric Measures
Value
Nominal by
Nominal

Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient

N of Valid Cases

-.032
.032
.032

Approx. Sig.
.642
.642
.642

217

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null
hypothesis.
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Table 5.11a
Crosstabulation of Outsourcing Decision * Size of Hospital
Size measured by
number of beds
Lowest - 100
101-200
201 - 300
301 to highest
Total

Result:

Outsource

No
97
19
7
12
135

Yes
50
13
10
9
82

Total

147
32
17
21
217

%2 sample = 4.430 (a =0.219, d f = 3)

Decision: Cannot reject the null hypothesis.
Computed %2 does not exceed the critical value: %2 critical = 7.815 (a =0.05, df = 3)
Chi-Square Tests

Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio

Value
4.430a
4.312

Linear-by-Linear
Association

2.526

N of Valid Cases

217

df

3
3

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.219
.230

1

.112

a

- 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 6.42.

Symmetric Measures

Nominal by
Nominal
N of Valid Cases

Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient

Value
.143
.143
.141
217

Approx. Sig.
.219
.219
.219

a- Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null
hypothesis.

Page

314

Appendix D ... Supporting Statistics for Chapter 5

Table 5.12a
Crosstabulation of Outsourcing Decision * Years of Experience
Years of
experience

Lowest - 5
6-10
11-15
16-20
21-25
26 - highest
Total

Result:

Outsource

No
26
35
30
22
13
8
134

Yes
15
30
18
13
4
2
82

Total

41
65
48
35
17
10
216

%2 sample = 4.773 (a =0.444, df = 5)

Decision: Cannot reject the null hypothesis.
Computed %2 does not exceed the critical value: % critical = 12.832 (a =0.05, df = 5)

Chi-Square Tests

Pearson Chi-Square

Value
4.773 a

5

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.444

df

Likelihood Ratio

4.975

5

.419

Linear-by-Linear
Association

2.244

1

.134

N of Valid Cases

216

a- 1 cells (8.3%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 3.80.

Symmetric Measures
Value
Nominal by
Nominal
N of Valid Cases

Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient

.149
.149

Approx. Sig.
.444

.147

.444
.444

216

a

- Not assuming the null hypothesis.
- Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null
hypothesis.

b
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Table 5.13a
Crosstabulation of Outsourcing Decision * Previously Considered Outsourcing
No/Yes
Previously
considered O/S

No
Yes
Total

Result:

Outsource

No
25
110
135

Yes
13
69
82

Total

38
179
217

% 2 sample = 0.251 (a =0.617, df = 1)

Decision: Cannot reject the null hypothesis.
Computed %2 does not exceed the critical value: %2 critical = 3.841 (a =0.05, df = 1)
Chi-Square Tests

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correction?
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases

Value
.251°
.100
.253

df

250

1
1
1

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.617
.752

(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.714

.379

Exact Sig.

.615

1

.617

217

a. Computed only for a 2x2 table
b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is
14.36.

Symmetric Measures

Nominal by
Nominal

Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient

N of Valid Cases

Value
-.034

Approx. Sig.
.617

.034

.617

.034
217

.617

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null
hypothesis.
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Table 5.14a
Crosstabulation of Outsourcing Decision * Previously Considered Outsourcing *
Previous Decision to Outsource No/Yes (Public Hospitals)
Previously
considered O/S
Prev Dec N o
Prev Dec Yes
Total

Outsource

No
26
34
60

Yes
10
30
40

Total

36
64
100

Public Hospitals % 2 sample = 3.501 (a =0.061, df = 1) Cannot reject the null hypothesis.

Chi-Square Tests
PREV
1

Value
3.501D
2.751
3.589

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correction5
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases

df

3.466

1
1
1

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.061
.097
.058

1

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.088

.048

.063

100

a- Computed only for a 2x2 table
b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14.40.

Symmetric Measures
PREV

Value
Nominal by
Nominal

1

Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient

N of Valid Cases

-.187
.187
.184

Approx. Sig.
.061
.061
.061

100

a

- Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b- Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
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Table 5.15a
Crosstabulation of Outsourcing Decision * Previously Considered Outsourcing *
Previous Decision to Outsource N o / Y e s (Private Hospitals)
Previously
considered O/S
Prev Dec N o
Prev Dec Yes
Total

Outsource

Yes
12
17
29

No
19
30
49

Total

31
47
78

Private Hospitals %2 sample = 0.052 (a =0.820, df = 1) Cannot reject the null hypothesis.

Chi-Square Tests
PREV
1

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correction*
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases

Value
.052°
.000
.051

df

.051

1
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.820
1.000
.820

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

1.000

.503

.821

78

a. Computed only for a 2x2 table
b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.53.

Symmetric Measures

PREV
1

Nominal by
Nominal

Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient

N of Valid Cases

Value
.026
.026

Approx. Sig.
.820

.026

.820
.820

78

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
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Table 5.18a
Crosstabulation of Outsourcing Decision * G e n d e r
Gender
Female
Male
Total

Outsource

No
64
70
13

Yes
41
40
81

Total

105
110
215

Result:

%2 sample = 0.165 (a =0.685, df = 1)

Decision:

Cannot reject the null hypothesis.

Computed x 2 does not exceed the critical value: x 2 critical = 3.841 (a =0.05, df = 1)
Chi-Square Tests

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correction3
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases

Value
.165°

df

.070
.165

.164

1
1
1

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.685
.791
.685

1

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.778

.395

.685

215

a. Computed only for a 2x2 table
b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is
39.56.

Symmetric Measures

Nominal by
Nominal

Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient

N of Valid Cases

Value
-.028
.028

Approx. Sig.
.685
.685

.028
215

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null
hypothesis.
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Table 5.20a
Crosstabulation of Outsourcing Decision * G e n d e r (Public Hospitals)
Gender
Female
Male
Total

Outsource

Yes
36
24
60

No
41
26
67

Total

77
50
217

Public Hospitals %2 sample = 0.019 (a =0.891, df = 1) Cannot reject the null hypothesis.

Chi-Square Tests

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correction3
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases

Value
.019°
.000

df

.019

.019

1
1
1

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.891
1.000

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

1.000

.517

.891

1

.891

127

a. Computed only for a 2x2 table
b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is
23.62.
Symmetric Measures

Nominal by
Nominal

Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient

N of Valid Cases

Value
.012
.012
.012

Approx. Sig.
.891
.891
.891

127

a

- Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b- Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null
hypothesis.
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Table 5.21a
Crosstabulation of Outsourcing Decision * G e n d e r (Private Hospitals)
Gender
Female
Male
Total

Outsource

No
23
15
38

Yes
34
16
50

Total

57
31
88

Private Hospitals %2 sample = 0.529 (a =0.467, df = 1) Cannot reject the null hypothesis.

Chi-Square Tests

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correction?
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association

Value
.529"
.252
.527

df

.523

1
1
1

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.467
.616
.468

1

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.505

.307

.470

88

N of Valid Cases
a

- Computed only for a 2x2 table

b- 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is
13.39.

Symmetric Measures

Nominal by
Nominal

Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient

N of Valid Cases

Value
-.077

Approx. Sig.
.467

.077

.467

.077

.467

88

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null
hypothesis.
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Table 6.3a
Analysis of Early Late Responses

Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances

F
RISK

Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
RESP
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
DISAP
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
IMPORT
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
LIKELY
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
MINI
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
SUNK
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
C O N T R O L Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
CLOSE
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
MOVING
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
GIVEN
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
TERMS
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
AMT
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed

.440

.183

1.918

5.045

.009

1.536

.001

1.483

4.780

2.990

5.913

6.790

6.130

Sig.
.509

.670

.170

.027

.926

.219

.973

.227

.032

.087

.017

.011

.015

t-test for Equality of Means

t

Mean
Sig. (2-tailed) Difference

df

Std. Error
Difference

9 5 % Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Lower
Upper

-1.165

84

.247

-.39

.33

-1.05

.27

-.981

10.575

.348

-.39

.39

-1.26

.49

-1.335

84

.185

-.59

.44

-1.46

.29

-1.373

11.698

.195

-.59

.43

-1.52

.35

-1.864

84

.066

-.69

.37

-1.42 4.60E-02

-1.532

10.472

.155

-.69

.45

-1.69

.31

-1.294

84

.199

-.48

.37

-1.22

.26

-1.799

15.393

.092

-.48

.27

-1.05 8.76E-02

-1.217

84

.227

-.39

.32

-1.04

.25

-1.125

11.026

.284

-.39

.35

-1.17

.38

1.884

84

.063

.80

.42 -4.42E-02

1.64

2.296

13.319

.039

.80

.35

4.88E-02

1.55

-.849

84

.398

-.39

.46

-1.31

.53

-.825

11.318

.426

-.39

.48

-1.43

.65

.365

84

.716

.19

.52

-.84

1.22

.426

12.830

.677

.19

.45

-.77

1.15

1.175

84

.243

.66

.56

-.46

1.78

.881

10.146

.399

.66

.75

-1.01

2.33

1.215

84

.228

.59

.49

-.38

1.56

.988

10.432

.345

.59

.60

-.74

1.92

.665

84

.508

.39

.59

-.77

1.55

.522

10.296

.613

.39

.75

-1.27

2.05

1.060

84

.292

.66

.63

-.58

1.91

.772

10.054

.458

.66

.86

-1.25

2.58

1.024

84

.309

9184.21

8968.14

.764

10.129

.462

9184.21

-8649.92 27018.34

12022.71 -17557.93 35926.35
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Table 6.7a
A N O V A Details of Investment Task
ANOVA

AMT

Within Groups

S u m of
Squares
6.21 E+09
5.42E+10

Total

6.04E+10

Between Groups

df
2

Mean Square
3106817187

83

653436178.7

F
4.755

Sig.
.011

85

Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable: A M T
Mean
Difference
(I) PAPER (J) PAPER
Std. Error
(l-J)
Scheffe
1
2
-14130.01
6393.72
3
7126.02
-20872.43*
2
1
14130.01
6393.72
3
7035.82
-6742.42
3
1
7126.02
20872.43*
2
7035.82
6742.42
LSD
1
2
-14130.01*
6393.72
3
7126.02
-20872.43*
2
1
14130.01*
6393.72
3
7035.82
-6742.42
3
1
7126.02
20872.43*
2
7035.82
6742.42
Dunnett t (2-sided^ 1
3
7126.02
-20872.43*
2
3
7035.82
-6742.42

Sig.
.093
.017
.093
.633
.017
.633
.030
.004
.030
.341
.004
.341
.008
.518

9 5 % Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
-30066.95
1806.93
-38634.71
-3110.16
30066.95
-1806.93
10795.00
-24279.85
3110.16
38634.71
24279.85
-10795.00
-1413.15
-26846.87
-6699.06
-35045.81
26846.87
1413.15
7251.54
-20736.38
35045.81
6699.06
-7251.54
20736.38
-36816.16
-4928.70
-22484.33
8999.48

*• The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
a

- Dunnett t-tests treat one group as a control, and compare all other groups against it.

AMT
Subset for alpha = .05
31

1
39354.84

2

33

53484.85

3

22

53484.85
60227.27

.126

.619

PAPER
Scheffe^ 1

Sig.

N

2

Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.
a- Uses Harmonic M e a n Sample Size = 27.774.
b- The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean
of the group sizes is used. Type I error levels are
not guaranteed.
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Table 6.8a
Means Testing of Perceived Responsibility and Multiple Comparisons

AMT
Subset for alpha = .05
RESP
Scheffea.,: 1
2
3
4
5
Sig.

1

N
15
13
20
26
12

36000.00
38461.54
52250.00
53076.92
.452

2

52250.00
53076.92
70416.67
.387

Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.
a

- Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 15.854.

b

- The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean
of the group sizes is used. Type I error levels are
not guaranteed.
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Table 6.8b
Means Testing of Multiple Comparisons

Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable: A M T
Mean
Difference
(1) R E S P
1

Scheffe

2

3

4

5

LSD

1

2

3

4

5

Dunnett t (2-sided)

a

1

2
3
4

(J) R E S P

2
3
4
5
1
3
4
5
1
2
4
5
1
2
3
5
1
2
3
4
2
3
4
5
1
3
4
5
1
2
4
5
1
2
3
5
1
2
3
4
5
5
5
5

d-J)
-2461.54
-16250.00
-17076.92
-34416.67*
2461.54
-13788.46
-14615.38
-31955.13*
16250.00
13788.46
-826.92
-18166.67
17076.92
14615.38
826.92
-17339.74
34416.67*
31955.13*
18166.67
17339.74
-2461.54
-16250.00
-17076.92*
-34416.67*
2461.54
-13788.46
-14615.38
-31955.13*
16250.00
13788.46
-826.92
-18166.67*
17076.92*
14615.38
826.92
-17339.74*
34416.67*
31955.13*
18166.67*
17339.74*
-34416.67*
-31955.13*
-18166.67
-17339.74

Std. Error
9455.02
8522.64
8090.22
9663.77
9455.02
8889.37
8475.69
9988.69
8522.64
8889.37
7421.27
9111.09
8090.22
8475.69
7421.27
8707.94
9663.77
9988.69
9111.09
8707.94
9455.02
8522.64
8090.22
9663.77
9455.02
8889.37
8475.69
9988.69
8522.64
8889.37
7421.27
9111.09
8090.22
8475.69
7421.27
8707.94
9663.77
9988.69
9111.09
8707.94
9663.77
9988.69
9111.09
8707.94

Sig.
.999
.463
.356
.018
.999
.663
.565
.045
.463
.663
1.000
.416
.356
.565
1.000
.417
.018
.045
.416
.417
.795
.060
.038
.001
.795
.125
.088
.002
.060
.125
.912
.050
.038
.088
.912
.050
.001
.002
.050
.050
.002
.007
.142
.143

9 5 % Confidence Interval
Lower Bound
Upper Bound
27344.69
-32267.76
10616.97
-43116.97
-42580.72
8426.88
-64880.94
-3952.39
32267.76
-27344.69
-41811.52
14234.60
12103.55
-41334.32
-63443.70
-466.56
43116.97
-10616.97
41811.52
-14234.60
22568.05
-24221.89
10555.33
-46888.66
42580.72
-8426.88
41334.32
-12103.55
24221.89
-22568.05
10111.36
-44790.84
64880.94
3952.39
63443.70
466.56
46888.66
-10555.33
44790.84
-10111.36
16350.99
-21274.07
707.38
-33207.38
-979.92
-33173.93
-15188.80
-53644.53
21274.07
-16350.99
3898.60
-31475.53
2248.57
-31479.34
-12080.77
-51829.49
33207.38
-707.38
31475.53
-3898.60
13939.07
-15592.92
-38.46
-36294.87
33173.93
979.92
31479.34
-2248.57
15592.92
-13939.07
-13.68
-34665.81
53644.53
15188.80
51829.49
12080.77
36294.87
38.46
34665.81
13.68
-10615.24
-58218.09
-7353.44
-56556.82
4273.53
-40606.86
4107.51
-38787.00

*• The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
a. Dunnett t-tests treat one group as a control, and compare all other groups against it.
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Table 6.12a Multiple Regression - Funding Regressed o n All Eight Problem-Space
Measures (Negative-1)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Measure

F

dfs

Funding
Intentions
Risk
Disappointment
Importance
Responsibility
Minimise loss
Sunk costs
Control

2.149

8,22

MSe

R2
.439

Adjusted
R2
.235

Standardised beta
coefficients
0.504
-0.192
-0.215
0.020
0.162
0.279
-0.028
-0.059

Model Summary

R
Model

NEG1= 1
(Selected)

1

.mF

R Square
.439

Adjusted
R Square
.235

Std. Error of
the Estimate
19717.59

a. Predictors: (Constant), CONTROL, DISAP, LIKELY, MINI,
RESP, RISK, IMPORT, SUNK
ANOWP'0

Model

1

Regression
Residual
Total

Sum of
Squares
6.68E+09

df

8
22
30

8.55E+09
1.52E+10

F

Mean Square
835483210.7

2.149

Sig.
.074a

388783231.3

a. Predictors: (Constant), C O N T R O L , DISAP, LIKELY, MINI, RESP, RISK, IMPORT,
SUNK
b. Dependent Variable: A M T
c Selecting only cases for which NEG1 = 1
Coefficients?'15
Standardi

zed

Model
1

(Constant)
RISK
RESP
DISAP
IMPORT
LIKELY
MINI
SUNK
CONTROL

Unstandardized

Coefficien

Coefficients

ts

B
Std. Error
10740.572 35653.475

Beta

t
.301

Sig.
.766

-4345.985

3948.057

-.192

-1.101

.283

3136.347

3971.242

.162

-4789.343

4016.264

-.215

.790
-1.192

.438
.246

408.423
11438.632

4241.422

.020

.096

.924

4376.527

.504

2.614

.016

4717.411

3677.199

.279

1.283

-481.667

4319.070

-.028

-.112

.213
.912

-781.407

2565.557

-.059

-.305

.764

a

- Dependent Variable: A M T

b- Selecting only cases for which NEG1 = 1
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Table 6.13a Multiple Regression - Funding Regressed on All Eight Problem-Space
Measures (Positive~ 2)

dfs

F

Measure

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Funding
5.122*
Intentions
Risk
Disappointment
Importance
Responsibility
Minimise loss
Sunk costs
Control
Significant at p < 0.001

R2

MSe

8,24

.631

Adjusted
R2
.507

Standardised beta
coefficients
0.248
-0.559
0.002
0.254
0.289
0.193
0.206
-0.152

Model Summary

R
Model

1

Adjusted
R Square
.507

POS2 = 2
(Selected) R Square
.794a
.631

Std. Error of
the Estimate
17966.99

a- Predictors: (Constant), C O N T R O L , RESP, DISAP,
LIKELY, MINI, RISK, SUNK, I M P O R T

ANOVA b - c

Model

1

Regression
Residual
Total

S u m of
Squares
1.32E+10
7.75E+09
2.10E+10

df

8
24
32

Mean Square
1653342486
322812605.8

F
5.122

Siq.
.001a

a- Predictors: (Constant), C O N T R O L , RESP, DISAP, LIKELY, MINI, RISK, SUNK,
IMPORT
b- Dependent Variable: A M T
c- Selecting only cases for which P O S 2 = 2
Coefficients1,1'

Model
1

Standardi
zed
Coefficien
Unstandardized
ts
Coefficients
Beta
Std. Error
B
(Constant) 28515.947 25306.924
-.559
RISK
-14295.1 3948.062
.289
RESP
5136.598 2709.256
DISAP
.002
54.633 4150.072
.254
IMPORT
5970.578 4442.090
LIKELY
.248
6403.796 3515.198
MINI
.193
3676.696 3091.014
SUNK
.206
3814.836 2912.924
CONTROL -2483.824 2778.233
-.152

t
1.127
-3.621
1.896
.013
1.344
1.822
1.189
1.310
-.894

Sig.
.271
.001
.070
.990
.191
.081
.246
.203
.380

a- Dependent Variable: A M T
b. Selecting only cases for which P O S 2 = 2
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Table 6.14a Multiple Regression - F u n d i n g Regressed o n All
M e a s u r e s (Negative~ 3 )
F
Measure
Adjusted
dfs MSe R2
R2
8,13
Funding
1
3.223*
.665
.459
Intentions
2
Risk
3
Disappointment
4
Importance
5
Responsibility
6
Minimise loss
7
Sunk costs
8
Control
9
* Significant at p < 0.030

Eight P r o b l e m - S p a c e
Standardised beta
coefficients
0.358
-0.272
-0.329
-0.104
0.310
0.233
0.173
-0.139

Model Summary

R
Model

1

NEG2= 3
(Selected) R Square
.665
.815a

Adjusted
R Square
.459

Std. Error of
the Estimate
21556.78

a. Predictors: (Constant), CONTROL, RESP, RISK, SUNK,
MINI, IMPORT, LIKELY, DISAP

ANOV^e
Model

1

Regression
Residual
Total

S u m of
Squares
1.20E+10
6.04E+09
1.80E+10

df

F

Mean Square
1497854000
464694741.2

8
13
21

3.223

Sig.
.030a

a- Predictors: (Constant), C O N T R O L , RESP, RISK, S U N K , MINI, IMPORT, LIKELY,
DISAP
b- Dependent Variable: A M T
c

- Selecting only cases for which N E G 2 = 3
Coefficients?'1'
Standardi

zed

Model
1

Unstandardized
Coefficients
Std. Error
B
(Constant) 33054.295 41551.878
RISK
6952.072
-8510.626
RESP
7020.810 4614.938
DISAP
5454.087
-7579.861
IMPORT
-2615.068 5321.325
LIKELY
6873.369
11493.500
MINI
6446.370 4887.593
7164.254
SUNK
5416.829
C O N T R O L -3176.039 4363.357

Coefficien

ts
Beta
-.272
.310
-.329
-.104
.358
.233
.173
-.139

t
.795
-1.224
1.521
-1.390
-.491
1.672
1.319
.756
-.728

Sig.
.441
.243
.152
.188
.631
.118
.210
.463
.480

a. Dependent Variable: A M T
b. Selecting only cases for which N E G 2 = 3
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Table 6.17a
Multiple Regression Details for Problem Space and Image Compatibility
Model Summary

Model

R
.709a

1

R Square
.503

Adjusted
R Square
.451

Std. Error of
the Estimate
19758.86

a. Predictors: (Constant), CONTROL, RISK, LIKELY,
RESP, MINI, IMPORT, DISAP, SUNK
ANOVA*

Model

1

Regression
Residual
Total

Sum of
Squares
3.04E+10
3.01 E+10
6.04E+10

df

F

Mean Square
3798382587

8
77
85

9.729

Sig.
.000a

390412682.0

a. Predictors: (Constant), CONTROL, RISK, LIKELY, RESP, MINI, IMPORT, DISAP,
SUNK
b. Dependent Variable: AMT
Coefficients3

Model
1

Unstandardized
Coefficients
Std. Error
B
(Constant) 19417.726 17180.627
RISK
2490.374
-9177.976

t
1.130

Sig.
.262
.000

-.341

-3.685

.282
-.168

2638.490

2280.743
2288.932

3.153
-1.762

.110

1.153

7457.710

2379.055

4542.053

1900.141

.271
.217

2.390

.002
.019

4754.975

1878.940

-2022.876

1519.025

.244
-.117

2.531
-1.332

.013
.187

5730.803
-4018.821

LIKELY

CONTROL

Beta

1817.295

RESP
DISAP
IMPORT
MINI
SUNK

Standardi
zed
Coefficien
ts

3.135

.002
.082
.253

a. Dependent Variable: AMT
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Table 6.18a
Multiple Regression Details for Problem Space and I m a g e Compatibility
(Collapsed)
Model Summary
Model

R
.945a

1

R Square
.893

Adjusted
R Square
.882

Std. Error of
the Estimate

.79

a- Predictors: (Constant), CONTROL, RISK, LIKELY,
RESP, MINI, IMPORT, DISAP, SUNK
ANOV^f5

Model

1

Regression
Residual
Total

Sum of
Squares
400.362
48.022
448.384

df

F

Mean Square
50.045
.624

8
77
85

80.244

Sig.
.000a

a. Predictors: (Constant), CONTROL, RISK, LIKELY, RESP, MINI, IMPORT, DISAP,
SUNK
b. Dependent Variable: IMAGE
Coefficients?

Model
1

(Constant)
RISK

Unstandardized
Coefficients
B
Std. Error
.687
1.899

Standardi
zed
Coefficien
ts
Beta

t
2.765
9.769

Sig.
.007
.000
.000

.100

RESP
DISAP
IMPORT

.972
1.081

.073

.419
.618

.903
2.061 E-03

.091

.438

14.883
9.901

.091

.001

.023

.000
.982

LIKELY

-4.89E-02

.095

-.021

-.514

.608

MINI

-6.46E-02

.076

-.036

-.850

.398

SUNK

8.032E-02

.075

.048

1.070

.288

CONTROL

4.395E-02

.061

.029

.724

.471

a. Dependent Variable: IMAGE
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Table 6.19a
Regression Analysis for Perceived I m a g e Compatibility

Model Summary

Model

R
.741a

1

R Square
.550

Adjusted
R Square
.496

Std. Error of
the Estimate
18922.99

a- Predictors: (Constant), IMAGE, LIKELY, CONTROL,
MINI, IMPORT, SUNK, RISK, DISAP, RESP

ANOV^f

Model

1

Regression
Residual
Total

Sum of
Squares
3.32E+10
2.72E+10
6.04E+10

df

F

Mean Square
3692753995
358079621.8

9
76
85

10.313

Sig.
.000a

a. Predictors: (Constant), IMAGE, LIKELY, CONTROL, MINI, IMPORT, SUNK, RISK,
DISAP, RESP
b. Dependent Variable: A M T

Coefficients3

Unstandardized
Coefficients
Model
1

B

(Constant)
RISK
RESP
DISAP
IMPORT

Std. Error
17251.381
3569.188
3426.687
-2593.472
-10969.2
3293.231
2192.109
2622.616
4796.338
-16666.2

Standardi
zed
Coefficien
ts
Beta
-.618
-.128
-.459

-.757
-3.331
1.196

Sig.
.782
.000
.451
.001

3.433

.241

2.756

.007

1812.771

.213

2.282

.025

1459.707

-.136

.110

2730.673

.663

-1.618
2.820

LIKELY

7834.399

2282.324

MINI

5039.293

1828.281

SUNK

4136.477
-2361.341
7700.677

IMAGE

.278
-4.669

.235
.001

.109
.284

CONTROL

t

.006

a. Dependent Variable: A M T
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Table 6.20a
Regression Analysis for Perceived I m a g e Compatibility a n d P r o b l e m Space
Model Summary

R

Model

.770a

1

R Square
.594

Adjusted
R Square
.492

Std. Error of
the Estimate
19007.29

a- Predictors: (Constant), CI, MINI, LIKELY, RISK,
IMPORT, RESP, SUNK, DISAP, IMAGE, C O N T R O L , Ml,
Dl, LI, RE, II, SI, Rl
ANOV/f

Model

1

Regression
Residual
Total

Sum of
Squares
3.59E+10
2.46E+10
6.04E+10

df

F

Mean Square
2110706028
361276981.5

17
68
85

5.842

Sig.
.000a

a. Predictors: (Constant), CI, MINI, LIKELY, RISK, IMPORT, RESP, SUNK, DISAP,
IMAGE, C O N T R O L , Ml, Dl, LI, RE, II, SI, Rl
b. Dependent Variable: A M T
Coefficients?
Standardi

zed

Model
1

Unstandardized
Coefficients
B
Std. Error
(Constant) 50500.800 95888.520
RISK
-9848.891 17112.434

Coefficien

ts

t
.527

Sig.
.600

-.365

-.576

.567

1032.616 11948.747
3347.431 13192.680

.051

.086

.931

.140

.254

.800

-.865

-6371.930

-.231

-1.470
-.399

.146

LIKELY

14136.127
15980.782

MINI
SUNK

8751.520 10554.410
-1464.679 13210.855
7708.748
154.964

.419
-.075

.829
-.111

.009

.020

.410
.912
.984

RESP
DISAP
IMPORT

CONTROL

-20777.7

Beta

.691

IMAGE

4701.185

7985.070

.405

.589

.558

Rl
RE
Dl
II
LI
Ml
SI
CI

-598.816

1410.362

-.403

-.425

.672

-332.804

941.690

-.258

-.353

.725

-1303.221

1135.544

-.960

-1.148

.255

1175.478

1.310

1.665

.101

1141.508

1316.348

.621

.867

.389

-328.298
457.751

889.752

-.369

.713

1058.279

-.187
.362

.433

.667

-190.240

667.141

-.153

-.285

.776

1956.842

a. Dependent Variable: A M T
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Table 6.21a
Regression of L o w Image Compatibility for Problem Space and Decision
Outcomes
Model Summary

Model

R
.673a

1

R Square
.452

Adjusted
R Square
.337

Std. Error of
the Estimate
19204.04

a- Predictors: (Constant), CONTROL, DISAP, LIKELY,
RESP, MINI, RISK, SUNK, IMPORT
ANOV^

Model

1

Regression
Residual
Total

Sum of
Squares
1.16E+10
1.40E+10
2.56E+10

df

F

Mean Square
1447691838
368794999.5

8
38
46

3.925

Sig.
.002a

a- Predictors: (Constant), CONTROL, DISAP, LIKELY, RESP, MINI, RISK, SUNK,
IMPORT
b- Dependent Variable: AMT
Coefficients3

Model
1

(Constant)
RISK
RESP
DISAP
IMPORT

Unstandardized
Coefficients
Std. Error
B
9515.118 22288.518
3221.252
-7488.324

t
.427

Sig.
.672

-.324

-2.325

.026

1993.633

2365.539

.110

.843

.405

-3241.089

3127.163

-.154

.307

4649.492

3512.734

.208
.364

-1.036
1.324
2.649

.012
.042

LIKELY

8621.986

3254.734

MINI
SUNK

5563.956

2644.687

3214.445
-2793.443

2634.434

CONTROL

Standardi
zed
Coefficien
ts
Beta

2051.408

.303
.187
-.197

2.104
1.220
-1.362

.194

.230
.181

a

- Dependent Variable: AMT
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Table 6.22a
Regression of H i g h I m a g e Compatibility for Problem Space and Decision
Outcomes
Model Summary

Model

R
.648a

1

R Square
.420

Adjusted
R Square
.265

Std. Error of
the Estimate
17372.52

a- Predictors: (Constant), CONTROL, SUNK, RISK,
RESP, LIKELY, MINI, DISAP, IMPORT
ANOV/P

Model

1

Regression
Residual
Total

Sum of
Squares
6.55E+09
9.05E+09
1.56E+10

df

F

Mean Square
819194705.7
301804488.7

8
30
38

2.714

Sig.
.022a

a- Predictors: (Constant), CONTROL, SUNK, RISK, RESP, LIKELY, MINI, DISAP,
IMPORT
b- Dependent Variable: A M T

Coefficients3

Model
1

Unstandardized
Coefficients
Std. Error
B
(Constant) 40199.673 26165.339
RISK
-1709.436
4231.909
RESP
DISAP

7274.639

-.070

t
1.536
-.404

Sig.
.135
.689

.435

2.380

.024

-.232

-1.332

.193

.062

.355

.725

.130
.014

.743
.080

.463
.937

.200
-.126

1.065

.295

-.736

.468

IMPORT

1069.004

LIKELY

2848.431

3833.252

MINI
SUNK

216.566
2960.042

2722.119
2778.852

-1835.751

2495.418

CONTROL

Beta

3057.061
3247.311
3012.908

-4326.220

Standardi
zed
Coefficien
ts

a. Dependent Variable: A M T
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Table 6.23a
Component 1 ~ Sunk Cost
+/Sunk Cost
Too much invested
Minimise Loss

+.854
+.644

Intention
Likely to invest

+.584

Component 2 ~ Accountability (Management Issues)
+/Importance
of the decision
Control

+.801
+.661

Responsibility
for initial investment

+.651

Component 3 ~ Risk Utility (feelings about risk)
+/Risk
Perceived
Disappointment

+.830
+.798

Table 6.23b
Version 1: Negative Frame ($400,000 sunk cost) ~ means, standard deviations and
correlations (N=31)
M

SD

1

1 Funding

39.35

22.53

-

2 Intentions

3.58

.99

A19#

3 Risk

3.55

.99

-.303

-.063

4 Disappointment

3.32

1.01

1.261

.006

.315

5 Importance

3.58

1.12

.075

.107

-.056

.241

-

6 Responsibility

2.81

1.17

.097

.072

-.020

.252

.523#

7 Minimise loss

2.87

1.34

.235

-.143

-.070

-.141

-.082

-.209

-

8 Sunk costs

3.35

1.31

.053

.479#

.051

-.064

-.146

-.172

-.528#

9 Control

4.10

1.70

-.024

-.074

-.230

-.057

.408*

.144

-.082

Variable

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

-

-

-.241

-

# Significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed)
* Significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed)
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Table 6.23c
Version 2: Positive Frame ($400,000 sunk cost) ~ means, standard deviations and
correlations (N=33)
M

SD

1

1 Funding

53.48

25.60

-

2 Intentions

3.79

.99

.098

3 Risk

3.76

1.00

-.576#

.198

-

4 Disappointment

3.45

1.09

-.109

-.005

.418*

-

5 Importance

3.76

1.09

.014

.038

.345*

.672#

6 Responsibility

3.15

1.44

.558#

-.042

-.277

.014

.124

7 Minimise loss

2.39

1.34

.263

-.076

-.391*

-.338

-.338

.194

8 Sunk costs

4.67

1.38

.294

.083

.098

.186

.110

.340

-.280

9 Control

4.42

1.56

-.058

.261

.128

.177

.337

.096

.275

Variable

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

-

-.323

-

# Significant at 0.05evel (2-tailed)
* Significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Table 6.23d
Version 3: Negative Frame + Sunk cost $100,000 ~ means, standard deviations and
correlations (N=22)
2

3

4

5

6

7

M

SD

1

1 Funding

60.22

29.29

-

2 Intentions

3.55

.91

.410

3 Risk

3.27

.94

-.395

-.138

-

4 Disappointment

3.00

1.27

-.558#

-.059

.588#

5 Importance

3.68

1.17

.022

.077

-.176

-.171

-

6 Responsibility

3.36

1.29

.262

-.092

-.054

-.113

.385

-

7 Minimise loss

2.55

1.06

.031

-.186

.043

-.056

.186

.060

8 Sunk costs

3.73

.94

.341

.485*

-.053

.150

-.208

.141

-.286

9 Control

4.27

1.28

-.365

.191

-.099

.296

.136

-.017

.193

Variable

8

9

-

-

.044

-

# Significan t at 0.05evel (2-tailed)
* Significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed)
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Table 7.3a
Analysis of Early Late Responses ~ Outsourcing Decision

Case Processing Summary

EL * O U T S R C

Valid
N
Percent
237
100.0%

N

Cases
Missing
Percent

0

.0%

Total
N
Percent
100.0%
237

EL * O U T S R C Crosstabulation
Count

OUTSRC
1
EL

1
2

2
64
22
86

Total

Total
173
64
237

109
42
151

Chi-Square Tests
Value
.139D

Pearson Chi-Square
3

Continuity Correction
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test

.048
.139

Linear-by-Linear
Association

.138

N of Valid Cases

237

df
1
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.710

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.762

.415

.826
.709

.710

a- Computed only for a 2x2 table
b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is
23.22.
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Table 7.4a
Analysis of Early Late Responses ~ Investment Decision

Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for
Equalitv of Variances

F
RISK

Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
DISAP
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
IMPORTAN Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
R E S P O N Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
MINI
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
S O M U C H Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
S U C C E S S Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
LIKELY
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
A M O U N T Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed

.310

1.049

.263

.614

.272

.699

.035

.203

.422

Sig.
.578

.307

.608

.434

.602

.404

.852

.653

.516

t-test for Eaualitv of Means

t

df

Mean
Std. Error
Sig. (2-tailed) Difference Difference

9 5 % Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Lower
Upper

.400

235

.690

5.73E-02

.14

-.22

.34

.409

117.946

.683

5.73E-02

.14

-.22

.33

1.552

235

.122

.16

.11 •4.41 E-02

.37

1.550

112.287

.124

.16

.11 -4.56E-02

.37

3.330

235

.001

.34

.10

.14

.54

3.057

96.861

.003

.34

.11

.12

.56

.459

235

.647

6.48E-02

.14

-.21

.34

.471

118.486

.639

6.48E-02

.14

-.21

.34

.667

235

.505

.15

.23

-.30

.60

.670

113.538

.504

.15

.23

-.30

.60

1.766

235

.079

.39

.22 •4.50E-02

.82

1.781

114.465

.078

.39

.22 •4.36E-02

.82

-.273

235

.785 -6.14E-02

.23

-.51

.38

-.280

118.749

.780 -6.14E-02

.22

-.50

.37

-.537

235

.592

-.12

.23

-.58

.33

-.522

106.755

.603

-.12

.24

-.59

.35

-.349

235

.727

-1825.78

5228.67 12126.84

8475.28

-.356

116.672

.723

-1825.78

5134.63 11994.94

8343.38
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T a b l e 7.7a
Crosstabulation of Outsourcing Decision * S u n k Cost H i g h / L o w
Outsource
No
Yes
Total
Rational
45
85
130
Intuitive
8
16
24
Total
53
101
154

Result:

% sample = 0.015 (a =0.903, df = 1)

Decision: Cannot reject the null hypothesis.
Computed x2 does not exceed the critical value: %2 critical = 3.841 (a =0.05, df = 1)
Chi-Square Tests

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correction

a

Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association

Value
.015°
.000
.015

df

.015

1
1
1

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.903
1.000
.903

1

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

1.000

.551

.904

154

N of Valid Cases

a- Computed only for a 2x2 table
b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is
8.26.

Symmetric Measures

Nominal by
Nominal

Phi

Value
.010

Approx. Sig.
.903

Cramer's V

.010

.903

Contingency Coefficient

.010

.903

N of Valid Cases

154

a- Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null
hypothesis.
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Table 7.7b
Crosstabulation of Rational vs Intuitive ~ Version " A "

RAIN * OUTSRC * A Crosstabulation
Count
OUTSRC

A
1

1
RAIN

2

1

35

14

2

1

6

36

20

Total

Total
49
7
56

Chi-Square Tests

A
1

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correction9
Likelihood Ratio

Value
8.711b
6.400

df

8.625

1
1
1

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.003

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.006

.006

.011
.003

Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association

8.556

N of Valid Cases

56

1

.003

a. Computed only for a 2x2 table
b. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.50.

Symmetric Measures

A
1

Nominal by
Nominal

Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient

N of Valid Cases

Value
.394

Approx. Sig.
.003

.394
.367

.003
.003

56

a- Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

There was a significant difference in the decision to outsource between rational and
intuitive decision makers in version " A " of the survey.
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Table 7.7c
Crosstabulation of Rational vs Intuitive ~ Version " B "

RAIN * O U T S R C * B Crosstabulation
Count
OUTSRC

B

1

2

RAIN

1
2

Total

2
4

40

Total
44

2

5

7

6

45

51

Chi-Square Tests

B
2

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correction3

Value
2.208D

Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases

df

.730
1.762

2.165

1
1
1

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.137
.393
.184

1

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.186

.186

.141

51

a

- Computed only for a 2x2 table

b- 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .82.

Symmetric Measures

B
2

Nominal by
Nominal

Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient

N of Valid Cases

Value
-.208
.208

Approx. Sig.
.137
.137

.204

.137

51

a

- Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b- Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

There was no significant difference in the decision to outsource between rational and
intuitive decision makers in version " B " of the survey.
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Table 7.7d
Crosstabulation of Rational vs Intuitive ~ Version " C "

RAIN * O U T S R C * C Crosstabulation
Count
OUTSRC

c
3

1
RAIN

1
2

2
1

Total

Total
20

19

2

3

5

3

22

25

Chi-Square Tests

c

3

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correction3

Value
4.64013

Likelihood Ratio

df

1.918
3.676

1
1
1

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.031
.166

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.091

.091

.055

Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases

4.455

1

.035

25

a. Computed only for a 2x2 table
b. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .60.

Symmetric Measures

c
3

Nominal by
Nominal

Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient

N of Valid Cases

Value
-.431

Approx. Sig.
.031

.431
.396

.031
.031

25

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

There was a significant difference in the decision to outsource between rational and
intuitive decision makers in version " C " of the survey.
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Table 7.7e
Crosstabulation of Rational vs Intuitive ~ Version " D "

RAIN * OUTSRC * D Crosstabulation
Count
OUTSRC

D

1

4

RAIN

1
2

2
5
3
8

Total

Total
17

12
2
14

5
22

Chi-Square Tests

D
4

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correction3

Value
1.562D

Likelihood Ratio

df

.520
1.514

Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases

1.491

1
1
1

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.211
.471
.219

1

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.309

.233

.222

22

a. Computed only for a 2x2 table
b. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.82.

Symmetric Measures

D
4

Nominal by
Nominal

Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient

N of Valid Cases

Value
-.266

Approx. Sig.
.211

.266
.257
22

.211
.211

a

- Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b- Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

There was a significant difference in the decision to outsource between rational and
intuitive decision makers in version " D " of the survey.
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Table 7.9a
Crosstabulation of Decision to Outsource
A B * O U T S R C Crosstabulation
Count
OUTSRC

2

1
AB

1
2

Total

50
15

33
71

Total
83
86

65

104

169

Chi-Square Tests

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correction3
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases

Value
32.688D

df

30.905
34.041

32.494

1
1
1

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.000
.000

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.000

.000

.000

1

.000

169

a. Computed only for a 2x2 table
b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is
31.92.

Symmetric Measures

Nominal by
Nominal

Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient

N of Valid Cases

Value
.440

Approx. Sig.
.000

.440

.000

.403

.000

169

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null
hypothesis.

Result:
For the sample " A vs B", the obtained % 2 = 32.688, df = 1, was significant at a =0.000.
Decision:
Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected.
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Table 7.10a
Crosstabulations of Outsourcing " A " a n d " C "
AC * OUTSRC Crosstabulation
Count
OUTSRC

1
AC

2

1

50

3

7

33
28

Total
83
35

57

61

118

Total

Chi-Square Tests
Asymp. Sig.
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correction3
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases

Value
15.965°
14.394

df

16.863

15.829

1
1
1

(2-sided)
.000

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.000

.000

.000
.000

1

.000

118

a

- Computed only for a 2x2 table

b- 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is
16.91.

Symmetric Measures

Nominal by
Nominal

Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient

Value
.368

Approx. Sig.
.000

.368

.000

.345

.000

N of Valid Cases

118

a

- Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b- Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null
hypothesis.

Result:
For the sample "A vs C" the obtained %2 = 15.965, df = 1, was significant at a =0.000.
Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected.
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Table 7.11a
Crosstabulations of Outsourcing " B " a n d " C "

B C * O U T S R C Crosstabulation
Count

OUTSRC
1
BC

2
3

2
15
7
22

Total

Total
86

71
28
99

35
121

Chi-Square Tests

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correction3
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases

Value
.109°
.005

1

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.741

1
1

.943
.743

df

.108

.109

1

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.797

.462

.742

121

a

- Computed only for a 2x2 table

b- 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is
6.36.

Symmetric Measures

Nominal by
Nominal

Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient

N of Valid Cases

Value
-.030

Approx. Sig.
.741

.030

.741

.030
121

.741

a

- Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b- Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null
hypothesis.

Result:
For the sample "B vs C" the obtained %2 = 0.109, df = 1, was not significant at a
=0.741. Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
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Table 7.12a
Crosstabulations of Outsourcing " A " a n d " B " vs " C "
ABVC * OUTSRC Crosstabulation
Count
OUTSRC

1
ABVC

1
2

2
65
7

Total

72

104

Total
169

28
132

35
204

Chi-Square Tests

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correction3
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases

Value
4.327D
3.557
4.663

df
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.038
.059
.031

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.051
4.306

1

.027

.038

204

a. Computed only for a 2x2 table
b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is
12.35.

Symmetric Measures

Nominal by
Nominal

Phi
Cramer's V

Value
.146

Contingency Coefficient
N of Valid Cases

Approx. Sig.
.038

.146
.144

.038
.038

204

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null
hypothesis.

Result:
For the sample "AB vs C" the obtained %2 = 4.327, df = 1, was significant at a =0.038.
Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected.
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Table 7.13a
Crosstabulations of Outsourcing " C " a n d " D "
CVD * OUTSRC Crosstabulation
Count

OUTSRC
1
CVD

3
4

2
7
14
21

Total

Total
35
33

28
19
47

68

Chi-Square Tests
Value
Pearson Chi-Square
3

Continuity Correction
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.045
.082
.044

df

4.001D
3.020
4.054

1
1
1

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.066
3.943

1

.041

.047

68

a. Computed only for a 2x2 table
b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is
10.19.

Symmetric Measures

Nominal by
Nominal

Phi
Cramer's V

Value
-.243

Contingency Coefficient
N of Valid Cases

Approx. Sig.
.045

.243

.045

.236

.045

68

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null
hypothesis.

Result:
For the sample "C vs D" the obtained %2 = 4.001, df = 1, was significant at a =0.045.
Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected.
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Table 7.15a
Multiple Comparisons for Framing of All Groups
Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable: A M O U N T

(1) P A P E R
1

Scheffe

2

3

4

5

6

LSD

1

2

3

4

5

6

Dunnett t (2-sided)

'

1

2
3
4
5

(J) P A P E R

2
3
4
5
6
1
3
4
5
6
1
2
4
5
6
1
2
3
5
6
1
2
3
4
6
1
2
3
4
5
2
3
4
5
6
1
3
4
5
6
1
2
4
5
6
1
2
3
5
6
1
2
3
4
6
1
2
3
4
5
6
6
6
6
6

Mean
Difference
(l-J)
-6207.11

9 5 % Confidence Interval
Std. Error
7208.68

Sig.
.980

31346.25*

6704.92

32869.28*

6537.64

837.54

Lower Bound
-30402.53

Upper Bound
17988.31

.001

8841.66

53850.83

.000

10926.16

54812.40

7016.28

1.000

-22712.11

-3110.52

7141.25

.999

-27079.62

24387.18
20858.58

6207.11

7208.68

.980

-17988.31

30402.53

37553.35'

7539.99

.000

12245.89

62860.82

39076.39'

7391.64

.000

14266.87

63885.90

7044.64

7818.17

.976

-19196.49

33285.77

3096.59

7930.51

1.000

-23521.62

29714.80

-31346.25*

6704.92

.001

-53850.83

-8841.66

-37553.35*

7539.99

.000

-62860.82

-12245.89

6901.25

1.000

-21640.52

24686.59

-30508.71*

1523.04

7356.27

-34456.76*

7475.56

.005
.001

-55199.50
-59547.94

-9365.58

-32869.28*

6537.64

.000

-54812.40

-10926.16

-39076.39*

7391.64

.000

-63885.90

-14266.87

-1523.04

6901.25

1.000

-24686.59

21640.52

-32031.75*

7204.13

.002

-56211.89

-7851.60

-35979.80*

7325.89

.000

-60568.65

-11390.95
22712.11

-5817.92

-837.54

7016.28

1.000

-24387.18

-7044.64

7818.17

.976

-33285.77

19196.49

30508.71'

7356.27

.005

5817.92

55199.50

32031.75*

7204.13

.002

7851.60

56211.89

-3948.05

7756.04

.998

-29980.66

22084.55

3110.52

7141.25

.999

-20858.58

27079.62

-3096.59

7930.51

1.000

-29714.80

23521.62

34456.76*

7475.56

.001

9365.58

59547.94

35979.80*

7325.89

.000

11390.95

60568.65

3948.05

7756.04

.998

-22084.55

2998066

-6207.11

7208.68

.390

-20410.27

7996.05

31346.25'

6704.92

.000

18135.64

44556.86

32869.28*

6537.64

.000

19988.26

45750.30

837.54

7016.28

-12986.54

14661.61

-3110.52

7141.25

.905
.664

-17180.82

10959.79

6207.11

7208.68

.390

-7996.05

20410.27

37553.35'

7539.99

.000

22697.40

52409.30

39076.39*

7391.64

.000

24512.74

53640.03

7044.64

7818.17

.368

-8359.39

22448.67

3096.59

7930.51

.697

-12528.79

18721.97

-31346.25*

6704.92

.000

-44556.86

-18135.64

-37553.35*

7539.99

.000

-52409.30

-22697.40

6901.25

.826

-12074.40

15120.47

-30508.71*

7356.27

.000

-45002.66

-16014.76

-34456.76*

7475.56

.000

-49185.75

-19727.77

-32869.28*

6537.64

.000

-45750.30

-19988.26

-39076.39*

7391.64

.000

-53640.03

-24512.74

-1523.04

6901.25

.826

-15120.47

12074.40

-32031.75*

7204.13

.000

-46225.94

-17837.55

-35979.80*

1523.04

7325.89

.000

-50413.91

-21545.69

-837.54

7016.28

.905

-14661.61

12986.54

-7044.64

7818.17

.368

-22448.67

8359.39

30508.71'

7356.27

.000

16014.76

45002.66

32031.75*

7204.13

.000

17837.55

46225.94

-3948.05

7756.04

.611

-19229.67

11333.57

3110.52

7141.25

.664

-10959.79

17180.82

-3096.59

7930.51

.697

-18721.97

12528.79

34456.76*

7475.56

.000

19727.77

49185.75

35979.80*

7325.89

.000

21545.69

50413.91

3948.05

7756.04

.611

-11333.57

19229.67

-3110.52

7141.25

.989

-21070.47

14849.44

3096.59

7930.51

.993

-16848.34

23041.52

-34456.76*

7475.56

.000

-53257.49

-15656.03

-35979.80*

7325.89

.000

-54404.13

-17555.46

-3948.05

7756.04

.979

-23454.19

15558.08

*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
a. Dunnett t-tests treat one group as a control, and compare all other groups against it.
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Table 7.16a
A N O V A for Framing of XI to Yl

ANOVA
AMOUNT1

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

S u m of
Squares
2.23E+10
1.13E+11
1.35E+11

df

Mean Square
2.233E+10
1251338807

1
90
91

F
17.847

Sig.
.000

Result:
The difference between groups is significant (F = 17.847, p =0.000, df = 1).
Decision:
Therefore, reject the null hypothesis.

Descriptives

AMOUNT1

N
1
3
Total

51
41
92

Mean
65980.39
34634.15
52010.87

Std. Deviation
34293.14
36680.89
38509.74

Std. Error
4802.00
5728.59
4014.92

9 5 % Confidence Interval for
Mean
Lower Bound
Upper Bound
56335.29
75625.49
23056.23
46212.06
44035.73
59986.01

Minimum
0
0
0

Maximum
100000
100000
100000

Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for
Eaualitv of Variances

F
A M O U N T 1 Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed

.568

Sip.
.453

t-test for Eaualitv of Means

t

Mean
Sig. (2-tailed) Difference

df

Std. Error
Difference

9 5 % Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Upper
Lower

4.225

90

.000

31346.25

7420.01

16605.11

46087.39

4.193

83.128

.000

31346.25

7475.02

16479.06

46213.43
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Table 7.17a
A N O V A for Framing of X2 to Y2
ANOVA
AMOUNT2

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of
Squares
2.86E+10

df
1
75
76

6.55E+10
9.40E+10

F

Mean Square
2.856E+10
872817592.6

SiQ.
.000

32.717

Result:
The difference between groups is significant (F = 32.111, p =0.000, df = 1).
Decision:
Therefore, reject the null hypothesis.

Descriptives
AMOUNT2
9 5 % Confidence Interval for
Mean

N
2
4
Total

32
45
77

Mean
72187.50

Std. Deviation
23757.43

Std. Error
4199.76

Lower Bound
63622.03

Upper Bound
80752.97

Minimum
30000

Maximum
100000

33111.11

33016.68

4921.84

49350.65

35172.05

4008.23

23191.80
41367.57

43030.42
57333.72

0
0

100000
100000

Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances

F
A M O U N T 2 Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed

4.694

Sig.
.033

t-test for Equality of Means

t

Mean
Sig. (2-tailed) Difference

df

Std. Error
Difference

9 5 % Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Upper
Lower

5.720

75

.000

39076.39

6831.65

25467.04

52685.74

6.040

74.980

.000

39076.39

6470.12

26187.19

51965.58

Page 353

Appendix F... Supporting Statistics for Chapter 7

Table 7.19a
A N O V A for Sunk Costs of X 2 to Zl
ANOVA
AMOUNT1

Between Groups

S u m of
Squares
8.30E+08

Within Groups
Total

df
1

Mean Square
829585554.4

4.46E+10

65

685710164.8

4.54E+10

66

F
1.210

Sig.
.275

Result:
(ANOVA) X2 vs Zl F= 1.210 (p<0.275, df = 1)
Decision:
Therefore the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.

Group Statistics

AMOUNT1

PAP1
2

N

5

32

Mean
72187.50

Std. Deviation
23757.43

35

65142.86

28218.83

Std. Error
Mean
4199.76
4769.85

Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances

F
AMOUNT!

Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed

2.611

Sig.
.111

t-test for Equality of Means

t

df

Sig. (2-tailed)

Mean
Difference

Std. Error
Difference

9 5 % Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Upper
Lower

1.100

65

.275

7044.64

6404.70

-5746.42

19835.71

1.108

64.581

.272

7044.64

6355.27

-5649.27

19738.56
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Table 7.20a
A N O V A for Sunk Costs of Y 2 to Z 2
ANOVA
AMOUNT2

Between Groups

Sum of
Squares
2.46E+10

Within Groups
Total

7.88E+10
1.03E+11

df

Mean Square
2.465E+10
1037331207

1
76

F
23.759

Sig.
.000

77

Result:
( A N O V A ) Y 2 vs Z2 F= 23.759 (p<0.000, df = 1)
Decision:
Therefore the null hypothesis is rejected.

Group Statistics

PAP2
AMOUNT2

N

4

45
33

6

Mean
33111.11

Std. Deviation
33016.68
31060.79

69090.91

Std. Error
Mean
4921.84
5406.99

Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances

F
AMOUNT2

Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed

.003

Sig.
.954

t-test for Equality of Means

t

.

df

Sig. (2-tailed)

Mean
Difference

Std. Error
Difference

9 5 % Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Lower
Upper

-4.874

76

.000

-35979.80

7381.47

-50681.27

-21278.33

-4.921

71.366

.000

-35979.80

7311.63

-50557.49

-21402.11
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Table 7.22a
A N O V A for Perceived Level of Responsibility/Funding
ANOVA
AMOUNT

Within Groups

Sum of
Squares
6.43E+10
2.36E+11

Total

3.00E+11

Between Groups

df

5
231
236

Mean Square
1.285E+10

F
12.580

Sig.
.000

1021769805

Result:
The result was F = 12.580, (a =0.000, df = 5)
Decision:
Reject the null hypothesis.

AMOUNT
Subset for alpha = .05
PAPER
Scheffe3* 4
3
5
1
6
2
Sig.

1

N
45
41

2

33111.11
34634.15
65142.86
65980.39
69090.91

35
51
33
32

72187.50
1.000

.968

Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.
a
- Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 38.377.
b

- The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean
of the group sizes is used. Type I error levels are
not guaranteed.
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Table 7.22b
Multiple Comparisons for Perceived Level of Responsibility/Funding
Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable: A M O U N T
Mean
Scheffe

(1) PAPER
1

(J) PAPER

Difference
(l-J)
-6207.11
31346.25"
32869.28*
837.54
-3110.52
6207.11
37553.35*
39076.39*
7044.64
3096.59
-31346.25*
-37553.35*
1523.04
-30508.71*
-34456.76*
-32869.28*
-39076.39*
-1523.04
-32031.75*
-35979.80*
-837.54
-7044.64
30508.71*
32031.75*
-3948.05
3110.52
-3096.59
34456.76*
35979.80*
3948.05
-6207.11
31346.25*
32869.28*
837.54
-3110.52
6207.11
37553.35*
39076.39*
7044.64
3096.59
-31346.25*
-37553.35*
1523.04
-30508.71*
-34456.76*
-32869.28*
-39076.39*
-1523.04
-32031.75*
-35979.80*
-837.54
-7044.64
30508.71*
32031.75*
-3948.05
3110.52
-3096.59
34456.76*
35979.80*
3948.05
-3110.52
3096.59
-34456.76*
-35979.80*
-3948.05

Std. Error
7208.68
6704.92
6537.64
7016.28
7141.25
7208.68
7539.99
7391.64
7818.17
7930.51
6704.92
7539.99
6901.25
7356.27
7475.56
6537.64
7391.64
6901.25
7204.13
7325.89
7016.28
7818.17
7356.27
7204.13
7756.04
7141.25
7930.51
7475.56
7325.89
7756.04
7208.68
6704.92
6537.64
7016.28
7141.25
7208.68
7539.99
7391.64
7818.17
7930.51
6704.92
7539.99
6901.25
7356.27
7475.56
6537.64
7391.64
6901.25
7204.13
7325.89
7016.28
7818.17
7356.27
7204.13
7756.04
7141.25
7930.51
7475.56
7325.89
7756.04
7141.25
7930.51
7475.56
7325.89
7756.04

2
3
4
5
6
2
1
3
4
5
6
3
1
2
4
5
6
4
1
2
3
5
6
5
1
2
3
4
6
6
1
2
3
4
5
LSD
1
2
3
4
5
6
2
1
3
4
5
6
3
1
2
4
5
6
4
1
2
3
5
6
5
1
2
3
4
6
6
1
2
3
4
5
Dunnett t (2-sided)
" 1
6
2
6
3
6
4
6
5
6
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
a. Dunnett t-tests treat one group as a control, and compare all other groups against it.

SiQ.
.980
.001
.000
1.000
.999
.980
.000
.000
.976
1.000
.001
.000
1.000
.005
.001
.000
.000
1.000
.002
.000
1.000
.976
.005
.002
.998
.999
1.000
.001
.000
.998
.390
.000
.000
.905
.664
.390
.000
.000
.368
.697
.000
.000
.826
.000
.000
.000
.000
.826
.000
.000
.905
.368
.000
.000
.611
.664
.697
.000
.000
.611
.989
.993
.000
.000
.979

9 5 % Confidence Interval
Lower Bound
Upper Bound
-30402.53
17988.31
8841.66
53850.83
10926.16
54812.40
-22712.11
24387.18
-27079.62
20858.58
-17988.31
30402.53
12245.89
62860.82
14266.87
63885.90
-19196.49
33285.77
-23521.62
29714.80
-8841.66
-53850.83
-62860.82
-12245.89
-21640.52
24686.59
-5817.92
-55199.50
-59547.94
-9365.58
-10926.16
-54812.40
-14266.87
-63885.90
21640.52
-24686.59
-7851.60
-56211.89
-60568.65
-11390.95
22712.11
-24387.18
19196.49
-33285.77
55199.50
5817.92
56211.89
7851.60
22084.55
-29980.66
27079.62
-20858.58
23521.62
-29714.80
59547.94
9365.58
60568.65
11390.95
29980.66
-22084.55
7996.05
-20410.27
44556.86
18135.64
45750.30
19988.26
14661.61
-12986.54
10959.79
-17180.82
20410.27
-7996.05
52409.30
22697.40
53640.03
24512.74
22448.67
-8359.39
18721.97
-12528.79
-18135.64
-44556.86
-22697.40
-52409.30
15120.47
-12074.40
-16014.76
-45002.66
-19727.77
-49185.75
-19988.26
-45750.30
-24512.74
-53640.03
12074.40
-15120.47
-17837.55
-46225.94
-21545.69
-50413.91
12986.54
-14661.61
8359.39
-22448.67
45002.66
16014.76
46225.94
17837.55
11333.57
-19229.67
17180.82
-10959.79
12528.79
-18721.97
49185.75
19727.77
50413.91
21545.69
19229.67
-11333.57
14849.44
-21070.47
23041.52
-16848.34
-15656.03
-53257.49
-17555.46
-54404.13
15558.08
-23454.19
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Table 7.23a
A N O V A for Perceived Responsibility on Intention to F u n d
ANOVA
LIKELY

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

S u m of
Squares
76.838
508.326

df

5
231
236

585.165

F

M e a n Square
15.368

6.984

Sig.
.000

2.201

Result:
The result was F = 6.984 (a =0.000, df = 6)
Decision:
Reject the null hypothesis.
LIKELY
Subset for alpha == .05
PAPER
3 1
Scheffe . : 3

4
1
2
6
5
Sig.

1

N
41
45
51
32
33
35

2

3

2.78
2.89

2.89

3.51

3.51

3.51

4.00

4.00
4.03
4.29
.389

.464

.060

Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 38.377.
b. The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the group
sizes is used. Type I error levels are not guaranteed.
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Table 23b
Multiple Comparisons for Perceived Responsibility on Intention to Fund
Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable: LIKELY

(1) P A P E R
1

Scheffe

2

3

4

5

6

1

LSD

(J) P A P E R
2

3

4

5

"
6

Dunnett t (2-sided)

*

9 5 % Confidence Interval
Std. Error
.33

Sig.
.828

Lower Bound
-1.61

Upper Bound
.63

3

.73

.31

.362

-.32

1.77

4

.62

.30

.524

-.40

1.64

5

-.78

.33

.342

-1.87

.32

6

-.52

.33

.781

-1.63

.59

1

.49

.33

.828

-.63

1.61

3

1.22*

.35

.036

4.51 E-02

2.39

4

1.11

.34

.066

-4.02E-02

2.26

5

-.29

.36

.987

-1.50

.93

6

-3.03E-02

.37

1.000

-1.27

1.20

1

-.73

.31

.362

-1.77

.32

2

-1.22"

.35

.036

-2.39

-4.51 E-02

4

-.11

.32

1.000

-1.18

.97

5

-1.51*

.34

.002

-2.65

-.36

6

-1.25*

.35

.026

-2.41

-8.54E-02

1

-.62

.30

.524

-1.64

.40

2

-1.11

.34

.066

-2.26

4.02E-02

3

.11

.32

1.000

-.97

1.18

5

-1.40*

.33

.005

-2.52

-.27

6

-1.14*

.34

.050

-2.28

-3.05E-04
1.87

1

.78

.33

.342

-.32

2

.29

.36

.987

-.93

1.50

3

1.51*

.34

.002

.36

2.65

4

1.40*

.33

.005

.27

2.52

6

.26

.36

.992

-.95

1.46

1

.52

.33

.781

-.59

1.63

2

3.03E-02

.37

1.000

-1.20

1.27

3

1.25*

.35

.026

8.54E-02

2.41

4

1.14*

.34

.050

3.05E-04

2.28

5

-.26

.36

.992

-1.46

.95

2

-.49

.33

.144

-1.15

.17

.73*

.31

.020

.12

1.34

3

2

Mean
Difference
(l-J)
-.49

4

.62*

.30

.042

2.31 E-02

1.22

5

-.78*

.33

.018

-1.42

-.13

6

-.52

.33

.118

-1.17

.13

1

.49

.33

.144

-.17

1.15

3

1.22"

.35

.001

.53

1.91

4

1.11"

.34

.001

.44

1.79

5

-.29

.36

.432

-1.00

.43

6

-3.03E-02

.37

.934

-.76

.69

1

-.73*

.31

.020

-1.34

-.12

2

-1.22*

.35

.001

-1.91

-.53

4

-.11

.32

.735

-.74

.52

5

-1.51*

.34

.000

-2.18

-.83

6

-1.25*

.35

.000

-1.93

-.57

1

-.62*

.30

.042

-1.22

-2.31 E-02

2

-1.11"

.34

.001

-1.79

-.44

3

.11

.32

.735

-.52

.74

5

-1.40"

.33

.000

-2.06

-.74

6

-1.14*

.34

.001

-1.81

-.47

1

.78*

.33

.018

.13

1.42

2

.29

.36

.432

-.43

1.00

3

1.51*

.34

.000

.83

2.18

4

1.40*

.33

.000

.74

2.06

6

.26

.36

.479

-.45

.96

1

.52

.33

.118

-.13

1.17

2

3.03E-02

.37

.934

-.69

.76

3

1.25*

.35

.000

.57

1.93

4

1.14*

.34

.001

.47

1.81

5

-.26

.36

.479

-.96

.45

1

6

-.52

.33

.363

-1.35

.31

2

6

-3.03E-02

.37

1.000

-.96

3

6

-1.25*

.35

.002

-2.12

.90
-.38

4

6

-1.14*

.34

.004

-2.00

-.29

.26

.36

.921

-.65

1.16

5

6

*• The m e a n difference is significant at the .05 level,
a. Dunnett t-tests treat one group as a control, and compare all other groups against it.
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Table 7.24a
A N O V A of Manipulation of Wording XI to X 2

ANOVA
AMOUNT1

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

S u m of
Squares
7.58E+08
7.63E+10

df

M e a n Square
757566294.6
941948832.0

1
81

7.71 E+10

F
.804

Sig.
.372

82

Result:
The result was F = 0.804, p =0.372, df =1
Decision:
Cannot reject the null hypothesis.

Group Statistics

AMOUNT1

PAP1
1
2

N
51
32

Mean
65980.39
72187.50

Std. Deviation
34293.14
23757.43

Std. Error
Mean
4802.00
4199.76

Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for
[quality of Variances

F
A M O U N T Equal variance
assumed
Equal variancf
not assumed

3.710

Sig.
.058

t-test for Equality of Means

t

df

9 5 % Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Mean
Std. Error
Upper
Sig. (2-tailed)Difference Difference Lower

-.897

81

.372 -6207.11

6921.38 9978.48 7564.27

-.973

80.129

.333 -6207.11

6379.43 8902.27 6488.06
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Table 7.25a
A N O V A of Manipulation of Wording Yl to Y2
ANOVA
AMOUNT1

Between Groups
Within Groups

S u m of
Squares
49764291
1.02E+11

Total

1.02E+11

df
1
84

Mean Square
49764290.67
1211713770

F
.041

Sig.
.840

85

Warnings
Post hoc tests are not performed for
A M O U N T 1 because there are fewer
than three groups.

Result:
The result was F = 0.041, p =0.840, df = 1
Decision:
Cannot reject the null hypothesis.

Group Statistics

AMOUNT1

PAP1
3

N

4

41

Mean
34634.15

45

33111.11

Std. Deviation
36680.89
33016.68

Std. Error
Mean
5728.59
4921.84

Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances

F
A M O U N T Equal variance
assumed
Equal variance
not assumed

.580

Sig.
.448

t-test for Equality of Means

t

Mean
Std. Error
Sig. (2-tailed)Difference Difference

df

9 5 % Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Lower
Upper

.203

84

.840

1523.04

7515.38 13422.13 16468.20

.202

80.816

.841

1523.04

7552.57 13504.72 16550.79
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Table 7.25b
Test for Significance X I vs X 2
Test Statistics
RISK1
675.500

DISAP1 IMPORT1
RESP1
733.500
715.500
788.500
Wilcoxon W
1203.500 1261.500 1243.500 2114.500
Z
-.864
-1.390
-1.055
-.271
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed
.164
.387
.291
.786
Mann-Whitney U

MINI1
775.000

SUNK1
803.000
1331.000
-.126
.900

1303.000
-.402
.688

SUC1
737.500
1265.500
-.751
.453

LIKE1
640.000
1966.000
-1.696
.090

a. Grouping Variable: PAP1

Table 7.25c
Test for Significance X I vs X 2 ~ continued
Test Statistics
Most Extreme
Differences

Absolute
Positive

Negative
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)

RISK1 DISAP1 MPORT1 RESP1
.184
.078
.173
.054
.000
.020
.054
.044
-.184
-.078
-.002
-.173
.818
.515

.345
1.000

.769
.595

MINI1
SUNK1
.184
.118
.184
.118
-.091
-.080
.818
.522
.515
.948

.239
1.000

LIKE1
.178

SUC1
.112
.024
-.112

.178
-.008
.788
.564

.495
.967

a-Grouping Variable: PAP1

Table 7.25d
Test for Significance Y l vs Y 2
Test Statistics'
Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)

RISK1
857.500

DISAP1
727.500

IMPORT1
771.000

RESP1
862.500

MINI1
764.500

SUNK1
840.000

SUC1
816.000

LIKE1
859.000

1718.500

1762.500
-1.831

1806.000
-1.427

1799.500
-1.398

1875.000
-.730

1851.000
-.939

.067

.154

1723.500
-.558
.577

.162

.466

.348

1720.000
-.562
.574

-.593
.553

a. Grouping Variable: PAP1
Table 7.25e
Test for Significance Y l vs Y 2 ~ continued
Test Statistics
Most Extreme
Differences

Absolute
Positive

RISK1 DISAP1 MPORT1 RESP1
.148
.149
.276
.118

MINI1
.136

SUNK1
.144

SUC1
.113

.086

.136

.144

.113

LIKE1
.137
.108

-.148

-.011

-.046

.000

-.137

.685

.630

.522

.635

.735

.822

.665
.768

.948

.815

.038

.276

-.118

-.040

Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z

.547

1.280

Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)

.926

.075

Negative

.149
.000
.690
.727

a-Grouping Variable: PAP1
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Table 7.27a
M A N O V A Testing of Framing Effect on Problem-space X I to X 2

Group Statistics

DISAP1

PAP1
1
3
1

IMPORT1

3
1

RISK1

3
RESP1
MINI1

1
3
1

SUNK1

3
1
3

SUC1

1

LIKE1

1

3
3

N

Mean
3.63
3.66
4.27
4.41

Std. Deviation
.94

51
41

4.25

.69
.62

51
41
51
41

3.73
3.63
4.92
3.73
4.78

51
41
51
41

51
41
51
41
51
41

4.37

3.66
4.61
4.37
3.51
2.78

1.02
.67
.81

Std. Error
Mean
.13
.16
9.32E-02
.13
9.64E-02
9.73E-02

.90
1.07
1.51
1.38
1.54
1.54

.13
.17
.21
.22
.22
.24

1.51
1.59

.21
.25

1.43
1.67

.20
.26
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Table 7.27b
M A N O V A Testing of Framing Effect on Problem-space XI to X 2
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for
iquality of Variance;

F
RISK1

Equal varianc*
assumed
Equal varianci
not assumed
DISAP1 Equal varianci
assumed
Equal varianci
not assumed
IMPORT Equal varianci
assumed

RESP1

MINI1

SUNK1

SUC1

LIKE1

Equal varianci
not assumed
Equal varianci
assumed
Equal varianci
not assumed
Equal variance
assumed
Equal variance
not assumed
Equal varianci
assumed
Equal varianci
not assumed
Equal variance
assumed
Equal varianci
not assumed
Equal varianci
assumed
Equal varianci
not assumed

.001

4.990

.172

1.287

.077

.295

.217

.950

Sig.
.976

.028

.680

.260

.782

.589

.643

.332

t-test for Equality of Means

t

9 5 % Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Mean
Std. Error
Sig. (2-tailed;Difference Difference Lower
Upper

df

-.152

90

.879 •3.11 E-02

.20

-.44

.37

-.151

82.582

.880 3.11 E-02

.21

-.44

.38

-.914

90

.363

-.14

.15

-.44

.16

-.895

77.335

.374

-.14

.16

-.45

.17

-.802

90

.425

-.11

.14

-.39

.16

-.810

88.703

.420

-.11

.14

-.38

.16

.446

90

.656 9.13E-02

.20

-.32

.50

.438

78.146

.663 9.13E-02

.21

-.32

.51

3.907

90

.000

1.19

.30

.58

1.79

3.945

88.468

.000

1.19

.30

.59

1.79

3.482

90

.001

1.13

.32

.48

1.77

3.481

85.742

.001

1.13

.32

.48

1.77

.745

90

.458

.24

.32

-.40

.89

.741

83.740

.461

.24

.33

-.41

.89

2.256

90

.026

.73

.32 S.71 E-02

1.37

2.219

79.308

.029

.73

.33 '.53E-02

1.38
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Table 7.28a
M A N O V A Testing of Framing Effect on Problem-space X 2 to Y 2

Group Statistics

RISK2
DISAP2
IMPORT2
RESP2
MINI2
SUNK2
SUCC2
LIKE2

PAP2
2
4
2
4
2
4
2
4
2
4
2
4
2
4
2
4

N
32
45
32
45
32
45
32
45
32
45
32
45
32
45
32
45

Mean
3.31
3.80
4.16
4.16
4.13
4.09
3.78
3.78
5.00
3.33
4.94
3.40
4.41
4.07
4.00
2.89

Std. Deviation
.78
1.01
.68
.74
.55
.85
.94
.79
.98
1.54
.91
1.27
1.39
1.50
1.30
1.53

Std. Error
Mean
.14
.15
.12
.11
9.79E-02
.13
.17
.12
.17
.23
.16
.19
.25
.22
.23
.23
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Table 7.28b
M A N O V A Testing of Framing Effect on Problem-space X 2 to Y 2
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances

F
RISK2

Equal variance;
assumed
Equal variance;
not assumed
DISAP2 Equal variance;
assumed
Equal variance;
not assumed
IMPORT2 Equal variance;
assumed
Equal variance;
not assumed
RESP2 Equal variance;
assumed
Equal variance;
not assumed
MINI2
Equal variance;
assumed
Equal variance;
not assumed
S U N K 2 Equal variance!
assumed
Equal variance;
not assumed
S U C C 2 Equal variance!
assumed
Equal variance;
not assumed
LIKE2
Equal variance;
assumed
Equal variance;
not assumed

2.224

.119

5.611

2.260

9.650

5.259

.000

1.299

Sig.
.140

.731

.020

.137

.003

.025

.992

.258

t-test for Equality of Means

t

Std. Error
Mean
Sig. (2-tailed)Difference Difference

df

9 5 % Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Lower
Upper

-2.281

75

.025

-.49

.21

-.91 6.17E-02

-2.383

74.477

.020

-.49

.20

-.90 7.99E-02

.004

75

.997

6.94E-04

.16

-.33

.33

.004

70.156

.997

6.94E-04

.16

-.32

.32

.211

75

.834

3.61 E-02

.17

-.31

.38

.226

74.541

.822

3.61 E-02

.16

-.28

.35

.017

75

.986

3.47E-03

.20

-.39

.40

.017

59.592

.986

3.47E-03

.20

-.41

.41

5.392

75

.000

1.67

.31

1.05

2.28

5.793

74.296

.000

1.67

.29

1.09

2.24

5.856

75

.000

1.54

.26

1.01

2.06

6.183

74.978

.000

1.54

.25

1.04

2.03

1.010

75

.316

.34

.34

-.33

1.01

1.023

69.869

.310

.34

.33

-.32

1.00

3.348

75

.001

1.11

.33

.45

1.77

3.443

72.579

.001

1.11

.32

.47

1.75
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Table 7.29a
Multiple Regression - Funding on all eight Problem-space Measures X I to X 2

Model Summary

Model

R
.831a

1

R Square
.691

Adjusted
R Square
.657

Std. Error of
the Estimate
17941.69

a- Predictors: (Constant), LIKE1, SUC1, IMPORT!,
RISK1, MINI1, DISAP1, RESP1, SUNK1

ANOVtf

Residual

S u m of
Squares
5.32E+10
2.38E+10

Total

7.71 E+10

Model

1

Regression

df

F

Mean Square
6654314871
321904090.8

8
74
82

20.672

Siq.
.000a

a- Predictors: (Constant), LIKE1, SUC1, IMPORT!, RISK1, MINI1, DISAP1, RESP1,
SUNK1
b- Dependent Variable: AMOUNT1

Coefficients?

Model
1

Unstandardized
Coefficients
Std. Error
B
(Constant) 20693.895 20295.376
2274.430
RISK1
-11278.7

Standardi
zed
Coefficien
ts
Beta

t

-.327

-4.959

4524.295

3512.755

.099

1.288

Sig.
.311
.000
.202

3590.867

.869

2696.066

-.012
-.037

-.166

RESP1

-596.257
-1233.674

.649

MINI1

1730.768

1962.884

.075

-.458
.882

SUNK1

3538.187

2078.018

.153

1.703

.381
.093

SUC1
LIKE1

543.532

1682.321

.026

.323

.748

12720.467

1678.101

.579

7.580

.000

DISAP1
IMPORT1

1.020

a- Dependent Variable: A M O U N T
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Table 7.30a
Multiple Regression - Funding o n all eight Problem-space Measures Y l to Y 2

Model Summary
Adjusted
R Square
.833

Std. Error of
the Estimate
.921'
1
14151.60
a. Predictors: (Constant), LIKE1, RISK1, I M P O R T , MINI1,
RESP1, SUC1, DISAP1, SUNK1

Model

R Square
.849

ANOWf
Model

1

Regression
Residual
Total

Sum of
Squares
8.64E+10

df

8
77
85

1.54E+10
1.02E+11

F

Mean Square
1.080E+10
200267810.9

53.936

Sig.
.000a

a. Predictors: (Constant), LIKE1, RISK1, I M P O R T , MINI1, RESP1, SUC1, DISAP1,
SUNK1
b. Dependent Variable: A M O U N T 1

Coefficients?
Standardi

zed

Model
1

Unstandardized

Coefficien

Coefficients
B
Std. Error
-61538.3 14276.920

ts

(Constant)
RISK1
-1462.385
DISAP1
1482.553
IMPORT1
4370.684
2448.389
RESP1
MINI1
2437.057
SUNK1
3992.397
SUC1
-931.068
LIKE1
16997.828

Beta

Sig.
.000

.033

.528

.378
.599

2535.340

.096

1.724

.089

2187.427

1.119

.266

1400.527

.066
.103

1.740

.086

1683.998

.162

1360.777

-.041

2.371
-.684

1401.221

.779

12.131

.020
.496
.000

1648.162
2808.597

-.043

t
-4.310
-.887

a- Dependent Variable: A M O U N T
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